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This fascinating book on imams in Western Europe is well timed to respond 
to the European discourse on Islam and Muslims, coming at a time of remark-
able developments in the imam as a concept, as a religious institution, and 
as an authority for the Muslims of Western Europe.
What are the origins of the concept of the ‘imam’, what lies behind it, and 
what are the historical antecedents that provide context for its current use? 
The present book provides pertinent answers to such questions; my short 
remarks here shall serve only to suggest the broadest possible framing of the 
many important themes, perspectives, and research on imams in Western 
Europe to be found within the following pages. By way of introduction to 
the multifaceted understandings and multiple usages of the concept of 
the imam, I trace three increasingly common and popular perspectives on 
the position of the imam. These are: f irst, the imam as the prayer leader; 
second, the imam as a religious authority; and, third, the imam – still almost 
exclusively a male role – as a kind of priest; the three perspectives lead to 
some of the complications and confusions that we are dealing with in the 
Western European context.
The imam as prayer leader
While the word ‘imam’ has its origins in the Quran – like many of the 
Islamic terms that have a social life and context in Western Europe – it 
did not originally have the technical sense that was later built into it. 
In the Quran, ‘imam’ means someone or something that is the moral 
model or guide for a community, which is held together by the shared 
ideal morality demonstrated by the imam. When leading his people into 
hellf ire, for example, the Pharaoh is described as an ‘imam’ (Quran 28:41). 
The book of Moses and the record of each person’s deeds are also described 
as ‘imams’, in that they are models, examples, or prescriptions of proper 
behaviour (Quran 46:12 and 36:12, respectively). Equally, Abraham (Quran 
2:124) is described as an example for all people, and therefore an ‘imam’. 
It is only later that the word ‘imam’ began to take on a variety of more 
specif ic meanings.
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Most commonly, ‘imam’ now refers to someone who leads the prayer. 
Strictly speaking, that person is only the imam while the prayer is being 
led; anyone who has the competence to lead the prayer and knows enough 
Quranic passages to do so is an imam. The idea that one has to be highly 
qualif ied to be an imam does not necessarily follow.
The concept began to be applied as an honorif ic title to someone who 
regularly leads the prayer in a community. More formally – and this came 
with the passage of time and growing institutionalization in the early 
centuries of the Islamic world – individuals were off icially appointed to 
the post of imam in larger mosques and provided with an income. In the 
biggest mosques in populous cities, the imam would be only one of several 
off icial posts attached to the mosque.
Then the term ‘imam’ began to be applied to the leader of the com-
munity. Initially, this was most common amongst the Shia current of 
Islam, and was applied to Ali and his descendants. This was true for both 
the Ismailis and the Twelvers, for whom a religious authority is appointed 
in the absence of a political authority – although in the Fatimid dynasty, 
the two aspects became united into the imam-caliph. In the modern 
period, Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran was often called ‘imam’ by some Shia 
factions, although he himself refused to claim that he was the returning 
twelfth imam.
Among the majority Sunnis, the term was applied to the khalīfa/amīr 
al-mu’minīn (‘commander of believers’) from very early on, and especially 
in medieval political theory. In the work of al-Mawardi the word used is 
‘imam’ rather than khalīfa (‘caliph’). It is also applied to the great religious 
scholars of the formative period, so there are imams of different madhāhib 
(‘schools of law and theology’), both Sunni and Shia.
With the passage of time, the role of the imam as a prayer leader was 
impacted by their official appointments, which linked imams to the political 
authority. Historically, an early sign of dissent against a political authority 
has been the refusal of the community to pray behind the off icially ap-
pointed imam. This often applies even today.
In the Western European context, local Islamic communities with or with-
out a f ixed mosque or prayer room have often made informal arrangements 
for someone to lead the prayer. It may be the same person on subsequent 
Fridays, but it may also be different ones. From the 1960s to the 1980s, it was 
left to the community itself to def ine what it meant by ‘religious leader’; 
immigration authorities would usually accept the community’s definition. 
The tightening of immigration rules in the 1980s and 1990s impacted the 
criteria of what constituted a religious leader.
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The imam as religious authority
The organized networks within the Islamic world and increasingly in Europe 
have tended to see the off ice of imam as the most effective access point to 
influence and organize European Muslim communities. The networks of 
the Turkish Diyanet especially, but also the Pakistani Jamaat-i-Islami and 
others, have organized their activities around trying to place members 
of their networks as imams in European communities. The local mosque 
communities often welcomed this, mostly because in the f irst generation 
they did not have the resources to give their imam an income or a place 
to live. There were instances in Britain, for example, where a small local 
community from a village in Kashmir would rent or purchase a property, 
set up a mosque, and bring in someone from their village who traditionally 
would have functioned as an imam. This person would be given a room in 
the same dwelling as the mosque. Because the imam would often speak 
little, if any, English, he would not be able to play a role in the leadership 
of the community other than leading the prayer and teaching basic prayer 
rituals and some Quranic texts to the children in the mosque’s school. 
Representing the mosque community to the wider society, media, or local 
government, would be taken care of by a community member, often a 
businessman, occasionally an academic or a professionally trained lawyer 
or doctor. The exception, of course, is the Diyanet with its often treaty-based 
dispatch of community-leader imams to Turkish immigrant communities 
in the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
the United Kingdom.
It is worth noting that in the European and more generally Western 
environment a whole new institution with no precedent in the historical 
Muslim world appeared, namely the generic Islamic Cultural Centre. This 
organization usually has at least a director and often has more than one 
full-time person. The director of the Cultural Centre also becomes known as 
an imam, and the centres enjoy signif icant f inancial and political sponsor-
ship, sometimes from the countries of origin, but just as often from other 
affluent Muslim countries.
The imam as priest
The concept of the imam as a kind of priest comes from the confluence 
of the imam’s role of representing a tradition of religious authority and 
the European concept of priesthood – whether Catholic or Protestant. In 
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the early phases of the establishment of Muslim communities in Western 
Europe, local Muslim communities were often placed in a diff icult situation 
when local governments or churches wanted to enter into some form of 
dialogue with them. Through its priest, the local church would contact the 
equivalent peer in the Muslim community – most often a poorly trained, 
uneducated imam who could not speak the local language, and who was 
therefore unable to meet the church’s expectations of interreligious dialogue. 
More precarious was when the local government wanted to engage with the 
Muslim community for reasons of social welfare, education, or integration 
policy, and found that the person they thought they were going to be talking 
to was – to put it frankly – absolutely useless. These imams were uneducated 
and unprepared for this new role. It was not a role that they had expected; in 
fact, nobody had expected it. Even if an imam had some learning, language 
problems remained. For instance, in Germany in the 1980s one of the big 
problems was that, although the imams the Diyanet were sending had 
theology degrees, they did not speak German. This produced an extended 
period of German converts to Islam playing a key role in communication 
with the authorities and other communities. In Britain, imams never played 
this role because they always stayed among the South Asian immigrants, 
while there was always someone else who could speak English and act on 
behalf of the community. This is why converts in Britain were seriously 
marginalized for a very long time.
In fact, there is a precedent for this role – a precedent that many Muslims 
for political reasons do not particularly like to face, even when they know 
about it: namely, the rabbi. In Judaism, the rabbi is traditionally a learned 
individual. He is a scholar, much more akin to a mufti, certainly, than to 
a prayer leader. But the rabbi has come to be treated as analogous to the 
Catholic priest or Protestant minister.
With the passage of time, the growth of Muslim communities, and the 
increased importance of integration, there is a growing need for commu-
nication with the administrative and social environment. This in turn has 
fostered a process of ‘ecclesiastif ication:’ professionalization modelled 
on Christian theological leadership. Such a process requires competent 
personnel, not only in terms of Islamic theology and law, but also with 
extensive skills in and knowledge of European law, politics, education, 
and communication – competencies that are commonly shared by priests 
and pastors. Hypothetically, to train new imams, then, one might as well 
send trainees to a Protestant or Catholic faculty, and focus on all that the 
religions share – law, pastoral theology, and so on – while replacing the 
Catholic or the Protestant theology with Islamic theology and religious 
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teachings. These shared skills include the ability to deal with all the new 
expectations of the community, the Muslim intellectuals both at home 
and abroad, and state institutions at the local and national level, not to 
mention the media and politicians – including populists, with their often 
vocal attitudes towards imams and Muslim leadership. This competence 
also extends to all of the new skills, tools, and modes of communication 
that the twenty-f irst century demands of imams.
This book rises to the occasion to dig beneath the simplistic surface and 
identif ies the variety of imams’ roles in Western Europe and their implica-
tions for authority, training, and – possibly – developmental priorities.





1 Imams in Western Europe
Developments, transformations, and institutional 
challenges
Mohammed Hashas, Jan Jaap de Ruiter, Niels Valdemar 
Vinding, and Khalid Hajji
Hashas, Mohammed, Jan Jaap de Ruiter, and Niels Valdemar Vinding 
(eds), Imams in Western Europe: Developments, Transformations, and 
Institutional Challenges. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018
doi: 10.5117/9789462983830/ch01
1 Imams in Western Europe
The study of imams, the off ice of the imamate, and Islamic religious author-
ity is not new, but has an intricate history within the disciplinary confines 
of Islamic studies. With the advent of what may be called ‘European Islamic 
thought’ and ‘European Islamic studies,’ the role of imams as agents of 
religious authority and leadership raises new questions in theology, sociology, 
anthropology, political science, law, migration studies, and religious and 
interreligious studies.
This book presents an omnibus academic inquiry into contemporary 
Islamic religious authority with a focus on imams and the imamate – on 
which, until now, not much has been written in English. Our ambition is 
to contribute deeper and more fruitful analyses of the changes and chal-
lenges experienced by this source of religious authority in the context of the 
secular-liberal societies of Western Europe since the Second World War and 
the subsequent migration and refugee flows. At the same time, this research 
also serves to highlight secular-liberal institutions and their adaptation, or 
lack thereof, to the multiculturalism that characterizes Western European 
states. The social facts of globalization, transnational migration, and various 
interpretations of secularism have challenged the visibility of religion in the 
public sphere in Western societies. This has most importantly and urgently 
required religious authorities to revisit their organization, governance, 
and internal hierarchy, and Islamic religious authority is no exception. 
Throughout the Muslim-majority countries and in Europe, Islamic religious 
authority is still struggling to negotiate its place among the institutions of 
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the modern state in the ‘secular age’ in the words of Charles Taylor (2007). 
The imamate is one of the institutions that are currently experiencing a 
shift of roles and functions in society. Scholars and historians of religion 
in particular are attentive to this shift.
2 Nomenclature
In the English edition of Hans Wehr’s A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic 
(1961), the def inition of imām is a prayer leader, leader, or master, with the 
plural a’imma. In its original meaning, the word implies leadership, control, 
governance, and authority in different aspects of political, spiritual, and 
theological affairs. According to Hanna Kassis’s A Concordance of the Qur’an 
(1983), the word imām appears twelve times in the Quran, in singular or 
plural form, with a number of different meanings such as model, example, 
leader, and guide. Both Abraham and the Book of Moses are described as 
‘imam,’ meaning examples or models to be followed. Closely associated 
with ‘imam’ and drawn from the same root is the word imāma, meaning the 
function or off ice of the prayer leader, a position of leadership in a small or 
big group, a mosque, or a community. This is the collective term that denotes 
the wider Islamic institution of the imam, independent of individual imams. 
It is neither meant as an occupation or as a rank; rather, it is an off ice and 
a function to fulf il. Other terms that share the same root are umm, which 
means mother, but also source, origin, and foundation, and umma, which 
means the nation, people, or community.
With the many specif ic historical applications of the word ‘imam’ come 
a variety of understandings that require unpacking. Most plainly, the imam 
is the prayer leader in a mosque, or simply the Muslim worshiper who leads 
the recitation of prayer when two or more worshipers are present. He is the 
example to follow in the bowing down and prostrations of the prayer. In early 
Islam, ‘imam’ was used to denote the highest off ice of the Muslims, who in 
legal and political terms was the lawful temporal leader of the community 
of believers in the times of the Rightly Guided Caliphs. After the death of 
the prophet Muhammad in 632, the question of imāma, legitimate religious 
and political leadership and legitimate authority in Islam, became central. 
According to Sunni sources, Muhammad had not given directions about 
the appointment of his successor – and paradoxically, for this very f irst of 
urgent issues there was little help to f ind in either the Quran or the sunna, 
the words and deeds of the prophet. This demonstrates the struggle of the 
community of believers to deal with the realities of power after the end of 
iMaMs in WesteRn euRope 21
the direct divine guidance delivered through revelation and in the practice 
of their prophet.
After the wars of succession and the establishment of the hereditary 
Umayyad dynasty, the word imam began to acquire a specif ic meaning 
for the Shia. For them, an imam is he who is recognized as the legitimate, 
faithful leader of the Muslim community by claiming direct descent from 
Muhammad. Amongst the Twelver Shia, such twelve descendants of Muham-
mad are regarded as divinely appointed spiritual and temporal leaders. In 
its later, mainly Sunni, application, and in a more abstract sense focusing 
on leadership through knowledge and merit, the word ‘imam’ also came to 
mean an exemplarily authoritative scholar, specif ically one of the founders 
of the four madhhabs (‘schools of law and theology’).
Very much a developing word and concept, the imams discussed in this 
book are prayers leaders, community leaders, and religious professionals 
in the present Western European context. As such, while the authors of 
this book take great care to be specif ic in describing their object of study 
in each chapter, the word ‘imam’ has taken on a shorthand meaning in 
contemporary parlance. In much of the current literature, the ‘imam’ is an 
Islamic religious professional who holds the responsibility for a variety of 
religious, social, and communal functions among Muslims. This book is 
concerned with the f igure of the imam – mostly male, but also female, such 
as murshidas (‘female guides’) – and the functions that revolve around his or 
her work: being a preacher, chaplain, teacher, community organizer, mosque 
spokesman, chairman, director, and organization representative. Imams 
sometimes perform all of these functions themselves, or they are performed 
in collaboration with others in the community and society at large.
3 Vested interests in imams in Western Europe: Current status
Socio-anthropological and security studies of Islam and Muslims in Western 
Europe after World War II hardly focus on religious authority, let alone 
imams per se. Political Islam, transnational Islamic movements, and radical 
Muslims have been central to the study of Islam and Muslims in European 
scholarship until recently. Studying religious authority, let alone thinking 
of training programmes for imams and community leaders, has been out 
of sight for decades. The Grand Mosque of Paris initiative in the mid-1990s 
might be considered the f irst one aimed at training imams, but it did not 
win support and attention from state or non-state actors until the mid-
2000s, after the terrorist events of 11 September 2001 in the United States. 
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Western Europe, most of which bound together by the institutions of the 
European Union, has not, and apparently will not, develop shared policies on 
religious affairs on Islam in particular, since each member state has its own 
particular relationship with religion. Strategic reports solicited or prepared 
by institutions of the European Union on the topic of Islamic religious 
leadership are scarce, to the extent that the f irst report on the topic was 
prepared by a body not of the European Union (King Baudouin Foundation, 
2007). One example of a report on this topic that was co-f inanced by an 
institution of the European Union is Education and Training of Islamic Faith 
Leaders in Europe: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in France and 
Germany, prepared by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue and co-f inanced 
by the Commission DG Home Affairs of the European Union (Hussain and 
Tuck, 2010).
Earlier scholarship on Islam and Muslims in Western Europe did not take 
the authority and roles of imams as a central topic of research, with the 
exception of the work of Franck Frégosi (1998) on France. Examples include 
the works of Felice Dassetto (1996), Jytte Klausen (2005), Jørgen Nielsen (1999), 
Tariq Ramadan (1999), and Wasif Shadid and Pieter Van Koningsveld (2002), 
to name but a few. Belonging, integration of second-generation immigrants, 
citizenship, loyalty, secularization, modernity, and representative bodies 
of Islam were the major topics that mostly consumed scholarly attention 
until 2001.
As post-World War II immigrants and their descendants are becoming 
citizens of Europe, and the debate about Islam in Europe is emerging as 
a debate about European Islam, the question is taking a different turn. 
It is the localization of the religious leaders of these Muslim citizens and 
residents that appears to be of paramount importance, and rightly so. 
Scholarship has turned toward examination of this theme to some extent; 
three recent works, by Willem B. Drees and Pieter Sjoerd van Koningsveld 
(2008), Juan Ferreiro Galguera (2011), and Ednan Aslan and Zsofia Windisch 
(2012), have begun to shed light on the topic. The f irst (Drees and van 
Koningsveld) mostly concerns religious freedom, and briefly gives space 
to the topic of imams in countries like the Netherlands and Italy. The 
third (Aslan and Windisch) mostly focuses on central Europe and the 
long experience of the Balkan countries, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
with forming and training teachers and imams for the European context. 
It is the second (Galguera) that appears to be the f irst comprehensive, 
descriptive text in English that tries to map the major imam-training 
centres in 27 countries of the European Union. Galguera shows how few 
of these centres are actually available, how scarce their funds and local 
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training faculty are, and how states and stakeholders are working more 
and more to develop them. Still, the study requires follow up to see how 
many of the institutes that were in the planning stage during the time 
of data collection have found their ways to realization, what they are 
teaching to the new imams of Europe, and what the best practices, their 
strong points, and their challenges are.
It is important to state the obvious: many have vested interests in the 
future of Islam in Western Europe, and therefore also in the imams and 
Islamic leadership that are experiencing change and innovation, as Felice 
Dassetto, Silvio Ferrari, and Brigitte Maréchal (2007) inform us in their 
report Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future. Overall, 
these interests can be divided into internal and external ones.
On the internal level, it is Muslims and congregations in mosques that are 
looking to imams for direction and leadership – both literally, during prayer, 
and in the more comprehensive sense of navigating life and circumstances 
in Europe. Mosques, their directors and boards, and the networks and 
organizations working on Muslim issues in Europe, are all concerned with 
the religious and social maintenance of the community. They employ imams 
for the primary function of leading the prayer, giving the Friday khuṭba 
(‘sermon’), and guiding and counselling the community in the event of 
marriages, divorces, births, funerals, and the like.
Externally, at least three levels of interest or concern can be listed. First, 
public institutions are trying to accommodate the needs of Muslim citizens, 
including their spiritual needs. A number of public and private institu-
tions, such as hospitals, prisons, the armed forces, and universities, are 
employing imams as chaplains to offer a service to Muslims commensurate 
with what other religious communities receive. With this service comes 
a long list of demands and requirements in terms of training, security, 
and professionalization.
Second, at a discursive level, many politicians, opinion-makers, and 
leading media outlets across Europe are concerned with the public and 
communal positions of imams and the impact these are assumed to have 
not only on Muslims but also on a long list of public concerns. This appears 
to be a shared concern across Europe – Western Europe in particular – and 
there is a dire need to train home-grown imams or imams that know the 
European context and its values and needs.
Third, outside Europe, a number of international actors, institutions, 
movements, governments, and ministries follow the case of imams in 
Europe and intervene in their affairs. These actors are either invited by 
the community to contribute to their religious life through education, 
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personnel, and funds, or are invited through bilateral agreements between 
states. Such agreements are few and have often come too late to answer the 
needs of the community, especially as various Western European Muslim 
denominations do not receive state funds nor receive recognition for the 
training offered by their schools and seminaries, which is one of the main 
reasons why the issue of imam training and recruitment is problematic.
This leads to the next point, which can be described as an intertwining 
space of concern for both internal and external stakeholders. In many ways, 
the question of Islam and imams in Europe speaks to the current status of 
secularism and the relationship between religion and the state. Normative 
claims have repeatedly been made that modern liberal democracies are 
characterized by the separation between church and state. Just as often, 
such claims have been challenged: each Western European state has its own 
version of secularism, and often has a ‘preferred’ or ‘historical religion’ that 
benefits from state institutions more than others, whether minimally, as 
in the case of the very laïc (‘secular’) France, or maximally, as in the cases 
of Spain and Italy. Borrowing the words of Jocelyne Cesari (2013), there is 
a clear ‘externalization’ of Islam from the European context and culture, 
which impacts its institutional integration.
Focusing on imams sheds light on the state’s relationship with national 
Muslim bodies, its wish to relate to one single Muslim body (and/or the 
failure of these), its control over the building of mosques and Islamic centres, 
the security issues related to terrorism that urge the state to interfere in 
Islamic affairs, and lastly, the overall role of the imam in the European 
context. The state sees in the imam more than a simple prayer leader; he 
is perhaps incorrectly seen as a Muslim equivalent of a rabbi or priest. 
It is assumed that imams are leaders and representatives of their com-
munities, and that states and governments can address them to f ix social 
issues and grievances. Especially since the tragic events of 11 September 
2001, the interest in opening training programmes for imams, religious 
leaders, and activists has grown, though still dominantly from a security 
approach – which, however, does not always lead to the desired fruits that 
engaged religious f igures will solve issues related to religious discourse in 
the public sphere, deradicalization of the youth, and Muslims’ integration 
into society. Too much is expected of the imam at a time when the mosques 
and institutions where he functions lack a faculty of experts that enjoy 
legitimacy from both Muslim trainees and their community, institutional 
visibility, and f inancial support. There is clear institutional ignorance and 
negligence of the f ield and its importance for quite a number of believing 
citizens in society.
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This book seeks to explore the role, function, and position of imams and 
the implications of the imamate as a religious-institutional authority in 
Western Europe. The f irst part intends to be more theoretical, with a focus 
on themes related to religious authority, theology, and their manifestation 
in the modern context of Western Europe. The second part mostly consists 
of country-specif ic case studies based on f ieldwork. The two parts are 
complementary, though at times they might intertwine.
4 The parts and their contributions: Part I
In the f irst chapter of the f irst part, Jasser Auda revisits the concept of the 
Land of Islam and the criteria that make a land, Europe in this case, open to 
be interpreted as a Land of Islam. Based on reading the definitions offered 
by classical and modern Islamic political theology, Auda proposes that 
security, justice, and the freedom to practice Islamic basic rituals do give 
an Islamic aspect to lands that are not dominantly Islamic in demography 
or governance: lands where justice, security, and freedom of worship prevail 
are Islamic lands, irrespective of the (lack of) religiosity of their lawmak-
ers and governors, which certain interpretations of the Islamic tradition 
prioritize. Through this reading, Auda proposes that European Muslims, 
including their imams, should move from an ‘integration’ to a ‘contribution’ 
approach toward Europe.
This contribution of Islam to Europe is further raised by Thijl Sunier, who 
underlines the crucial but neglected role of ordinary Muslims in the making 
of religious authority and leadership. Sunier argues that the sources of Islamic 
religious authority are more diverse and unstable than ever before. The 
Islamic landscape is complex; multi-socio-political, economic, and media 
factors play a big role in forming such complexity. The multiplication of 
religious audiences and their followers has opened a market of competition 
among both old and new generations of leaders, each trying to use and f ind 
a place in the media world that broadcasts their performance and rhetoric 
widely. The new media has especially become a challenge to traditional 
religious authority. Modern schools that use up-to-date technology to dis-
seminate a plural and reformulated religious discourse and interpretation 
of religious norms are challenging the old centres of learning in special 
Islamic centres. The same norms are being lived and practiced differently 
by different generations or by the same generation in different locations, be 
they marginal or central. Ordinary Muslims play a major role in this process, 
which consequently shifts religious authority from classical leaders to new 
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stakeholders, according to Sunier. Such a multiplicity of interpretations of 
religious norms worries the nation states that are trying to domesticate 
Islam and Muslims’ behaviour in the public sphere – an endeavour that 
endangers the neutrality that a secular state should uphold.
Away from both the externalization of Muslims and Islam in Europe and 
the negligence that ordinary Muslims and emerging religious authorities 
face, Jonathan Laurence brings in the Roman Catholic question in America in 
the nineteenth century to argue that Muslims in Europe are experiencing a 
similar historical moment of adjustment to a new context through implanta-
tion, institutionalization, and professionalization. American Catholics 
in the early nineteenth century lacked churches, dioceses, professional 
priests, and colleges; to meet the needs of the ever growing Catholic com-
munities in the mid-nineteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church had 
to create an ‘American College’ in Rome to train proper Catholic priests, 
and similar colleges were created elsewhere in Europe to cater to the need 
for professionalization and houses of worship. Laurence provides some 
comparative statistics to show that Muslims are not lagging when compared 
with the example of American Catholics. Like them, Muslims in Europe 
lack professionalism, places of worship, and colleges – but these have been 
increasing for the last couple of decades. This increase is especially caused 
by continuing contact with Muslims’ countries of origin and influential 
capitals like Rabat, Algiers, Ankara, and others. Laurence argues that the 
power of the countries of origin over their diasporas will change with 
time, and is already changing; what will remain is what he calls ‘spiritual 
fatherhood’ or ‘spiritual leadership’, through which the capitals that train 
the imams and religious leaders for Europe will maintain a link with their 
diaspora. Laurence says that this should not be read as a political defeat of 
the countries of origin, but rather a mere transfer of power to the Muslims 
who are trying to implant themselves into their new soil, Europe. This 
leads to the formation of local Islams: French Islam, German Islam, British 
Islam, and so on.
The localization of religious authority is further probed by Mohammed 
Hashas, who argues that the imamate, as a new field of study and policy focus 
for Islamic scholarship and modern nation-state institutions, is becoming 
a nationalized and dependent religious authority under the surveillance 
of state institutions, unlike the past independence of local communities 
in choosing their own imams. Hashas gives the example of the role of the 
imam as stipulated by the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs in 
Morocco: a role that lists duties and obligations that make the imam subject 
to state institutions and focalizes the discourse of Islamic ethics rather 
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than political issues, which imams are not allowed to deal with. Hashas 
also gives the example of imams in France as another instance in which 
the nationalization of this religious function is underlined by state surveil-
lance, in which the religious power the imam holds is of an ethical-spiritual 
dimension. These examples illustrate that this religious function that has 
gained prominence and attention in recent years has been nationalized, 
institutionalized, and rendered dependent, with a clearly def ined role of 
ethical (i.e., non-political) teaching.
The chapter by Farid El Asri also deals with the question of religious 
authority and its multiplication among Muslims in Europe. El Asri empha-
sizes the dynamics of a once-silenced Muslim presence, and the growth of 
various bodies that complement and at times strongly compete with each 
other as representatives of a pluralist community. He focalizes the growth 
of engaged young generations of Muslims and their attempts to organize 
their communities through acculturation, integration, and cohabitation 
through various interpretations of religious norms. El Asri also discusses his 
view of the development of training programmes for imams and religious 
leaders, and the challenges facing them.
Still related to the question of imams’ training, but from a Swedish 
perspective, Göran Larsson highlights the complexity and diff iculty of 
teaching Islamic theology in secular Western universities. First, he reviews 
the differences between religious and theological studies, presenting ‘aca-
demic theology’ as the convenient approach/discipline that studies religion, 
and theology in particular, critically and not apologetically, irrespective 
of the differences among religions. Afterwards, he dwells on the initiative 
of the Swedish Ministry of Education in 2009, which was followed up in 
2014, to offer a training programme for imams in state universities. In the 
questionnaire that circulated widely among Muslim representative councils, 
associations, and religious leaders, the informants showed interest in a 
training programme for subjects that deal with language, society, and other 
topics, but not for pursuing Islamic theology studies in secular universities. 
Larsson argues that Muslims who are interested in such training leave out 
theology because they do not consider a secular university (with faculty 
who are probably not Muslim) to be an able or legitimate source of learning 
about Islamic theology, particularly subjects concerning the creed. These 
Muslims often obtain training elsewhere in the Islamic world. Moreover, 
Larsson also illustrates how diff icult it is for the teaching faculty in Western 
secular societies to provide such training for very diverse Muslims belong-
ing to different madhhabs and different models of imam training in their 
countries of origin.
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The contribution of Solenne Jouanneau provides a typology of French 
imams according to their presence in the country since World War I, the 
various paths of their institutionalization, and the challenges they have 
faced during this process. Her chapter is a synthesis of six years of f ieldwork 
on imams in France, during which she interviewed about thirty imams and 
about f ifteen senior civil servants from the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as accessing state archives. 
Jouanneau also examines the French Law of 1905 and how state institutions 
tend to transgress it with regard to Islamic issues, such as imam selection. 
She outlines different ways the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs have been intervening in the selection of imams since the 
1990s: using diplomatic relations and the consular networks of the sending 
countries to select ‘consular imams’; using the residence permit cards that 
imams apply for in monitoring their good conduct as only ‘good imams’ can 
secure residence cards; and monitor the imam-training programmes, their 
content of good practices, and their ‘legitimate beliefs.’ Jouanneau critiques 
this interference and argues that it actually backfires, because imams and 
programmes that are controlled by the state risk losing legitimacy and 
authority among Muslims.
In the Netherlands, Welmoet Boender and Jan Jaap de Ruiter propose a 
different reading of the function of the imam in the public sphere, away 
from the traditional and limited space of the mosque. They consider the 
engagement of Yassin Elforkani – the ‘imam of the young’, as he describes 
himself – to be that of an organic public intellectual. Integrating religion 
into the definition of the public intellectual, they show how this imam uses 
different arguments (theological and non-theological) to challenge both 
the sceptical part of Dutch society and its religious Salaf i counterparts 
in order to position himself and others that share his ideas in the heart of 
intense public debates.
Claudia Carvalho takes us into the digital world to examine how religious 
authority is both practiced and challenged. The Internet has opened a new 
space for the agency of Muslim women and youths, who have not found 
themselves or their ideas in traditional spaces of worship (mosques) or 
represented by traditional forms of religious authority, including imams. 
The privatization and individualization of religious knowledge is manifest in 
their online discussions. Based on online f ieldwork tracing the discussions 
of 50 Muslim women of Moroccan origin or converts in Catalonia, Spain, 
in 2013-2014, Carvalho describes these ‘potential jihadists’ and their praise 
of the Islamic State, their dreams of joining it, and their use of classical 
concepts like hijra (‘migration’) and da’wa (‘proselytizing’) to recruit jihadists 
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online. Carvalho ends her chapter by referring to a female religious scholar’s 
argument that this individualized digital jihadism is not representative of 
the community or of Islamic scholarship.
Continuing with the study of female religious authority in a country 
that is present in Europe through both its diaspora and its programmes of 
training imams, Sara Borrillo presents the gender-based reform of Morocco’s 
Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs in 2004, which institutional-
ized women’s participation in off icial Islamic bureaucracy and knowledge 
production. The reform introduced murshidāt (‘female religious preachers’) 
and ‘ālimāt (‘female religious scholars’) into the Islamic public discourse and 
authority structure. Borrillo reads this reform as a form of empowerment 
of women in the public space, but in which they remain under the tutelage 
of male authority and the state apparatus. She also analyses it from Islamic 
feminist perspectives as a form of women’s agency and subjectivity. Unlike in 
secular-liberal societies, where gender equality in institutions is the norm, in 
Morocco female agency is still looked at from ‘complementarity’ of genders 
perspective. For this reason, the Moroccan state was able to intervene and 
provide a space for women in the public sphere and public institutions. In 
Europe, the empowerment of Muslim women takes a different path because 
the state cannot intervene in religious affairs to offer Muslim women a 
special space in their community.
5 The parts and their contributions: Part II
The second part is concerned with the institutionalization of Islam in 
Western Europe as seen through the role of imams. These processes are 
directed both by the Muslims themselves and by the states they settle in. 
This part contains ten chapters of case studies on imams: their day-to-day 
life, education, and institutional challenges and aspirations. The cases are 
located in the following countries: the United Kingdom (Mansur Ali and 
Alyaa Ebbiary), France (Cédric Baylocq and Romain Sèze), Spain (Juan 
Ferreiro Galguera), Finland (Tuomas Martikainen and Riitta Latvio), Sweden 
(Göran Larsson), the Netherlands (Welmoet Boender and Jan Jaap de Ruiter), 
and Italy (Francesco Alicino, Yahya Pallavicini, and Khalid Rhazzali). Niels 
Valdemar Vinding opens the second part with a chapter on the typology of 
imams in Europe, based on his f ieldwork.
While there are aspects that all of the examined countries share, it is 
diff icult to propose a scheme that can place all of these case studies into 
a single clear framework – an idea to which we return in the concluding 
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remarks of this introduction. There is the question of the success or failure 
of national representative Muslim organizations in the concerned countries; 
the relationship between the government and any national Muslim bodies 
that was ultimately formed; the state’s desire to deal with a single Muslim 
body (and the failure of these); the control over the building of mosques 
and Islamic centres; the role of imams, not only as bearers of religious 
authority but also as intermediates between civil authorities and Muslim 
communities; security issues related to terrorism that urge the state to 
interfere in Islamic affairs; the desire of parts of Muslim communities to 
establish good relationships with the state; the lack of f inancial support for 
imams (i.e. salaries) and their education; the competition of various external 
bodies to import imams; the fear of being accused of dismissive attitudes 
in society; the desire to establish imam-training programmes and Islamic 
studies programmes in universities; and other related issues.
The second part opens with an exploratory analysis of the institutional 
and epistemic authority of imams, which Vinding develops into a typol-
ogy. He focuses on the two expressions of religious authority in Islam, and 
argues for their centrality to the legitimacy of imams and their work. His 
proposed typology can be understood as an expression of the interrelations 
embodied by imams during their movement within the diverse institutional 
frameworks of both Western and Islamic knowledge.
The study of the French and Italian contexts takes up a good amount 
of space in this book, which shows how the imamate can be approached 
differently in the same geographical-institutional-and-political context. 
Jouanneau’s chapter in the first part focalizes the question of the relationship 
between churches/mosques and the state, ending with a critique of state 
intervention in the internal dynamics of the Islamic ‘cult’, particularly by 
choosing imams. In this part, Sèze, whose conclusions are based on fieldwork 
conducted between 2006 and 2012, describes the internal dynamics of the 
imamate as a function in quite a secular context; he argues that imams 
tend to take up a leadership role in their communities, as well as acting as 
markers of Muslim identity. In their public discourse, imams critique both 
the state laws that limit Muslim religious freedom and visibility and the 
‘excessive’ visibility of some Muslims, in the words of the author. To gain 
societal recognition, imams exhort their co-religionists to be active and 
engaged citizens. Baylocq explores more of the details of this French debate 
by examining the role of the theologian-imam Tareq Oubrou. He presents 
Oubrou’s intellectual trajectory and his key theological concepts, like ‘sharia 
of minority’, his overall contribution to the institutionalization of Islam in 
France, and his founding role in the birth of a French Islam.
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Ali and Ebbiary each consider a specif ic case of an imam-training pro-
gramme in the United Kingdom, highlighting the programmes’ shortcom-
ings and achievements. Ali starts his chapter by describing the important 
training most functioning imams in the United Kingdom take from the 
widespread South Asian schools of Darul Uloom, including their Dars-i 
Nizami curriculum. Ali focalizes the work of chaplaincy and proposes it as 
a model for imamship (i.e. the imamate): he sees that imams have to learn a 
number of professional skills, most importantly how to ‘talk with’ believers 
in a tolerant mode, instead of ‘talking to’ or only preaching to them in the 
traditional sense. Ali calls ‘immanent spirituality’ a value, which imams 
are advised to adopt and make apparent in their work.
Ebbiary deals with the shortcomings of the Darul Uloom seminaries in 
the United Kingdom and the critiques they receive, and then examines the 
establishment and vision of the Cambridge Muslim College (CMC), founded 
in 2011. Cambridge Muslim College is presented as a project to train more 
advanced, highly educated imams and religious leaders – the hub that gathers 
and trains the ‘best’ graduates from the Darul Ulooms. In Ebbiary’s words, 
Cambridge Muslim College was ‘established to provide a higher education 
experience for the graduates of the traditional Indian-style Darul Ulooms 
in the United Kingdom […] with a curriculum emphasizing citizenship, 
political and cultural awareness, interfaith understanding, community 
building, counseling, and other pastoral skills.’
This part also considers the southern part of Europe, which is especially 
important due to its large number of Muslims. Until very recently, hardly any 
Muslims lived in Spain, but due to growing immigration since the 1970s the 
kingdom now has a sizable Muslim population. While the country was the 
cradle of the Moorish presence for eight centuries, during the ‘Reconquista’ 
in 1492 most Muslims left or fled the country, or converted (in)voluntarily to 
Christianity. Ferreiro Galguera considers the presence of Muslims in Spain in 
the context of Spanish legislation since 1975, especially since the Cooperation 
Agreement of 1992, which recognizes certif icates of theology studies from 
theology centres at universities. Ferreiro Galguera describes the efforts of 
Muslim communities to obtain recognition under this law. He recounts that 
while there used to be Islamic studies courses offered by two universities and 
two courses organized by two Islamic organizations, now there is only one 
solid imam-training programme in the country, organized by the Spanish 
Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI) in cooperation with the 
Islamic University of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Ferreiro Galguera says 
that Muslim institutionalization in Spain still has a long way to go. He calls for 
the establishment of a ‘European Institute’ or ‘University of Islamic Studies’, 
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like Al-Azhar in Cairo, which would work in close collaboration with Islamic 
authorities in Muslim countries to develop legitimate training for Islamic 
religious authorities in Europe, as well as for interreligious dialogue.
Italy is well represented in this publication, with chapters from Alicino, 
Rhazzali, and Pallavicini. Alicino describes the complexity of the institu-
tionalization of Islam in a country that has a special legal relationship with 
the Catholic Church, whose headquarters are in the Italian capital, Rome. 
Alicino describes Italy’s relationship between church and state as ‘limited 
secularism’. The absence of the recognition of Islam as a religion in Italy 
leads to the ongoing disorganized structure of its Muslim communities, 
characterized by growing initiatives for mosque-building and the setting up 
of imam-training programmes, despite the lack of institutional recognition, 
training cadres, and f inancial support.
Rhazzali puts the Italian imams into context. After presenting a map of 
imam types in Europe, he localizes their situation and types for the Italian 
context, furthering this typology with a map of the mosques in Italy to 
illustrate the geographical distribution of Islamic religious authority in 
the country. For Rhazzali, Muslim communities’ search for an identity in 
Italy consists of claiming ‘Italianicity’ from an autonomous perspective.
Pallavicini is a practicing imam and the chairman of Comunità Religiosa 
Islamica Italiana, the Italian Islamic Religious Community (CO.RE.IS); his 
contribution gives the reader an inside view of the institutionalization of 
Islam in Italy, which is quite burdensome and slow. Echoing Rhazzali’s 
argument, he states that ‘imported imams, or those either appointed by 
international Islamic organizations from abroad or religious institutions 
of foreign governments, represent in the eyes of CO.RE.IS an obstacle for 
the active participation of the faithful and the ministers of the faith in the 
country’s activities’; imported imams ‘are […] conditioned by a vision that 
is not fully compatible with how Italian Islam should look like’. This is why 
CO.RE.IS has been involved in training home-grown imams since 1995.
Finland is another country with a recent history of Muslim migration – 
although it has historically been home to the Islamic Tatars, whose religious 
affairs were taken care of by earlier legislation. The new migrants posed new 
questions, including how to set up imam-training programmes. The chapter 
by Martikainen and Latvio gives lucid insight into the efforts of the Finnish 
government and the feedback of the Muslim community, particularly its 
leaders and imams. At the moment, the issue is still undecided; both the 
government and the Muslim communities are still discussing the possible 
solutions, and new initiatives have been taken to further the processes 
of negotiation.
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6 The imamate: challenges and future prospects
These two parts aim to contribute to the emerging f ield of imams as agents 
of religious authority, who develop new forms of understanding the imamate 
in relation to national institutions that are either already in place or in 
development. Taken as a whole, three major points can be retained from 
these studies. First, there are signif icant efforts, many led by the Muslim 
communities themselves, to address the void of representation and leader-
ship within the community. This representation is spiritual, cultural, and 
institutional. Spiritually, the imam is the nearest person who is given the 
responsibility of leading rituals with spiritual signif icance, and therefore 
becomes the symbol of Islamic presence in the land or country; it is through 
mosques and the imams that inhabit them that Muslims feel their spirituality 
is f irst non-spatial, and then part of Europe. Culturally, the imam is an 
identity marker; it is through him that Muslims identify with the mosque 
and their religion (leaving aside the fact that imams are not always welcomed 
by or considered the best representatives of their communities). The role of 
the imam in the cultural aspects of marriages, divorces, male circumcision 
festivities, funerals, and general consultations represents an aff iliation with 
a particular way of life and spiritual-cultural belonging in a multicultural 
context. Institutionally, the imam is often, but not always, an institutional 
axis for the community of believers – although in this he is sometimes in 
direct or indirect competition with other Muslim representative bodies. 
Whether he is directly the point of focus himself, or it is the community and 
the mosque where he functions that is at the centre of such institutional 
care or contact is open to further examination, as this book illustrates in 
different contexts and countries. These three aspects of the imam’s role 
render the f igure of the imam and the imamate worth investigating.
Second, the imamate is winning more and more interest from various 
stakeholders because of its spiritual, cultural, and institutional roles. After 
decades of negligence, Western European nation-states have woken up to 
the fact that Muslim communities lack imams who know the country where 
they function, its language(s), history, laws, and other related information. 
They have also come to realize that imams cannot solve integration problems 
– even if the states want to give them that responsibility in the attempt to 
prevent the radicalization of youths from Muslim backgrounds. European 
states have discovered that the imamate has been under the influence and 
control of various other external actors, including embassies, consulates, and 
international Islamic movements. This renders the issue extremely delicate, 
and divisions among Muslim representative bodies about how to deal with 
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state institutions are not new. Despite this contestation of the imamate, 
many Muslim communities and the concerned imams actively seek the 
recognition that will normalize their presence in Europe, through, among 
others, institutional representation, funding, and civil society activism.
Third, there is high interest from the Muslim community and its stake-
holders, as well as from various state institutions, in developing adequate 
training programmes for the imams, religious leaders, and teachers of Islamic 
education in Europe. This interest, nurtured by the various factors tackled 
in this book, indicates the dire need for a well-educated and well-trained 
imam corps. While European nation-states expect Muslim communities 
to care about such an important aspect of their internal affairs, for decades 
governments have ignored the institutional and f inancial needs of these 
communities; it is unfortunate that only terrorist attacks have awakened 
them to this vital need of a part of their society. After the interest in training 
programmes has grown, most public state institutions have discovered 
that they too do not have the means or workforce to contribute to such 
programmes, and the state-representative Islamic councils that have been 
formed over the last decade or so often enjoy little recognition from Muslim 
communities for various reasons, as this book shows. The public universities 
that might contribute to such training often lack faculty trained in Islamic 
studies, which consequently affects their legitimacy among the community 
of believers and their representative bodies. It is for these reasons that 
working with Muslim bodies and their training programmes, and with 
‘embassy Islam’ for the symbolic legitimacy they have in the f ield, appears 
the most reasonable path to follow (as the case studies in this book chart) 
until full-f ledged national programmes that can graduate home-grown 
imams are developed.
Learning from the experience of Islam in the Balkans and the rest of the 
world where Muslim minorities have developed interesting imam-training 
programmes also remains an option and opportunity for the exchange of 
practical experiences and theoretical considerations in the new f ield of 
the study of Islam in Europe, and European Islam. Moreover, the historical 
experiences of institutionalizing religious authorities (e.g. rabbis and priests) 
in Europe and the United States might suggest the role of time in the slow 
absorption of the ‘Muslim problem’ before they take a natural course in 
social affairs, without fear and suspicion – as is slowly happening now with 
Islam and Muslims in Western Europe.
Finally, we wish to remind the reader of the broader context in which the 
issue of the imamate is and should be discussed: modernity and globaliza-
tion. First, the issue of imam training cannot be disentangled from thorny 
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questions, such as those concerning Islam and modernity or migration in 
the era of globalization. It is undoubtedly a form of self-deception to focus 
exclusively on the training of imams as an effective measure to counteract 
religious extremism. The imam – it should not be forgotten – is one of the 
most vulnerable links in the chain of religious institutions and discourses. 
He is not a leader appointed by a divine authority, but an employee at the 
behest of his employer – the community of believers or the state, or both. 
This is why the improvement of imams’ legal status is no less urgent than 
their training.
Second, the discord that threatens to undermine the unity of European 
societies can by no means be ascribed to the imams’ omission of duties; 
rather, it should be attributed to the forms of fragility caused by globalization. 
The open world in which we live remodels all societies, no matter how rich, 
poor, developed, or developing they are. This state of fragility renders it 
expedient for Europe to renegotiate the place of Islam in its space. For many 
European leaders, multiculturalism is no longer the pledge of a perfect union 
between the different constituents of European citizens. In this context, 
the question of imams might seem like the tip of the iceberg, or the tree 
that hides a forest of other, bigger problems.
To extricate European societies from the consequences of the collapse 
of multiculturalism – and, unlike some political leaders, we are not saying 
multiculturalism has collapsed – it is wise to persevere in endeavours to 
include Islam in the European socio-cultural and institutional ambit. It 
is necessary to devise ways and means to harmonize the following three 
exigencies: (1) it is necessary to respect Islamic traditions – Muslim communi-
ties in Europe must not relish the feeling of being discriminated against; (2) 
it is necessary to respect the sovereignty of European countries – heeding 
the spirit of modern times, Muslims living in Europe must accommodate 
their cultural heritage to their new surroundings, discerning between the 
cultural practices of the Arab-Islamic world and the spirit of the religion; 
and (3) it is necessary that European cultures evolve freely towards a new 
historic concordance where citizens of different faiths and beliefs can 
converge into a more harmonious multitude.
The training of imams is but one small measure that should be part of a 
range of measures prescribed to banish the suspicions between different 
constituents of European citizenship, to restrain citizens from committing 
acts of hostility against each other, to restore mutual confidence between 
communities, to maintain order and justice, and to preserve liberty. The chal-
lenge confronting Europe, a continent in gestation in the age of globalization, 
is not exclusively related to the religion of Islam, but mainly a challenge to 
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accommodate the cultures and traditions of immigrants from the Islamic 
world and post-colonial societies, and in general to adjust to the changing, 
globalized world. Whether in imams’ training or other measures related to 
migration in general, it is wise to adopt a new approach that would combine 
respect for Islamic traditions, compliance with the undeniable sovereignty 
of the host countries, and the responsible use of liberties afforded by the 
new media of communication. As Ednan Aslan writes, we should not build 
an image of a ‘super-imam’ who we expect to be the panacea to all societal 
ills (Aslan and Windisch, 2012, p. 61). Instead, we have to be realistic and 
steady in our study of the phenomenon for the betterment of society.
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Abstract
The fiqh al-aqalliyāt (‘Islamic law for Muslim minorities’) is based on the 
problematic concept of living outside the ‘Land of Islam’. This chapter offers 
a brief survey of the criteria for a land to be judged a ‘Land of Islam’. It is 
shown that the basic criteria are the freedom and security for Muslims 
to practice the basic shacā’ir al-islām (‘Islamic rules’) and to serve al-cadl 
(‘the cause of justice’). Ironically, a general assessment of many Western 
and Eastern Muslim-minority countries according to these criteria gives 
them a relatively high score on the ‘Land of Islam’ scale.
Keywords: fiqh al-aqalliyyāt, Land of Islam, Land of war, Land of Justice, 
Land of security
1 ‘Fiqh for minorities’: On what basis?
Technically, a ‘minority’ is a community that counts for less than 50 per 
cent of a larger community. ‘Muslim minorities’ are believed to comprise 
somewhere between 40 and 50 per cent of Muslims worldwide (Auda, 2005; 
Khalidi, 1989). However, a quick look at the body of literature developed for 
the fiqh al-aqalliyāt (‘law for minorities’) shows that the basic consideration 
for Muslims to be considered an aqalliya (‘minority’) is not population. 
Instead, it is whether Muslims live in what is called a non-Muslim ‘country’ 
(Hoffman, 2002), ‘society’ (Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, and Meyer, 2001), 
‘context’ (Murad, 1997), ‘polity’ (Masud, 1989), or under ‘non-Muslim rule’ 
(Waardenburg, 2000). Thus, the ‘exceptional circumstance’ here is not 
about the number of Muslims, but rather about how the country runs its 
‘polity’, ‘system’, or ‘rule’ – which can be labelled ‘non-Muslim’, as far as 
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the current discourse goes. For this reason, the political view of Muslims 
necessitated the creation of a special law which is called fiqh al-aqalliyāt 
(‘Islamic law for minorities’), fiqh al-ghurba (‘Islamic law for the homesick’), 
al-madhhab alūrūbbiyy (‘European School of Law’), European sharia, 
or European Islam (e.g. Haddad, 1991; Hofmann, 2002; Ramadan, 2000; 
Rohe, 2001).
However, the questions that are typically raised under the ‘f iqh of 
minorities’ theme do not have a clear relationship with this basic premise. 
Examples of such questions are whether or not it is lawful to: deal with 
banks, insurance companies, or mortgage lenders; work in restaurants 
or supermarkets that sell wine or serve pork; apply for citizenship in the 
‘non-Muslim’ country of residence, especially if the oath of citizenship 
involves adherence to its monarchy, constitution, or military service; 
participate in a ‘secular political system’ by joining a political party, 
supporting certain (non-Muslim) candidates, or running for elections; 
greet non-Muslims, congratulate them during their religious festivals, 
or attend their weddings or funerals; and accept a marriage or divorce 
ceremony or court ruling from a non-Muslim judge or based on ‘non-
Muslim law’ (Al-Saify, 2004). In all of these queries, there is no clear link 
between the juridical point of view and the fact that the inquirer does 
or does not live outside the ‘Land of Islam’. In fact, all of these questions 
are valid everywhere.
The basic premise of a ‘Land of Islam’ is not about the percentage of 
Muslims in a country. Re-visiting the wide variety of f iqh literature to 
f ind what makes a certain territory or land ‘Islamic’ to start with, one 
realizes that:
1 The criteria of a 50 per cent + 1 majority of Muslims in a nation-state – 
regardless of whether the state’s constitution declares it to be a ‘secular 
country’, as in Turkey, or does not designate any specif ic religion, as in 
Nigeria and Indonesia, whether the head of state is non-Muslim, such 
as Lebanon, or whether Islamic rituals and acts of worship are not 
generally practiced, as in a number of former Soviet Union States – is 
not accurate. In fact, classical Islamic sources clearly state that whether 
Muslims are a majority or minority in a certain country is irrelevant 
when determining whether a land is a ‘Land of Islam’, and suggest other 
criteria instead.1
1 For example, Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi (d. 728 h), 1996, vol. 3, p. 459; and Al-Bayhaqi (d. 458 
h), 1994, vol. 9, p. 16
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2 There is no mention of the other popularly mentioned criteria (recently 
applied to some regions of tribal Pakistan and Afghanistan, and of course 
under the ‘Islamic State’ (IS), in an attempt to be in a ‘Land of Islam’): 
the application of ‘Islamic’ criminal law (or ḥudūd). I found no explicit 
mention in any school of law that specif ically related the ‘Islamicity of 
a state’ or the concept of the ‘Land of Islam’ to the ḥudūd.
2 What is the ‘Land of Islam’ or ‘Islamic territory’?
The question, then, is: What are the classic criteria for being inside or outside 
the ‘Land of Islam’, or the ‘Islamic territory’, which fiqh al-aqalliyāt is sup-
posedly addressing? The results of a survey I carried out on various Sunni, 
Shia, and Ibadi Schools of Islamic Law, can be summarised in the following 
f ive criteria:
1 A land where Islamic rules (aḥkām al-islām) apply.2
2 A land where a Muslim ruler has control (istīlā’) over its affairs.3
3 A ‘Land of Security’ (al-amn).4
4 A land where the practicing of public acts of worship (shacā’ir al-islām) 
is allowed.5
5 A ‘Land of Justice’ (dār al-cadl).6
The following is a brief analysis of each of these concepts and 
their implications.
2 For example, Ibn Al-Qayyim (d. 751 h), 1997, vol. 2, p. 728; Reda, 1971; Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, 
vol. 3, p. 459; Al-Sarakhsi (d. 483 h), n.d., vol. 9, p. 182; and Al-Yunini (d. 726 h), n.d., vol. 2, p. 58.
3 For example, Al-Mawardi (d. 450 h), 1999, vol. 14, p. 267; Reda, 1971; Reda, n.d., p. 50; Al-
Mawardi, 1985, vol. 1, p. 22; Al-Mawsili (d. 683 h), 2005, vol. 4, p. 178; and Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, 
1996, vol. 3, p. 459.
4 For example, Al-Bayhaqi, 1994, vol. 9, p. 16; Al-Kasani (d. 587 h), 1982, vol. 7, p. 131; Al-Sarakhsi, 
n.d., vol. 9, p. 182.
5 For example. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 h), 1386 h, vol. 1, p. 197; Al-Razi (d. 606 h), 1400 h, vol. 4, 
p. 43; Al-Mawardi, 1985, vol. 1, p. 275; Al-Nasa’i (d. 303 h), n.d., p. 10; Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari (d. 
384 h), 1999, vol. 1, p. 130; Al-Mawardi, 1999, vol. 2, p. 48; Ibn Al-Arabi (d 543 h), n.d., vol. 1, pp. 368, 
530; Al-Kasani, 1982, vol. 7, p. 113; Al-Razi (d. 604 h), n.d., vol. 32, p. 108; Al-Mawsili, 2005, vol. 4, 
p. 178; Al-Yunini, n.d., vol. 2, p. 58; Ibn Taymiyyah, n.d., vol. 23, p. 146, and vol. 28, p. 408.
6 For example, Ibn Taymiyyah, n.d., vol. 28, p. 146; Reda, n.d., pp. 50, 62; Al-Mawardi, 1985, 
vol. 1, p. 22; Al-Sarakhsi, n.d., vol. 9, p. 182; Al-Kasani, 1982, vol. 7, p. 80; Ibn Qudamah (d. 620 
h), 1405 h, vol. 9, p. 14; Al-Nawawi (d. 676 h), 1405 h, vol. 10, p. 49; Al-Zar`i (d. 751h), 1405 h, vol. 1, 
p. 101; Ibn Abidin (d. 1252 h), 2000, vol. 4, p. 45; Al-Alusi (d 1270 h), n.d., vol. 18, p. 91; Nizam, 1991, 
vol. 2, p. 179; Reda, n.d., p. 50.
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2.1 The ‘Land of Islamic rulings’
A popular definition of the ‘Land of Islam’ in classic sources is ‘the land where 
the Islamic rulings apply’.7 What are these ‘Islamic rulings’? Without getting 
into a technical juridical analysis of analogy by legal ‘causes’ and ‘purposes’, 
a rule can be labelled ‘Islamic’ if it fulf ils the following two conditions:
1 The legal philosophy and purpose is to achieve the purpose and higher 
objectives of the maqāṣid al-sharīca (‘Islamic Law’), such as justice, 
freedom of choice, orderliness, and the preservation of faith/religion, 
soul/life, lineage/family, mind/intellect, dignity/honour, and wealth/
property (Auda, 2008).
2 It does not go against any f ixed fundamental of Islam. Defining what 
is ‘f ixed’ and what is ‘variable’ is a complex question, which I have 
attempted to answer elsewhere (Auda, 2006).
However, one could also say that a law is ‘Islamic’ if it is not ‘non-Islamic’. I 
had an interesting conversation with a Muslim convert from London who 
insisted that every law in the United Kingdom is ‘non-Islamic’. And when I 
asked why, he replied: ‘Because the United Kingdom is outside the “Land of 
Islam”.’ And when I asked him to explain what he meant by that, he stated: 
‘Because the legislators are not Muslim.’ I asked: ‘The laws that criminalize 
theft, killing, monopoly, bribery, abuse, and so on, aren’t they “Islamic 
laws”?’ He answered: ‘No, because the people who proposed them are not 
Muslim.’ I replied: ‘But that is irrelevant, isn’t it?’ He replied: ‘No, because 
they did not have the right “intention” (niyya) when they proposed them.’ I 
asked: ‘What do you think their intention was?’ He said: ‘The achievement 
of justice, merely.’ I exclaimed: ‘Isn’t justice an “Islamic” intention?’ He 
replied: ‘No, because they applied justice because it served the well-being 
of the people, not because it is ordained by God!’ I said: ‘But the well-being 
of the people is exactly the purpose of God’s order to establish justice, isn’t 
it?’ We failed to agree on whether the purpose of Islamic law is justice, or if 
‘we apply the “Islamic law” anyway and justice will then emerge’.
In any case, given that the concept of law in the qānūn (‘canon’) sense 
was not known in the Muslim-majority countries until the late nineteenth 
century (Reda, 1898), it is safe to assume that the ‘application of the sharia 
in the legal system’, or ‘sharia-compliant laws’, were not part of the classic 
interpretation of the ‘Land of Islam’. These concepts have a ‘post-colonial’ 
7 For example, ref. 1, 4, 5, 12, 32. Ibn Al-Qayyim, 1997, vol. 2, p. 728; Reda, 1971; Al-Qummi 
Al-Naisaburi, 1996, vol. 3, p. 459; Al-Sarakhsi, n.d., vol. 9, p. 182; and Al-Yunini, n.d., vol. 2, p. 58.
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context, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Thus, the 
aḥkām al-islām (‘Islamic rulings’) were explained in several other senses, 
which the rest of this chapter will attempt to explain.
2.2 The ‘Land of a Muslim ruler’
To have a Muslim ruler in istīlā’ (‘control’) over the affairs of a certain land 
is a criterion that some classic and contemporary scholars used for judging 
whether it is indeed a ‘Land of Islam’.8 Al-Mawardi, for example, explicitly 
mentions that ‘when Muslims reside in and control a certain land, it becomes 
a Land of Islam’ (1999, vol. 14, p. 267). However, this criterion is subject to a 
number of conditions, most importantly the ability of Muslims to practice 
their religious obligations, a public feeling of security, and the application of 
justice. A Muslim ruler who fails to observe or work towards these obligations 
jeopardizes his or her jurisdiction’s status as a ‘Land of Islam’. Sheikh Rashid 
Reda (n.d., p. 50) summarized the related opinions as follows:
The Land of Islam is a Land of Justice that has a true Muslim leader. This 
is contrary to a land that could be called a Land of Injustice, ruled by 
force dictated by nationalistic Muslims who do not observe the proper 
conditions of a legitimate Islamic leadership.
Thus, the existence of a level of security and freedom that is adequate for 
allowing Muslims to practice religion is, juridically, more essential than 
the religion of the ruler.
2.3 The ‘Land of Security’
A number of imams – meaning the founders of the main legal theories or 
madhhabs – state that security is the original maqṣūd (‘purpose’) of the 
differentiation between ‘Land of Islam’ and ‘Land of War’, and not ‘Islam’ 
versus ‘non-Islam’, per se. For example, imam Abu Hanifa states: ‘The purpose 
(maqṣūd) of calling a certain land a “Land of Islam” or a “Land of Disbelief” 
(kufr) is not Islam versus kufr. It is security versus insecurity’ (Al-Kasani, 
1982, vol. 7, p. 131).
In July 2008, I witnessed an interesting debate in Deoband, India, where 
a group of students from Darul Uloom University were asked: ‘What do you 
8 For example, Al-Mawardi, 1999, vol. 14, p. 267; Reda, 1971; Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi, 1996, 
vol. 3, p. 459; and Al-Bayhaqi, 1994, vol. 9, p. 16.
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think India is? Dar al-Harb or Dar al-Islam (Land of War or Land of Islam)?’ 
At f irst, there was almost a consensus on the fact that India cannot be 
Dar al-Islam, since ‘Islam’ has not ruled it since the days of the Mughals. I 
exclaimed: ‘But it cannot be Dar al-Harb either because there is no actual 
“war” going on in India.’ Many students, however, thought that the ‘war on 
terror’ in India is actually a war on Islam, and thus it converted India into 
a Dar al-Harb. Other students referred to the fact that Muslims in India do 
have the freedom to practice their religion and they are generally ‘secure’, 
which makes today’s India a ‘Land of Security’, based on imam Abu Hanifa’s 
statement above. I was delighted when I learned that in April 2009 Darul 
Uloom scholars had f inally issued a fatwa stating that India is not Dar 
al-Harb but rather Dar al-Amn (Land of Security) – the purpose behind 
the classif ication anyway, as Abu Hanifa stated.
Mecca itself – according to imam al-Bayhaqi, for example – became a ‘Land 
of Islam’ after its ‘conquest’ only because of its newfound sense of security. 
He writes: ‘Mecca became a “Land of Islam” and “Land of Security” after its 
conquest because no one there was forced against his/her religion. Any other 
land is likewise if it acquires the same kind of security’ (1994, vol. 9, p. 16).
It is clear from the classic def initions that security itself is a means to 
obtain the freedom to practice Islamic ‘public acts of worship’. Several 
scholars mentioned that Muslims who enjoy enough security and freedom 
to practice public acts of worship actually live in a ‘Land of Islam’, even if 
they are a minority. Al-Qummi Al-Naisaburi explains: ‘Muslims, even a 
minority, have a higher moral ground than non-Muslims, even if they were 
a majority, if they are not prevented from practicing the public Islamic acts 
of worship’ (1996, vol. 3, p. 459). The next section elaborates on the Islamic 
‘public acts of worship’, which appear to form a more basic criterion for 
whether a country can be considered a ‘Land of Islam’.
2.4 The ‘Land of Freedom to Practice Islam’
The majority of scholars and schools of Islamic law f ind the ‘freedom to 
practise Islam’ to be the ‘true sign’ that a land is a ‘Land of Islam’. Many of 
them refer to prophetic traditions that are interpreted to mean just that, 
such as prophetic sayings about the importance of certain identifying acts, 
such as group prayers in the mosque, the call for prayer (adhān), pilgrimage, 
the celebration of religious feasts, and so on. Al-Mawardi writes: ‘The public 
acts of worship (shacā’ir) of Islam such as group prayers in mosques and 
[the] call for prayers are the criteria by which the Prophet, peace be upon 
him, differentiated between the Land of Islam and the Land of Disbelief’ 
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(1985, vol. 1, p. 275). Al-Razi writes: ‘If the Islamic acts of worship are evident 
in streets and public places, this certainly entails that Islam is dominant’ 
(1400 h, vol. 4, p. 43). And Ibn Taymiyyah writes: ‘The public acts of worship 
(shacā’ir) of Islam are the true signs that a certain land is a Land of Islam’ 
(1386 h, vol. 1, p. 197).
I found that the ‘public acts of worship’ include a variety of Islamic rituals 
from the following list, according to all schools of Islamic law:
1 The f ive prayers.9
2 Calling for the prayers.10
3 Friday prayers.11
4 Fasting in Ramadan.12




9 Reading the Qur’an.17
10 Circumcision.18
11 Sacrif icing animals to feed the poor.19
12 Building mosques, and especially minarets.20
13 Greeting people with ‘peace be upon you’.21
14 Charitable endowments (awqāf ).22
If we – objectively – assess various countries around the world based on Mus-
lims’ freedom to practice the above specif ic Islamic acts of worship, and cre-
ate some sort of ‘index’ for them, we will quickly realise that many European 
countries score much higher than a number of Muslim-majority countries.
9 Al-Mawardi, 1985, vol. 1, p. 275; Ibn Al-Arabi, n.d., vol. 1, pp. 368, 530; Al-Razi, n.d., vol. 32, 
p. 108; and Ibn Taymiyyah, n.d., vol. 28, p. 408.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibn Al-Arabi, n.d., vol. 1, p. 530.
13 Al-Razi, n.d., vol. 32, p. 108.
14 Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari, Bahr al-Fawa’id, vol. 1, p. 130.
15 Ibid.
16 Al-Mawardi, 1999, vol. 2, p. 48.
17 Ibn Al-Arabi, n.d., vol. 1, p. 368; and Ibn Taymiyyah, 1386 h, vol. 28, p. 408.
18 Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari, 1999, vol. 1, p. 130.
19 Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari, 1999, vol. 23, p. 146.
20 Al-Kalabadhi Al-Bukhari, 1999, vol. 28, p. 408; Al-Yunini, n.d., vol. 2, p. 58.
21 Al-Kasani, 1982, vol. 7, p. 113.
22 Al-Yunini, n.d., vol. 2, p. 58.
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3 Conclusion: The ‘Land of Justice’
This criterion, i.e., the achievement of justice, is so central to the Islamic 
concept of the ‘Land of Islam’ to the extent that the term ‘Land of Justice’ ap-
pears to be used interchangeably with ‘Land of Islam’ in numerous sources.23 
Justice is the basis of all of the above criteria, according to Islamic jurists, 
and hence more fundamental to Islamic principles and purposes. Thus, an 
‘Islamic leadership’ that is not based on justice but on caṣabiyya (‘ethnic 
solidarity’) does not constitute a valid condition for a ‘Land of Islam’. Rashid 
Reda (1922), for example, writes:
The land of justice, which is the Land of Islam, is a land that has a true leader 
who establishes justice. This is contrary to the ‘land of injustice and aggres-
sion’, in which governorship is based on some Muslims’ ‘ethnic solidarity’ 
(caṣabiyya), regardless of the establishment of the Islamic rulings.24
Al-Mawardi also stresses the importance of the ‘competence’ and ‘good char-
acter’ of the leader of the ‘Land of Justice’. He writes: ‘People who are qualified 
to make decisions in the Land of Justice should choose a leader who possesses 
a good character and [who is] competent’ (1985, vol. 1, p. 22). Ibn Taymiyyah 
holds the ‘achievement of justice’ in a state as the most fundamental and 
deserving of God’s support, even for a ‘nation of disbelievers’. He writes:
In this life, people’s situations uphold when justice prevails in their society 
even if they fall into various kinds of sins. However, people’s situations do 
not uphold when injustice and lack of rights prevail in their society. That 
is why the saying goes: God upholds a state established on justice, even if 
it were a nation of disbelievers, and would not uphold a state established 
on injustice, even if it were a nation of Muslims. The other saying goes: 
This world lives with justice and disbelief, and does not live with injustice 
and Islam. The Prophet, peace be upon him, had said: ‘No sin has a faster 
divine punishment than the sin of injustice …’ Thus, people of injustice 
fail in this life, even if they were to be forgiven in the hereafter. This is 
because justice is the universal law of things. (n.d., vol. 28, p. 146)
23 For example, Ibn Taymiyyah, n.d., vol. 28, p. 146; Reda, n.d., pp. 50, 62; Al-Mawardi, 1985, 
vol. 1, p. 22; Al-Sarakhsi, n.d., vol. 9, p. 182; Al-Kasani, 1982, vol. 7, p. 80; Ibn Qudamah, 1405 h, 
vol. 9, p. 14; Al-Nawawi, 1405 h, vol. 10, p. 49; Al-Zar`i, 1405 h, vol. 1, p. 101; Ibn Abidin, 2000, vol. 4, 
p. 45; Al-Alusi, n.d., vol. 18, p. 91; Nizam, 1991, vol. 2, p. 179.
24 Reda, n.d., pp. 50, 62.
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The ‘Land of Islam’ and ‘Land of War’ is, then, a false dichotomy; a more 
realistic and ‘logical’ classif ication looks at not only the grey levels between 
the black and white extremes, but also at the various colours. In other words, 
the achievement of the above criteria, especially the three that are most 
fundamental (namely, security, freedom of practicing religion, and justice) 
is relative, whether in Muslim-majority or Muslim-minority societies.
Therefore, and regardless of popular opinion, a country that is juridi-
cally worthy of being a ‘Land of Islam’, a ‘Land of Security’, or a ‘Land of 
Justice’ will achieve a relatively high score on the criteria detailed above. 
This judgment obviously requires a comprehensive and realistic survey of 
various countries to create a ‘ranking’ of some sort. However, a rough but 
very reasonable assessment of many Western and Eastern Muslim-minority 
countries’ performance on the above criteria gives them a relatively high 
score on the ‘Land of Islam’ scale.
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Abstract
There is a growing body of scholarly work that addresses the transfor-
mations taking place in the ways Muslims experience, practice, and 
live Islam in Europe. One of the issues that have been taken up is the 
changing relationship between (established) religious authority and 
ordinary Muslims.1 There is a growing consensus that these relations 
are under pressure. Older, established conf igurations of authority are 
destabilized and increasingly challenged by rival voices and practices. 
However, neither the position that Islamic authority is simply generated 
from Islamic sources or the depiction of the Islamic landscape in Europe 
as thoroughly fragmented and individualized properly address the ques-
tion of how religious authority is produced. How does authority become 
acknowledged, and how is it incorporated into people’s life worlds? In 
this chapter, I argue that modes of religious knowledge production and 
conveyance do not just operate cognitively, but also involve a whole range 
of sensorial experiences that shape the relationship between religious 
practitioners and leaders.
Keywords: Islam in Europe, Islamic authority, globalization, knowledge 
production, lived Islam
1 I prefer the term ‘ordinary Muslim’ over the more commonly used ‘lay Muslims’ for want 
of a better way to denote on the one hand those Muslims who are not religious experts or 
necessarily knowledgeable in matters of Islamic theology, and on the other ordinary ways of 
acting, acting in everyday situations. I critically engage with the dominant assumption that 
theological ref lection is f irst and foremost a matter of theologians.
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1 The institutionalization of Islam in Europe
In the fall of 1977, an ideological conflict emerged between two groups of 
Turkish Muslims in the Netherlands. The conflict reached an apogee when 
a church located in a Rotterdam neighbourhood with a relatively large 
proportion of Turkish immigrants put its building at the disposal of Turkish 
Muslims during Ramadan. Two imams were invited from Turkey to lead the 
ceremonies. One belonged to the Süleymanli Movement, which had already 
been active among Turkish Muslims in Europe for years. The other was sent 
by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the government 
department that regulates religious life in Turkey. The Diyanet feared that the 
Süleymanli Movement would gain more influence among Turkish Muslims at 
the time when the development of religious infrastructure in the Netherlands 
was gaining momentum. Both organizations claimed to speak on behalf 
of the majority of Turkish Muslims, so it was decided to let the attendees 
decide which of the two imams should lead the rest of the celebrations. The 
majority chose the Diyanet imam. Afterwards a debate broke out about how 
to interpret this choice. For Diyanet, it was a clear sign that the majority 
of Turkish Muslims opted for the off icial version of Islam promoted by the 
Turkish state – or at least a sign that there would be no major objection 
against the further involvement of Diyanet in religious affairs in Europe 
(Sunier, 1996). Similar conflicts also emerged in other European countries 
about the representation and guidance of Turkish Muslims. Soon after 
this event, the Diyanet’s supporters founded the Islamic Association for 
Cultural and Social Guidance of Turks. One of the objectives was to maintain 
contact with the Diyanet in Turkey, which would not only provide imams 
for Turkish mosques in Europe, but also issue religious material, organize 
the pilgrimage to Mecca, and provide a whole range of other services for 
Muslims in the diaspora.2
Around 1983, Diyanet signed agreements with a number of European 
governments to send imams for a designated period, whose salaries the 
Turkish government would pay. The need for trained religious personnel 
among the quickly growing Turkish migrant community was one of the 
most pressing issues at that time. Although regular labour immigration 
had already been stopped for a number of years, these ‘Diyanet imams’ 
were exempt from the general immigration restrictions because of their 
special capacities. After serving a certain number of years, they would be 
replaced by new ones.
2 See Sunier and Landman (2015) for a more elaborate analysis of the Turkish Islamic landscape.
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By investing in the institutionalization of Islam in Europe and supporting 
the local initiatives of the mosque communities, Diyanet and the Turkish 
government made a very clever strategic move. The majority of Muslims 
in Europe still maintained strong ties with their country of origin and 
were relatively poor. The decision to f inancially support the building of 
the Islamic religious infrastructure in Europe gave Diyanet a very strong 
bargaining position in relation to rival movements, which had to organize 
their own religious services.
The reasons for Turkish organizations to extend or to transfer activities 
to Europe were manifold and differed from organization to organization. 
In Turkey, the state control of religious affairs was very strict, and the 
constitutional prohibition on using religion as a political tool left little 
room for religious organizations. In Europe, the constitutional freedom of 
religion provided much better opportunities (Sunier and Landman, 2015, 
p. 14). Opposition groups tried to escape state repression and the ever-stricter 
measures to control dissident religious activity by f leeing to Europe. The 
state-controlled Islam responded by investing in European activities.
Others considered the growing number of Turkish migrants in Europe 
an appropriate f ield to increase their influence. The largest actors were the 
Süleymanlis, the Milli Görüş, and the Diyanet, but Turkish nationalist parties 
also became active in the European scene. These actors struggled for control 
over the existing mosque associations, inviting them to join the umbrella 
organizations they had established. This often led to the fusion and f ission 
of various groups, adding to the dynamics of organizational developments 
(Akgönül, 2005; Canatan, 2001; Kühle, 2012; Landman, 1992; Maréchal and El 
Asri, 2012; Sunier and Landman, 2015; Yükleyen, 2012). The Nurcu Movement 
and its offshoot Gülen Movement also extended their network to Europe, but 
chose to focus on knowledge acquisition and study rather than competing for 
the control of mosques. As a result of this competition, the institutionalization 
of Turkish Islam in Europe evolved relatively quickly. In the course of the 
1980s the Turkish landscape was more or less accomplished.
The case of the Rotterdam community described at the beginning of 
this chapter can be simply explained as an example of a f ierce ideological 
struggle for influence over the rank-and-f ile between rival Islamic move-
ments not particularly unique among Turkish Muslims, with only very 
limited relevance for how ordinary Muslims practice their religion. In this 
particular case, the common argument was that the majority of Muslims in 
the 1970s and 1980s had a rural background and were therefore not familiar 
with the ideological struggles taking place in Turkish cities. They simply 
wanted good and cheap accommodation.
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Such an explanation assumes that the Islamic (Turkish in this case) land-
scape in Europe was simply a copy of the situation in the countries of origin. 
I question that perspective. Patterns of settlement and institutionalization 
and negotiations with local authorities about religious accommodation are 
of course important factors that contributed to the shaping of Islam under 
migrant conditions. However, this case was f irst and foremost a struggle 
about religious authority and legitimacy in new circumstances. In many 
studies that address the processes of institutionalization, religious author-
ity seems to be taken as self-evident or is not even mentioned at all (e.g., 
Laurence, 2012; Maussen, 2006; Mügge, 2010; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, 
and Meyer, 2001; Shadid and Van Koningsveld, 2008). I argue that, f irst, the 
making of religious authority is a decisive factor in the way Islam takes 
shape – especially under new and changing circumstances and in times of 
rapid societal change. Second, I argue that ordinary Muslims play a crucial 
role in the making and un-making of religious authority.
2 Authenticating religious authority
Let me f irst ponder the two concepts that I have introduced here: ‘religious 
authority’ and ‘ordinary Muslims’. ‘Religious authority’ refers to theological 
legitimacy and persuasive powers (Chaves, 2003), and is much broader 
than leadership. It is a domain where negotiation and power are central 
constituting processes and where tensions – but also innovations – in Muslim 
communities become manifest (Volpi and Turner, 2007). It is commonly ac-
cepted that modernization, globalization, and the emergence of the modern 
mass media have unsettled traditional religious authority (Caeiro, 2010; 
Mandaville, 2007; Masud, Salvatore, and Van Bruinessen, 2009; Salvatore, 
2006, 2007; Van Bruinessen, 2003). The modern mass media has allowed 
a tremendous increase in the number of voices in the public sphere (De 
Koning, 2008; Eickelman and Anderson, 2003). This shift has been referred 
to as the fragmentation and pluralization of religious authority and knowl-
edge production; it has also affected Islamic authority. It can be observed 
throughout the Muslim world, but probably most explicitly in Europe. 
However, to refer to these developments in terms of the fragmentation of 
authority is only partly true. As Peter Mandaville rightly argues:
The tacit normative undercurrent within this line of analysis has often 
been the idea that such changes represent a positive and progressive 
‘democratization’ of knowledge production and reception in Islam, with 
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Muslims increasingly reshaping religion with their own hands (rather than 
relying on ‘crusty’ clerics) and willing to offer these new formulations to 
critical consumers within the market of the public sphere. Yet it should 
be obvious that the mere fact alone of more people being able to serve up 
a wider range of ideas about religion – that is, a widening of the public 
sphere – does not in itself produce more pluralistic (in the sense of being 
more tolerant or open-ended) knowledge. (2007, p. 102)
In many studies of contemporary religious change and renewal there is a 
tendency to consider religious authority as an external normative force 
located in the domain of conformity, power, and obligation, which is set 
against the domain of spirituality, authenticity, individualization, and 
personal subjectivity – a distinction much in line with Charles Taylor’s 
‘subjective turn’ (Taylor, 2002).
But although the individual search for knowledge may certainly have 
contributed to the fragmentation of authority, this does not necessarily 
mean that authority has faded or become irrelevant. New forms of acquiring 
knowledge and new (lay) preachers may contribute to fragmentation, but 
they do not replace existing religious authorities altogether; rather, they are 
new players on the religious market alongside other religious specialists. 
As Daan Beekers shows, religious subjectivation is not just an individual 
process of self-fulf ilment, the victory of individual religious agency over 
submission to an external religious authority. Subjectivation also entails a 
process of subjection to religious authority, a quest for truth. This is what he 
calls a ‘Foucauldian understanding of subjectivation’ (Beekers, 2015, p. 139). 
It should be emphasized that subjection to religious authority (human or 
otherwise) does not mean unconditional and unquestioning submission 
to a certain regime of truth.
Religious authority is not just a normative external force vested in estab-
lished institutions, religious scholarship, or religious sources that ordinary 
believers either submit to or reject. Rather, as George Husinger (1961) has 
reminded us, a theological utterance and its application are inextricably 
linked to each other and cannot be separated. Religious texts are mute, 
unless they have an audience and are applied and interpreted. Talal Asad 
has argued:
That enquiry, broadly speaking, has to do with the theme of power and 
religion, not merely in the sense in which political interests have used 
religion to justify a given social order or to challenge and change it (an 
important question in itself) but in the sense in which power constructs 
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religious ideology, establishes the preconditions for distinctive kinds 
of religious personality, authorises specif iable religious practices and 
utterances, produces religiously def ined knowledge. (Asad, 1983, p. 237)
What is at stake here is the contextuality of authority and knowledge production 
in what Michael Lambek calls a ‘political economy of knowledge’: ‘How are we 
to characterize the order to which people submit? Where is the locus of power?’ 
(Lambek, 1990, p. 28). I define (the making of) religious authority as an ongoing 
process of the authentication and production of religious knowledge. This 
authentication process is inextricably linked with legitimacy and persuasion.
Making religious authority is a constant dynamic; it is not just the im-
position of normative frames onto ordinary believers, but also bottom-up 
critical reflection on authoritative frames. These reflections are related to 
the everyday lives and experiences of ‘ordinary Muslims’. ‘Everyday Islam’, 
‘lived Islam’, and ‘ordinary Muslims’ all refer to an emerging scholarly f ield 
in the study of religion and an epistemological and methodological shift 
from institution to practice. ‘Ordinary’ denotes two things: Muslims who are 
not religious experts; and quotidian activities, practices, and experiences. 
‘Everyday religion’ addresses the bottom-up experiences and religious prac-
tices of people of faith. The focus on everyday experiences, ordinary ethics, 
and everyday religion postulates that theologies are not made exclusively 
in off icial venues by religious experts, but at a multiplicity of places and 
occasions and not only by experts. ‘Expert religion’ is, then, a specific domain 
of activity and reasoning, to be distinguished from the no less important 
religious activities of non-experts (Davie, 2006, p. 274). Samuli Schielke and 
Liza Debevec (2012) draw on Michel De Certeau’s (1984) notion of the everyday 
as the domain where ordinary Muslims confront the order and discipline of 
powerful institutions. ‘Everyday Islam’ brings back the agency of ordinary 
Muslims (Bracke, 2008; Mahmood, 2005), who practice ‘tactical religion’ as 
a domain of creativity and innovation that is in constant interaction with 
the dominant ‘strategic religion’, which is ‘constantly engaged in operations 
to delimit and guard its sacred spaces’ (Woodhead, 2013, p. 16). In short, 
‘ordinary Muslims’ and ‘everyday Islam’ refer to a perspective and category of 
practices that is less visible, but can be innovative and even transformative.
Skimming the recent literature that operates the concept of ‘everyday 
Islam’ or ‘lived Islam’, however, it seems too often be too broad and hardly 
focused on the ethical and normative dimensions of how Islam is lived and 
experienced in daily situations. ‘Lived Islam’ tends to become shorthand for 
the things done by people whom we generically call Muslims. According to 
this definition, an individual performing his or her religious duties is as much 
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‘lived Islam’ as the practice of a football team made up of people with an Islamic 
background. In other words, there is a tendency to categorize the activities and 
views of people with Islamic backgrounds as Islamic without any thorough 
conceptual underpinning. I would, in certain circumstances, qualify both 
activities as Islamic – but not because they are performed by ‘Muslims’. Do we 
use the term ‘Muslim’ generically, or does it have specific (religious or cultural) 
connotations? Are Muslims’ practices different from those of non-Muslims? Is 
it a cultural category? Or are Muslims the people who practice a religion? The 
way we categorize people has crucial methodological implications because it 
determines where and how we observe, what we include, and what we leave 
out in our observations. We also need to not distinguish the acts, practices, 
and convictions of Muslims on the basis of a priori ethical criteria. We need to 
not distinguish between the practices of people with faith and those of people 
with only Islamic backgrounds; rather, we have to critically and rigorously 
address the ethical issues that are at stake and how people reflect on them.
Different experiences lead to different interpretations of the same 
normative frames. When people f ind themselves in situations in which 
authoritative scripts are no longer self-evident or when a moral breakdown 
occurs, transformation is likely to follow. As Jarrett Zigon argues, ethics 
is always about stepping into an uncanny situation and back again into 
the unreflective comfort of the familiar. ‘But this return from the ethical 
moment is never a return to the same unreflective moral dispositions. […] It 
is in the moment of breakdown, then, that it can be said that people work 
on themselves, and in so doing, alter their very way of being-in-the-world’ 
(Zigon, 2007, p. 138, my emphasis). Two Muslims, one living all of his or 
her life in a tiny, remote village, the other in a big city in Europe, may 
refer to the same normative principles, but they have built up completely 
different ethical reference schemes. If one shares their experiences with 
others – a process that has been altered tremendously due to the use of 
modern media – we come closer to a reflection on the very authoritative 
status quo. Critical ref lection may generate inventiveness and renewal, 
and will impact religious authentication, the social process that confers 
normative authority on persons, rules, or institutions.
3 A political economy of religious knowledge
The Islamic landscape in Europe towards the end of the 1980s was formed 
by the configuration of power amongst Muslims, host countries’ policies 
on migration and integration, and the relationship between the states and 
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religion (see Laurence, Part I). The general observer of the organizational 
landscape of Muslims in Europe about three decades ago would probably 
conclude that the picture was clear and simple: there were Muslims with 
strong familial ties back home; religious practices were rooted f irmly in 
their countries of origin; and mosques were run by Muslim organizations 
that had origins in the home countries, and were often controlled from 
a headquarters there as well. Political and doctrinal dividing lines fol-
lowed a similar pattern, and religious authority was f irmly in the hands 
of the traditional ulama, who were often sent from the home countries. 
Islamic observances and religious life revolved around the mosque and were 
practiced in familial and communal networks based on a common origin. 
Leadership and sources of religious authority were believed to self-evidently 
emanate from religious doctrine.
Since the vast majority of Muslims in European countries have a migrant 
background, issues of integration, minoritization, and not least political 
and cultural controversies largely determine how political decision-making 
evolves and how religious freedom and religious equality take shape. Until 
the end of the 1970s, the cultural and religious background of migrants 
did not play a signif icant role in debates about their position in society. 
Migrants were def ined in terms of their ethnic origin, but this had no 
political consequences. Migrants were primarily seen as members of a 
temporary labour force who would return to their countries of origin. Policies 
across Europe were based on this idea of temporariness. The creation of 
religious facilities was therefore seen as something that should be left solely 
to private initiatives. No special policies were needed, as it was believed to 
be a self-regulating process (Nielsen, 1992; Rath, Penninx, Groenendijk, and 
Meyer, 2001; Sunier, 1996).
Towards the end of the 1970s, some important developments took place. 
The number of immigrants increased considerably, mainly through family 
reunions. These families settled in the old quarters of the main town centres 
and altered the urban landscape considerably. Although returning to their 
country of origin was still the intention of the vast majority of Muslims, their 
actual return was postponed. Many migrants could not afford to return home. 
As a consequence, the need for religious facilities increased, especially the 
need for qualif ied religious personnel (Abadan-Unat, 2011; Landman, 1992). 
Towards the beginning of the 1980s, governments acknowledged that the ma-
jority of the migrants were planning to stay permanently. In some countries 
this resulted in elaborate programmes to integrate migrants into the host 
countries; in other countries, it was basically through general legislation that 
integration would take place. The gradual transformation from migrants to 
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settlers also resulted in a stronger emphasis on their cultural backgrounds. 
Governments realized that migrants brought their cultural and religious 
backgrounds with them. This ‘culturalization’ process would intensify in 
the 1990s and 2000s (Duyvendak, Tonkens, and Hurenkamp, 2010).
Across Europe, the emerging Islamic organizations were increasingly 
perceived as organizations for migrants. This was certainly not unfavourable 
for Islamic organizations, as it provided the political legitimization to set up 
an Islamic infrastructure. But a seemingly opposite effect took place at the 
same time. Developments in the Islamic world such as the revolution in Iran 
(1979) and the assassination of the Egyptian president Sadat (1981) resulted in 
the ‘Islamization’ of migrants: the over-emphasis on the religious background 
of migrants as an explanation for their moods and motivations. Migrants 
with completely different backgrounds were lumped together under the 
heading of ‘Muslim culture’. Although the position of migrants was the result 
of a complex interplay of economic, social, political, and ideological factors, 
assumptions about the nature of Islam became a dominant explanatory 
factor. Towards the end of the 1980s, this discursive transformation was 
almost fully accomplished and would further develop in the 1990s and 2000s.
One of the consequences of the ‘Islamization’ of policy discourses was the 
emergence of a specif ic type of leadership among Muslims. These leaders 
had lived in Europe for quite some time, knew the language and society of 
residence quite well, and acted as intermediaries between Muslim migrants 
and the host society. They were entrepreneurs rather than ‘ideologists’, 
and were oriented towards mobilizing as many resources as possible. They 
emphasized that Islamic organizations should be considered the main forms 
of ‘self-organization’ among migrants. These leaders increasingly took part 
in societal discussions about the position of migrants, thereby influencing 
the ways the situation was understood and assessed. They represented the 
Muslim populations in the countries of residence and articulated Muslim 
needs and what it meant to be Muslim in a non-Islamic society. By stressing 
the ‘foreign’ aspect of Islam as part of the cultural heritage of a specif ic 
group of migrants, they were able to convince policymakers that certain 
facilities were necessary. What these leaders were in fact emphasizing was 
the unique character of this cultural and religious heritage, and the fact 
that they were the only ones who had access to these communities. This 
‘enclavization’ of culture and religion impacted how religious authority was 
produced and reconfirmed. The almost complete conflation of religion and 
migrant culture made Islam into a ‘foreign’ element, and reinforced the 
idea of the exceptional position of Islam and that religious authority was 
predominantly a matter of the countries of origin.
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In the course of the 1990s, many Muslim organizations had made a fun-
damental shift in their political agendas. This was mainly the result of the 
increasing influence of a younger generation and the ‘cognitive shift’ from an 
orientation towards the countries of origin into a focus on the host country 
(Sunier, 1996). There were two main reasons for this shift: the increasing upward 
mobility of Muslims, and the fundamental transformation of Muslims from 
migrants to permanent residents in European societies. From organizations of 
‘foreigners’, they developed into organizations that asked for a place in society 
as Muslim citizens. Whereas in the 1980s the ‘migrantization’ of Muslims 
turned out to be an effective strategy, leaders now had to convince society that 
there was no fundamental contradiction between being Muslim and being a 
European citizen. Many young leaders considered ‘migrantization’ a weak bid, 
as it emphasized the role of Muslims as victims and outsiders. As to religion 
many spokespersons adopted a strategy of pillarization. As individual citizens 
migrants should integrate into society, but as Muslims they should have the 
right to set up their own institutions just as Catholics and Protestants do. This 
shift paralleled the emerging discussion about the place of Islam in European 
nation-states and the gradual ‘racialization’ of Islam (Silverstein, 2005).
In short, the developments of the last two decades have distorted the 
religious life of Muslims in Europe and unsettled power relations. Taking 
a closer look at the changes, we can observe two (seemingly contradic-
tory) developments. On the one hand, the Islamic landscape in Europe 
has increasingly operated according to local dynamics and become less 
dependent on agents in the countries of origin to determine their agendas. 
On the other, a relatively wealthy, well-educated, and mobile middle class 
has emerged among Muslims in Europe. Due to the rapid spread of the 
modern mass media, transnational networks have increased, producing a 
multiplicity of forms and modes through which Muslims sustain relations 
across borders. Islamic organizations in Europe have to resort to other 
means than the ‘old’ emotional, familial, and f inancial bonds that once 
linked migrant communities with their country and region of origin. Other 
Islamic movements are also changing their strategies, and new players have 
emerged. Today we f ind a wide array of different organizational patterns 
and networks operating simultaneously among Muslims.
While the countries of origin used to be the dominant guiding factor 
in determining the development of organized Islam among migrants in 
Europe, the changing situation has seriously undermined this dominance. 
The contemporary landscape of European Islam must be approached as a 
complex multi-polar and multi-directional f ield, in which the modern mass 
media and socio-economic developments are crucial co-shaping factors.
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When we look at the present-day Islamic landscape in Europe, the picture 
is complex. Organizations have changed or reformulated their policies and 
activities. The number of mosques and religious associations that are not 
organized along ethnic lines has increased sharply. A considerable number 
of young people no longer go to ordinary ethnicity-based mosques or have 
abandoned Islam altogether, while others opt for more radical variants 
of Islam or explore new modes and expressions of religiosity and piety. 
This has had a tremendous impact on the established ways of conveying 
religious knowledge. Traditional sources of religious authority have come 
under pressure; there is an enormous increase of semi-religious activities 
and practices that do not f it the picture of ‘mainstream’ religion.
4 Islamic authority: Future prospects
As I stated above, the fragmentation of religious authority and knowledge 
production should not be seen as a shorthand for the process of individu-
alization, a ‘copy-paste’ or ‘do-it-yourself ’ Islam under the inf luence of 
an ongoing secularization process (Cesari, 2004). Young Muslims also 
seek guidance and develop new notions of belonging. However, the cir-
cumstances and conditions in which this takes place are fundamentally 
different from those in a migration context. Consequently, the sources 
for the making and re-making of religious authority have also changed. 
Today the sources of Islamic authority are more diverse and unstable 
than ever before; modernization, the changing characteristics of migra-
tion, globalization, and the emergence of the modern mass media have 
unsettled traditional religious authority. The multiplicity of public voices 
has affected the making of Islamic authority in European countries. The 
authoritative frames and institutional settings that emerged in the early 
years of migration are still functioning, but their legitimacy is questioned 
by a growing number of Muslims born and raised in Europe. A wide variety 
of issues of faith that used to be undisputed are now brought into question. 
Religious authority has to be reconf irmed and reproduced continuously, 
and in contemporary media-saturated societies it increasingly needs 
to respond to the forms of auratic and charismatic power found in the 
mass media. In most studies that deal explicitly with doctrinal issues, 
Islamic leaders and organizational arrangements – in short, established 
institutional settings – are the principal focus. I contend that the role of 
ordinary Muslims in the making of religious authority and leadership is a 
crucial, but neglected venue of inquiry.
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This is of course not a uniquely Islamic phenomenon. The increasing diver-
sif ication and multiplication of religious audiences, the growing competition 
for followers, and the emergence of religious marketplaces have changed 
how religious practitioners perceive religious authority. This should not be 
understood in the narrow sense of a market system of demand and supply, 
where people make choices based on rational calculations of profit. Instead 
it should be understood more loosely, in the sense of a f ield of competition 
for audiences and followers who can be attracted by a strong public presence 
and seducing and convincing rhetoric, performance, and imagery. The 
older ‘legitimized’ and established categories of authority erode, and the 
capacity to disseminate specif ic understandings of religious practices and 
beliefs become increasingly based upon rhetoric, performances, and visual 
events (image bites). Miranda Klaver (2011) showed how ‘pastorpreneurs’ 
in the Pentecostal church have developed a mode of authority in which 
they combine entrepreneurial business skills with an orthodox Christian 
message, fostering a neo-Pentecostal style of spirituality. In this case, the 
new media create, inform, and facilitate a particular mode of leadership 
built upon the ‘media-savviness’ of the local preacher.
The growth of the modern mass media has produced new forms of 
religious leadership and has fundamentally changed the modes through 
which religious messages are communicated and disseminated.3 Modern 
mass media has become a serious challenge to traditional forms of Islamic 
authority, mainly because it has allowed a tremendous increase in the 
number of voices in the public sphere (Schulz, 2006; see also Warner, 2002, 
p. 50). Traditional forms of religious learning are complemented and increas-
ingly challenged by ‘rival and alternative articulations of belief and practice’ 
(Eickelman and Anderson, 2003). New technologies of communication 
circumvent traditional centres of learning and address new publics – mainly 
young Muslims in urban centres. They engage with parts of the public sphere 
that are considered secularized. The complexities of the modern urban life 
in which the majority of young Muslims live require specif ic competences. 
Robert Orsi argues that:
[they] arise out of the complex desires, needs, and fears of many different 
people who have come to cities by choice or compulsion (or both), and 
who f ind themselves intersecting with unexpected others (and with 
3 As Meyer and Moors argue: ‘[new forms of mediation not only create] new styles of self-
representation, but also pinpoint new forms of religious experience that cast believers as 
spectators, spectacles as miracles, and God’s blessing as prosperity’ (2006, p. 9).
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unexpected experiences of their own subjectivities) on a complex f ield 
and in a protean physical landscape that insists on itself with particular 
intensity. (2005, p. 45)
They are both preachers and simultaneously opinion leaders – public f igures 
that act upon certain situations and events. Sometimes they emerge from 
within the ranks of organizations, and in the course of becoming publicly 
known, they tend to detach from their original organizational bedrock 
and become free-floating public f igures. They deliver speeches, appear in 
the media to comment on events, and in some cases become the centre of 
new devotional practices and beliefs. Sometimes these f igures are genuine 
celebrities with fans rather than adherents. Their persuasive qualities 
emanate from a particular style of address and presentation (Meyer, 2006).
Performative styles, aesthetics, sensorial experiences and contextual 
factors are as important as discursive content to grasp the prominence 
of religious leadership (Schulz, 2006, p. 212). Leadership shifts from mere 
representation of a group to a form where the religious message and the 
representative’s presence merge in particular and interdependent ways. 
The Islamic leader becomes part of the religious experience (Gräf and 
Skovgaard-Petersen, 2009; see also De Witte, 2008). New forms of religious 
mediation also constitute new audiences (Hirschkind, 2012, p. 5). These 
audiences consist of relatively unstable overlapping constituencies that 
have no institutional ties to leaders; similarly, there is no sharp distinction 
between opinion leaders, entrepreneurs, brokers, priests, stakeholders, 
celebrities, and politicians. Where these roles used to be separated, they 
are increasingly merging. They preach, but also deliver speeches, appear 
on television, take part in debates, operate websites, and make use of social 
media (see Boender and De Ruiter, Part I). There is no sharp distinction 
between Muslim and non-Muslim, religious and non-religious, and political 
and non-political spheres. It is precisely their elusiveness, in combination 
with the fact they do not correspond to the image of the traditional imam, 
that makes them suspect in the eyes of many politicians. For this reason, 
much of the research on Islamic leadership treats them as a potential danger 
(Niblett, 2006).
In the light of these developments, the question is how and in what 
direction the Islamic landscape of Europe will develop. The fragmentation 
process has prompted some observers to call for a European centre of reli-
gious authority to counter the ever-increasing, un-coerced and deregulated 
playing f ield in which these new preachers operate (see Galguera, Part II). 
Others have reflected on the development of f iqh for Muslims in minority 
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situations (Al-Alwani, 2004; see also Auda, Part I), or the installation of 
sharia courts to deal with questions of Islamic law and morality of ordinary 
Muslims. What would be the main constituents of a ‘European imamate’?
More generally, the question of why fragmentation is considered problematic 
arises. Governments no doubt fear a loss of control, as do established centres 
of religious authority, but why do countries need interlocutors who will speak 
on behalf of as many Muslims as possible? And why do the spokespersons of 
established Islamic institutions express worry about the loss of control over 
a growing proportion of the Muslim population? It is clear that there is a 
somewhat odd common interest between governments and religious elites in a 
‘domesticated Islam’. Elsewhere I have discussed this term to understand how 
and why European governments attempt to domesticate religious practices 
and institutions (Sunier, 2014; see also Bowen, 2004; Humphrey, 2009; Sunier, 
2009). John Bowen uses this term to come to grips with the ‘structural problem 
of articulating a global religious field onto a self-consciously bounded French 
nation-state’. He shows how the strategies through which the French state 
tries to create ‘domesticated forms of Islam’ imply a set of dilemmas regarding 
the control of transnational religious communities (Bowen, 2004, pp. 43-44). 
These dilemmas revolve around three basic issues: the behaviour of Muslims, 
control of the republic, and adaptation of Islamic norms to France.
This is not unique to Islam. The issue of loyalty has been raised in the 
case of other transnational religions as well (see Baker, 1997; Casanova, 1994; 
Sunier, 2004). However, while ‘domestication’ or the gradual rooting of a 
once-imported religion has usually been described as an organic process 
that takes years, in the case of Islam it has become a state project with 
a considerable sense of urgency. Loyalty has to be enforced rather than 
developed organically. The same occurs with respect to religious authority. 
Instead of facilitating the recasting of the religious landscape, European 
governments increasingly interfere in religious issues, thereby violating 
their own principle of the separation of religion and state.
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Abstract
This chapter examines the process of adapting organized Islam to the 
institutional needs of the modern state. The adaptation processes that 
Islam is currently undergoing in Europe are compared to similar develop-
ments in the history of the Catholic Church.
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1 Introduction
The process of adapting organized Islam to the institutional needs of the 
modern state in Europe is happening less than a century after the agreements 
between the Catholic Church and the European states, and two centuries 
after that of Judaism. However, Islam cannot really be considered late if 
we take into account the great number of Muslim-majority countries that 
endured colonial continuity after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire, 
with the arrival of the French, British, and Italian Empires. Only through 
national independence has Islam begun to f ind a role in state institutions, a 
process that has become clearer through the pressure for democratization. 
This chapter compares the adaptation processes that organized Islam is 
currently undergoing in Europe with similar developments in the Catholic 
Church in the nineteenth-century United States.
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2 The Muslim diaspora
The democratization of Islamic nation-states is happening at the same time 
as the migration that has given birth to an overseas diaspora. We are thus 
witnessing the natural reaction of the older centres of Islamic religious 
authority to the appearance of new demographic groups. For example, 
there is growing investment by the capital cities of origin countries in the 
construction of monumental mosques in Europe for the use of their diaspora 
(Fuess, 2007). There is a range of training programmes for imams that are 
adapted to the language and culture of the European destination countries. 
And we can see the beginnings of hierarchical structures of ulama that 
are adapted to everyday life in Europe, of which the European Council of 
Moroccan Ulema is a prime example. In the past, these efforts were mostly 
uncoordinated and eclectic – and they still do not always manage to meet the 
actual demand for infrastructure and religious authority to respond to daily 
life. As of yet, none play the role of the ministry of waqf or traditional habous 
(‘religious endowments’) in Muslim-majority countries. From a historical 
point of view, it is natural for such an institutional gap to close slowly. Islamic 
schools are still rare on the European continent: the Netherlands counts a 
small number, while Great Britain has signif icantly more. Mosques built 
for the purpose of training make up only a small proportion of the Muslim 
places of worship in Europe.
One may wonder why the representative bodies of Islam such as the 
CFCM (Conseil français du culte musulman; French Council of the Muslim 
Faith) or the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference) have 
not succeeded in managing everything after ten years of work (Kortmann 
and Rosenow-Williams, 2013). This delay is quite normal, considering 
the transformation of Islam into a minority religion on Western soil. It 
is unrealistic to imagine that such a transition could happen over a short 
period of time. This situation is stimulating an institutional response 
from the ‘religious’ capitals of various countries of Sunni Muslim origin, 
particularly those in the Maghreb (North Africa) and Turkey. Ultimately, 
the persistence of imported imams has had the greatest impact. The vast 
majority of imams in Germany were trained in Ankara, while most formally 
educated prayer leaders in France, Italy, and Spain have attended religious 
schools in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, or the Gulf. This is the case for the 
imams who arrive in Europe with visas for four or f ive years, as well as the 
hundreds of prayer leaders and reciters of the Quran who are sent to Europe 
to preach during the month of Ramadan. However, the home states have 
failed to provide suff icient religious personnel to cover all of the places of 
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worship, hospitals, and prisons that serve the diaspora in Europe. How are 
we to consider this state of affairs? Is the pursuit of ‘externalization’ and 
the use of national Islamic bureaucracies in foreign countries just a quick 
f ix? Are European societies missing the opportunity to take up the task of 
acclimatization?
There are ample tangible signs that more durable institutional solutions 
have begun to take shape among the Islamic diasporas in Europe. Despite 
the appearance of disarray, there are several institutional developments 
that mark the permanence and true beginning of various European national 
Islams. I hypothesize that this represents the passage ‘towards European 
Islams’ – a French Islam, a German Islam, a British Islam, etc. At the same 
time, it is important to emphasize that the idea of creating a ‘European’ 
Islam cut off from its origins in Muslim countries does not make sense; it 
would be rather like insisting on dropping the reference to Rome in ‘Roman 
Catholicism’.
I would like to examine the logic governing the recent developments in 
this area to determine where these efforts place the institutional history 
of Sunni Islam since the end of the Ottoman Empire. We are witnessing a 
phase of ‘professionalization’ in Islamic religious training that is part of a 
broader institutional response to both the ‘exogenous shocks’ experienced 
by ‘religious centres’, including, for example, Algiers, Ankara, Rabat, Tunis, 
and, more recently, the challenge of a diaspora that is beyond the reach of 
the law and administration of the host countries (Bauböck and Faist, 2010). 
What we see is the attempt to maintain religious influence over a group 
that has grown dramatically during a very short period of time. Unlike the 
countries of origin, where there is one imam for every one or two mosques, 
until now it has not been possible to meet the demand for imams in Western 
European societies (Qattab, 2009). While what is happening in the diaspora 
represents only a small portion of the tip of the iceberg of changes in Islamic 
religious authority, mass immigration – sometimes equalling as much as 
10 per cent of the country of origin’s population – is the same fundamental 
challenge that led another world religion (Roman Catholicism) to take 
religious training more seriously in the nineteenth century.
3 The example of the Catholic Church
The analogy that can and must be made between the institutional develop-
ment of Islam and that of other religions that have recently experienced a 
diaspora – such as Catholicism in the nineteenth century – lies in what is 
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now being set up to organize religious affairs relating to the Muslim faith. 
Indeed, it was the unplanned and involuntary establishment of Catholics 
as a religious minority outside of their religious metropoles that eventually 
allowed local Catholic bureaucracies to thrive (United States Conference 
of Catholic Bishops, 1992). We are witnessing the same process today in the 
development of Islamic religious governance in European host countries. 
The religious institutions of both Catholics and Sunni Muslims have reacted 
to this ‘accident’ of history – that is, the diasporas – that developed in the 
Americas in the nineteenth century for Catholics and in Europe in the 
twentieth century for Muslims. The comparison of these two religions 
requires a change in perspective and a revision of the common description 
of Islamic religious governance as ‘non-hierarchical’ or ‘non-clerical’. The 
main institutional stakeholders here are precisely the hierarchical ministries 
of Islamic affairs in the countries of origin and the formal councils (ulama) 
that oversee the large and growing demand for guidance in prayer and 
religious education. At every major turning point of modern European 
history, religions have been the f irst to struggle to maintain their influence 
and their centralized control over diasporas. Religious capitals – the Vatican 
for Catholicism and Rabat, Alger, and Ankara for Islam – have never been 
passive actors in this process.
The migrations of Roman Catholics to North America resulted in the 
formation of an unexpected minority that created what could be called 
an ‘Emigrant Empire’. The residence of Catholics in non-Catholic majority 
countries provoked an adaptive institutional response from the Catholic 
Church (Bauböck and Faist, 2010). Even when the legal authority of a religious 
capital becomes null and void, its spiritual influence can still cross national 
borders in the form of theological power. Two main tasks were and are 
imposed on the Catholic Church: awareness of its new role to support the 
religious practice of its minorities abroad; and, as a consequence, the right 
to defend the same people against proselytism. At f irst, most American 
Catholics led their lives outside of the reach of a consecrated chapel – infra-
structural density was thin: there were 1500 Catholics per church (United 
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1992). This number is just below 
the average of 1700 Muslims per mosque in twenty-f irst century Europe 
(Cameron, 2015).
While hardly an exact equivalent, the experiences of Catholicism in the 
United States and Islam in Europe are similar in order and nature. Because 
of inadequate infrastructure, diasporas are exposed to certain risks; from 
the perspective of the ‘religious capital’ they are extremely susceptible to 
external influences, for example. There was also the risk that as successive 
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generations of Catholics attended public schools, they might fall under the 
spell of Protestant missionaries from hundreds of sects – proselytizing 
Methodists or Mormons, or even secularist Republicans. There were tensions 
within the diaspora because of the variety of customs, languages, and 
traditions practiced by groups from different origin countries, as well as 
the varying prejudices each part of the community was exposed to. Since 
the nineteenth century, reports issued by envoys of the Pope were quick to 
arrive in Rome stating that many Catholic immigrants in the United States 
were losing their faith, and that Rome would need to intervene to counteract 
the problem. This challenging scene is not entirely different from that of 
the contemporary Muslim diaspora in Europe.
This great and unexpected ‘Emigrant Empire’ was f irst ignored, and 
then shortly thereafter considered a risk. The national Catholic Churches 
competed with each other, and priests had to be imported from the countries 
of origin. The New World became a site of imperial rivalry for the souls 
of both the indigenous peoples and the settlers. The British and Dutch 
competed with each other for colonial dominance, overshadowing the 
Spanish, French, and Portuguese. The United States was effectively written 
off by the Roman Catholic Church after the Seven Years’ War, which ended 
in 1761 with France’s surrender of most of North America to England.
However, the new Catholic population that arrived in the mostly Prot-
estant United States through labour immigration a century later again at-
tracted the eyes of Rome. This was the beginning of the internationalization 
of ecclesiastical authorities outside of Europe, with the spread of dioceses, 
training seminars, theological faculties at universities, and the sending of 
bishops and cardinals all over the world to serve the Catholic minorities (in 
addition to services intended for overseas colonies). In just 30 years, between 
1820 and 1850, the number of Catholic churches in the United States increased 
from 124 to 1124, and from 1850 to 1860 it again doubled to 2550 (Cassidy, 
1924). The construction of churches and the arrival of a suff icient number 
of priests happened fast enough, but the foundation of schools and on-site 
seminars took time. In 1821 an isolated, solitary seminar in Baltimore started 
to train priests, but this one programme was not enough for the onslaught 
of millions of Catholic immigrants who arrived at the continental territory 
of the United States throughout the nineteenth century (Goebel, 1937). The 
same delay occurred for secondary education. To address the shortage of 
clergy, there had been proposals to train priests in Leuven, Belgium, as a 
short-term solution; an American college was opened there in 1859. However, 
the number of churches evidently increased faster than priests could arrive 
or be trained. The linguistic plurality of immigrant communities (German, 
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Irish, Italian, and Polish) complicated the situation further. A generation 
after the massive influx of Catholics, there were still only a handful of formal 
seminars to train the priests meant to serve a Catholic population of close 
to six million. As a result, many priests were not ‘professionals’, and were 
often uneducated in the rites.
This situation provoked a centralized response from Rome. In 1853, the 
Church sent a nuncio to visit the major cities in the United States with a 
Catholic minority and undertake a f irst inspection of the locally created 
organizational culture. This is comparable to the visits of the President of 
the Turkish Diyanet, the Moroccan Minister of Habous, or the Secretary 
General of the Muslim World League to their allied organizations in 
Europe. The nuncio discovered that ‘Many immigrants had lost faith […] 
more than those who had joined other churches.’ Following this report, 
in 1854 the Pope proposed the creation of an ‘American College’ in Rome. 
He also established French, Irish, Polish, and Latin American colleges. 
The original Collegio Romano and Collegio Germanico date from the 
sixteenth century (Cassidy, 1924); the idea was to invite American students 
to Rome to learn how to become ‘proper’ Catholic priests – a form of 
signalling that they needed to follow institutional standards if they really 
wanted to regulate the religious life of the immigrant populations. As a 
response to the new ‘emigrant’ Church, the Pope personally supervised 
the creation of a record number of dioceses and archdioceses to cater 
to Catholics overseas: 130, or 15 per cent of the existing dioceses in the 
world at the time.
4 The Muslim diaspora in Western Europe
For the Sunni Islam diaspora a century later, it is obviously Western Europe 
that plays the role of the United States in comparison to the various Islamic 
‘religious capitals’. When the religious capitals’ political power was taken 
away by the fact that they are foreign citizens, spiritual leadership became 
their only transnational currency. Once there is a sufficient mass of believers 
residing in a foreign jurisdiction, there are few options other than resorting 
to ‘soft power’ (Ozdora-Aksak, 2014). The creation of a foreign diaspora raises 
some diff iculties (quantity and quality of services), challenges (defend-
ing against rivals and extremists), and opportunities (power struggles or 
evangelization). How can we understand the efforts implemented by states 
of origin to f ill the void of religious services for their citizens and their 
citizens’ descendants abroad?
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The f irst and most urgent question always concerns the quantity and 
quality of the religious infrastructure, i.e., the places of worship and the 
clergy. With the passing of time, however, the missionary goal turns into 
one of socialization: continuing religious traditions through subsequent 
generations. This socialization is happening in the twenty-f irst century; 
for example, the number of Islamic educational establishments in France 
increased from 9 in 2010 to 34 in 2014 (Barou, 2014). The number of prayer 
spaces also increased from 1300 in 2001 to 2500 today. There is still a real 
shortage of imams. There are two kinds of educational institutions needed: 
one for the clergy and teachers, and one for the children and students of 
the community.
The countries of origin have sometimes sought to literally appropriate the 
existing prayer spaces and mosques of their diasporas. From the early 1980s 
to the 2000s there have been supporting operations from Turkey through 
the CCMTF (Comité de coordination des musulmans turcs de France; the 
Coordinating Committee of Turkish Muslims in France) and the FNMF 
(Fédération nationale des musulmans de France; National Federation of 
Muslims in France), as well as through related associations from Morocco 
(Senay, 2013). These same networks have made the construction of new 
mosque-cathedrals (i.e., big mosques, rather than small prayer-rooms) 
possible: there is now one in Cologne and one in Strasbourg, both symbols 
of the new, lasting presence of Islam in the institutional and architectural 
landscape of these European cities (Allievi, 2009).
Finally, it is vital to draw the reader’s attention to institutional develop-
ments that parallel the development of the Roman Catholic Church in the 
United States. We see the same pattern of institutionalization through both 
the ‘collegio’ model – training targeted at the diaspora, but taking place in 
the country of origin – and the diocesan seminary model, which is located in 
the host country (Catholic Church, 1958). With relocation, the trusteeship of 
the Congregation Propaganda Fide was lifted, which brought the Catholics 
in the United States under the centralized Church hierarchy and Canon 
Law – both in the early twentieth century. For Islam, the equivalent of the 
‘collegio’ was opened in the early twenty-f irst century; for example, since 
2006 more than 350 foreign students, almost all Europeans, have been 
registered at a religious training course in Istanbul. Similarly, in Rabat 
the King Mohammed VI International Imam Training Centre opened its 
doors to the f irst class of 50 students from France in 2015 (Brown, 2015; see 
also Hashas, Part I). In terms of religious ‘hierarchy’, the anchoring of the 
European Council of Moroccan Ulema in Brussels is a key sign of institutional 
adaptation to the permanence and specif icity of the European diaspora as a 
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religious minority and the recognition of new religious realities for believers, 
without creating a new jurisprudential section. In the end, ‘the territory’ 
of the modern Muslim state also incorporates the diaspora of millions of 
European Union citizens with origins in that country.
This is, of course, far from the level of institutional internationalization 
demonstrated by the cardinals who serve in the various governmental 
bodies of the Vatican. For the moment, European Islam only has what 
could be considered the equivalent of apostolic delegates – for example, the 
ambassadors of countries representing off icial Islams. However, Mohamed 
Moussaoui and Dalil Boubakeur are among the f irst ‘bishops’ of Moroccan 
and Algerian Islam, respectively, in France today. The religious centres of 
authority need to nurture, manage, and then maintain their relationships 
with the faithful after a temporary loss of power. In short, this is the story of 
transnational religion: the religious capital must recognize political ‘defeat’ 
and accept the transfer of administrative and legal control over the faithful 
who become citizens of a third country. While doing so, the religious capital 
seeks to preserve its natural role in the spiritual supervision of its diaspora 
believer-citizens. In the end, the religious centre accepts the weakening of 
its temporary political relationships in exchange for spiritual fatherhood.
In the history of Catholicism, the Vatican has accepted this exchange 
after 60 years of crossing the desert, during which the ‘Roman Question’ 
remained an open wound. Before that happened, however, the new European 
national authorities put the Catholic hierarchy under the yoke of national 
governments, insisting on the right to approve the appointment of priests 
and bishops sent by Rome. One can think of the Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy in France, but also of the anti-clerical laws of the late nineteenth 
century, which saw the takeover of Catholic hierarchies by national govern-
ments in Germany, Spain, and Italy. It had not been long since the wars of 
the Investiture Controversy – and it is impossible to deny the similarities 
with current European Islam. Only with the Vatican’s establishment as a 
sovereign state in 1929 did Europe’s nation-states manage to close the Roman 
Question – more than a century after the concordats. Internal autonomy 
is restored to a religious community that can organize itself as it wishes 
under local legal frameworks. Can we assume that the relationship between 
the major Muslim capitals – such as Rabat, Algiers, or Ankara – and their 
diasporas will in the future look like the Rome of today, each with its own 
natural and organic sphere of influence?
It is important to realize that Catholic and Muslim diasporas were con-
sidered temporary. Rome has come to accept the permanence of its minority 
– and has therefore gotten down to sanctioning the spread of schools and 
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seminars. Similarly, Turkey, Algeria, and the Morrocan Ministry of Endow-
ments and Islamic Affairs did not consider their migrants in Western Europe 
a permanent minority until recently (Hosseini, 2013). This is a process that 
requires the operation of localization so that it absorbs the diversity of the 
periphery. In the United States, it took 50 years before the number of churches 
and schools met the demographic requirements (in the late nineteenth 
century). It took one hundred years before there were enough schools and 
Catholic teachers (between the two World Wars) (Cassidy, 1924). Decades 
passed before American Catholics got a cardinal. Even more patience was 
required for obtaining their fair share in the College of Cardinals – and it still 
took a few more decades, until the mid-twentieth century, for the majority 
of Catholic priests in the United States to be US graduates.
Paradoxically, asking foreign religious capitals to ‘drop’ control in this 
context must take the form of the creation of bureaucracies designed to 
precisely f it the targeted diaspora, which can actually leave much room for 
localization. What we see now is the spiritualization of international religious 
networks that no longer have jurisdiction beyond their own borders, and 
whose new currency is therefore only spiritual. In a way, this is the resolution 
based on the ‘success’ of relations between the state and the church. The 
church-state relationship is loaded, and necessarily creates a tense atmos-
phere. To function, neither party should think of itself as completely victorious 
or ‘defeated’. Rather, it demands mutual tolerance, after the recognition of 
legal and political competence in a separate manner. This is what seems to 
be happening now with Islam in Europe, albeit slowly. Internationalization 
and negotiation as a minority can provide support for this historic change.
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Abstract
This chapter argues that the position of the European imam is being 
nationalized and consequently rendered more dependent on both reli-
gious scholarship and political authority, and that the transmission of an 
ethicist message has become its major mission. First, this chapter briefly 
overviews the crisis of modern Islamic religious authority, situating the 
place of the imamate in Islamic scholarship to demonstrate that it is 
not an independent scholarly position but rather an administrator of 
the religious affairs of believers at the local level. Second, the chapter 
presents the model of the Moroccan imamate as a way of understanding 
the role that is expected of imams by modern political and religious 
authorities. Third, reference is made to the situation of the French 
imamate as an example of the situation of imams in Western Europe. 
The ref lective closure of the chapter raises points about how the ques-
tion of ethics is becoming central in the sermons and teachings of a 
growing number of imams, and how important it may be as a f ield for 
further research.
Keywords: Islam in Morocco, Moroccan imams, French imams, King 
Mohammed VI International Imam Training Center
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1 Introduction
In the Sunni tradition, the study of the imams and imamate is a very recent 
phenomenon for two main reasons.1 First, simply paging through the tables 
of content of Islamic scholarly classics cannot direct you to chapters or 
clauses dedicated to the position of the imam and/or his roles. This is because 
neither the Quran nor the Sunna uses or emphasizes the term ‘imam’ as 
we know it today (i.e., ‘the leader of prayers and the mosque’). However, 
the term or its derivatives do appear in both. Second, this study originates 
in Western liberal societies whose state institutions have been unable to 
understand their Muslim minorities, or simply citizens of Muslim belief, since 
World War II. This confusion is partially a result of the fact that the Islamic 
religious authorities have not been able to agree on a modern reading of the 
tradition that would allow easier integration into modern state institutions 
and pluralist contexts where Muslims are a minority. Consequently, the 
imamate has emerged as a space in which authority – religious, political, or 
both – is negotiated. It has become a sign that shows the crises of governing 
authorities, and thus the space where they are reclaimed differently.
This chapter argues that the position of the European imam is being 
nationalized and consequently rendered more dependent on both religious 
scholarship and political authority, where his functions take place for the 
transmission of an ethicist message. Three major features distinguish this 
new position of the European imamate: (1) it is dependent on religious 
scholarship, and does not stand as an independent authority; (2) it is under 
the sovereignty and interests of the political regime within whose institu-
tions and territories it functions; and (3) its major authority lies in direct 
contact with the community of believers, to whom it transmits an ethicist 
religious discourse. I illustrate this argument in three major steps. First, after 
a preliminary note on defining the imamate, this chapter provides a brief 
overview of the crisis of modern Islamic religious authority and its impact 
in Europe; it situates the place of the imamate in Islamic scholarship to 
1 What has developed as a fiqh al-aqalliyāt (‘f iqh of minorities’) does not focalize the role 
of imams but the role of mosques, muftis, and scholars of Islam. This means that imams as an 
independent category or authority are considered only channels of scholarship, not its main 
thinkers or leaders. For example, the publications of the European Council for Fatwa and 
Research (ECFR), founded in Dublin in 1997, do not devote clear space to the category of the 
imam and his functions. This chapter does not delve into the literature of the minority f iqh or 
of the ECFR. Rather, it examines the place of imams within broad Islamic scholarship and their 
newly focalized functions. For more on the state of the art of training imams in Europe, see 
Aslan and Windisch (2012); Drees and Van Koningsveld (2008); Ferreiro (2011); Husson (2007).
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demonstrate that it (the imamate) is not an independent scholarly organiza-
tion, but more of an administrative structure for the religious affairs of the 
community of believers at the local level. Second, the chapter presents the 
Moroccan imamate model to illustrate the role that modern political and 
religious authorities expect imams to f ill. Finally, I refer to the situation of 
the French imamate according to recent anthropological-sociological studies.
2 The imam in Islamic religious authority: An overview
The word ‘imam’ literally means ‘the one who leads’, and in the Sunni Islamic 
tradition it indicates the male leader of the f ive daily prayers. Though rarely 
used in the Sunni tradition, the term ‘imamate’ means the function of car-
rying out such a task. In Shia Islam the ‘imamate’ takes on a totally different 
meaning: infallible leadership of the community or the umma. The ‘imam’ 
is then the infallible leader of such a community. Thus the Shia definition 
of ‘imam’ and ‘imamate’ are close to the Sunni meaning of ‘caliph’ and 
‘caliphate’, although the latter is basically a political position empowered with 
theological roles, while the Shia version is a theological position empowered 
with political roles. Al-imāma al-kubrā (‘greater imamate’) is another name 
for the ‘the caliphate’, while al-imāma as-ṣughrā (‘lesser imamate’) means 
‘leadership of prayers’. In this chapter, I use the term ‘imamate’ to mean the 
organizational duties of imams in the Sunni tradition.
The Quran makes at least f ive references to the term ‘imam’ and ‘imamate’ 
in the sense of a leader of prayers, or leader of the people, or leader of the 
people of the Book.2 The prophetic hadiths also use ‘imam’ to mean a leader 
in prayers, although in one example it is used for the leader of the army.3 
2 See Quran 2:124, 15:79, 17:71, 25:74, and 36:12.
3 Examples of hadiths include: idhā ʾamma aḥadukom al-nāsa fal yukhaff if, fa inna f īhim 
al-ṣaghīr wa-l-kabīr wa al-ḍaʿīf wa al-marīḍ, fa idhā ṣallā waḥda-hu fal yuṣalli kayfa shā’ [When 
any one of you leads the people in prayer, he should be brief for among them are the young and the 
aged, the weak and the sick. But when one of you prays by himself, he may (prolong) as he likes]. 
Sahih Moslem 467 a, The Book of Prayers, 5, Hadith 208; in kānū thalathatan fal ya′ummahum 
aḥaduhum, wa aḥaqquhum bil imāmati ʾaqra′u-hum [If they, believers, are three, one of them 
leads them in prayers, and the most suitable for the imamate is the one who has the Quran by 
heart most], Sahih Moslem, The Book of Who Merits the Imamate, 54, Hadith 1561; wa ʾinnamā 
lʾimāmu junnatun, yuqātalu min warā‘ihi wa yuttaqā bihi [The imam is like a shield whose orders 
should be obeyed when they (the Muslims) f ight, and where they should seek protection. If he 
enjoins fear of Allah and behaves justly, then he will be rewarded, but if he enjoins otherwise, 
then it will be a burden (of sin) on him], Sunan annasa’i, The Book of al-Bay a, Book 35, Hadith 
71, also available at: http://qaalarasulallah.com.
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From the prophetic Sunna, some hadiths that use the word ‘imam’ or its 
roots or derivatives can be listed. Sunni medieval scholars rarely dedicated 
whole chapters to the functions of imams, which were instead covered as 
part of the ‘books’ or ‘clauses’ dedicated to rituals or prayers. In the Sahihs 
of Bukhari and Moslim, the two hadith collections that are considered the 
most authoritative written texts after the Quran, the word ‘imamate’ is 
used in the subtitles of ‘books’ or ‘clauses’.4
The question of Islamic authority and representation has been a topic 
of debate for nearly two centuries, since the start of the modern encounter 
between the two commonly used and abused entities ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’. 
On the one hand, the Orientalist view contends that Islam does not recognize 
the distinction between God and Caesar (i.e., between religion and state 
power), which renders it an outsider to the modern West that builds on the 
Christian tradition. The Islamic world, according to this view, is inherently 
incompatible with the separation of the powers of church and state required 
by the modern world.5 On the other hand stand the defenders of Islamic 
diversity and its potential to adapt to the modern secular age.6 Islamic 
religious authority has commonly been considered autonomous, or at least 
quasi-autonomous even when tamed, from the political powers. That was 
the general case in the medieval Islamic times of caliphates and empires. The 
encounter with the concept of the modern nation-state during the European 
colonial period, and the postcolonial attempts of intellectual-political elites 
to establish Arab-Islamic nation-states have combined the two traditions and 
caused, apparently, a deep theological-philosophical confusion of concepts.7
4 For example, in Saḥiḥ Bokhari, there is a clause entitled abwāb ṣalāt al jamāʿa wal ʾ imāma [Clauses 
on Collective Prayer and the Imamate], and a sub-clause entitled bāb imāmat al‘abd wa-l-mawlā 
[Clause on the Imamate of the Slave and the Freed]. In Sahih Muslem, one finds kitāb al masājid wa 
mawādīʿ al-ṣalāt [Clause on Mosques and Prayer Spaces], and beneath it a sub-title, among other 
entries, bāb man aḥaqqu bi-l-ʾimāma [Clause on Who Deserves the Imamate Most]; here the imamate 
is used as a noun to mean the act of leading prayers. As to the imamate in its meaning of political 
leadership, or what is also known as the ‘great imamate’ or ‘caliphate’, it is referred to as imāra, as 
found in a subsequent Clause in Sahih Moslem, entitled kitāb al-ʾimāra [Book on Imara]. Following 
the same tradition, later scholars entitled some of their chapters or clauses using the word ‘imamate’. 
The Hanbali scholar Ibn Qudama (1147-1223), for example sub-titles his kitāb al-ṣalāt [Clause on 
Prayers] with bāb al-imāma wa ṣalāt al- jamāʿa [Clause on the Imamate and Collective Prayers]. 
(Ibn Qudamah, al-Mughni [The Enricher] (10 vols.) (Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ atturāth al ʿarabiyy, 1985).
5 Among the contemporary ‘Western’ scholars that support this line of thought there is 
Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntignton, Francis Fukuyama, Joseph Schacht, Ernest Gellner, Martin 
Kramer, and Patricia Crone.
6 John Esposito and John Voll, to name but two, represent this perspective.
7 Scholarship on this includes An’naim (2008); El Fadl (2005); Hallaq (2005, 2009); Moosa 
(2009, pp. 158-181); Zaman (2002, 2012).
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The established Islamic view that religious scholarship (led by the 
ulama, be they jurists, muftis, or theologians) supports the just ruler of a 
just society has not been respected during all of Islamic history. Islamic 
empires and dynasties largely allowed the adoption of various madhhabs 
(‘legal schools’) even within a narrow territory or in the same big city, let 
alone in big territories. The waqf (pl. awqāf, ‘endowments’) enjoyed by the 
religious establishment and scholarship resulted in substantial independence 
and quasi-immunity from political interventions and dictates, especially 
regarding issues that were not political (Hallaq, 2013; Winter, 2009).
However, the modern nation-state seeks the centralization of authority, 
which means unifying the legal tradition(s) into statutory laws. Since its 
encounter with ‘Euro-modernity’ through the Napoleonic attempt to conquer 
Egypt (1798-1801) and the later successful attempts at colonialism, the Islamic 
world has entered a phase of hybridization, in which it tries to form modern 
states that still preserve the basic Islamic requirements. The so-called 
incomplete Arab-Islamic ‘Renaissance’ and the failures of Arab-nationalisms 
in the heartlands of Islam have contributed to the fragmentation of Islamic 
religious authority through its cooptation or domestication by the ‘undemo-
cratic’ state. For example, since the era of Egypt’s former President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, Al-Azhar in Cairo has become a state institution, whose 
clerics are now salaried civil servants of the state. Likewise, the Grand 
Muftis of each modern Arab-Islamic state have become state-salaried, and 
nearly each state has created its own Council of Religious Scholars, often 
presided over by the monarch or president of the state. Each state has also 
adopted a single madhhab (‘legal tradition’), and turned it into a pillar of 
the culture of the state (Hallaq, 2013; Lo and Haron, 2015; Maussen, Bader, 
and Moors 2012; Nasr, 2015). The postcolonial states in Islamic societies 
either refer to sharia as the source of their legislation, as in Egypt, or refer 
to Islam as the religion of the state – thereby appearing to give more space 
to legal interpretations and avoiding the statement that sharia is the source 
of legislation – as in Morocco.
The pre-colonial and postcolonial conditions of the imams have not 
raised serious challenges to society and state institutions through their 
profession, particularly because they are not listed as an authority in 
Islamic classical religious scholarship. While the imams of big mosques 
in big cities are usually appointed by the local state authorities, mosques 
of lower status and size are often led by imams who are either appointed 
by the local inhabitants who care about religious matters in their area, or 
are self-appointed in the sense that, since they have learnt (at least some 
of) the Quran by heart, they gradually win the status of a ṭālib (‘seeker 
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of knowledge in the Islamic sciences’) or faqīh (‘learned in the Islamic 
sciences’) within their community. The self-appointed imam starts by 
leading prayers and maybe giving sermons on Fridays, and voluntarily 
durūs (‘teaching/preaching lessons’) on particular days, or gains respect 
during the month of Ramadan when the whole Quran is recited in the 
tarāwīḥ (‘night prayers’) each night after the evening prayers. Traditionally, 
such a religious position does not entitle the imam to payment, as it is f irst 
and foremost a service based on piety. Custom, however, requires that the 
community support the imam f inancially, either directly by handing out 
little amounts of money frequently and also on the occasion of marriages, 
funerals, circumcisions of baby boys, and other religious get-togethers, or 
indirectly by offering the imam a space on the outskirts of the mosque, 
which he can use for his own business and needs. If the mosque and its 
nearby endowments are big enough, the imam may also be given a house 
as a part of his ‘job’.
Both before and during the colonial period, learning (parts of) the Quran 
was part of the education most males received from their local mosques. 
Some would continue their religious education in nearby cities or bigger 
cities in the country, memorizing the whole Quran and learning the other 
sciences that complement its understanding, such as language, tafsīr, and 
hadith. Those who received some higher education but did not complete it 
and receive ijāzas (‘licenses’) of scholarship from the senior ulama, which 
would allow them to enter the club of scholars, could easily become imams 
in big mosques.
During the colonial era, the modern school was introduced. It was not 
welcomed by the masses, though graduates could find jobs in the administra-
tion of the colonial state or with the ally native authorities that continued 
to hold minimal power under colonial rule. In the early colonial period, 
the modern school was not appreciated for two main reasons: f irst, it was a 
school created by colonists, the boycotting of whom was a political statement; 
second, modern schools did not teach Arabic or Islam, or taught them only 
minimally, while the masses cared about the religious education of their 
children. Even when the modern school became part of the new postcolonial 
state institution, the tradition of national schools kept going: before going 
to school in the morning, for instance, kids were obliged to pass by the 
local school (called al-kuttāb or al-massīd in Morocco) to learn some of the 
Quran before going to the modern school. Now modern schools teach Arabic 
and Islam, including the Quran, so there is less need for extra religious 
education – but this need is very present among Muslims in the West, who 
seem to be reviving the process of parallel schooling (i.e. ‘religious/Islamic 
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schools’ in addition to ‘secular’ ones) because ‘secular schools’ do not teach, 
or only teach a little, about their religion.8
After the Second World War, Europe recruited guest workers/labourers 
mostly from the former colonies in the Islamic world. These immigrant-
labourers travelled to the new secular and liberal space of Europe with the 
socio-political and religious background referred to above. In terms of the 
organization of religious institutions and administration of community 
affairs, the immigrants often found themselves functioning in modern new 
territories using traditional practices.
Practicing Muslims or Muslims that identify as such, whether practicing 
or not – the number of which has increased, especially with the second 
generation and the so-called resurgence of Islam beginning in the late 1960s 
and 1970s – would either choose a respected believer to become their leader 
in prayers or, later, sought to import an imam from their own village or city 
in their country of origin. Because religious education in the wider Islamic 
world was still in the making during the postcolonial era, these imported 
imams either had a conservative education and were therefore not open 
to modern state institutions or liberal multicultural society, or they were 
not trained as imams at all, but were laymen who had learnt the Quran, or 
part of it, by heart at madrasas rather than modern schools or universities. 
The latter untrained type of imams could only lead prayers as an extra 
responsibility given by the community or taken up willingly as a divine 
call. The irregular functioning of imams in Western Europe would bring 
challenges and changes to their traditional role in Muslim-majority societies.
State interference in the religious affairs of the immigrant communities 
was also present. The sending postcolonial states of South Asia and the broad 
Middle East and North Africa established their own versions of ‘Embassy 
Islam’ to ascertain the religious identity ties between the diaspora abroad 
and the homeland, and to secure economic benefits through remittances. 
‘Embassy Islam’ also attempted to combat transnational Islam, or ‘Political 
Islam’, which engendered the legitimacy of the political authority of these 
countries back home (Laurence, 2012; see also Laurence, Part I).
At the time, European states were not interested in the religious ques-
tion. The immigrants were guest workers that had to go back after the 
expiration of their work contracts. For this reason, the European state 
found it more convenient to generally ‘outsource’ the care of the religious 
needs of the immigrants to the governments of the sending countries and 
8 More on the Moroccan kuttāb, or madrasa, in Eickelman (2010, pp. 131-148). For an insider’s 
look into the madrasa in modern times, see Moosa (2015).
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petrodollar-rich Gulf states (Laurence, 2006). Employing companies would 
often provide prayer rooms for the workers to avoid their demands for better 
work conditions and higher salaries, and workers would then appoint their 
own imam to lead prayers and do the needed rituals. Friday sermons were 
often prepared by Islamist groups, when the imam of the sending govern-
ment and the hosting state was absent or was not provided (Kepel, 1987).
Especially after the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, European states 
adopted laws to tighten the surveillance of radical movements and preachers 
whose discourses could endanger public security or the public good, and 
some values of liberty and equality. In the process of ‘taming imams’, France, 
for example, deported twelve imams in 2004, some because they did not 
condemn polygamy or the practice of husbands beating their wives. After the 
7 July London bombings in 2005, Britain listed some 50 imams for deportation 
because of statements that endangered public security. Since this was against 
the European Union treaty forbidding the deportation of suspected criminals 
to countries where domestic security and intelligence services employ torture, 
the British government signed contracts with some Middle East governments 
pledging that the detainees would be humanely treated upon repatriation 
(Haddad and Balz, 2010). In 2007, a report requested by the European Com-
mission (DG-Justice, Freedom and Security) and prepared by experts at King’s 
College reported that ‘radical imams’ were no longer the magnates of radical-
ism, and underlined the emergence of new Islamist recruiting militant groups 
that especially operate through Internet recruitment. The new media of the 
Internet, has ‘opened up new spaces of religious contestation where traditional 
sources of authority could be challenged by the wider public’ (Mandaville, 1999). 
This is even so when this religious authority is challenged by religionists in a 
diaspora position, as is the case with (especially young) Muslims in the ‘West’, 
particularly in Europe where Islam and its traditions are being re-interpreted 
and imbued with new meanings (Mandaville, 2001). While a good number of 
sociological, anthropological, and theoretical works read such challenges to 
classical Islamic authority from progressive perspectives, giving them meanings 
that defend the idea of Europeanization of Islam and that Islam is inlandish 
[i.e. at home in Europe] (Allievi, 2003), some tragic events inside and around 
Europe indicate a new regressive appropriation of religious authority. In other 
words, if traditional religious authority can be given different meanings, one 
can be radically violent. This is manifest in the formation of the bloodthirsty 
Islamic State in June 2014, to which a good number of foreign fighters have 
joined from all over the world, including Europe. Out of some 11,000 foreign 
fighters, statistics note 1,500 European Muslims, including women, adolescents, 
born Muslims, and converts (Byman and Shapiro, 2014).
The european iMaM 87
Violent incidents like the 24 May 2014 killing of four people in the Jewish 
Museum in Brussels by Mehdi Nemmouche, a French citizen who had spent 
a year f ighting in Syria, and the 7 January 2015 massacre of Charlie Hebdo 
journalists in Paris by the brothers Kouachi, who belong to the Al-Qaeda 
network in Yemen, exemplify the possible orientations the new meanings of 
religion can take in the age of ‘digital Islam’. To face this challenge, globally 
recognized religious scholars have come together to condemn violence in the 
name of religion, Islam here; some 125 Muslim scholars have come together 
to condemn the birth of the ‘Islamic State’ as not only non-Islamic, but also 
anti-Islamic.9 Muslim religious leaders at the international, national and local 
levels have spoken out against such atrocities (Kuruvilla and Blumberg, 2015). 
Imams themselves have also come out to ‘reclaim the Internet’ from violent 
jihadists (Wyatt, 2015). Female leaders have come out to challenge not only 
violent jihadists, but also the moderately conservative religious authorities 
that do not allow women to lead prayers (El Fadl, 2015; McLaughlin, 2005, 
2012; Taylor, 2015). Another challenge emerges from gay imams, who try to 
provide what they describe as the spiritual needs of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
and transgender Muslims that the broad community of believers fails to 
meet (Jama, 2015; Khan and Waheed, 2013).
3 The Moroccan imam: Submitted, depoliticized, and 
ethicist
Amidst the predicament of who speaks for Islam, models seem a requisite. 
Morocco, a centuries old monarchy that enjoys religious legitimacy, appears 
to be confident of its model of ‘moderate Islam’, in which it has started to 
invest heavily in the last decade through, for example, the recently founded 
King Mohammed VI International Imam Training Center.10 Countries like 
Mali, Tunisia, and France have requested that Morocco provides training 
for their imams, and Belgium has also shown an interest (Alaoui, 2015).11 
9 ‘Open Letter to al-Baghdadi and to the Fighters and Followers of the Self-Declared “Islamic 
State”’, issued 19 September 2014. http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/.
10 ‘King Mohammed VI Inaugurates International Imam Training Center in Rabat in Push to 
Promote Moderate Islam’. Morocco World News, 28 March 2015. http://www.marketwired.com/
press-release/king-mohammed-vi-inaugurates-international-imam-training-center-rabat-push-
promote-moderate-2004480.htm.
11 Also see ‘Belgium, Interested in Morocco’s Imam Training Experience- Minister’. 
Morocco World News, 3 March 2015. http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2015/03/152934/
belgium-interested-moroccos-imam-training-experience-minister/.
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The Moroccan model is institutionalizing the religious training of imams 
to avoid the potential that it could become a tool in the hands of political 
movements that may radicalize or show political dissent, a model that 
appeals to European institutions. Since 2010, the European Council of 
Moroccan Ulema (CEOM), based in Brussels, has used this model. Among 
other aims, the council organizes scholarly seminars on religious issues 
and offers training and guidance for imams throughout Western Europe 
(CEOM, n.d.). This model also guides the Mohamed VI Foundation of African 
Ulema, founded on 13 July 2015 to maintain Morocco’s historical ties with 
(especially sub-Saharan) African Islam.12
Among the state institutions and Islamic councils that have voiced 
concerns about the structure of Islamic authority, the Moroccan Ministry 
of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, led by Dr. Ahmed Toufiq since 2002, 
has clearly underlined the vital religious and political role of imams. This 
declaration was made during Toufiq’s speech to the fifth conference of World 
Religious Leaders in Astana, Kazakhstan, in June 2015. His speech, which 
merits careful consideration here, can be divided into two major arguments, 
the f irst indicates the place of imams in society and their role therein, and 
the second describes a model for training imams to meet socio-cultural, 
religious, and political needs.
Touf iq opened the speech by saying that while religious institutions, 
leaders of religious sects and movements, and religious scholars may be 
the f irst that come to mind when it comes to religious authority, the imams 
that are present in every city, village, and district, and that are thus the 
closest to the people, have the greatest opportunity to make an impact on 
the community. While other religious leaders make decisions at the top 
level, where contact with the people is at a minimum, imams’ tasks bring 
them close to the society: leading the prayers f ive times a day; offering 
durūs (courses on religious teachings); giving Friday sermons; and being 
the community’s religious reference during marriage arrangements and 
consultations, weddings, marriage reconciliations, funerals, circumci-
sion festivities, and the like. Toufiq then underlines the role of imams in 
encouraging peace at various levels, both local and global:
Henceforth, it is obvious that the imam should be taken into consideration 
if religious leaders at the top level want to invest religious teachings and 
their energizing powers and incentives for the sake of serving peace, the 
12 See ‘Mohammed VI Foundation for African Scholars’ at http://www.habous.gov.ma/fr.
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spreading of virtuous values and ethics among people, and the rectif ica-
tion of many a disequilibrium that the world suffers from. (Toufiq, 2015)13
With the imam primarily entrusted with spreading such an ethical perspec-
tive, Touf iq moves on to his second major point: how to train imams to 
uphold such messages and consequently clarify their role in society and 
within religious and political authority. This training model has been tested 
in Morocco, and is being implemented in 50,000 mosques throughout the 
country, according to Toufiq. He outlines his training model in eleven points, 
summarized as follows (Toufiq, 2015):
1 Modernize the organization of ulama (‘religious scholars’) to allow the 
cālim (‘scholar’) to be faithful to the nation’s historical choices of creed, 
madhhab, and customs.
2 Organize the fatwas on public affairs within state scientif ic institutions, 
and consider any fatwa that comes from outside these channels a mere 
personal opinion, which is respected but does not guide the collective 
religious conscience of believers – itself based on a political choice for 
the preservation of the public good and the avoidance of fitna (‘rebellion’) 
and dogma.
3 Connect and harmonize what the ulama and the imams say about the 
references that make the identity of the nation.
4 Consider the state’s laws legitimate for public good, as long as they 
do not contradict a clear ḥukm qaṭcī (‘clear religious jurisprudential 
inscription’).
5 Circulate a guidebook among imams to remind them of the prophetic 
manners of communication and proselytization, to avoid that imams 
attribute their statements to fake names or to personalities outside 
the tradition.
6 Provide extra training to young imams who are graduates from universi-
ties with distinction and learners of the Quran, and appoint them to 
tutor other imams in various mosques.
7 Integrate social sciences into the training programmes for young imams.
8 Provide equal training for murshidāt (‘women religious guides’), who 
provide guidance to women believers.
9 Organize continuous training programmes for already-working imams.
10 The ulama and imams should take the responsibility of not only training 
and preaching, but also practicing lived ethics that are based on ease 
and hope, to be close to the common human condition.
13 The translation from Arabic is mine.
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11 Consider religion a good for all and avoid bringing political disputes 
into religious affairs. This means politically neutralizing mosques and 
upholding the values of mercy, justice, and universal compassion in 
religious discourse.
Three major points from Toufiq’s speech summarize the Moroccan project 
of training and forming imams according to the Sunni Maliki legal madhhab 
and Ash‘ari theology, imbued with a Sufi orientation.
First, imams remain a dependent religious authority. They follow religious 
scholarship, led by the ulama, and cannot compose a new or independent 
body of authority, however important their role becomes. This is the classic 
definition of the place of the imam within religious hierarchy and scholar-
ship. Imams enjoy liberty in their sermons; views that might go against the 
established stream are considered personal views that are not binding to 
the community – views for which the imam may be held accountable by 
the state and its religious authority.
Second, imams, as part of religious leadership, are banned from political 
activities. Imam training follows the overall religious interpretation of 
the country’s ulama for the public good, as ensured by the bayca (‘pact’) 
that bonds the monarchy, ulama, and society at large; in other words, the 
religious authority and the imams that follow it have no (direct) political 
role to play. While religion is an important part of the political legitimacy 
of the state and monarchy, there is now a clear depoliticization of religious 
actors, backed by a royal decree issued in July 2014 that banned religious 
leaders from participating in any form of political activity.14
Third, the major role of imams is to bring ethical sharia into the daily 
life of the believers. Since imams are neither a leading religious authority 
nor political agents, they are focused on applying the dominant view of 
Islam as conceived by the ulama and endorsed and inf luenced by the 
political powers. Imams are preachers of ethics, justice, and compas-
sion, as Touf iq described, and transmitters of moderate Islam. Such 
transmission may not be led by the imams – since they are themselves 
led by the ulama and political authorities – but they play a big role in its 
accomplishment. Because they are the “closest” to the believers, imams 
14 ‘Morocco Prevents Religious Leaders from Participating in Politics’, Al Arabiya News, 
3 July 2014. http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/03/Morocco-prevents-
religious-leaders-from-participating-in-politics.html. It should however be noted that while 
the State forbids religious leaders and imams from politicizing their religious positions, it alone 
enjoys such a right, for example through Friday sermons that it controls and through public TV 
religious festivities.
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are supposed to know how to relay the proper interpretation of religious 
messages according to believers’ levels of understanding. A lot of the 
‘ethicization’, ‘localization’, or ‘nationalization’ of sharia takes place at 
this level. To examine some aspects of the roles of imams in a minority 
context, within a secular-liberal society, the next section considers the 
example of France.
4 The French imam: Dependent, controlled, and 
conciliatory
Two major sociological-anthropological works were published in 2013, each 
a result of six years of f ieldwork: Romain Sèze’s Être imam en France and 
Solenne Jouanneau’s Les Imams en France (Jouanneau, 2013; Sèze, 2013; see 
Jouanneau, Part I, and Sèze, Part II). Their f indings describe the changing 
status of the imam, and depict the transformation of his religious position, 
or newly growing religious authority. Three major themes of this book can 
be summarized as follows:
1 Imams’ lower levels of education and socio-economic status contribute 
to making them dependent on the ulama’s scholarship. Eight out of the 
30 imams that Sèze interviews make the category of what he refers to 
as an ‘imam-labourer’, with very low levels of education or none at all 
(Sèze, 2013, p. 39). This kind of imam is requested by his community of 
workers to lead prayers because he is pious, knows some of the Quran by 
heart, or provides some answers to the social needs of the community. 
The ‘imam-labourer’ in Sèze’s work is close to Jouanneau’s typology of 
the ‘indigenous-invisible imam’, though their typologies differ because 
Sèze focalizes imams while Jouanneau focalizes the imamate and its 
chronological development in France (Jouanneau, 2013, p. 25). Eighteen 
out of 30 imams interviewed by Sèze had a background in religious 
education, which they studied in their country of origin in the Islamic 
world. These imams did not travel to Europe with the intention of 
becoming an imam, but found themselves making a living out of it 
because they had no other choices. They are often more conf ident, 
charismatic, and knowledgeable than ‘imam-labourers’, and thus gain 
more respect in their communities; with time, they may find their way to 
being imams in bigger mosques, in big cities. This type of imam is close 
to what Jouanneau terms an ‘imam of the district’ (2013, p. 69). Finally, 
only one out of the 30 interviewed imams had received a diploma from 
training as an imam in France (Sèze, 2013, p. 75).
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 Imams are not state-funded and do not receive salaries from the state. 
Because they depend on their countries of origin and community as-
sociations for a living, imams are often in a bad economic condition; 
a lot of them do not enjoy health coverage. This impacts their social 
standing: no one wants to be trained as an imam only to f ind themselves 
jobless or badly paid (Sèze, 2013, p. 88) – including the students enrolled 
in the imam-training programme the state has recently tried to of-
fer in cooperation with universities like the one in Strasbourg. This 
also explains the lack of imam-chaplains in the military, prisons, and 
hospitals (Sèze, 2013, p. 122). The dire economic situation of imams is 
especially noticeable among those of Moroccan origins because they 
usually did not enter France intending to become an imam, but end 
up doing it anyway because of the circumstances they f ind themselves 
in. This is very different from their Turkish and Algerian counterparts, 
who are often legal and living in better conditions because of the state’s 
(France) conventions on importing imams from Turkey and Algeria 
(Jouanneau, 2013, pp. 296, 310, 315; Sèze, 2013, p. 47). Overall, imams’ 
lower general education, or non-religious profound education, and 
socio-economic condition contribute to making them dependent on 
ulama scholars – a position that imams have held historically.
2 Politics and state construction of the ‘good imam’. Jouanneau’s work 
with about 30 imams and mosques in the East and South of France 
reaches two main conclusions. First, through her access to numerous 
state archives, statements, and municipal police documents, she found 
out that French authorities have tried to intervene in the internal affairs 
of the Muslim community. For instance, the French state has tried 
to play a role in the selection of imams that would be sent to its ter-
ritories, following the conventions signed with the Turkish and Algerian 
authorities. Imams chosen in this way are what Jouanneau refers to 
as the ‘consular imam’, or what documents from the French authori-
ties refer to as the ‘good imam’ (Jouanneau, 2013, p. 307). The French 
authorities also intervened in the signing of conventions with two state 
universities to train imams (on non-religious/theological issues, since 
the 1905 law does not allow that) – an initiative that has had few results, 
because the training programmes were either boycotted or not trusted 
by the Muslim community and Muslim representative bodies; some of 
these programmes were soon closed, allegedly because of a shortage 
of f inances (Jouanneau, 2013, pp. 296, 310, 315). The French authorities, 
then, do not enjoy having an established religious scholarship, or ulama, 
but do depend on Arab-Islamic authorities for the importation of ‘good 
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imams’ who understand the apolitical position required of them in a 
secular-liberal society.
3 Imams’ role as an identity marker for the community of believers in 
a multicultural-liberal society. Based on the f ieldwork by Sèze and 
Jouanneau, it seems that imams have three separate but related roles in 
Muslim communities in France. Institutionally, the imam co-administers 
the community of believers and is a symbol of its identity; socially, he 
interacts with and is close to the community; and theologically, he 
is an eclectic-ethicist. First, institutionally, the imam does not lead 
the community alone; instead, he co-administers it with the rector or 
director of the mosque, or with the head of the Islamic cultural associa-
tion that is in charge of the prayer hall. Since most imams come from 
Muslim-majority countries, and some from small communities enjoy 
modest educational levels and/or speak little to none of the language of 
the majority society, they are often unable to stand as the spokesperson 
of the community – with the French authorities for legal issues, with 
other religious denominations for religious dialogue and civil society 
activities, or with the media that seeks religious authorities for feed-
back on certain issues concerning Muslims and the rest of society. An 
‘indigenous-invisible imam’, in Jouanneau’s words, or ‘imam-labourer’ in 
Sèze’s, is unable to play the role of the communicator for the community, 
often because of his educational level. Instead, it is the rector of the 
mosque or the director of the association who is often highly educated 
and carries out the tasks of external communications.
 More importantly, the imam becomes the cultural symbol of the com-
munity. He leads prayers, gives Friday sermons, the two cīd (‘feast’) 
sermons, and presides over funerals. He plays the role of a matchmaker, 
in the sense that he knows the community and helps the believers f ind 
partners for marriage; he intervenes in solving family conflicts or cases 
of divorce. The imam also acquires new roles that are related to identity, 
possibly more than roles that are related to the core creed of Islam. One 
example is marriage ceremonies. A number of families hold part of the 
wedding ceremony in the mosque, in the presence of the imam, who 
reads the fātiḥa Quranic verse and blesses the marriage after it has 
gone through civil legal authorization and authentication. Traditionally, 
Islamic marriages are civil and do not require the presence of an imam, 
but only the presence of a legal authority/notary (Sèze, 2013, pp. 115-119).
 Socially, the educated imam interacts constantly with the community 
of believers. After having spent time observing an imam in Assalam 
(anonymous) Mosque, Jouanneau notes that there is interaction in his 
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work; he does not dictate opinions on certain issues the community 
raises. For example, when asked about the permissibility of adopting 
children or listening to music in Islam, the imam gives the mainstream 
and classical Islamic view, and cites the permissibility expressed by 
other Islamic classical scholars, but his interlocutors make their own 
choices in the end, and sometimes make choices a priori. One of the 
women still defends the idea of adoption, and another listens to music 
anyway – though the latter tries to explain her choice by saying that 
she actually watches the Star Academy show featuring talented Arab 
young singers, which is visual; since music is only secondary in this TV 
show, according to her, it is permissible. In other words, she emphasizes 
watching instead of listening as a way of allowing herself to watch the 
musical programme Star Academy (Jouanneau, 2013, p. 454).
 A second example of an interaction between an imam and his community 
was when an imam refused to put a dividing line in the mosque to sepa-
rate women and men, but the community elders and the administrators of 
the mosque erected the divider anyway (Jouanneau, 2013, p. 471).15 A final 
example concerns a woman, a teacher, who, after being on parental leave 
for some years, was considering returning to her job after the French ban 
of the veil. She planned to consult the imam of the mosque, but stated in 
advance that she may not consider what he says, if he were to say that a 
majority of scholars consider the veil mandatory for women – an answer 
she seemed ready to oppose a priori (Jouanneau, 2013, p. 430).
 Theologically, for various reasons, the imam finds himself eclectic and 
ethicist. The imam is in a secular-liberal society, and his discourse has 
to adjust to both the law of the country and the level of religiosity of 
the believers he talks to. Only three out of the 30 imams interviewed 
by Sèze had a license to pronounce fatwas; of these, two were issued 
and recognized by Turkish authorities, and the other was a Shiite imam 
who had a scholarly reputation in Lebanon, and had received a PhD 
from Sorbonne University. This Shiite imam was able to issue fatwas 
and divorce certif icates recognized by Lebanese authorities due to his 
religious scholarship and reputation (Sèze, 2013, p. 141). These imam-
muftis, as well as other imams like the public f igures Tareq Oubrou and 
Hassan Iquioussen, speak of the necessity of an eclectic approach that 
is rooted in tradition but comes from different legal theories – theories 
that, if followed completely, might not accommodate the wide range 
15 Sèze (2013, p. 114) could not access the women’s side, but says they organize their activities 
under the tutelage of men.
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of individual cases and questions that imams receive from believers 
(Sèze, 2013, pp. 188-189, 217).
 The use of eclecticism indicates that one (legal) school of thought 
does not have harmonious or adequate answers for the issues faced by 
believers of various races, genders, ages, and geopolitical belongings. To 
stay rooted in the tradition while adapting to the new secular-liberal 
context, the imam needs to emphasize the aspects of the tradition 
that he considers more basic at the expense of others that the context 
renders obsolete or not applicable, and thus not essential. This is why 
when asked about homosexuality, for example, most of the interviewed 
imams stressed the idea that it is religiously unacceptable, but still 
emphasized the importance of human respect and the rule of law (Sèze, 
2013, pp. 192-193). Sharia law is therefore ethicized (Sèze, 2013, pp. 164, 183, 
212), in the sense that it is considered an ethical responsibility targeting 
the individual and his or her internal communication with God, family 
care and protection, and the environment or outside world with which 
the believer has to be engaged ethically and responsibly in defence of 
social justice (Sèze, 2013, pp. 168-171). Values like respect, forgiveness, 
and dedication at work are emphasized as fundamentally Islamic (Sèze, 
2013, pp. 48, 170). However, this is not the case with all imams. Some 
ambiguities remain for those who do not straightforwardly preach gender 
equality, or who speak derogatively about homosexuality and abor-
tion (Sèze, 2013, p. 164). Broadly, the tone that appears to dominate the 
studied sermons (25 out of 30) is conciliatory, in the sense that it invokes 
eschatological arguments and the world of judgment and punishment 
(al-tarhīb), while also invoking the importance of the here-and-now 
through ethical engagement (al-targhīb) (Sèze, 2013, p. 168).
5 Reflective closure
This chapter shows some of the challenges that Islamic religious authority 
is experiencing in modern times, with a focus on the f igure of the imam in 
European secular-liberal societies. I argue that the imam is a dependent 
figure that adheres to the Islamic religious authority of a particular (political) 
trend and/or madhhab, and to the political institutions governing where 
he functions. The Moroccan model of the imamate is presented by the 
political-religious institution of the country as a way to illustrate the roles 
expected of the imam, especially in times of socio-political instability and 
tension, and the restraints his position entails. I also examine these roles 
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and constraints through some recent socio-anthropological work on the 
French imamate. One of the main aspects of an imam’s agency, within the 
religious-political powers that have influence over him, is the transmission 
of an ethicist message that preserves what he considers to be the core of the 
tradition and avoids going against the overall context in which he works, 
though cases of antagonism and incompatibility continue to be expressed 
by some imams on issues like female leadership and equality.
This argument suggests three main points that require further research. 
First, the imamate is not an independent or organized religious authority 
that can change the discourse on Islam in Europe, and on European Islam, 
unless it is nurtured and influenced by religious-political powers. This in 
no way belittles its fundamental role in the transmission of messages to 
the community of believers with which it is in direct contact, or to the 
community of non-believers when some imams participate in inter-religious 
dialogue initiatives or in the media as representatives of their community 
and religion. Because the imamate is not an independent religious author-
ity, the authorities that influence it should be examined – especially in 
Europe, where the state authorities seem to be more organized and powerful 
than the Islamic religious authorities. That is, the neutrality of the modern 
secular state should be examined to see how far it is influencing the internal 
dynamics of religion and religious actors. At the same time, the religious 
authority that the imam clings to or that influences his thought and work 
has to be examined as well, to understand its sources, be they intellectual 
or f inancial. This can help scholars understand the dynamics of religion in 
modern contexts, including state institutions, bilateral agreements between 
European and Arab-Islamic countries, and transnational movements.
Second, the message of ethics also needs more examination. Ethics 
appears to have become an important discourse among theologians, 
philosophers, and engaged scholars trained in traditional seminaries and 
modern universities. The fact that the European imam, as a possible new 
agent in religious authority, seems to be adopting this ethicist discourse 
may gradually herald a paradigm shift in the ‘episteme’ of European Islam 
(Hashas, 2014, pp. 14-49). Put otherwise, is this ethicist message an approach 
that is rooted in the tradition itself while being re-appropriated, or it is a 
new development required by text and context? Who influences this new 
direction: the religious authorities in Europe, the ones ‘back home’ outside 
Europe, state interference, or all of these factors? Are imams transform-
ing Islamic theology and law in a bottom-up approach, or are they mere 
transmitters of its modern internal dynamics? And what is the place of 
female leader-imams?
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Third, the role of imams and their ethicist messages intertwine with the 
issues of integration (especially of Muslim youth) and the construction of 
new meanings of being European. Religion in this sense becomes a way to 
fuse various identities together for a better feeling of citizenship. But can the 
imam in his mosque and community do that alone? What about the school 
and curricula, the media, and the mainstream European externalization of 
Islam? Has the imam failed to transmit his ethicist message to the European 
foreign f ighters in Syria and Iraq? Or, as a dependent authority, does he f ind 
himself unable to do much? These issues remain to be studied, and can shed 
light on the profound and at times invisible roles a minor religious authority 
can or cannot play, and through which that authority either increases or 
decreases. Imams act within a local and national geography in which other 
factors and agents intervene.
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Abstract
This chapter examines the various religious trends in European Islam 
by identifying examples of leadership and highlighting areas where 
trends interact to construct a training agenda for imams. It highlights 
the schematized training spaces that intellectually nourish the individual 
beliefs of particular citizens of Muslim faith, who are considered sources 
of future Muslim discursive practices. These discursive practices, in 
turn, can be considered tools for future religious leaders who seek to 
reconstruct the dominant Islamic discourse in Europe. Several major 
intertwining elements are studied in this chapter: mosques, imams, 
space and identity dynamics, actors of Islam and the construction of 
leadership, the formation of authority in European Islam, and the training 
of imams in Europe.
Keywords: Muslim citizenship, f iqh of contextualities, f iqh of priorities, 
religious authority, fragmentation of authority
1 Introduction
What do imams preach in their sermons? How can we f ight religious 
radicalization? How can we develop an environmentally friendly Islam of 
modernity that is in line with existing constitutions? How can we deal with 
Muslim countries without running the risk of political interference into the 
fabric of their faithful subjects? How can we achieve an aggiornamento of 
Islam for and by Muslims? (Arkoun, 2012). Each of these questions is likely 
to provoke different policies and inspire observers, institutional Muslims, 
and the stakeholders who are directly involved in the training of imams, to 
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weigh the political and sociological paradigms suggested for understanding 
European Islams and to plan the construction of a single Islamic agenda 
congruent with Western democracy (Abou El Fadl, 2004; Dassetto, 1996).
Viewed in all of its complexity, the Gordian knot of the debate about 
Islam in Europe remains an issue of philosophical, theological, and 
epistemological order. Training religious leaders in Europe is almost 
analogous to directly touching the construction of a semiotics of faith, 
which involves considering the selection of methodologies, the choice of 
scientif ic disciplines, and the f iltering of theological currents. In other 
words, the project consists of a certain degree of interference into the 
religious mechanisms that (re)def ine the European representations of 
Islam’s overall future function. It goes without saying that the persistent 
need of an urgent functional effect in the present implies that the various 
actors involved in the project of training imams are not always aware 
of the scope of their interference into the future. This blind spot merits 
serious ref lection and indicates the need to implement a programme of 
religious training that can build a structural platform, religious reform, 
and the formation of what might be called an ‘Islam of tomorrow’ – a kind 
of training model corroborated by consequent analyses that commits to 
prof iling a functional corporatism of imams recognized by such training 
(Filali-Ansary, 2003).
The bulk of the reflections that feed on existing experiences to foster types 
of religious studies in Europe has led to a complex stream of readings of 
mainstream policies, guidelines, methods, contents, and training pedagogies, 
including training professionals in functional religious matters. In this 
chapter I propose to develop an examination of the alternative religious 
trends in European Islam (Leveau, 1998; Roy, 1999), identifying examples 
of leadership and highlighting areas where these trends could interact to 
construct a training agenda for imams (Mahmood, 2006). In other words, I 
try to highlight the currently active, schematized training spaces that intel-
lectually nourish the individual beliefs of particular citizens of the Muslim 
faith, and take them as sources of future Muslim discursive practices – as 
tools to shape further future religious leaders. I also explain how media 
tropes have been squarely remodelled, shifting attention from random 
religious practices within the local community to the rhetorical voices of 
religious leaders or counsellors (Oubrou, 1998). The focus of training entails 
not only a return to religious sources, but also an attempt to (re)construct 
a dominant Islamic discourse in Europe. The role of religious leaders is 
therefore not limited to a simple response to their own community’s affairs. 
Rather, they are required to act as credible interfaces between a quickly 
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changing society and congruent religious aff iliations in action. Individu-
als with this type of prof ile do exist; nonetheless, the drafting of projects 
that are structurally designed for this purpose intensif ies the necessity of 
redesigning an effervescent context around Islam per se and leaving open 
the prospect of a particular European Islam in the making.
2 A mosque’s spotlights
Delving into the reality of the cultural unconscious of European Islam, we 
cannot help coming to terms with a variety of religious experiences – itself 
a challenge to highlight an engineering management of training projects. 
Diversity involves national, cultural, religious, and linguistic aspects. On the 
one hand, the framework of ethnicity is very important and does impact the 
religious habitus within mosque premises. Discrepancies between European 
Muslim groups continue to play a role at the level of religious institutions 
within different cults, which is clearly manifest on large ethno-religious 
maps, prescribing trendy and diverse religious discourses. This diversity 
demands a wide typology of imams or religious leaders, including the leading 
f igures from European Muslim associations. On the other hand, even the 
second and third generations of European Muslims have not produced many 
transnational Muslims who bridge different points of views, tendencies, 
and agendas. The debate over a common language and identity politics is 
also pending. Although language can bring together generations of converts 
and justify a coherent training programme, the inherent divergences are 
still powerful. Even if emerging actors of the religious fabric may seem to 
be effective at mediating the different sub-groups, a standard encounter 
remains a forlorn exception.
So far, the reality of Islam in the European cultural landscape is the 
outcome of a three-step transformation. We have gone from Muslims as a 
temporary presence, resulting in the discovery of other peripheral transits, 
to the expectation of acculturation and political calls for social integration. 
The religious component of this socialization into European society was 
initially dominated by specif ic ethnic markers, but it has ultimately gone 
on to establish other identity markers,1 entailing a degree of awareness of 
1 The f irst signif icant expressions were thus focused on exclusively ritual aspects, nested in 
imported cultural forms. Building up Islam in a new and largely non-Muslim context was, at 
the time of the arrival of Muslims in Europe, complicated by attachments to the particularities 
of immigrants’ language, ethnic, or national origin and non-European cultures.
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the existing Other2 and hence legitimizing the f inal cohabitation between 
various religious dimensions and interpretations.
Viewed in this light, the outstanding visibility of Islam is further expressed 
through the explicit re-joining of nascent religious dimensions. Ultimately, 
rooting an Islamic epistemology in Europe requires the culmination of a 
long trajectory of social and political insertions. The latest trend discloses 
a complicit maturation of the inaugural presence and a more confirmed 
status of a novel self in Europe. We have thus tended to move from the study 
of a silenced Muslim presence to that of the manifest, voiced outburst of a 
religious movement, collectively and gradually organized around mosques, 
which seeks to develop a theological-canonical approach that will reflect a 
new Muslim semiosis in the European context. The slow process of growing 
a ritualized, normative, intellectual, and institutional presence has been 
constructed according to circumstantial conditions, reinforced by trial-
and-error experimentation and a checks-and-balance positioning in the 
European context.
Changes in who represents Muslims in Europe on a given axis (e.g. foreign 
labour, immigration, social integration, citizenship, and the like) have 
fostered the (re)consideration of new centres of interest for the collective 
unconscious of an Islamic cross-border cause. Initial training platforms 
coincide, on the one hand, with the process tracing the roots of Muslim pres-
ence in the European context, thus breaking with the migration trajectory 
that would normally lead to the next step of citizenship, and, on the other 
hand, with the emergence of a Muslim youth that is in search of broader 
Islamic references. This swift change of perspective differs from religious 
transmission within the family and home, converging with intergenera-
tional congruity and local community narratives (i.e., lectures, sermons, 
schooling, mentoring, and the like). Mosques, for example, were originally 
proclaimed to be functional spaces where identities pool in the search for 
religious observance, spiritual peace, reassurance, counselling, orientation, 
and a quest for self-assertion and self-preservation. This reading takes us 
back to the 1960s and 1970s, when we witnessed a statutorily unregulated 
population that was confronted, in an unprecedented way, with non-Muslim 
European communities and societies. At that time, the urgent need arose to 
adopt new strategies or principles and invoke new benchmarks to gradually 
2 The visible presence of Muslims in Europe has actually been reinforced since the beginning 
of the 1960s through the migratory cycle of foreign labour, which helped in the reconstruction 
of post-war Europe. A young population from North African countries, the Balkans, Pakistan, 
and Turkey was the main population of Muslim origin in a number of European countries.
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re-appropriate the European cultural mindset. To contend with this new 
process of integration, Muslims in Europe gathered vocational imams from 
villages and the countryside of their home countries, who were stuck in 
traditional roles and needed time to evolve. These imams were hampered 
by deeply inconsistent societal expectations, and in their isolation sought to 
play the role of guardians of the temple. Therefore, they could only take on 
the role of moral safeguards and proponents of the traditions upheld by the 
subconscious of generations of expatriates, feeding on their spiritual angst 
and perpetuating therapeutic kinds of religious healing and cultural rituals.
These ‘ritual coaches’ were originally young, single imams whose civic role 
started with monitoring the Muslim workers who were economic migrants, 
eventually becoming counsellors for migrant Muslim families. Mosques then 
became a space for family planning and, in the process, adopted a discourse 
that was highly identity-focused. There were structural instabilities in these 
new functions and integral dynamics of the professions of imams, as clearly 
highlighted in Profession imam by the French imam Tareq Oubrou (2009; 
see also Baylocq in Part II).
The contested status of imams by the mosque structures, discrepancies 
between ethnic-community and moral duties, and the instability of the 
imams’ contractual commitments are all parts of imams’ functioning and 
malfunctioning. This precarious reality of spiritual leaders or coaches 
calls for the development of a system of rotation, in which imams could 
move from one mosque to another as requested by the representatives of a 
board of mosques where momentary modalities would be negotiated by a 
committee of imams. Religious trends, sermon content, preaching styles, 
relational aff inities, involvement with the mosque’s contributors, and wages 
were the main motivations behind the development of such a rotational 
system and the increased mobility of imams. Confined to their assigned 
mosque appointments, imams were likely to become more visible in their 
cities. Many Muslim advocates of district imams supported the requirement 
for imams to have strong cultural capital so as to be able to deal with the 
required level of internal and external duties.
Returning to the issue of transferring knowledge to the youth, considered 
the Achilles heel of serene religious transmission, I argue that religious 
schooling has to be f irst discussed in respect to the linguistic, ethnic, 
religious, and cultural indicators of the host country. Then comes the task 
of searching for a cultural environment that can ensure the vitality of 
religious practices during successive immigration stages. New dynamics will 
eventually be developed by upcoming generations that will make religion 
a local form of self-assertion, both in the visibility of worship, ceremonies, 
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rituals, and practices and in the production of Islamic teachings that are 
reconsidered from within European cultural praxis.
The pioneering spaces of training, the intense mobility and low cost 
of Islamic sciences, and the ample investments and involvements of ap-
plicants for training programmes have resulted in structuring the admission 
requirements for religious education/knowledge in Europe. The highly 
skilled scholarship taught in these programmes, meant to empower the 
Islamic sciences, have been reinforced by organizational programmes, the 
management of educational, f inancial, and real estate institutions, teaching 
practicums, the mobility of teaching staff, and the selection criteria, moral 
pre-requisites, and expectations of the students themselves (El Asri, 2011a).
An analytical deconstruction of the content of the training practicums, 
assigned from the agreed curricula, should take time into account. Indeed, 
a short chronology of religious training in Europe indicates that each 
programme falls into distinct pathways that are dictated by current needs 
and trends (El Asri, 2006). The environment and development of training 
conditions strongly determine the nature and type of teaching experiences. 
We can, for example, set aside the proposals for Arabic curricula, which 
are traditionally open to the public, and instead favour proposals that 
promote functional training, which tends to match the expectations of 
potential students. It is now possible to detect an emerging market request-
ing customized Islamic vocational training in Europe. To support this 
tangible need for qualif ied professionals in religious training, the existing 
experimental programmes of Islamic schooling in Europe should be updated 
and maintained in response to the changing profiles of potential candidates 
(El Asri, 2015a).
3 Imams’ timeline
Taking into account the migration trajectory foregrounds a number of 
changes in religious discourse and project reports with respect to the 
historicity of Islamic discourse and its symbolic manifestations. This 
retrospective reading allows us to understand which contents of Islam 
will work towards the implementation of Islamic education programmes 
in Europe and assessments of candidates for the chairs of Quranic schools 
and mosques. The early situations of Muslims in Europe indicate that their 
status, added to the remoteness of their country of origin, awakened in 
them an interest in religion and Arabic as a way to recapture a distorted 
and/or lost identity (El Asri, 2011b). This has increasingly reduced their 
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expectations from broad religious scholarship to mere utilitarian worship, 
family protectionism, and the dream of a reconstruction of a fading sense 
of national belonging to the country of origin. The double exposure to 
different cultures evokes an identity split resulting in a two-fold quest: to 
reconstruct the bits left there (in the country of origin) and reunite them 
with the others built here (in Europe). The pioneering Muslim generation 
thus projected a Europeanized Islam as an extension of the original Islam 
practiced back home, which they fear has experienced a certain shortness 
of breath in the conservation of traditional practices, especially during 
generational transitions.
The second stage concerns the socialization of Muslims in their endeavour 
to fulfil the citizenship requirements of their host countries (Maréchal and El 
Asri, 2012). The ‘masters’ of Islam are then ascribed the role of spokespersons 
who offer a renewable representation of an imagined Islam. The expected 
image is that of a sensible, pure Islam, rooted in national languages and 
perceived as a devout and intelligent creed that can defend Muslim subjects 
(to counter the controversial perception of Islam that has been distorted 
through biased media reports). This demand for representation explains 
the success of the ongoing conferences and the logic of identity assertion. 
Knowledge of elite authorship thus translates a close understanding of social 
realities, including the reorientation or rectif ication of popular culture. The 
dissemination of knowledge is thus f iltered through a discursive dialogic 
of moral and pedagogical interfaces.
The existing analyses of successful ‘merchants of knowledge’ who 
market services or products based on Islamic scholarship to European 
Muslim masses show that demand is gradually shrinking due to a grow-
ing pragmatism of cultural practices and socio-religious issues that cross 
into the everyday worries and anxieties of Muslims (El Asri, 2012). We can 
concur that the expectation a synthesis between ‘how to be a Muslim’ per 
se and ‘how to be a European Muslim’ remains a temporal rather than 
spatial semiosis of intent. These moments of desire for a strong identity 
and nostalgic therapy continue to dominate the transcultural landscape, 
despite the growing unconditional knowledge acquisitions within specif ic 
lifestyles and realities. Spaces of reflection and production of theologies, 
disconnected from social anchors, are still perceived as a luxury. Therefore, 
a number of sites of theological reflection are being sacrif iced on the altar of 
eschatological preaching and ordinary community services like marriage, 
divorce, and disputes over property ownership. The current bestsellers 
in ‘Islamic libraries’ deal mostly with these issues. The social value of 
Islamic knowledge can therefore only contribute to its pragmatic appeal. 
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The question worth asking at this stage is how to deterritorialize these 
new mind-sets via ascending critical perspectives. In other words, can we 
afford a fundamental epistemological deconstruction of Islamic knowledge 
through the critical construction of a hybrid Muslim identity?
4 Space and identity dynamics
If we consider the question of training youth in Islam, we cannot help but 
discard the issue of European space and the evolution of its def inition 
through a complicit religious discourse and Muslim representations (Sellam, 
1998; Turki, 1998). The peculiarity of the Muslim presence in Europe requires a 
particular legal expertise and provides the key to a dialogical understanding 
that can create a viable standpoint for Muslims. The stakeholders involved 
in the development of Islamic training should take different perspectives 
into account, as well as the legal-canonical context. Again, different religious 
paradigms have integrated to form an untested ‘archaeology of faith.’ From 
an Islamic point of view, a schematized Europe would allow the application 
of jurisprudential accounts and the legitimization of fatwas prescribed by a 
legal view of European reality. A classif ication of areas of knowledge, each 
prescribed according to specif ic contexts, should be developed in their con-
temporaneity and integrated into the historicity of European scholarship. We 
talk about a fiqh al-wāqiʿ (‘f iqh of contextualities’), fiqh al-awlāwiyyāt (‘f iqh 
of priorities’), and fiqh al-aqaliyyāt (‘f iqh of minorities’) – all independent of 
the dominant sharia matrix – to propose deductive, practical, and applied 
legal provisions in contexts in which Muslims are considered to be minorities 
(Al-Alwani, 2007). The concept of ‘minority’ can be further criticized as a 
factor in psychosocial ghettoization, provided that these urban extensions, 
which serve as a way to understand a multi-layered context, function mostly 
as healing management tools. Religious annotations are used to draw on legal 
exceptions in the past to develop viable fatwas for European Muslims. The 
context and newly introduced facts, such as the headscarf ban, bank credit, 
and marriage with non-Muslims, put the flexibility of Islamic law to the test 
just as much as the resources deconstructing traditional hindrances do.3
3 As early as 1970, Zaki Badawi, one of the leading f igures of British Islam, initiated debate 
on the practical management of the experiences of Islam, focusing particularly on the issue of 
inheritance and women’s testimony. Imam Tareq Oubrou describes a denser relationship between 
the theological sources and the secular context of France, outlining a theory of the contraction 
of sharia into secularization through the concept of ‘sharia of minorities’ (Oubrou, 1998).
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Besides the dominance of highly codif ied Islamic knowledge, in practice 
interpretative literature focusing on metonymic readings or allegorical 
meanings has emerged. The questioning of the compartmentalization of 
disciplinary boundaries is becoming more common and invokes a multidis-
ciplinary approach. At the same time, deconstructionist and epistemologi-
cal questioning tends to favour empirical readings of the Muslim world. 
The critical works of Mohamed Arkoun (d. 2010) and Nasr Abu Zayd (d. 
2010) fall within this trend. Thus, the question of the overflow of the legal 
framework, which ensures the viability of the institutions and practices of 
Islam, proclaims the exit of the permissible and the forbidden and opens 
up debate on the concept of maṣāliḥ (‘advantages’) – equivalent to the 
logic of a common homogeneity or grammar of the ‘forms of thought’, as 
def ined by Kenneth Burke (1969) – which overlooks the closed readings of 
the fuqahā’ (‘Muslim jurists’) and conventional imams. The crisis of Islamic 
discursivity in Europe testif ies to the palpable tension between mainstream 
narratives and the expectations of the new Muslim readership. While no 
call for the reinvention of the core Islamic legacies has yet been made, a 
post-identity approach could make new theological prospects possible in this 
new context. The particularity of European Muslim mainstream theology 
allows for irregularities in religious scholarship. How can we perceive of 
Islamic training in such a context? Should we consider dialogized training 
in the legal concept of minority, for example? Or, on the contrary, should we 
privilege approaches that encourage historical-critical readings?
5 Profiling actors of Islam
In any social group, and more specifically in any religious system, leadership 
is crucial for guiding the development of the community in question (El Asri, 
2009). Religious leadership performs various functions: improving social 
cohesion, promoting resources, managing social relations with the divinity, 
producing knowledge, and transmitting religion to the next generation.
As it is organized in Europe, Islam seems to be associated with appointing 
leaders first, then other intermediary actors and groups, and finally through 
considering new influences. The fact that Muslim leaders, trained in Muslim 
countries that are at the forefront of pure Islam, come on stage through socio-
cultural praxis also presupposes the appearance of new figures, new leaders – a 
fact that introduces into Europe the concerns of Muslim countries, including 
their own vision of the present state of things and claims that European 
society is not considered particularly functional or appropriate to their needs.
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Similarly, we have lately begun to note the return of members of the 
second generation of immigrants after studying the Islamic sciences in 
Muslim countries, all of whom are aware that their studies cannot be 
continued in Europe. This return with an Islamic background that cannot 
easily be adapted for the new socio-cultural environment in which they 
f ind themselves is even more important because extremist Salaf i groups 
could easily inf luence it. In other words, European Islam continues to 
be affected by the dynamics of a global Islam, in this case the global 
tributaries of Islams (Cesari, 2014). Nevertheless, European Islam is not 
only imported, but also imprinted by actors born in European territory 
(Dassetto, 1996).
The internal organization of European Islam is never f inalized; leaders are 
few, and the board of scholars is constantly being reconstituted. Populations 
are not yet ready to take full possession of their rights in the European 
public space of their host countries, and a large number of Muslim citizens 
remain hampered by daily diff iculties and incessant feelings of insecurity. 
The political drive to develop a training practicum of imams, chaplains 
in prisons, and creed consorts spells out the priorities of the government, 
which does not guarantee a healthy construction of self-projection in the 
near future (El Asri, 2015b).
Steps towards grasping the paradigms of Islamic practice are schematized 
by the social recession and other urgent matters. Though the process of 
precipitation might sometimes offer interesting creative outcomes, the 
result is generally much more complex. European, and especially French, 
Islam, for example, gains momentum from a politically correct narrative; 
if the issue of Islam is submitted to the heat of unfriendly news lobbies, it 
is likewise too often tampered with based on election agendas.
6 Muslim leadership in construction
Compared to other religions like Roman Catholicism, European Islam does 
not have a rigid structure with a monopoly on legitimate power. In Muslim 
societies there are clear-cut authorities that derive their legitimacy from 
acquired religious scholarship (the ulama), or whose legitimacy is delegated 
to them by a public authority (Muslim jurists, even if some of them are also 
regarded as scholars). These include the murshids (‘guides’) or Sufi masters, 
who are legitimized by their spirituality. These leaders exert their power de 
facto and cannot claim to be part of a monopoly with respect to a hierarchy 
or more legitimate religious authority.
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The development of a school syllabus with an educational agenda, 
coupled with empowering mass communication systems such as satellite 
transmissions and social media, have signif icantly changed how leadership 
is developed in Muslim countries. New leaders appear on the boards of 
traditional structures of Islamic universities and in other public arenas of 
the brotherhood networks. In their transfer to the European context, a large 
number of these religious leaders have become popular public f igures, such 
as Larbi Kechat in Paris, Tahar Toujgani in Antwerp, and Adnan Ibrahim 
in Vienna. Each of these leaders was trained in Islamic sciences and only 
afterwards introduced to European cultural models. They may be known 
as the isolated leaders of immigrants, or might be recognized by Islamic 
organizations. Other leaders are members of international Islamic agencies 
within their home countries, whose agenda they represent and implement 
in Europe; the work of the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) 
in Europe is a major example of this. In most cases, these leaders exercise a 
certain degree of bureaucratic authority, bolstering their eff iciency through 
their relationship with the structure that has mandated their role, and are 
sometimes supported by European state agencies (like the Muslim World 
League and the Turkish Diyanet, the Directorate of Religious Affairs). Some 
leaders are part of the political fraternities of students who complete gradu-
ate studies in Europe, but upon returning home resort to Islamic activities 
(whether as their main activity or a separate professional project). While 
some are self-taught, others have received hasty and intensive Islamic 
training. All claim to be, often more or less, experts in disciplines like 
medicine, economics, sociology, agriculture, and information technology, 
to name but a few.
Another type of leader, like Tareq Oubrou in Bordeaux, consists of indi-
viduals who have been able to cross into European territory through mixed 
marriages since the 1980s. Immigration through marriage and family reunion 
has become a common strategy to access Europe. Some of these leaders 
acquired their socialization in religious studies in their country of origin in 
the 1980s; after marriage, the newlyweds transferred their knowledge and 
religious expertise into their European lifestyle. While certain leaders have 
even been born, bred, and immersed in European culture, immigrants have 
had their own leaders since the moment Islam arrived in post-World War II 
Europe. It was the older generation of immigrants (often retirees, sometimes 
victims of work accidents and social security recipients) who received more 
Quranic training from an early age and undertook organizational tasks in 
Europe, including the role of imam in the prime prayer rooms. Starting in 
the mid-1990s, the younger generation from immigrant families, but who 
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were educated or even born in a European country, began to play a more 
important role on the European Islamic scene. Some examples of leaders 
from this second generation are Yacob Mahi, Rachid Haddach, and Mustafa 
Kastit in Brussels. These new leaders were so successful that a generational 
conflict seems to have divided the ‘founding fathers’ and other pioneer 
immigrants who still exercised authority from the younger generation, 
whose leaders wished to invest in a future European Islam.
Thanks to study grants and research partnerships, some of these young 
Muslims were able to f inance their studies and training in Muslim countries, 
where courses are offered in traditional Islamic universities (Zeytouna 
in Tunis, Al-Azhar in Cairo, Al-Qarawiyyine in Fez), as well as in Turkish 
universities, in Saudi universities, and in the madrasas of Pakistan. Some 
were also able to undertake internships with Muslim NGOs and state institu-
tions. After their studies, some of these young Muslims returned to Europe 
and began to play an active role in European Islam.
Another category of leaders consists of European converts to Islam like 
Franck Amin Hensch in Verviers or Dawud van Beveren in Brussels. Apart 
from the well-known public f igures in politics, cinema, sports, and music, 
a large number of common men and women, often young, are attracted by 
Islamic teachings and choose conversion. Of course, these new converts 
to Islam do not all aspire to be leaders. For many of them, the conversion 
is desirable for mystical or spiritual reasons involving no public action 
whatsoever. Others still adhere to a spirit of intellectual, organizational, and 
political leadership that lead them, in their dual positioning, to undertake 
great responsibilities in the European settlement of Muslim populations, 
particularly with respect to leading the scholarship on how to bridge Islamic 
creed and embrace public activism.
7 The construction of a religious authority for European Islam
The current political predicaments that have brought the crisis of Islam to a 
global scale raise the sensitive issue of authority. The new presence of Islam 
in Europe addresses this issue as a small, original case, but it can indicate 
the reflexive tracks that can be applied to a larger scale. We consider this 
reflection on the authority and training agenda in Europe to be a potentially 
malleable experience, rather than an isolated concern confined by its so-
ciological and geographic specif icity. The legitimacy of Muslim intellectual 
authority in Europe is assessed above all based on scholarly training. This 
legitimacy varies according to the scholar’s degree of connection to the 
imam training in europe 113
Muslim reality and the depth of their scriptural lineage. The conventional 
transmission of knowledge from master to disciple and credentials from 
traditional universities retain strong symbolic capital in the assignment 
of authority. Places of seniority and the direct transfer of Islamic sciences 
to others by the Islamic scholars remain the symbols of authenticity from 
which a genealogy of authority has developed.
The relocation of young Muslim Berliners or Londoners to places of 
knowledge in Islamic lands is therefore explained by the lack of local 
supply, but also by an inappropriate natural breeding-ground for what 
will make up authority. A case in point is a bachelor’s degree in theology 
from the university in the collective mind-set of Muslims. The relentless 
reasoning that continues to forge Muslim representation is that authority 
must be sought outside of Europe. This is true despite major political turmoil 
across the Arab world, which has given birth to a good number of so-called 
natural, in the sense of non-organized, religious authorities through the ijāza 
(‘license’) system offered by a known scholar or sheikh to new graduates. 
Many of them are newly perceived as seraglio authorities in perpetual loss 
of credibility and legitimacy. The interweaving of Islam and politics has 
tinged the credentials of muftis in Egypt, sheikhs in Syria, scholars from 
the Gulf countries, and popular media preachers, tainting their reputation 
through their audience’s mistrust (El Asri, 2012).
In addition to the religious training curriculum necessary in European 
Islam, religious authority draws on community experiences. The authority 
of theologians or Muslim intellectuals in Europe is a social construc-
tion prompted by mediators and faith managers. It is the outcome of 
individuals’ interpretations and readings, ranging from the modes and 
production of concrete holy texts to their pragmatic earthly use. The 
leaders produce ideas in communion with the community’s customized 
needs as well as for public consumption more broadly. They interact 
with reality and may gradually gain recognition from the public. Since 
the 1990s, the construction of the status of Muslim scholars and intel-
lectuals has changed. These are now intellectuals who weigh political, 
economic, and religious aff iliations at the crossroads of valuable formal 
training. The training programmes led by public institutions or formed 
by Muslim organizations are channels that fuel the emergence of well-
trained religious f igures and intellectuals from Muslim backgrounds. The 
teaching of Islamic and social sciences initiated in 2015 by the Exécutif 
des Musulmans de Belgique (Council of Muslims in Belgium) and the 
Faculty of Theology of the Catholic University of Leuven is one example 
of work in this direction.
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In examining the sociological reality of Muslim leaders in Europe one 
soon realizes that the process of fragmentation and proliferation of religious 
authority is inherited from Islam’s various contexts (Gaborieau and Zeghal, 
2004). A theological contest has been launched between ‘traditional Islam’ 
and ‘modern Islam’, extending most particularly to the divide between 
the intellectual and traditional ulama. However, there is the possibility of 
challenging the authority of each of these groups based on the legitimacy of 
their training, thus ensuring the continued internal criticism of scriptural 
sources and Islamic teachings.
The Muslim religious landscape shows signif icant fragmentation of 
religious authority, resulting in a segmentation of public audiences. The 
process of individualization of Muslims arises in this cacophonous situation 
(Roy, 1999). The entry of Islam into secularized European cultural space, 
which is specif ically tailored towards the importance of individual choices, 
reveals poignant differences of religious orientation. This individualization 
is caused by the gradual breakdown of ethno-religious referents to imagined 
sources. One of the major intellectual challenges is to rethink the multiplicity 
of forms of membership, their relative autonomy, and the profound unity 
of the Muslim community. The umma-egocentres operate in the religious 
f ield through the trial of identities, where new dictates of the self are (re)
constructed. This growing individualization that leads to an Islamic text 
in the f irst person causes the impact of authority to erode; leaders become 
mediators between the diff iculty of accessing sources (including language 
barriers) and the choice of individual orientations. New converts draw 
on a variety of religious offerings, including a blurred typology of Islamic 
leaders. They have a plethora of choices between the conservatives, school 
mentors, secularists, liberals, radicals, ‘new thinkers’, literalists, and so on.
This trend still demonstrates a shared intellectual reality between the 
in-house authors, who produce an extension of the hermeneutics of religious 
texts, and the advocates of an unconditional hermeneutics dictated by 
interpretative purity. This approach to theological literature and the required 
hermeneutical efforts have yielded stringent problems within Islam in 
Europe. It is worth asking, then, whether it is better to develop a training 
practicum that grants participants a single choice, or one that allows them 
to adopt different approaches.
In light of this question, we should note that there is a category of 
theologians who advocate a hybrid curriculum, inspired as much from 
theology as from the social sciences (El Asri, 2015a). They propose new ways 
of understanding religious texts beyond the conventional interpretative 
pamphlets. These voices stand out as proponents of exceptional prof iles, 
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which are increasingly solicited by Muslim trainees, and whose teaching 
portfolios attract certain training projects related to applied theology. This 
issue of profiles and guidelines emphasizes the ultimate end of the training 
beyond oratorical advances of the urgent f ight against radicalization.
Muslim audiences are looking for a relatively easy way to meet their needs 
provided by leaders with multidisciplinary profiles. This analysis is based on 
our follow-up of the continuous training offered at the Catholic University of 
Leuven from 2007 to 2017 in a course entitled ‘Social and religious sciences: 
Islam in the modern world’. Some 500 students that have gone through this 
training believe that the allocation of religious authority must now reflect a 
mastery of the complexities of related issues. We are far from the imprints 
of the f irst trends installed in Europe, which have been in rupture or which 
were subjected to a repositioning against Islamist ideologies of the 1960s, and 
closer to an overflow of the historicized and contextualized interpretation of 
texts for religious purposes. The progressive decline of judicial and normative 
approaches to Islamic authority implies the necessity of moving away from 
religious formalism. More objectivist approaches and multidisciplinary 
methods of reading Islam are gaining ground in the implementation of an 
Islamic discursivity, despite the surge in literalist readings that is clearly 
visible in some Muslim groups and associations.
8 Towards a scrutiny of Islamic training projects in Europe
Support for the spiritual and rational credentials of religious scholarship 
has, to different degrees, affected local communities in Europe. Drafted 
for and adapted to changing circumstances, and gradually legitimized 
through progressive academic and institutional programmes, religious 
training packages show a curve of nascent trends, as well as projections 
of a new Islam. Apart from sermons and religious preaching at mosques, 
there are three basic configurations of religious training: (1) within private 
circles in Europe; (2) expatriation to a Muslim context; and (3) in-between, 
i.e. anywhere where training is (or was) done in Europe, including cases 
where certif ication was acquired through an internship-based immersion 
in a religious authority (El Asri, 2006).
Private circles are informal, sometimes spontaneous, and often of a 
nuclear nature. Seminar circles called ḥalaqāt, which are similar to types 
of Sufi gatherings, are one example. They provide an outline of structured 
lessons, with a specif ic needs-analysis of daily expectations. These ḥalaqāt 
cover a variety of subject areas, including mysticism, religious norms, and 
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patterns and ethical standards. Eventually, it is from these structured 
religious commitments that the dynamics of future training sessions 
are adapted.
Starting from the second generation of immigrants to Europe and with 
the gradual conversions to Islam, new departures and imam-training 
programmes developed in Muslim countries to provide further studies. 
The potential return to Europe after a few months or years of training in 
either academic or traditional teachings has created a new profile for the 
leading f igures of local Islam. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, 
and Morocco are the target countries for Muslim youth in search of such 
knowledge. The general guidelines, readings, and quality of the training are 
variable and depend on the orientation of the religious organization that 
provides the training and its stream of thought.
Finally, the tradition of ijāza (literally, ‘authorization/permission to 
preach’) is a middle path that has been appropriated for pedagogical and 
ideological purposes. It consists of a set of skills and tools used to assess 
a teacher’s ability to control learners’ acquisition of religious material. In 
an Islamic context, a religious authority or individual with disciplinary 
jurisdiction in the Islamic sciences performs this comprehensive competency 
assessment. It seeks to evaluate the transmission of knowledge from master 
to disciple, reminiscent of the teachings of the prophet in early Islam. Ijāza 
can extend from reading from the Quran to a minute critique of classical 
reference books, a discipline, or a whole school. Upon graduation, the right to 
convey the referenced knowledge for which the ijāza is delivered is conferred 
onto the graduate. This title and the accompanying teaching certif ication 
have traditionally been highly valued and authoritative. Its holders are 
given maximum respect in some countries (by virtue of the rigor attributed 
to their receipt of the title), though they may also be subject to doubt in 
others.4 The status of the ijāza is unlikely to be compromised, but it is still 
not safe from scrutiny and criticism. This process is contested more so in 
Europe, where religious authorities offer either all or part of the traditional 
certif ications in religious curricula (Roussillon, 2005). More traditional 
training institutions are also being set up, such as the Islamic University 
of Rotterdam. Their activism is indicative of the quietist presence of Islam, 
which is dominated by the language of the country of origin.
The structural transformation of Islamic training environments coincides 
with the projection of Islamic life into the European context, over more 
4 Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East, are sometimes known for how easy it is 
to receive ijāza there, which brings the credibility of the title into question.
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than a decade at least. Austrian jurists, for instance, have allowed the 
establishment of a school to train religious counsellors. However, for 25 
years we have mostly seen attempts to transplant models, mainly Arabic- or 
Turkish-speaking ones, into Europe. These models mostly attract students 
from Muslim countries (El Asri, 2006).
The linguistic transition to European languages has been imposed by 
the scarcity of individuals with the ability to cope with both the require-
ments of the original language and the need to adapt to new demands of 
the Muslim community. Over the last f ifteen years, we have witnessed a 
growing demand for training from French-speaking, English-speaking, and 
Spanish-speaking candidates, among others. There are now more than 100 
hundred training projects dotted across European countries (El Asri, 2006). 
Initiatives include more than one hundred enrolled, leading to better and 
diverse training pathways.
Over at least the last f ive years, serious initiatives have been taken up in 
various European contexts to train imams within the context in which they 
have to function. Still, European Muslims have suffered from a severe lack 
of new training experiences. Those that are already on track, for example, 
at the junction of the research of off icial recognition on the part of the 
political, academic, national institutions or universities in Muslim countries, 
as well as public authorities’ contributions, are all eager to build up a certain 
Islamic narrative. Thus, in addition to market demands, public recognition, 
academic conventions, and institutional partnerships, the result will be an 
efficient training practicum that meets the expectations of the public sector.
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Abstract
The primary aim of this chapter is to describe the relationship between 
the last decade’s discussions and debates about theology and religious 
studies and the start of courses in academic Islamic theology at European 
universities. After a brief outline of the most important positions in this 
debate, I turn to how Muslim theologians sometimes behave when they 
describe how the study of Islamic theology ‘should’ be performed. A 
second aim is to discuss, with the help of a survey sample from Sweden, 
whether and to what extent Muslims who seek a theological education 
at a European university are interested in courses on academic Islamic 
theology. A third and f inal aim is to discuss why European universities 
are interested in starting courses in a subject that is often promoted under 
the title of academic Islamic theology.
Keywords: Islam in Sweden, Islam in Germany, Islamic theology, secular 
universities
1 Introduction
Some more-or-less organized studies of Islam and Muslim texts have been 
part of the academic curriculum of European universities since the Middle 
Ages (Martin, 1995). The earliest studies were primarily philological and 
polemical, often with an overarching purpose of demonstrating that Islam 
was a false religion. After the rise of the history of religions as a sub-discipline 
at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, 
Islamic studies continued primarily to be the study of history and ancient 
texts, a process in which Islam and Muslims were generally, if not always, 
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seen as non-European. The Swedish Professor of History of Religions at 
Uppsala, Geo Widengren (1907-1996), serves as an example here, as he is 
quoted as having claimed that: ‘Yes, when it comes to the study of Islam 
I have never done anything on this side of the 12th century’ (quoted in 
Hjärpe, 2012, p. 270, my translation). I suggest that this quotation tells us 
much about the early study of Islam in Western Europe, namely that it was 
rooted in the idea that Islam was only a relevant object of study in relation 
to the Christian theological traditions, and that consequently scholars 
should focus on texts and not on living Muslims. Today the situation has 
changed, as it is evident that large numbers of Europe’s very heterogeneous 
population have Muslim cultural backgrounds. These structural changes 
have challenged the study of religions in many ways. For example, more 
academic studies have focused on sociological and contemporary issues of 
so-called lived religions. One could say that the tables have been turned, 
and that there is currently less focus on history and philological questions. 
Apart from the risk of losing important philological and historical aspects 
of religious studies, one new advantage is the rich diversity in terms of 
faith, worldviews, ethnicities, and languages of university students today. 
However, it is evident that the study of Islam and Muslims has not taken the 
theoretical and methodological implications of these changes suff iciently 
into account. According to Aaron Hughes (2007), the f ield could, in fact, be 
described as immature when it comes to theoretical and methodological 
issues; there is, then, a great need to develop the study of Islam and Muslims 
in a scientif ic and critical manner.
Leaving Hughes’ critique aside, the primary aim of this chapter is to 
describe the relationship between the last decade’s discussions and debates 
about theology and religious studies and the start of courses in academic 
Islamic theology at European universities. After a brief outline of the most 
important positions in this debate, I turn to how Muslim theologians 
(sometimes) behave when describing how the study of Islamic theology 
should be conducted. My intention is to highlight the possible differences 
between how Muslim theologians envisage Islamic theology and how an 
academic Islamic theology might be taught at European universities, most 
of which are secular by nature. A second aim is to discuss, with the help of a 
sample survey in Sweden, whether and to what extent Muslims who seek a 
theological education at European universities are interested in programmes 
that offer academic Islamic theology. A third and f inal aim is to discuss why 
European universities are interested in starting courses in a subject that 
is often promoted under the title ‘academic Islamic theology’. Sometimes 
these initiatives are presented as parts or rather as modules in imam training 
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programmes, but in other cases they are ‘only’ labelled as courses in Islamic 
theology. Given the focus of Part I, it is important to underline that the 
difference between so-called Islamic training programmes and courses 
in Islamic theology is unclear, and that the two terms are often used as 
synonyms. The focus in this chapter is on courses in Islamic theology, but 
these courses can often be parts of larger programmes, some of which could 
have the ambition to educate Islamic theologians or imams.
2 Same but different?
First, it is clear that all academic subjects must be situated in a theoretical, 
methodological, and conceptual understanding that addresses the problem 
of what to include and what to exclude, and how the ‘subject matter’ should 
be delimited and studied. Although I am well aware that the scope and 
def inition of what to include and what to exclude in the general rules of 
science is debatable and has changed over time, I wish to primarily focus on 
the importance of coming to conclusions that are based on intersubjectively 
testable observations and studies that are based on hypothetical-inductive 
methods. It is therefore important to decide whether the study of Islam 
and Muslims should form part of the general programmes covering the 
history of religions. Is this f ield an area study in a geographical sense? 
Does it have its own theories and methods, or does it follow the general 
rules of academia?
Second, it has also become more important to consider the real or im-
agined boundary between the academic study of religions and theology, 
especially since a growing number of universities in Europe have started 
imam-training programmes (Larsson, 2009) and to set up courses in aca-
demic Islamic theology and philosophy, such as the one at the University 
of Uppsala, Sweden. Should the theological study of Islam follow a different 
set of rules, live up to other expectations, or should this topic be part of the 
curriculum at universities that are often secular by nature?
Without going into these sometimes heated debates in great detail, 
the issue at stake seems closely related to questions about the nature and 
scope of the study of religions and whether theology should be considered 
a scientif ic discipline. On the one hand, there are those who strongly argue 
that universities should be driven by critical and scientif ic agendas that 
follow the basic requirements promoted by most scholars of the natural 
sciences. This understanding is, for example, advocated by many scholars 
who adhere to the programme that often is known as the cognitive study 
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of religions (Pyysiäinen, 2014). Accordingly, the university scholar should 
only be a critic and not a caretaker that works like an apologist (Lincoln, 
1996; McCutcheon, 2001). In the words of the Canadian professor of religious 
studies Donald Wiebe:
the academic study of religions must be undertaken for academic – that 
is, purely intellectual/scientif ic reasons and not as instrumental in the 
achievement of religious, cultural, political or other ends. This means, 
quite simply, that the academic/scientif ic study of religion must aim only 
at understanding religion where ‘understanding’ is mediated through an 
intersubjectively testable set of statements about religious phenomena 
and religious traditions. As with any other scientif ic enterprise, therefore, 
the academic study of religion aims at public knowledge of public facts. 
(1988, p. 407)
Still, we also f ind scholars and thinkers who are more open to the idea that 
the study of religions could be innovative, constructive, and contribute to 
the development of so-called theological thinking (Ford, 2009, p. 34). In 
Jeppe Sinding Jensen’s understanding, this approach is often characterized 
by a common explicit or implicit agreement that religions ‘have a “common 
essence” and refer to something metaphysically real (e.g. “God”) that is 
considered the origin and cause of religion’ (2014, pp. 21-22). While the f irst 
position, i.e. the scientif ic study of religions, leaves little to no room for 
theology, the other position is more open and positive towards theology 
and other forms of constructive sociological and historical enquiry, such as 
post-colonial studies (Joy, 2001), gender studies, or the critique of ideologies.
Between the two positions I have described above according to a some-
what Weberian ideal-type model, it is also possible to f ind a large number 
of scholars occupying what we might call the middle ground. Scholars 
like Craig Martin (2012) and Russell McCutcheon (2001) have problems 
with propositions that are based on religious claims, i.e., with some kind 
of reference to a transcendent reality, but not with theories that are based 
on, for example, social constructivism, post-colonialism, or gender studies. 
These scholars emphasize the importance of considering language, semiotics, 
hermeneutics, and power constellations when studying religions to a much 
greater degree than, for example, Wiebe. Because of their understanding of 
science, they are also more inclined to express doubts about explanations 
that primarily equate the study of religions with the natural sciences. Hence, 
it is essential to stress that there is no consensus among scholars. Instead, 
there are a number of different and often conflicting understandings of the 
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definitions of both theology and religious studies (Jensen, 2014). David Ford 
envisages a combination of religious studies and theological studies, with 
the two approaches coexisting in the university (2009), but for a thinker and 
Thomist like Gavin D’Costa, theology should be theology. In his own words, 
‘If theology is not theological, it should abandon its name’ (D’Costa, 2009, 
p. 53). Leaving aside these interesting differences over how to teach religious 
studies and theology, it is still necessary to ask what these questions have 
to do with the study of Islam at European universities today.
Before I turn to this question, however, I should make my own position 
clear. According to my own understanding and scientif ic outlook, religious 
studies consist primarily of the study of humans and what individuals do 
with something they call religion, both in history and today. Consequently, 
it is beyond the scope of science to decide whether God exists or not, and 
the matter of interpretation has nothing to do with God or any other 
superhuman agencies. Rather, it is a matter of conflicts over authority and 
legitimacy. Interpretations about what God thinks, approves, or dislikes, 
or what ‘religion says’ is nothing more or less than information about how 
humans interpret and make use of something they call religion to gain 
power or influence in society. My attitude to religious studies is therefore 
reductionist and in line with the approach commonly known as the critical 
academic study of religions, an approach upheld and supported by thinkers 
such as Russell T. McCutcheon, Craig Martin, and Donald Wiebe, three 
academics to whom I refer and quote extensively in this text. That said, it 
should be clear that I have problems with speculations that make reference 
to something transcendent, for example: ‘this is the will of God’, or this is 
in line with ‘proper’ Christianity, or something similar, but this scientif ic 
outlook does not automatically rule out the ability to make normative or 
ethical statements. In my understanding, the university should be free from 
confessional statements, but it should not be free from normative statements 
concerning values like democracy, equality, or justice.
3 A confessional study of Islam, or an apologetic approach?
One way to describe how the majority of Muslims have approached Islamic 
theology is to turn to an educational text compiled for Muslim students 
who want to learn about Islamic dogmas and creeds. Still, when using the 
word ‘creed’ in an Islamic context, it is important to bear in mind that 
the ‘notion of creed comes from the Christian thought world’ and that it 
is diff icult to f ind an exact parallel in Islamic traditions when it comes to 
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form and function (Speight, 1995, p. 139). Within Christian traditions, creeds 
are often the outcome of Church synods and discussions of conflicting 
opinions about how to understand and apply Christian theology. In Islamic 
traditions – which are the focus of this chapter – there are in most cases no 
similar way to lay down a creed. One Islamic parallel that is very similar 
to a Christian creed is the shahada, the declaration of faith (‘I witness that 
there is no God but God and that Muhammad is the messenger of God’), 
the utterance that generally constitutes the minimal qualif ication for an 
individual to be counted as a Muslim. Yet another parallel to Christian 
creeds are the debates about ‘aqīda, generally translated as ‘creed’, ‘doctrine’, 
‘dogma’, or ‘article of faith’; a formula written with the aim of ‘def ining the 
position of an individual, school or sect on some disputed point’ (Watt, 2013, 
p. 332). While there does not seem to be much conflict over the content 
of the shahada, there are evidently more disputes concerning the issue of 
‘aqīda. Drawing a boundary around the Islamic faith is complicated because 
there are few if any organizational structures among Muslims that resemble 
the organizations found among Christian churches. As a consequence, 
there are few instances or people that can claim the authority to stipulate 
a def inition that would automatically become valid for or applied to all 
Muslims around the world.1 Thus, when discussing creeds it would, of 
course, be possible to choose many different texts, but one illustrative 
example that is often recommended by Sunni Muslim theologians is from 
the ninth-century theologian Abu Ja’far al-Tahawi al-Hanafi’s very popular 
text, Aqidah al-Tahawiyya (On the life of al-Tahawi, see Calder, 2012/2014).2
The Aqidah al-Tahawiyya is a short text that lists what Muslims ‘should’ 
believe in and what they ‘should’ refrain from, in al-Tahawi’s understanding. 
Explicitly or implicitly, the text contains references to a number of so-called 
1 One example is the rise of the Ottoman Empire and the Turks, who tried to impose Hanaf i 
law on their subjects by installing a chief theologian with authority over how Islam ‘should’ 
be applied and understood by Muslims. This position was held by the Shaykh al-Islam (Hallaq, 
2009, pp. 55-56, 80-82). Today the situation is different, and several states in the Middle East and 
the Gulf region have so-called state imams and muftis, who try to lay down how Islam should 
be interpreted, applied, and understood in a specif ic country. One illustrative example of this 
development is found in Skovgaard-Petersen’s study of Egypt and the rule and function of the 
Al-Azhar Institute and the dār al-iftā’ (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997). See also Waardenburg (2000) 
for more examples.
2 The text Aqida al-Tahawiyya is easy to f ind online in both translation and in Arabic (with or 
without commentaries). One such collection of different editions and translations can be found 
at: http://attahawi.com/2009/03/21/english-aqidah-tahawiyyah-translations-and-commentaries/, 
consulted on 10 November 2014. An academic translation of the text is also found in Watt, 2007, 
pp. 48-56, 332-336.
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Muslim sectarian opinions, or, to use a more scientif ic language, positions 
that are different from or in conflict with al-Tahawi’s views. These groups are 
the Muctazila, Jahmiyya, Qadriyya, Jabriyya, Shia, Khawarij, and those aiming 
at the mystical interpretation of Islam, i.e., interpretations that are generally 
subsumed under the heading of Sufism. Because of the limitations of this 
chapter I do not have enough space to go into any theological or historical 
details about any of these sets of ideas (for general references see, for example, 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition). However, the most important point is 
that readers of al-Tahawi’s creed should be sceptical or even openly critical 
of the approaches, interpretations, and ways that are associated with these 
ideas. The text confirms over and over again that a Muslim should believe in 
Allah, his messengers, the books, the angels, divine destiny, the end of time, 
and judgement day. To give one example from al-Tahawi’s compendium:
The Quran is the word of Allah. It came from Him as speech without it 
being possible to say how. He sent it down on His Messenger as revelation. 
The believers accept it, as absolute truth. They are certain that it is, in 
truth, the word of Allah. It is not created, as is the speech of human beings, 
and anyone who hears it and claims that it is human speech has become 
an unbeliever. (Al-Tahawi, n.d., p. 7)
Based on this brief summary and quotation from the Aqidah al-Tahawiyya, 
as well as other observations (Boender, 2013), most Muslim students who 
are interested in theology seem to be concerned about learning about God 
and how to become a good Muslim. For example, Jacques Waardenburg 
makes the following observation regarding books on other religions used in 
Muslim countries: ‘As far as I could ascertain, most of these books directly 
(in often blunt terms) or indirectly make it clear to the reader that Islam is 
the only true religion, and the true alternative to the other religions that are 
described’ (2000, p. 97). Boender also confirms that many young students 
who want to work in Islamic organizations or mosques are more interested 
in acquiring a confessional training rather than a secular understanding 
of Religious or Islamic Studies. She concludes: ‘the attractiveness of foreign 
imams and Islam education is relatively large ‒ Muslim students, born and 
raised in the Netherlands, go to the University of Medina or to Al-Azhar if 
they want to study Islam’ (Boender, 2013, p. 244). The desire to learn about 
God and how to become a good Muslim is very different from how scholars 
of religious studies in the West approach religious texts and traditions 
(Jensen, 2014, p. 22). In stark contrast to McCutcheon’s research credo, the 
whole purpose of this kind of study is that the student should become a 
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caretaker, not a critic. Faith should be upheld, maintained, and defended 
against heresy and all forms of corruption. However, before I leave this 
discussion it is important to stress that this understanding of the rule and 
function of theology and theological education as an apologetic enterprise 
is not unique to those Muslims who want to act as, for example, religious 
leaders in mosques or Islamic institutions. Similar ways of understanding 
the purpose of religious education can be found among most, if not all, 
religious traditions, no matter their time and place. Consequently, many 
religious leaders have been sceptical and suspicious of the academic theology 
that is found in many European universities. An illustrative example can 
be found in the words of Lars Lewi Pethrus (1884-1974), the organizer of the 
Pentecostal movement in Sweden. With regard to theological education, 
for which he uses the term ‘seminaries for preachers’, he says regretfully:
Christianity is a revelation that can only be received through revelation 
(Matthew 16:15-17). It is because of this [perception] that one loses track 
when one tries to move the salvation of Jesus Christ to the area of science. 
The innermost in Christianity cannot be grasped by any science in the 
world, for Christianity is foremost and in its innermost essence divine 
life. Hence it is obvious that no intellectual learning can bring any deeper 
knowledge to the question of salvation. (Pethrus, 1929, p. 24, my translation)
He continues by stressing that every congregation should know that no 
institution of intellectual learning is capable of giving a preacher the ‘true’ 
qualities that are required to understand God’s secrets. It is only through 
salvation and the fruits of the Holy Ghost that a preacher has the potential 
to attain a ‘sound’ knowledge of the Bible and of God (Pethrus, 1929, p. 32). 
Without giving further examples, this should be enough to indicate that 
Christian theologians can also express concerns and even doubts about 
the value of so-called academic theology, and that there are different 
understandings of what one might mean by Christian theology.
4 Muslims at European universities
Having established a basic outline of the differences between the secular 
study of religions and Islamic theology, we must now ask why Muslims 
study Islam at European universities at all. This question can undoubtedly 
be answered in many different ways, and each student should primarily be 
looked on as an individual and not as a part of some religious collective. 
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We must not assume that, for example, all Christians or Muslims have the 
same expectations, wants, or needs just because they belong to the same 
religious tradition or family. In addition, this question is of an empirical 
nature, and to the best of my knowledge we lack studies examining why 
students actually choose to study the ‘subject matter’ we call religion, or 
for that matter theology or Islamic studies at universities. Leaving this 
signif icant lacuna aside, I still believe it is possible to identify some general 
and plausible trends, explanations, and ideal-type positions. One reason 
could be that students from a Muslim cultural background are interested in 
learning more about their own traditions (Waardenburg, 2000, p. 94). This 
is especially true if the students have been born and raised in the West. For 
students who f it this description, a critical study is generally not a problem: 
most of those who belong to this category have, for example, absorbed the 
importance of a critical approach to science and knowledge from European 
and for that matter Western school systems (Vertovec and Rogers, 1998). 
Some of these students could also be more interested in a critical approach 
than in studying and learning about religion in ways that are based on the 
so-called theological ways of thinking that could be described as a ‘caretaker 
position’ (McCutcheon, 2001). Some of them could also have been raised 
and taught according to specif ic norms and values, i.e., how to understand 
and apply Islam in a ‘proper’ way, in their homes, mosques, or other Islamic 
institutions. These might consequently want to learn other ways of studying 
their own traditions, and turn to European universities as a result. Others 
could be interested in finding new ways of developing their modes of thinking 
about Islam and Muslim traditions, perhaps wanting to develop a new kind 
of Islamic theology with the aid of, for example, philosophy, critical theory, 
gender studies, post-colonial theories, or academic theology (Waardenburg, 
2000, p. 94). This approach could easily be compared with the ‘subject mat-
ter’ that many theologians label ‘academic theology’. In the words of Ford, 
academic theology is defined and characterized in the following way:
It seeks wisdom in relation to questions, such as those of meaning, truth, 
beauty and practice, which are raised by, about and between the religions 
and are pursued through engagement with a range of academic disciplines. 
(2010, p. 94, italics in original text)
For Ford, academic theology is different from ‘ordinary’ theology because of 
its ‘relation to the various disciplines of the academy’ (2010, p. 94). However, 
the ways in which this type of theology is different from ‘theology in general’ 
(Ford, 2010, p. 93) are not that clear.
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Moving from the question of how to def ine academic theology and dif-
ferentiate it from the academic study of religions to the opinions of Muslim 
leaders who have actually been asked about Islamic theological programmes 
at European universities, the picture becomes more complicated. Before I 
provide some data from Sweden, it is important to stress that most imam 
training programmes that were started (and in some cases ended; see 
Boender and De Ruiter, Part I) in Europe (for example, in the Netherlands 
or Germany; Boender, 2013; Larsson, 2009, 2014a) have neglected to take into 
account the possible differences between the theological study of Islam and 
how Islam is studied at a secular university. From Boender’s study of imam 
training programmes in the Netherlands, it is also clear that many mosques 
and other Muslim organizations are sceptical of how European universities 
study and teach Islam. One interviewee gave voice to this feeling by saying:
Some see our programme as in function of the Dutch government; we are 
sometimes accused of being here ‘to confuse the young’ and ‘to assimilate 
them.’ Until now, mosque boards have often kept a distance. (quotation 
taken from Boender, 2013, p. 243)
As indicated by this quotation, it is clear that the expectations and demands 
of confessional viewpoints and secular or scientific ways of studying religions 
could be very different, and that there might be clashes between the two.
5 The Swedish experience
The differences in expectations outlined above were clearly seen in Sweden 
in 2009, when the Ministry of Education asked Muslim leaders about the 
possibility of setting up a Swedish imam training programme that would 
include courses in Islamic theology and the history of religions as well as 
courses about Swedish society and its history. To acquire some background 
information on Muslims’ opinions and needs, the Ministry of Education 
launched a government enquiry, and a questionnaire consisting of thirteen 
questions was sent to 181 mosques and Islamic institutions in Sweden. In 
total, 121 questionnaires were answered and returned (Staten och imamerna, 
2009, pp. 38-39; the questions are found on pp. 117-120). The questions from 
the 2009 survey were repeated in 2014, when 73 responses were collected 
(Larsson, 2014b, p. 121). There are several reasons why the number of returned 
responses was lower in the 2014 survey. First, the Muslim religious leaders 
had already answered the same questions in 2009, and on the basis of 
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that enquiry the government and the Ministry of Education decided not 
to start an imam-training programme in Sweden (Staten och imamerna, 
2009). Second, the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Faith 
Communities had already launched a course for religious leaders working in 
Sweden in 2014.3 Held in the cities of Stockholm, Göteborg, and Helsingborg/
Malmö, this course could partly be seen as a response to some of the requests 
that imams had made in the 2009 survey. This course did not include any 
modules on Islamic theology, and the content focus was on Swedish society. 
Figures 1 and 2 present data on how the Muslim leaders responded to the 
prospect of setting up an imam-training programme in Sweden.
Figure 1 shows clearly that most of the imams who returned the 
questionnaire felt positive about the idea of starting a Swedish 
imam-training programme.
3 For more information on these courses, see: http://www.sst.a.se/sstsuppdrag/kompetensutv
ecklingfortrossamfundsledare.4.4c4b074714116b0cfa29f60.html, consulted on 17 November 2014.

















source: Staten och imamerna, 2009, p. 46
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Still, Figure 2 shows that most of those who answered the questionnaire 
were asking for training in so-called ‘non-theological’ subjects, such as the 
Swedish language, conflict resolution strategies, and Swedish law.
To properly understand Figure 2, it is important to know that each 
respondent could give several answers, and that most respondents who 
requested Islamic theology stressed that it should be taught by Muslims, 
not by non-Muslims at Swedish universities (Staten och imamerna, 2009, 
p. 47). However, it is clear from the survey results that the great majority 
wanted to acquire more knowledge of the Swedish language, how Swedish 
society works, rights and responsibilities in Sweden, and similar topics that 
are broadly related to living in Sweden.
These results could be interpreted as indicating that the respondents 
were not asking for a ‘secular’ or non-confessional education in Islamic 
subjects – i.e., these subjects should only be studied and taught by devout 
Muslims and not by non-Muslim academicians – or that they already had 
received a theological education from a Muslim institution. Would it have 
been possible to f ind different responses to these questions if the survey had 
been conducted among, for example, young Muslims who were born and 
raised in Sweden? This question is critically discussed by Jonatan Bäckelie 
(2011), who tends to answer it in the aff irmative given the fact that most of 





























source: Staten och imamerna, 2009, p. 47
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the imams who were included in the 2009 survey had already had a long 
period of education in countries like Turkey, Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, or Egypt 
(Staten och imamerna, 2009, pp. 42-44).
Without going into great detail about the surveys, and no matter how we 
interpret the collected data, it is clear that the great majority of respondents 
were not interested in acquiring a degree in Islamic theology from universi-
ties that were secular by nature. It was also clear that internal differences 
among Muslim groups and competing madhhabs (‘legal schools’), ethnic 
differences, and variations in language and political outlook were too 
great; it would be impossible to offer a single educational model that could 
cover every aspect of Islamic theology. To put it differently, most European 
universities do not have academics who are knowledgeable in every aspect 
of Islamic theology, such as kalām, tafsīr, hadith, f iqh, and taṣawwuf. And 
if different theological systems, such as the different opinions of the law 
schools, were mixed up in one educational programme, it would draw strong 
criticism from Muslim leaders and potential students who wanted to obtain 
a specif ic form of Islamic theological training according to one particular 
Muslim tradition or school. The survey of the Ministry of Education in 
2009 made these tensions quite clear. It would be unlikely that imams who, 
for example, were trained according to the Turkish Diyanet model would be 
interested in a training programme moulded in accordance with the cur-
riculum of the schools in Medina in Saudi Arabia, or of Al-Azhar University 
in Cairo, Egypt. Though we should refrain from drawing the conclusion that 
the opinions of Muslim leaders automatically correspond to or match the 
way ‘ordinary’ Muslims would like to learn about Islamic theology, I believe 
that the answers in the Swedish surveys give us an important indication 
of the possibility of a gap between what Muslims would like to learn about 
Islamic theology and how the subject is taught at European universities.
6 Academic Islamic theology at European universities
From both historical and contemporary examples, we can plausibly argue 
that most (but not all) Muslims who go to university to study Islam for 
theological reasons might have different expectations than students who 
want to study Islam with the aid of secular theories and methods. These dif-
ferences in expectations should come as no surprise, and the tension between 
a theological study and a critical academic study has been highlighted in 
several publications over the years (Bird and Smith, 2009; McCutcheon, 2001; 
Wiebe, 1988). Most of the examples and positions in this debate have been 
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derived from Christian and secular positions (Bird and Smith, 2009), but in 
this chapter I have tried to highlight these debates through the example of 
the study of Islam and Islamic theology. The problems I have discussed here 
are therefore not unique, and the positions in the debate primarily concern 
different opinions about science and the role and function of theology in 
the higher education system. I now leave these debates and turn to the 
crucial question: why do European universities want to start programmes 
in academic Islamic theology?
This question can, of course, be answered in many different ways, but 
it is still possible to outline some views and reasons. First, it is clear that 
most debates about, and attempts to start, imam training programmes in 
Europe have been closely related to the political debate about Islam and 
Muslims in Europe. Integration, security, and a need to gain control over 
Islamic theology have been important implicit and explicit reasons behind 
the setting up of many imam-training programmes in Europe (Birt, 2006; 
Sunier, 2009). This concern has, of course, increased in importance because 
of the rise of international terrorism in the name of Islam that has been 
carried out on European soil.
Second, the universities, especially within the f ield of humanities, are 
under great pressure to gain more money and new students, and to show 
that they have the potential to be useful and to contribute to society (cf. 
Nussbaum, 2010). From this point of view, imam training programmes and 
courses in academic Islamic theology can be perceived as a way to fulf il 
these needs.
Third, it is clear that some scholars who embrace the idea of an academic 
theology also want to make a positive contribution to how Islamic traditions 
could or ‘should’ be interpreted in a new, and maybe also more modern and 
egalitarian, way (cf. Martinson, 2004, 2009). For scholars who adhere to 
this position, theology should be constructive; the rule and function of the 
theologian is to arrive at a position from which it is possible to know ‘how 
we should talk about God in a fruitful way today’ (Martinson, Sigurdson, 
and Svenungsson, 2007, p. 15; my translation). In accordance with this 
understanding, the aim is to develop interpretations that are capable of 
contributing to debates and challenging established opinions on subjects 
such as gender issues, sexuality, justice, and interfaith relations. Today it is 
possible to f ind this kind of academic theology when it comes to Christian 
traditions, and for Mattias Martinson (2004, 2009) it is important to close the 
gap between Christian and Islamic theology. He argues that the division of 
labour that predominates at Swedish universities – i.e. that theologians are 
primarily if not only studying Christian traditions, that scholars of religion 
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only study non-Christian religions, and that the former are more positive 
about ‘theological thinking’, while the latter are outspoken critics of theology 
at secular universities – puts many Muslims in a diff icult position.4 If, he 
argues, ‘Muslim students’ decide to follow the path of a critical and secular 
study of religions, they will only meet an ‘instinctive fear and disgust against 
the very idea of being involved in a more constructive interpretation of 
Islam’ (Martinson, 2009, p. 82). But if they choose to do theology, they will 
only meet theologians who are interested in Christianity and who are ‘more 
or less incompetent when it comes to the f ield of Islam’ (Martinson, 2009, 
p. 82). This approach is stressed, for example, in a press release posted on the 
webpage of the University of Uppsala, in which Mikael Stenmark, the dean 
of the faculty of theology for the year 2012, explains how the university’s 
courses in Islamic theology and philosophy are structured. He states:
Within the new programme [at Uppsala University] we will be able to offer 
studies about the specific content in Islam: the creeds, ethical guidelines, 
legal principles and religious texts that are included. By this procedure we 
take Islam as seriously as we take the Christian faith; that is, with a critical 
and constructive approach to the content.5 (my translation and italics)
This quotation illustrates how some Swedish theologians understand and 
envisage the content and objective of academic Islamic theology – an ap-
proach that can be easily compared with that of many Muslim feminists, 
like Amina Wadud (2006) and Asma Barlas (2002) to give just two examples. 
Similar ideas are also found in the texts of thinkers such as Tariq Ramadan 
(2010), Tareq Oubrou (Hashas 2014), and Omid Saf i (2003), who promote 
so-called modern or progressive interpretations of Islam. For example, in the 
introductory chapter to the edited volume Progressive Muslims: On Justice, 
Gender, and Pluralism, Saf i claims to have been inspired by Bob Dylan and 
his song The Times They Are A-Changin’ when he writes:
4 Martinson’s mode of argumentation resonates with that of Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s over 
the distinction between theology and religious studies (Smith, 1987, p. 12). But it should also be 
emphasized that Martinson’s description of the distinction between the two could be called 
into question if we look at what topics historians of religions have actually studied. If we turn to 
Sweden, we can easily f ind scholars of religions who have studied Islam and Muslim traditions 
as well as Christian traditions (Marsh and Thurf jell, 2013; Westerlund, 2009). From this point 
of view, Martinson’s distinction tells more about the interests of the theologians who work at 
Swedish universities.
5 The original quotation in Swedish is taken from: http://www.uu.se/press/pressmedde-
landen/pressmeddelande-visning/?id=1825&area=3,8&typ=pm&na=&lang=sv, consulted on 
22 August 2017. 
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It is time to start ‘a-changin’. It is time to acknowledge the complicated 
mess around us, and to aim for the implementation of the vision of 
justice and goodness-and-beauty that is rooted in the Quran. We start 
by admitting that it is not just our time that is worth saving, but also 
our very humanity, the most precious blessing we have been given by 
God. (2003, p. 2)
Tellingly, the writers who are included in Safi’s edited volume are presented 
as ‘thinkers and activists’, and from the quotation above it is tempting to 
compare this enterprise with how many academic Christian theologians 
outline their scholarly projects. Like their Christian counterparts, who 
are inclined to start with an implicit understanding of what constitutes 
the essence of Christianity, it is clear that a so-called progressive Muslim 
interpretation has to start from and have its roots in what Saf i calls ‘the 
soil of Islam’. He writes further:
To state the obvious, a progressive Muslim agenda has to be both progres-
sive and Islamic, in the sense of deriving its inspiration from the heart of 
the Islamic tradition. It cannot survive as a graft of Secular Humanism 
onto the tree of Islam, but must emerge from within that very entity. It 
can receive and surely has received inspiration from other spiritual and 
political movements, but it must ultimately grow in the soil of Islam. 
(Saf i, 2003, pp. 7-8)
In the quotation above, it is not clear what Saf i includes or excludes in 
relation to the rich diversity that exists in Muslim historiography, i.e., what 
Muslims write about so-called Islamic traditions, and it is also unclear what 
he means when he talks about ‘the soil of Islam’. As a result, there is a great 
risk that the theologian, thinker, or activist is doing nothing more or less 
than projecting his or her own values onto Islamic traditions or ‘the soil 
of Islam’ (Martin, 2012, pp. 14-15 and Figure 1.1 on p. 12). Saf i’s expression 
‘the soil of Islam’ also seems to be analogous to the phrase ‘the essence of 
religion’, which, according to Jensen, is one of the most persistent yet unclear 
concepts found in the history of the study of religions (Jensen, 2014, p. 40).
Yet another position involving Islamic theology at European universities 
– and this is my fourth and f inal point – is found among those scholars who 
argue that Muslims should be given equal opportunities and rights to set 
up programmes for their own religious education. If priests and Christians 
can learn about Christian theology at European universities, why shouldn’t 
Muslims be given a similar right (Martinson, 2004, 2009, and partly also 
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Mårtensson, 2010)? One could argue that this position is primarily based 
on a political vision that stresses how equal opportunities should be given 
to all religious groups.
7 Conclusions
From this discussion and the empirical data from the Swedish survey, it 
is clear that the issue of academic theology, whether Christian, Islamic, or 
something else, is closely related to the current debates about how to study 
religion at European universities. To put it more bluntly, does the so-called 
academic study of theology belong in the modern research university? 
While some will answer this question negatively, others will be more 
moderate and try to argue that both theology and religious studies should 
coexist, and that both belong in the university (Ford, 2009). No matter 
how we tackle this diff icult but very important question, it is uncertain 
how many students from a Muslim confessional background are actually 
looking for an education in academic Islamic theology – at least from the 
Swedish sample I have referred to in this text. Why students in general 
or students from a Muslim cultural background in particular turn to the 
academic study of religions is something we actually know very little about 
(Sultán Sjökvist, 2009). Maybe some of them are interested in gaining 
insight into how religions can be studied from a secular academic point 
of view, or maybe they want to f ind something different that they may 
either reject or embrace from the confessional and normative approach 
to the study of religions. But should an academic institution really care 
about these questions, and what will happen if universities are primarily 
driven by a will to adjust and pick up on new trends without critical discus-
sion? The primary aim of a university must be to seek better and more 
substantiated knowledge of how the world functions and why individuals 
believe and act the way they do. Hence, it is necessary to establish scientif ic 
models that are open to criticism and that can be tested intersubjectively 
by other scholars using a scientif ic approach that leaves no room for 
transcendent speculations. What God wants or thinks about the world 
is beyond scientif ic knowledge, and consequently to talk about God in 
a meaningful way produces nothing but speculation. Although some of 
these issues and discussions might be provocative, it is clear that both 
the questions and our answers must be related to how we view the study 
of religions and how the ‘subject matter’ that we call religion relates to 
the thing we call science.
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Abstract
Based on the f indings of a research project that combined ethnographic 
and socio-historic approaches, this chapter investigates how imams in 
France progressively established themselves as one of the main embodi-
ments of Islamic authority under the dual impetus of Muslim communities 
and state authorities, particularly at the local level. Retracing the socio-
historical stages of the reinvention of their role(s), it shows both how 
French imams have emerged as a distinctive type of ‘organic intellectuals 
of migration’ in their places of worship, and how they became the objects 
of public policies in laïque (‘secular’) French society.
Keywords: (history of) Imams in France, laïcité, immigration, state policy
1 Imams in France
This chapter is based on the findings of a doctoral study I conducted in France 
(Jouanneau, 2009a),1 in which I investigated how imams have progressively 
established themselves as one of the main embodiments of Islamic authority 
under the dual impetus of Muslim communities and state authorities – par-
ticularly at the local level. Imams, who lead the main rites of the daily prayers 
and the Friday congregational prayers in French mosques, interact with a wide 
range of actors: the faithful, leaders of Muslim associations, consulates of their 
countries of origin, local politicians, and agents of the central French authorities. 
1 The translation of this chapter into English was made possible by the Excellence Initiative 
of the University of Strasbourg, and funded by the French government’s Future Investments 
programme. Mr. Jean-Yves Bart skilfully executed the translation.
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In my doctoral research, I explored why imams play a much more central role 
in France than they do in countries where Islam is both the state and majority 
religion (Frégosi, 2004, p. 137). This required retracing the socio-historical stages 
of their changing role(s) to identify the processes that have allowed imams to 
emerge as a distinct type of ‘organic intellectuals of migration’ in French places 
of worship. It also sheds light on the influence of civil servants in redefining 
the imamate in France. Indeed, civil servants have gradually made imams the 
objects of public policies, as they saw them as an ‘immigrant clergy’ that could 
have some authority over immigrants and their descendants.
I used a range of methods combining ethnographic and socio-historic 
approaches to conduct this research over a six-year period. In the early 
years, I carried out fieldwork in several Muslim prayer rooms in Eastern 
and Southern France to collect accounts of the life stories and practices of 
around 30 imams. I also spent several months making daily observations in 
a neighbourhood prayer hall. In the following stage of my research, I looked 
for traces of imams’ historical presence in various archives, particularly 
those of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Additionally, I interviewed about 
f ifteen senior civil servants who had been assigned to work on Islam in 
France at some point in their careers.
This chapter briefly presents the main f indings of this research. In the 
f irst part I retrace the main steps in the institutionalization of the social 
role of imams in France, as Muslim immigrant workers and their families 
settled into French society. The focus is on the conditions that made genuine 
community leadership possible for imams in France. I also describe the most 
important features of imams’ role in contemporary France. The second part 
shows that from the 1990s onwards imams also became the targets of public 
policies aimed at influencing Islam’s identity in France as oppositional 
political Islam gained momentum in major countries of Muslim emigration.
2 From imams in the trenches to neighbourhood imams
The f irst French imams left very few traces and are seldom mentioned 
in the archives of the French administration. Historians and sociologists 
of immigration generally did not consider them until the late 1990s. Yet, 
based on archival material, interviews, and second-hand sources, a short 
socio-history of their settlement in France can be retraced. These sources 
allow us to identify the various stages of the formation of the imamate in 
France, which are to a great extent connected to the phases of Muslim 
migration to France and of the structuring of French Muslim faith.
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2.1 The colonial legacy and the invisibility of the indigenous imam
In the twentieth century, the earliest records that indicate the presence of 
imams in mainland France date to the beginning of the First World War, 
when French military commanders decided to ‘send imams among the 
Muslim troops stationed in France in January 1915’ (Le Pautremat, 2003, 
pp. 153-154), and to build mosques in military depots (Laurens, 2004, p. 42). 
When the war ended some of these imams – soon to be joined by others 
– continued to meet the needs of immigrant workers coming from the 
French colonies, whose numbers were rapidly growing. For instance, there 
is evidence of the existence of a wooden mosque in Toulouse, built on the 
initiative of a French employer ‘wishing to create a good environment in his 
business’ in the 1930s (Clément, 1990, p. 98). In Paris, the chronicles of the 
Renault car factory recount the death of the Moroccan imam tasked with 
meeting the religious needs of the company’s Muslim colonial workforce 
in the same period (Garache, 1984). However, employers’ practices aimed 
at ensuring the loyalty of colonial workers are not the only explanation for 
the presence of these imams. In certain cases, the imams also seem to have 
been directly mandated by the migrants’ community of origin to accompany 
those who were given the responsibility of migrating to mainland France 
from rural communities (Sayad, 2004).
Unfortunately, very little is known about these early imams in metro-
politan France and the practical conditions they faced in exercising their 
religious duties. These imams, who were both migrants and colonized, 
left few traces. The few documents that mention them are from the press 
or archives of administrative, military, and productive institutions (like 
factories), or of those monitoring immigrant workers (like the Sonacotra 
foyers).2 These archives let us look at these migrant clerics only through the 
words of the non-Muslims who wrote about them (Spivak, 1988). There is 
another reason for the scarcity of sources. In the ‘era of empires’ (Hobsbawn, 
2009), the Muslim religion was seen as a factor of control in most French 
colonies (Luizard, 2006), particularly in Algeria where attainment of the role 
of imam was tightly controlled by the prefectural authorities (Achi, 2004). 
However, French authorities seem to have had little interest in the religious 
practices of the natives of the colonies after they migrated to the mainland. 
This was partly because the authorities thought that this immigration would 
2 The term foyer refers to social housing units built mostly in the 1950s for the specif ic purpose 
of accommodating migrant workers. The social Housing Sonacotra was initially established for 
Algerian migrant workers.
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be temporary (Tripier and Rea, 2003, p. 41), but it also reflected the reality 
of the migrants’ religious practices to some extent: most specialists of Islam 
in France agree that, until the tail end of the 1950s, there were few religious 
demands from Muslim immigrants. The majority tended to consider their 
experience as migrants as ‘a space of freedom in which, for a certain time, 
Islamic precepts did not apply’ (Cesari, 1994a, p. 36).
2.2 The makeshift Islam of the factories and foyers of migrant 
workers in the 1970s
Under the influence of three distinct but highly congruent phenomena, 
the exposure of Islam and the number of imams both started to gradu-
ally increase in 1970s’ France. First, the continual extension of the stays of 
migrants from the former French colonies tended to favour their mobilization 
to organize Muslim worship during the migration period. Second, starting 
with the decision to end immigration in 1974, a state discourse developed 
around the need to ‘facilitate [among migrants] the preservation of religious 
tradition[s]’, so as to allow ‘foreigners who wish to pursue temporary im-
migration’ to ‘preserve their ties to their culture of origin’ (Dijoud, 1974). 
Third, at roughly the same time, as strikes in factories and foyers became 
increasingly frequent, some officials in charge of immigrant workers’ affairs 
were inclined to use imams as ‘antidotes to leftism’ (Kepel, 2004, p. 299). 
The imams of the 1970s, who were largely self-taught volunteers, can be split 
into two distinct groups: the ‘isolated imams’ and the ‘aff iliated imams’.
Isolated imams were f irst and foremost workers or foyer residents who 
were appointed to fulf il the role of imam, partially in response to requests 
from the migrants and partially to humour the paternalistic goodwill of 
employers and foyer managers. They were generally appointed following 
a consultation among the ‘inner circle’ of attendants of the newly-created 
prayer halls, i.e., those involved in their day-to-day running (such as cleaning, 
decorating, and making repairs). It is worth noting that the evaluation of 
these imams’ religious competence was always connected to the social, 
familial, professional, and symbolic prestige they enjoyed among their peer 
group. Among different candidates with an equivalent amount of religious 
capital, the one chosen would generally be the man with the best reputation 
– a reputation based on age, seniority within the group of migrants, and 
social position within the factory or foyer. These imams who did not belong 
to any organized group were often in vulnerable positions and dependent 
on the institutions that employed or housed them. Taking a stance that 
contradicted the interests of their employers or landlords would potentially 
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be detrimental to their situation as migrants: they risked being f ired or 
expelled from their foyer. It could also impede the effective functioning of 
the prayer hall, which might be closed down, or cause prayer time arrange-
ments to be discontinued. Additionally, they had little legitimacy to serve as 
imams due to their lack of religious knowledge. Thus, caught between the 
hammer of potential dismissal and the anvil of losing religious legitimacy in 
the eyes of the faithful, these ‘worker imams’ were often assigned a strictly 
ritual incarnation of the role of imam. Lacking conviction in their Islamic 
knowledge and wishing to avoid the risk of writing their own sermons, they 
contented themselves with the Friday ‘reading of a pre-prepared sermon, 
obtained in advance by some Islamic association or taken from a collection’ 
(Kepel, 2004, p. 299). These ‘imams of fortune’ experienced an insecurity 
reflecting that of the Muslim immigrants to whom they preached in factories 
or foyers; it is doubtful whether under such conditions they were able to 
exert any real religious authority over believers.
In contrast to these ‘isolated imams’, the ‘affiliated imams’ became imams 
due to their involvement in the Islamic associations that were active in the 
early days of the structuring of Muslim worship in France. These included 
the Association des étudiants islamiques en France (AEIF, founded in 1963), 
which represented a reform movement of Islam in France; Foi et pratique 
(founded in 1972), the French branch of the Tablighi Jamaat pietistic move-
ment; and the Mouvement islamique des mourides en Europe (MIME, founded 
in 1977), founded by West African students who had come to France to 
complete their studies. In many cases, these aff iliated imams were not 
workers, but students or self-employed professionals. To Muslim immigrant 
workers, they embodied a model of self-accomplishment. Furthermore, 
because of their involvement in Islamic movements they generally acquired 
complementary religious training in addition to their religious education in 
the family and at school. Although they were self-taught in the handling of 
‘Islamic salvation goods’, their religious discourse displayed a consistency 
and systematization not usually found in those of the worker imams who 
acted autonomously. Third, the movements of which they were members 
had a history of reflecting on what ‘being a Muslim’ means in a country 
where Islam is not the majority religion. Thus, beyond fulf illing a purely 
ritual function, they were also generally predisposed to accompanying 
migrant workers in the process of rethinking their religious beliefs, which 
until their arrival in France had been deeply rooted in village customs 
(Thomas and Znaniecki, 1996). By using the language of Islam to explain 
how to live in France within Muslim communities, they gave the faithful 
a sense of belonging in a community of destiny experiencing the same 
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living conditions. Therefore, they were able to play the role of ‘organic 
intellectuals’ in their communities better than the ‘isolated imams’ were. By 
prescribing certain self-representations and behaviours for ‘Muslims’ living 
on French soil, they gave them an existence as a social group (Gramsci, 1978, 
p. 309). Finally, given the frequently conservative leanings of the Islamic 
associations of which they were members, they were also more often able 
to get in the good graces of the factory bosses and foyer managers than the 
worker imams were.
2.3 The emergence of neighbourhood imams in the 1980s and 1990s
A number of processes involved in the rooting of immigrants in French 
society – longer stays, more frequent family reunif ications, increasingly 
restrictive immigration policies – also played a part in reshaping the in-
stitutional framework of imams’ practices in France.3 This was especially 
the case after 1981, as the right of association was expanded to include 
foreigners (Wihtol de Wenden and Leveau, 2001). Between the late 1970s and 
mid-1980s, places of Islamic worship opened at a faster rate, and factories 
and foyers ceased to be the main locations of these prayer halls. As of 1981-2, 
the majority of imams in France practised in working-class neighbourhoods 
that had large proportions of Muslim immigrants. This trend continued into 
the 1990s. By 2004, only 18 per cent of the Muslim prayer halls registered 
with the French Council of Muslim Worship (CFCM) were still located in 
foyers for migrant workers (Godard and Taussig, 2009, p. 116).
New prayer halls opened outside of factories and foyers were granted 
institutional representation in the form of officially registered associations 
(Kepel, 1987, pp. 229-234). These new prayer halls facilitated the embedding of 
Muslim worship in the municipal space. They also enabled the development of 
relationships with local politicians (as they were progressively included in local 
associative life). To the Muslims that frequented them, these prayer halls were 
a source of collective pride: they were no longer symbols of the generosity of 
some factory or foyer manager, but objective evidence of the group’s existence 
and of its capacity for collective mobilization (Bourdieu, 1980).
In addition to giving imams more local recognition and exposure, these 
associations also transformed the practical conditions of their religious 
leadership. Indeed, with the creation of these Islamic associations came a 
gradual separation of the roles of ‘imam’ and ‘president of the association’. 
3 The Ministerial Circular issued by Schumann on 29 July 1968, the Ministerial Circular issued 
by Marcellin-Fontanet on 24 January 1972, and the Council of Ministers Circular of 3 July 1974.
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This prompted discussions within mosques about the imam’s role in France. 
The imam’s legitimate authority progressively came to be def ined as that 
of a cleric, who was in charge of handling the goods of Islamic salvation. 
The president of the association was chiefly a notable member of the com-
munity commissioned to represent the group’s administrative, symbolic, 
and political interests.
Another development that transformed imams’ practices in the 1980s 
and 1990s was the bureaucratization of the Islamic associations managing 
prayer halls for the purpose of rationalizing their functioning and increasing 
their f inancial resources. In many mosques, this professionalization process 
inspired the idea that it was necessary to pay imams. In 2004, according to 
a Ministry of Internal Affairs survey, only 45 per cent of imams practicing 
on French soil were regularly paid.4 Yet, since the early 1990s, paying the 
imams had become an ideal for most Islamic associations, much as they 
dreamed of one day owning their own mosque. While costly, placing imams 
in an employer-employee relationship had the immediate advantage of 
allowing association leaders to have control, if not a monopoly, over the 
appointment of the imam and the def inition of his scope of action. Also, 
this mercantile relationship placed imams under the direct authority of 
board members, whereas previously different forms of authority were able 
to coexist without a clear hierarchy.
With the introduction of this mercantile relationship and the continuously 
increasing number of Islamic prayer halls in France, the backgrounds of 
French imams became more and more varied. When imams were still 
unpaid, those aspiring to be imams in neighbourhood mosques had similar 
backgrounds to those practicing in factories and foyers during the previ-
ous decade. These individuals were self-taught in the handling of Islamic 
salvation goods. Whether they were aff iliated with national or international 
Islamic movements or not, for them being a voluntary imam was never a 
reason to emigrate or a professional activity: they always did it alongside paid 
employment in another sector or in addition to pursuing secular studies.
Conversely, the paid imam positions that began to develop in the 1980s 
attracted several categories of individuals who saw religion as a potential 
profession. First, there were students with a degree in Islamic studies and/
or experiences of activism in (political or trade union) organizations with 
ties to oppositional political Islam. Having arrived in France with the goal of 
completing advanced graduate studies, they had high amounts of educational 
4 These f igures come from the statistics reported by the technical adviser in charge of the 
‘Islam f ile’ at the Bureau central des cultes between 2000 and 2010 (interview, July 2005).
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capital and were well versed in Islamic culture. These new positions were in 
some cases the means for them to pay for their studies in France. For those 
with ties to organizations such as the Union des organisations islamiques 
de France (UOIF) – itself close to the Muslim Brotherhood movement –,the 
positions were direct extensions of their political engagement in favour of 
political Islam, as well as an opportunity to disseminate their political and 
religious ideology to others.
The second category of paid imams that appeared in the 1980s comprised 
individuals who came to France at their own expense, often illegally. Out of the 
paid imams who applied for a residence permit as ‘ministers of religion’ between 
1990 and 1997, only 29.5 per cent had entered French territory with the 90-day-
visa required to subsequently be granted ‘visitor’ status for one year (Jouanneau, 
2009b). They hoped to be recognized for their religious competences by word of 
mouth and paid by Islamic associations. These competences could come in the 
form of an Islamic degree, or of experience as imam or muezzin in their home 
country. They had generally come to France for f inancial reasons, and chose 
to be imams out of a sense of ‘pragmatism’. As conditions of residence became 
gradually more strict between 1980 and the end of the 1990s, the perspective 
of a salary (however low) and of a residence permit (however temporary) was 
an enticing prospect for individuals with no hope of obtaining a regular work 
permit, but with the ability to monetize a religious capital that was still rare 
on French soil. These early migrants aspiring to the title of imam were often 
considered excellent candidates by the presidents of associations who were 
able to pay imams a regular salary for two reasons. First, they often possessed 
enough religious experience and competence to make them credible in the 
eyes of the faithful. Second, they were generally doubly dependent on the 
association in which they practised: they relied on it for both their salary and 
the certificate required to obtain a residence permit.
Finally, from the 1990s on, civil servant imams sent to France by some 
Muslim countries of emigration – such as Algeria, Turkey, and, to a lesser 
extent, Morocco – made up a third category of paid imams. Islamic as-
sociations were often formed on the basis of shared national origins and 
languages. Those in charge of such associations often managed to secure 
funding to have ‘professional’ imams come to France through the consular 
representatives of their country of origin. As these imams’ salaries were paid 
by their home countries, they came at little cost to the associations; as their 
status as imam was officially recognized by the consulates, they were gener-
ally perceived as highly legitimate by immigrant workers (Akgonul, 2005, 
p. 123). However, compared to the other categories fewer civil servant imams 
spoke French and were familiar with French society, and they sometimes 
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struggled to fulf il the religious needs of Muslims born or socialized in 
France – whether converts or the children of migrants.
2.4 How imams became local community leaders
During the First World War, France already had imams who were able to 
perform the main Muslim group rites. Yet, until the late 1970s their authority 
was largely reduced by the weight of the institutions in which they officiated: 
the army, the factories, and the foyers. In contrast, the structuring of Muslim 
worship that began in the 1980s transformed the material conditions of imams’ 
practice in ways that directly contributed to increasing their influence over 
the faithful. It gave them a more central role in the process of the social con-
struction of a Muslim community with a newly established, local anchoring.
They might often have been just as cramped and worn down as the older 
ones, but the prayer halls that opened in working-class neighbourhoods 
were a source of collective and individual pride for those frequenting them. 
They were no longer the symbol of the generosity of a factory or foyer boss, 
but objective evidence of the group’s existence and capacity of collective 
mobilization. By offering a new visibility to Muslim worship and more space 
for the faithful to gather, these prayer halls favoured a form of appropriation 
of communal space and by extension the ‘(re)constitution of community 
life on the scale of a residential unit’ (Cesari, 1994b, pp. 112-113). By actively 
participating in the creation of this religion-inflected community life, the 
imams themselves progressively found the opportunity to experiment with 
a certain form of leadership over their faithful.
As keepers – and in a more prosaic sense ‘janitors’ – of the mosques 
where they off iciated, neighbourhood imams f irst found themselves oc-
cupying a crucial place in the creation of community networks of mutual 
assistance. In the process they contributed to transforming their prayer 
groups into genuine ‘communities of shared purpose’. In addition to their 
community-building role, the imams of the 1980s and 1990s also helped 
define the specif icity of the Muslim community within French society at 
the neighbourhood level. Indeed, while the presidents of Islamic associations 
worked towards the recognition of the existence of a ‘Muslim community’ 
with specific needs among ‘non-Muslims’, particularly municipal authorities, 
imams offered their f lock ‘procedures for dichotomization between us 
(Muslims) and them (non-Muslims)’ (Streiff-Fenart, 1996, p. 39). They did 
this by focusing on the supposed bans and recommendations of Islam. These 
procedures had considerable symbolic power, especially because they drew 
on religious terminology that conferred a degree of sanctity.
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Finally, as it became clear that families of Muslim workers had durably 
settled in France, neighbourhood imams – clerics ‘mandated to assure the 
production, reproduction, conservation and diffusion of religious goods’ 
(Bourdieu, 1971, p. 305) – promoted an increasingly practical and detailed 
discourse about the everyday behaviour required from a ‘good Muslim’ in 
France. As they agreed to reply to the faithful’s questions on the ‘right way’ 
to live an Islamic life in France, most imams found themselves in a position 
to propose to their religious communities what one might call ‘Islamically 
desirable forms of acculturation’ to French society, in a more or less conscious 
and intellectualized manner depending on the cases (Jouanneau, 2013).
3 Imams as a public problem: The paradoxes of laïcité
As I noted above, in the postcolonial period of the 1970s the French authori-
ties started addressing Islam and Muslim worship. Initially managed by the 
little-known Secrétariat d’Etat aux travailleurs immigrés (State Secretariat 
for Immigrant Workers), this gradually became a more signif icant policy 
area during the 1980s as the government tackled the necessary ‘integration of 
immigrants’ more broadly (Escafré-Dublet, 2008, p. 337). In the case of Islam, 
this translated into a discourse on the need to ‘upgrade Muslim worship’ 
to bring it up to the standards of other religions with a longer history on 
French soil (Commission Culture et Immigration, 1979).
However, as long as the government approached the question of Islam 
only in terms of how to remedy its material and symbolic ‘indigence’, like 
the lack of cultural centres, absence of representation in chaplaincies, and 
absence of religious broadcasts on public channels, the imamate received 
little exposure. The situation began to change radically in the early 1990s, 
when ‘Islam and Muslim worship’ became marked as a ‘sensitive issue’ by 
French government agencies because off icials at the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs were increasingly concerned that the civil conflict in Algeria and 
the rise of oppositional political Islam in North Africa could have a fallout 
in France (Frégosi, 2008, p. 256; Jouanneau, 2013, pp. 245-250).
3.1 Development of the surveillance of imams’ sermons
French authorities thus began to be concerned by the development of op-
positional political Islam in the late 1980s. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
was worried about the potentially harmful consequences of the rise to power 
of ‘Islamists’ for France’s diplomatic relations with its former colonies. For 
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their part, off icials from the Ministry of Internal Affairs grew concerned 
about the influence such movements might have over immigrants of North 
African origin and their children. As a result, the French authorities started 
adopting a security-centred approach to the question of Islam and Muslim 
worship (Frégosi, 2008, p. 256), which is abundantly documented in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs archives from the 1990s and 2000s that I was 
able to consult.5
Starting in Pierre Joxe’s second term as Minister of Internal Affairs (1988-
1991), these archives mentioned a ‘fundamentalist threat’ to France. In 
response to this ‘threat’, the minister’s advisor wrote that the government 
should, on the one hand, encourage a ‘moderate, tolerant Islam, well-
integrated into French society’ and, on the other, f ight ‘the unregulated 
development of mosques whose imams preach fundamentalism, intolerance 
and violence’.6
This preoccupation became more visible during the term of Charles Pas-
qua (1993-1995), who was the f irst to order the surveillance of sites of Muslim 
worship. This surveillance was ramped up during Jean-Louis Debré’s term 
(1995-1998), after the wave of attacks in 1995 orchestrated by the Algerian 
Groupe islamique armée (GIA; Armed Islamic Group) that culminated in 
the bombing of a train in Paris. Due to the involvement in these attacks of 
Khaled Kelkal, an Algerian-born youth who grew up in the banlieues of Lyon 
and who was radicalized in prison, the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ agents 
became increasingly suspicious of immigrant clerics in France.
As the surveillance of imams’ sermons widened, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs entrusted intelligence agents with the tasks of identifying any attempt 
by imams to import the political conflicts in North Africa and the Middle 
East into France, and reporting cases of support for certain forms of religious 
radicalism among disenfranchised youth.7 In other words, in the 1990s, as 
the new focus on public security and efforts to monitor the fallout of faraway 
geopolitical conflicts combined with older discourses on the ‘integration’ of 
foreigners, imams became an object of governmental attention more than ever.
5 This refers to the archives of the cabinets of the Ministers of Internal Affairs Pierre Joxe, 
Jean-Louis Debré, and Jean-Pierre Chevènement. Charles Pasqua, Philippe Marchand, and Paul 
Quilès refused to grant access to their archives.
6 Contemporary Archives Center (CAC), v. 19920417, art. 2, ‘Questions de fond soulevées par 
la disparition du recteur de la Mosquée de Paris’, May 1989. Administrative memorandum of 
‘Islam’ technical Adviser to the Minister of Internal Affairs Pierre Joxe.
7 CAC, v. 19970347, art. 4, l. 1. For example, the administrative memorandums written by 
the Central administration of the Renseignements généraux, Les échos des prêches et de la 
communauté musulmane, on 19 August 1996 and on 2 September 1996.
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3.2 A double-edged government discourse: Imams as problems and 
as solutions
Until the late 1980s, French authorities generally accepted the fact that 
Muslim worship was essentially structured at the local level through the 
creation of a multitude of Islamic associations largely independent of 
each other. In the subsequent decade, the fear of Islamism spreading to 
French soil brought Ministers of Internal Affairs to turn the organiza-
tion of Muslim worship in France into a ‘public problem’ requiring state 
intervention. This concern for rationalizing the structure of France’s ‘second 
religion’ was publicly justif ied by left- and right-wing politicians alike on 
the grounds of the necessary emergence of an Islam à la française, a phrase 
that amalgamated two distinct projects. The f irst, openly acknowledged, 
consisted of ensuring religious equality in the country by improving 
the conditions of Muslim worship in France, and thus meeting the legal 
def inition of laïcité (‘secularity’) set forth in the 9 December 1905 law on 
the separation of church and state. The second, which was less covered 
and more overt as it did not strictly fall within the legal bounds of laïcité, 
was to introduce government monitoring of a religion that worried the 
authorities in several respects.
Examination of the archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs confirms 
that attempts to push the creation of a central representative body for 
Muslim worship almost always came with the institutionalization of 
a public state discourse on imams. This happened on numerous occa-
sions, from the creation of the Conseil de réflexion sur l’islam en France 
(CoRIF, Council for Reflection on Islam in France, 1990-1993) under the 
impetus of Pierre Joxe, to the assisted birth of the Conseil français du 
culte musulman (CFCM, French Council for the Muslim Faith, since 2003) 
by Nicolas Sarkozy, the Conseil consultatif des musulmans de France 
(CCMF, Consultative Council of French Muslims in 1995) by Charles 
Pasqua, and the Istishara association (Consultation, in 1999) initiated by 
Jean-Pierre Chevènement.
For Ministry higher-ups, these ambivalent developments gradually came 
to embody either the problems allegedly posed by the Muslim religion 
in France – such as the dependence on foreign countries, the threat of 
fundamentalism, and the dispersion of religious authority due to the lack of 
institutional structures – or opportunities for the diffusion of a more ‘liberal 
Islam’ that was ‘modern’ and ‘adapted’ to French society. In their briefs, 
Ministry technical advisors presented ‘foreign imams’ at best as having an 
‘outdated theological training’ and, at worst, as having ‘marked Islamist 
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tendencies’ (Debré, 1997, p. 102-103).8 At any rate, they were ‘incapable of 
speaking French’ and of ‘understanding the problems of young French people 
living in the banlieues’. As a response to this, the belief progressively emerged 
that the ‘creation of imams should be undertaken’9 to promote a model of 
‘French imam’ or, failing that, of a Francophone imam trained in France.
In other words, from the 1990s onward imams increasingly came to play 
a crucial role in the symbolic apparatus through which French government 
agents def ined and planned to address the alleged issues pertaining to the 
Muslim religion in France. In the off icial discourse, ‘the foreign imam’ 
became one of the root causes for the supposed ‘inadequacy of Islam’ to 
meet the ‘values of the French Republic’. In contrast, the ‘French imam’ – 
‘integrated’, ‘well trained’, and ‘moderate’ – was held as the possible ‘solution’ 
to this ‘inadequacy’.10
This belief did not only become widespread among officials working in the 
Ministries of Internal and Foreign Affairs and the presidential advisors. The 
Ministers of Internal Affairs and their representatives – ministerial advisers, 
heads of the Bureau central des cultes, and police off icers – publicized it 
in the media; in the second half of the 1990s, it became a staple of French 
mainstream media discourse.
However, before further describing the forms of government intervention 
into the structuring of the imamate in France it is worth noting that in 
this policy area the authorities had to act indirectly due to the objective 
constraints of the legal and constitutional framework of laïcité. The following 
section provides more clarity on this subject.
3.3 The particulars of state action toward imams in the context 
of laïcité
The so-called law on the ‘Separation of Churches and State’, adopted on 
9 December 1905, heralded a turning point in the French authorities’ 
management of religions. Since then, the French Republic has ostensibly 
been a laïc (‘secular’) regime, refusing all forms of religious identity or 
aff iliation. It neither recognizes, nor subsidizes, nor provides salaries for 
any religion (Article 2), but ensures freedom of conscience and the free 
8 CAC, v. 19970347, art. 4, l. 1, ref: no. 38 / AN MO – CHM, ‘L’islam et la poussée islamiste en 
France’, 1997. Administrative memorandum written by the technical adviser to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to the attention of the cabinet of the Minister of Internal Affairs Jean-Louis Debré.
9 CAC, v. 19970347, art. 4, l. 1, 9 July 1997. Administrative memorandum written by the technical 
adviser for religious affairs of the Minister of Internal Affairs Jean-Louis Debré.
10 Idem.
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exercise of religion in the entire country (Article 1). Laïcité, as it is defined in 
the 44 articles of the 1905 law, breaks the ties that formerly bound the State 
and religious institutions together under the Concordat regime (Chantin, 
2010). While the State’s religious neutrality might have been asserted, this 
did not mean that its representatives would necessarily or systematically 
ignore the existence of the religious sphere, or even give up on regulating it 
entirely. Indeed, laïcité is not only the legal translation of the socio-historical 
process through which government agents have progressively managed to 
impose the principle of a distinction between order in religious activities and 
order in political activities (Lalouette, 2005); it is also – and perhaps more 
importantly – the idea that the latter prevails over the former, considering 
the fact that struggles over the control and legitimization of these spaces 
of differentiated activities cannot be separated from struggles over their 
hierarchy (Lagroye, 2003, pp. 361-362). From this perspective, laïcité is not 
only aimed at ensuring the freedom of religion and the state’s religious 
neutrality, but is also a possible tool for politically de-legitimizing the 
religious contestations of the ‘national order’ that political representatives 
and civil servants are supposed to guarantee (Bourdieu, 1971; Noiriel, 1991). 
Yet it is also a means of regulating religions that translates into legal and/or 
administrative norms. These norms define the nature of the relationships 
that state agents are legally authorized to have with the actors of institutions 
that are defined or that define themselves as ‘religious’. They also establish 
the practical scope of the intervention of administrations into the religious 
sphere for the purpose of managing or regulating such activities within the 
social space (Boyer, 2005, p. 2). Since 1911, there has been a bureau within the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs that is in charge of the compliance of religious 
organizations with public rules. The members of that bureau, the Bureau 
central des cultes, can force religious institutions to conform to the general 
organizational rules stipulated in the 1905 law. It is also worth recalling that 
the 1905 law lays the groundwork for the surveillance of places of worship 
and their ministers by public authorities. Under Article 34, ‘Any ministers 
of religion who, in those places where religion is exercised, has publicly […] 
insulted or defamed a citizen charged with public service, will face a f ine 
of € 3,750 and a one-year prison sentence, or one of these two penalties’; 
under Article 35,
If a speech given or a piece of writing posted or publicly distributed in 
places where religion is exercised contains a direct incitement to resist the 
implementation of laws or legal acts of the public authorities, or if it tends 
to cause an uprising or to arm one group of citizens against others, the 
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minister of the religion who has made himself culpable will be punished 
by a prison sentence of three months to two years, without prejudice in a 
case where the incitement is followed by a riot, revolt or civil war.
Yet, since the implementation of the 1905 law the French Republic is no longer 
authorized to interfere in the selection and appointment of ‘ministers of 
religion’: this domain has been legally def ined as the sole responsibility of 
religious communities. This means that French government off icials have 
no legal right (in theory) to express an opinion on whether a given individual 
is f it to play that role. To maintain the appearance of compliance with the 
legal framework set by laïcité, civil servants and political representatives 
largely have to act through back channels, in policy areas where the legal 
and political basis of state intervention cannot be legally questioned.
The second characteristic of the public policies targeting imams is the 
involvement of multiple institutions. Because of the principle of laïcité, 
there is no administrative department in France that deals off icially and 
practically with all aspects of Muslim worship. Depending on the case 
at hand, imams may be managed by the Direction de la surveillance du 
territoire (DST, Directorate of Territorial Surveillance), or Direction centrale 
des renseignements généraux (DCRG, Central Directorate of General Intel-
ligence), or by their local branches when surveillance is required; the Bureau 
central des cultes on questions linked to the training and status of imams 
in particular; the Direction des libertés publiques et des affaires juridiques 
(DLPAJ, Directorate of Public Liberties and Legal Affairs) and the prefectures’ 
departments for non-nationals on questions about the regularization or 
expulsion of foreign imams; or the Conseiller pour les affaires religieuses 
(CAR, Counsellor for Religious Affairs) and Direction de l’Afrique du Nord et 
du Moyen-Orient (Directorate for North Africa and the Middle East) for the 
diplomatic component of negotiation with countries of Muslim emigration. 
Of course, the number of institutions that are involved has consequences 
for how each issue is handled. Each of these administrations not only has 
its own imperatives, but also has a distinct ‘administrative culture’ that 
endows its agents with a distinct ethos that does not necessarily coincide 
with those of other agencies (Jouanneau, 2009b).
Finally, aware of the fact that they were playing with the legal limits 
of laïcité, the successive Ministers of Internal Affairs have generally tried 
to remain discreet about the internal attempts by some of their advisers 
and top off icials to restructure Islamic worship in France. This constraint 
manifests in the often-unofficial status of technical advisors working on the 
question of Islam in France within the Ministry’s off ices. These advisors, 
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whose ranks do not include graduates of the Ecole nationale d’administration 
(ENA, National School of Administration), are often civil servants recruited 
informally on the basis of their pre-existing ties with the Ministers to 
‘coordinate’ a public policy with a limited scope of action (Jouanneau, 
2013, pp. 266-270).
3.4 Three forms of the state monitoring of imams
The legal rules of laïcité preclude Ministers of Internal Affairs from directly 
reforming the recruitment of imams to off iciate in France. However, in the 
1990s, they developed at least three measures aimed at indirectly altering 
the profiles of Muslim ‘ministers of religion’, with varying outcomes.
Based on the premise that ‘from a Muslim point of view, France is a 
mission country, i.e. a country that receives foreign missionaries’,11 the f irst 
policy option for monitoring French imams consisted of approaching the 
selection of imams as a specif ic component of diplomatic relations with the 
countries of so-called ‘Muslim emigration’. The intention was to introduce 
a ‘bureaucratic rationalization’ of the monitoring of foreign imams through 
enrolling the consular networks of their countries of origin. If imams were 
going to be foreign nationals anyway, they were at least going to try to 
promote those whose status as an imam was off icially guaranteed by the 
governments in their countries of origin (Jouanneau, 2014). This measure 
rested on the assumption that the selected candidates would preach an Islam 
that is in conformity with the interests of the governments in place in those 
states and – the flipside of the same coin – that would not promote Islamism 
in France. Furthermore, supporting consular procedures for monitoring the 
emigration of imams allowed Ministry officials to rely on trusted diplomatic 
partners who were capable of keeping the concerned imams in check, or 
even of revoking their residence permits in case of problems. Not only do 
‘consular imams’ depend on the diplomatic authorities of their countries of 
origin for their pay and status, but during their stay in France they also f ind 
themselves embedded in hierarchical structures which, both in everyday 
life and in the case of problems, makes them potential mouthpieces and 
channels for French government off icials.
A second measure dating to November 1990 consisted of introducing 
a conf idential procedure for monitoring the visa applications of Muslim 
11 CAC, v. 19970347, art. 4, l. 1, 10 January 1996. ‘Situation actuelle de l’islam de France’. Ad-
ministrative memorandum written by the technical adviser for religious affairs of Minister of 
Internal Affairs Jean-Louis Debré.
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‘ministers of religion’.12 Indeed, as the overwhelming majority of Muslim 
clerics are not French nationals,13 the Ministry of Internal Affairs systemati-
cally used the right of residence as a roundabout way of recruiting ‘good 
candidates’ and turning down ‘bad’ ones (Jouanneau, 2009b). This method 
was directly in line with a long-attested French tradition of ‘à la carte treat-
ment of foreigners’ through the frequent use of ad hoc circulars (Spire, 2005, 
p. 13). This measure, which only affected professional imams – volunteer 
imams generally do not apply for visas in their capacity as ministers of 
religion, instead using their main occupation – had only a marginal impact 
on the prof iles of imams in France, but it was symbolically useful for the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs. Whether the imams who applied for residence 
were expelled or granted more or less short-term residence permits, each of 
the stages in the administrative investigation served as a reminder of ‘what 
any foreigner who fails to comply with the rules of good conduct exposes 
himself to’. Here these rules were the obligation ‘of being respectful of the 
existing order [and of] its system of values’ (Sayad, 1999, p. 9). The policy 
also contributed to facilitating the bureaucratic identif ication of foreign 
imams, chiefly by centralizing ‘the body of information at the disposal of 
the different administrations’ on the same imam and therefore ‘recording, 
and eventually (should the need arise) punishing all deviant behaviour, or 
behaviour suspected to be deviant’ (Spire, 2005, p. 58).
The third measure devised by off icials of the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs received more coverage. It consisted of unoff icially encouraging and 
supervising projects intended to ensure the training of imams à la française, 
in a bid to influence the profile of imams off iciating in French mosques in 
the long or short term. The intention of this measure was to set up training 
programmes in which individuals would learn how to conduct the profession 
of imam, and in the process create places where Islamic religious rationality 
was adjusted to French State rationality by defining the ‘good practices’ and 
‘legitimate beliefs’ of future imams to better reflect the ‘values’ of French 
society. For government agents, promoting and steering the creation of 
training institutions for the role or ‘profession’ of imam also stemmed 
from a desire to establish a more formal definition of the pre-requisites for 
becoming an imam. To make an educational institution the main means of 
12 CAC 200030069, art. 28. Conf idential telegram issued by the Sub-Directorate for Aliens 
and Cross-border Travel (SDECT), dated 21 November 1990.
13 In 2005, B. Godard (special adviser to the Central Bureau for Religious Worship) stated that 
‘less than 20 per cent of the imams in France had French nationality’ and that ‘they were less 
than a handful a decade ago’.
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obtaining the status of imam was also to progressively reduce the credit of 
other forms of legitimization that might have been employed by individuals 
striving to become the imam in a given mosque (Jouanneau, 2013, pp. 333-
357). However, most of the training projects launched or supported by 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs struggled to take off, and subsequently to 
function effectively. In addition to f inancial diff iculties, these programmes 
also had problems recruiting students because of the current state of the 
structuring of Muslim worship in France; training appeared to be an 
expensive investment for such a poorly paid ‘occupation’ (Frégosi, 1998).
4 Conclusion
In their efforts to introduce formal standards and certif icates for imams, 
the monitoring policies devised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (often 
with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) all encountered the issue 
of the legitimacy of the imams they attempted to select or endorse. As 
both the archives and my ethnographic research indicate, these measures 
failed to address the conditions of the emergence of a religious authority 
which in practice rests not so much on off icial titles and degrees as on 
the elective aff inities that develop between an imam and those who over 
time became ‘his’ faithful. Indeed, in the absence of a single ecclesiastical 
institution or a bureaucratization of the imamate (resembling the system in 
place in certain countries of origin), in France an imam’s ‘audience’ remains 
the main yardstick to gauge the religious legitimacy of a Muslim cleric 
(Jouanneau, 2012). Try as it might, the government will never be able to fully 
‘rationalize’ the ability of the imams it selects to meet the expectations of 
a wide array of faithful. No title, no foreign state can ensure the success of 
this co-optation, which’ forms vary depending on the place of worship, and 
which is necessary for an imam to ‘establish’ himself or ‘emerge’ within a 
mosque. This is undoubtedly a thorn in the side of the French government 
actors who contend that imams have the power to facilitate or hinder the 
‘cultural integration’ of French Muslims and seek to indirectly control their 
prof iles. But in fact, this limitation of state power is in keeping with the 
legal spirit of laïcité.
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Abstract
This chapter describes the case of a Dutch imam, Yassin Elforkani (b. 
1982), who is struggling to negotiate his position as an authoritative 
mediating religious leader in Dutch civil society. It follows Elforkani’s 
steps of becoming an influential public f igure and gaining a certain level 
of prestige as a religious authority in a secular context, while also meeting 
strong resistance from different audiences, both Islamic and non-Islamic. 
The chapter also discusses the broader question of the role and influence 
of imams as ‘public intellectuals’.
Keywords: Islam in the Netherlands, public intellectuals, populism, 
Salaf ism, institutionalization of Islam
1 Introduction
On 17 June 2015, the Dutch national newspaper Trouw reported the following: 
‘Face of moderate Islam in the Netherlands quits.’1 Due to serious security 
threats to him and his family, Yassin Elforkani, by then known by his chosen 
title of ‘imam of the young’, announced his resignation as the spokesman 
and board member of the largest national representative body of Muslims 
1 http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/5091/Religie/article/detail/4078761/2015/06/17/Gezicht-van-
gematigde-islam-in-Nederland-stapt-op.dhtml.
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in the Netherlands, the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid (Contact Organ 
of Muslims and Government, CMO).2
Since around 2004, Elforkani had been very active in the Dutch public sphere 
after making a name for himself as an imam in several mosques in Amsterdam 
and other Dutch cities. Highly accessible to the media, especially in his position 
as spokesman of the CMO, he has played a public role in the debate on Islam 
and Muslims in an increasingly tense national and international context.
Whereas most imams opt for an inward-oriented approach focused on 
leading the mosque community (Boender, 2007, 2014) with less exposure 
to the public, Elforkani is among the small group of imams that play an 
explicitly public role and actively contribute to the public debate. In this 
sense, Elforkani answers the call for a stronger civic engagement of imams 
in the public sphere not only in the Netherlands, but elsewhere in Western 
Europe as well. National authorities in Western-European societies often 
regard imams as communication channels between the governments and 
Muslim communities. Their role has recently been under close scrutiny for 
both integration and security concerns.
Since 2006, the Dutch state has provided a subsidy for imam-training and 
Islam programmes at two Dutch universities and one University of Applied 
Sciences (Boender, 2013; Ghaly, 2008). In 2013, however, the boards of both 
Inholland and Leiden University announced the closure of their programmes 
due to low success rates as measured by the number of graduates. The boards 
considered the programmes too expensive. This was in contradiction to both 
the national plan and the government’s expectations. Particularly since the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 and the murder of the Dutch f ilmmaker Theo 
van Gogh by the Moroccan-born Mohammed Bouyeri in November 2004, 
there has been a strong anxiety about so-called ‘hate-imams’, a specif ic 
type of travelling preacher who rejects the non-Muslim environment and 
encourages his followers to separate themselves from mainstream society 
(Cesari, 2004), and who sometimes are refused entrance visas for European 
countries. Similar to other Western European countries, the Dutch state 
has been balancing between policies of emancipation and of restriction.
2 CMO represents 380 of the 450 mosques in the Netherlands, most Moroccan, Turkish, 
Surinamese, or Bosnian (Boender, 2014; FORUM, 2010, p. 7). Elforkani was a board member of 
CMO from 2012 to the summer of 2015. The CMO, however, is in a diff icult position. Its authority 
and position is not obvious in relation to its constituencies (see Boender, 2014). The Dutch Muslim 
population is diverse. Many Muslims are not even aware of the existence of the CMO. The CMO 
is, then, barely supported by its ‘own constituencies’ (Vellenga and Wiegers, 2011). At the same 
time, it is an indispensable institution in the realization of legal rights, including the right to 
spiritual care in prisons and the army.
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In this chapter, we aim to show how Elforkani has operated within the 
constraints of a polemic public debate on Islam in the Netherlands, moving 
strategically between Muslim communities, the Dutch government, and the 
general public. Using the philosophical concept of the ‘public intellectual’ based 
on the definition proposed by Odile Heynders (2016; see below), we discuss 
whether this imam is being accepted in his public performance. The concept 
of the ‘public intellectual’ brings in an analytical perspective that allows us to 
discuss the contested expectations of his civic engagement as a religious leader.
Several other imams have been prominent in the public debate in the 
Netherlands. For instance, Abdulwahid van Bommel, a convert, was among 
the very f irst spokespeople of the Muslim community in the Netherlands, 
during the f irst phases of their integration and institutionalization. Moham-
med Cheppih was able to reach second generation Muslims by explaining the 
Islamic sources in Dutch, unlike most mosques’ imams at the time (Boender, 
2012). The ‘new kid on the block’ is Azzedine Karrat, a young imam of the 
Essalam mosque in Rotterdam. He received his religious education in the 
Netherlands and – just like Elforkani – is regularly present on television, 
radio, and social media. Another publicly outspoken imam is Abdul-Jabbar 
van de Ven, a convert who has propagated a Salaf i form of Islam. He made 
a name for himself through his public debate with Hans Jansen (1942-2015), 
a renowned Arabist and member of the European Parliament from Geert 
Wilders’s populist Party for Freedom – a debate that was later published in 
book form (Jansen and Van de Ven, 2008). In this chapter, however, we confine 
our discussion to the case of Elforkani, as he is a prominent example of an 
imam balancing between different audiences and expressing his own voice.
The chapter is divided as follows. Section 2 presents some considerations 
about the definition of a ‘public intellectual’, including arguments both for 
and against the inclusion of religious leaders in the category. Section 3 sets 
out the key currents in the Dutch public debate on Islam to which Elforkani 
contributes. In Section 4, we present Elforkani’s professional background 
and core message. Section 5 provides some key responses of recognition 
and rejection of Elforkani’s message, as expressed through (social) media. 
Section 6 presents our conclusion.
2 (Religious) public intellectuals
Can a religious person, in this case a Muslim, contribute as an independ-
ent thinker to a public debate? Or does religious doctrinal bias permeate 
every level of his/her thinking, preventing him/her from adding a critical 
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contribution to public debate in the secular public sphere? In the literature, 
three main positions can be distinguished.
Professor of literature Heynders describes the role of a public intellectual 
as follows: ‘The public intellectual intervenes in the public debate and 
proclaims a controversial and committed stance from a sideline position. 
S/he has critical knowledge and ideas, stimulates discussion and offers 
alternative scenarios in regard to topics of political, social and ethical 
nature, thus addressing non-specialist audiences on matters of general 
concern’ (Heynders, 2016, p. 3). Public intellectuals are expected to provide a 
rational contribution to the formation of the public sphere. Table 1 presents 
Heynders’ view on what she calls ‘component frames’ that indicate ‘which 
themes and strategies are dominant in regard to certain cases of public 
intellectual performance’ (Heynders, 2016, p. 21).
Table 1  Heuristic four-level scheme for researching public intellectuals
Public intellectual (PI)
cultural authority the pi has ideas, cultural authority and credentials, and 
the talent to give a broad, condensable, popularizing, 
and new perspective on issues of general concern
social and cultural context the pi operates in a specific (trans-) national, societal, 
and economic context, which provides a narrative frame 
that is used as well as criticized
mediated context of 
production and reception
the pi introduces an issue, using the appropriate media 
and a particular rhetoric (style of arguing and framing)
aesthetic performance and 
theatricality
the pi implements aesthetic features in texts and 
performances, and consciously creates a persona in the 
media with an effect on audiences
We apply this ‘four-level’ scheme to the question of whether Yassin Elforkani 
can be regarded as a public intellectual. In treating the question of independ-
ent thinking, Heynders goes back to Gramsci (1971), who distinguished 
between ‘traditional’ and ‘organic’ intellectuals – the former independent 
of a social class and the latter organizing particular social classes or groups. 
Heynders quotes Edward Said, who followed Gramsci in arguing that ‘[e]
veryone working in any media f ield associated with the production or the 
distribution of knowledge is […] an organic intellectual in giving voice to 
certain ideas and groups’ (Said, 1996, p. 4, in Heynders, 2016, p. 8). Heynders 
argues that it is inevitable that public intellectuals will develop political 
preferences, which at a certain point they can no longer hide. She mentions 
the playwright, dissident, and later president of Czecho-Slovakia Václav 
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Havel as an example, and also notes that Mario Vargas Llosa, writer and 
candidate for the presidency in Peru in 1990 was an exemplary organic 
intellectual (Heynders, 2016, p. 8). From Heynders’ arguments, it could be 
concluded that it does not really matter whether a public intellectual uses 
religiously based arguments.
Jan Peter Hartung (2013) takes a different position. He considers the 
term ‘Muslim public intellectual’ a contradictio in terminis (‘contradiction 
in terms’). In his view, the concept is used without proper justif ication. 
He argues that ‘this tag appears to be ascribed to those Muslims who, by 
emphasizing rationality over slavishly adhering to a textual tradition, sup-
port the general compatibility of Western and Islamic social and political 
values’ (Hartung, 2013, p. 35). Criticizing Weber (1972) and Schluchter (1991) 
for including religious thinkers or even ‘clerics’ as intellectuals, Hartung 
presents two arguments to support his position. First, he argues that the 
label of religious intellectual ‘is very much the production of dogmas [… It] 
leads ultimately to conflict with a philosophical concept of “intellectual”’ 
(p. 37). According to him, religious dogmas oppose philosophical conceptions 
by their very nature, as dogmas are inherently considered immutable or 
fatalist. Hartung’s second argument is that modern Arab societies themselves 
distinguish between the roles of religious thinkers and public intellectuals, 
referring to the f irst as ulama who represent a religious authority, and 
the second as mufakkirūn which can be translated as ‘intellectuals’ and 
stresses their secular nature. Hartung thus refuses to see religious leaders 
as independent thinkers.
Jürgen Habermas takes an ‘in-between position’. Habermas stipulated 
that a pluralist society is an extremely complex ensemble of groups, each 
striving for their own interests, and as such living in an ongoing situation 
of conflict. The public sphere is die Öffentlichkeit (‘public space’) in which 
competing sets of norms and values have to be discussed to decide how the 
Öffentlichkeit should look like (Habermas, 1962). Later, Habermas (2006) 
argued that in post-secular liberal societies it is relevant to accept religious 
thinkers as partners in this public discussion. Since it is not self-evident 
for secular societies and/or politics to accept the public contributions of a 
(new) cohort of religious leaders as rational contributions to the formation 
of the public sphere, this should be done through a vocabulary that is shared 
by different agents. This can only be possible in secular terms, Habermas 
states (2006). Evidently, this argument only concerns contributions in the 
public sphere, since most activities of religious groups take place in the non-
public sphere of the congregation. Their actions become public when they 
involve interactions outside of this sphere. Based on these three different 
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positions, we discuss Elforkani’s performance in the public debate on Islam 
and Muslims in the Netherlands with the aim of determining whether he 
could be regarded a ‘public intellectual’, and if so, of what nature.
3 Actors in the public debate on Islam
Islamophobia increasingly has affected Dutch public debate about the 
integration of Muslims (Sheehi, 2011; Taras, 2012; Van der Valk, 2012). Populist 
neo-nationalist parties such as Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom have 
considerably grown in size and influence (De Ruiter, 2012a, 2012b). At the 
same time, Salaf ism has grown in popularity among young Muslims who 
feel discriminated and increasingly segregated from society (De Kon-
ing, Becker, Roex, and Aarns, 2014). While radical Islamist groups create 
fear through violent international attacks, populist movements come up 
with unrealistic solutions (De Ruiter, 2016). In this section, we present a 
short overview of the different currents of these debates, illustrated with 
examples of different publicists, to show the narrative frames in which 
Elforkani operates. These range from anti-Islam ideologists to individuals 
who are very open towards Islam, and Islamic religious voices that can 
basically be divided into streams of openness to Dutch society or isolation. 
We start with presenting some main statistics on the Muslim presence in 
the Netherlands.
3.1 Islam in the Netherlands
The Dutch Muslim community is ethnically, culturally, and religiously 
diverse and politically divided. According to the Dutch Central Off ice of 
Statistics (Maliepaard and Gijsberts, 2012), 825,000 people in the Netherlands 
are Muslim, which is around 5 per cent of the total population of nearly 
17 million. 296,000 of them have a Moroccan background and 285,000 have a 
Turkish one, together making up 67 per cent of the total number of Muslims 
(Berger, 2012-2013; Maliepaard and Gijsberts, 2012). Other major groups of 
Muslims in the country have backgrounds from Suriname (34,000 people), 
Afghanistan (31,000), Iraq (27,000), and Somalia (20,000). There are around 
13,000 Dutch converts. Around 95 per cent of the Muslims in the Netherlands 
have a non-Western background (Berger, 2012-2013; FORUM, 2012). There 
are also several different Shiite communities, including Turkish Alevites, 
Iraqis, and Iranians, that together make up a population of around 100,000 
to 150,000 people. Within Sunni circles, the number of Salaf i Muslims has 
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been growing in the past decade, and now numbers approximately 25,000 
(De Koning, Becker, Roex, and Aarns, 2014; De Koning, Wagemakers, and 
Becker, 2014).
3.2 The ideology of the Party for Freedom
Since its birth in 2006, the Party for Freedom lead by Geert Wilders has 
been relatively successful in general, regional, local, and European elections. 
Although it has suffered some electoral setbacks and internal scissions, 
it is a powerful political force in the country.3 The party’s core issue is 
the ‘battle against Islam’ (De Ruiter, 2012a, 2012b). In public statements, 
Wilders, assisted by his ‘party ideologue’ Martin Bosma (2010), has repeat-
edly claimed that he has ‘nothing against Muslims but everything against 
Islam’. In 2010-2011, Wilders faced trial for his public statement of ‘How 
do we imagine a country without Islam?’ – for which he was eventually 
acquitted (De Ruiter, 2012a, 2012b). At an election meeting on the occasion 
of the Municipal Elections in March 2014, he asked his supporters if they 
wanted ‘less Moroccans’ in the country; in answer the crowd cheered ‘less, 
less, less’, to which Wilders responded, ‘Then we are going to organize that.’ 
Thousands of complaints were f iled against him for these statements, and 
he again faced trial. Eventually Wilders was found guilty of the charge of 
inciting discrimination, but he was not punished. To remove this guilty 
verdict, Wilders f iled an appeal and as of the publication of this book the 
outcome of that appeal is not yet known. Wilders is not alone in this f ight 
against Islam; a small group of opinion makers also espouses this political 
ideology, such as the publicist Joost Niemöller (2012; 2017).
3.3 Other voices
There is hardly any opinion leader in the Netherlands that has not expressed 
a specif ic opinion on Islam, Muslims, and their integration into Dutch 
society. There is one group that accepts Muslims as they are, and another 
that demands that they adapt to Dutch-Western values. On the one end of 
the scale is Afshin Ellian, a professor of law at Leiden University and political 
refugee from Khomeini’s Iran, who does not cease to inform the public of 
3 Between November 2010 and April 2012, Wilders’s party supported the minority government 
of Liberal Party leader Mark Rutte together with the Christian Democratic Party. He dropped 
his support for this coalition, as he declared he was no longer able to support the budget cuts 
proposed by the cabinet.
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the crimes committed in the name of Islam. But he does not deny Muslims 
their existence in the country. The other end of the scale is symbolized by 
the suggestion of Labour politician and ex-mayor of Amsterdam Job Cohen, 
who asked people to ‘drink tea’ with Muslim leaders to ‘keep things together’ 
(Sohorto, 2010). Cohen was accused of engaging in dialogue with Muslims 
whose anti-democratic and misogynist attitudes were well known.
The Socialist Minister of Social Affairs from 2012-2017, Lodewijk Asscher, 
was also concerned about the debate on Islam in the country. He regularly 
organized meetings with the representatives of the Muslim communities 
in the country to discuss their role in the further integration of Muslims. In 
speeches, press conferences, and newspaper articles, Asscher expressed an 
assimilationist vision by encouraging Muslims and migrants to subscribe to 
Western values of democracy, the freedom of speech, and women’s and gay 
rights.4 In the spring of 2014, Salaf i imams and leaders were invited to the 
Ministry for a meeting, during which they expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the government’s views on Islamic issues. In fall 2015, the Labour Party 
MP Ahmed Marcouch, himself of Moroccan origin, suggested in Parliament 
that the Salaf i movement should be forbidden.5 This proposal was met 
with strong criticism, not only from the Salafis, but also from other political 
parties that stated that the Labour Party was no longer far from Wilders’s 
view that all of Islam should be forbidden. Since then, a f ierce debate has 
continued about the position of Salaf is in particular in the country.
3.4 Islamic voices
Muslim voices are not homogeneous. In addition to jihadists and Salaf is, 
there are also the mainstream so-called moderates, the culturally Muslim, 
and the former Muslims who have since declared themselves atheists.
The number of jihadi Muslims in the country is low (cf. De Koning, Becker, 
Roex, and Aarns, 2014), and they are under the surveillance of the secret 
services and police. Obviously, most of their activities take place in secret, 
but they still appear occasionally to proclaim their support for the Islamic 
State or Al-Qaeda and their aversion to democracy (Zeegers, 2016).
There are still relatively few Salafi Muslims in the country; in 2007, the 
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(AIVD-NCTV, 2015). The Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies of the 
University of Amsterdam estimated that 8 per cent of the Muslims in the 
Netherlands could be regarded as ‘orthodox and sensitive for Salafism’ (Roex, 
Van Stiphout, and Tillie, 2010). Salafi ideology acknowledges that Muslims 
can live in a non-Muslim country while also obeying a complex set of rules 
based on the sharia. There are basically two streams within Salafism. One 
is explicitly non-political; they strive to keep a distance from mainstream 
society (De Koning, Becker, Roex, and Aarns, 2014). Young people are told 
not to mix with Dutch society and to only focus on Islam. The other allegedly 
has a political agenda. It rejects democracy, but strives to develop through 
the democratic system to gain more political support for the Salafi lifestyle.6 
However, the researcher and expert in jihadi-Salaf ism Shiraz Maher has 
recently argued that this two-fold classif ication is not without problems. 
Maher (2016) suggests using a more individual approach to understand Salafis, 
which captures the relationship between how the actors view their connection 
to power and the manner in which they wish to engage with or change it.
There are plenty of so-called moderate voices in the Muslim communities 
of the Netherlands. They share the opinion that Islam and democracy, 
and Islamic values and Western values, are compatible. They attempt to 
understand the meaning of the Islamic sources in the context of their original 
time and place. One example is Enis Odaci, an Alevi Muslim who manages a 
website called Humanislam.7 He seeks a rapprochement between the Islamic 
and Western value systems. Others underline the importance of both value 
systems while embedding their thinking in an orthodox Sunni interpreta-
tion of Islam. An example is Stella van de Wetering, a staff member of the 
Amsterdam Centre of Islamic Theology of the Amsterdam Free University. 
Mehmet Cerit, the editor-in-chief of the former Turkish-Dutch journal Zaman 
Vandaag (the off-spring of the Turkish newspaper Today’s Zaman, which 
was forcibly closed by the Turkish government in March 2016) is a fervent 
supporter of the combination of Western and Islamic values.8
Finally, there is a group of voices that considers themselves Muslim 
by culture and to whom Islam is an identity marker, such as the novelist 
Abdelkader Benali. Others declare that they have broken with Islam, and 
are continuing their lives as atheists or agnostics. One example is Haf id 
Bouazza, the author of highly symbolic novels.
6 Recently, the validity of this distribution into two streams of Salaf ism has been questioned, 
especially by one of the authors of this chapter, De Ruiter.
7 http://www.humanislam.com/.
8 http://www.zamanvandaag.nl/.
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4 Elforkani: background and message
Yassin Elforkani calls himself an ‘imam of the young’; he has been frequently 
in the spotlight in the debate on Islam, particularly since the murder of 
Dutch f ilmmaker Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri in November 
2004. Elforkani is married and the father of two children. He runs a business 
f irm with several partners. Born in a small town near Amsterdam to f irst-
generation Moroccan migrants9 from a rural area of Morocco, Elforkani 
was raised in an orthodox family where Islam played an important role. 
His father and grandfather were imams. From a young age, Elforkani was 
interested in the sources of Islam, the Quran, and Sunna of the Prophet, 
and in studying Islamic theological works. He spent part of his childhood in 
Morocco, where he learned the Quran by heart, and studied in several Islamic 
institutions both in and outside of Europe, such as Al-Azhar University in 
Cairo.10 Elforkani allegedly has a conservative Islamic past during which 
he condoned or even stimulated the visit of conservative preachers from 
abroad, some of whom were close to Salaf ism. He has also been accused of 
having f inancial ties with oligarchs from Kuwait in order to fund mosques 
in The Netherlands.11 Elforkani has strongly contested these allegations.12
In 2010, he became the spokesman of the Contact Organ of Muslims and 
Government (CMO). He has expressed his drive as wanting to encourage 
young Muslims to integrate into and function in Dutch society while at 
the same time maintaining their Muslim identity. He combines the roles 
of a religious leader, youth social worker, and socio-political debater. This 
threefold role is visible through his aesthetic performance: he wears a jellaba 
(‘robe’) while preaching – providing him with the aura of a traditional 
imam –, the jeans and t-shirt of a social worker, and the black tie of a debater. 
During a relatively short period of time, he has developed into an important 
Muslim participant in the public debate on Islam in the Netherlands. In the 
summer of 2015, however, he withdrew from his position as spokesperson of 
9 It was in the 1960s and 1970s that the Dutch government and companies recruited labourers 
from Turkey and Morocco, who were later followed by their spouses and children. Although the 
mind-set of the Dutch governments at the time was that they would later return to their home 
countries, the opposite happened. Today we are witnessing a second and third generation of 
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the CMO, a decision reinforced by ongoing security threats to him and his 
family. After the second Paris attacks in November 2015, he stepped back 
onto front stage, appearing in several media channels and on Twitter and 
Facebook, and has been active since then. In March 2016, he issued a public 
warning to society that pointed at the ongoing unrest and radicalization 
in certain Muslim circles in Amsterdam, and predicted possible terrorist 
attacks. Muslim spokesmen heavily criticized him for this, accusing him 
of sowing unnecessary fear.13
Elforkani’s public performances occur in the highly complicated social 
and political context described above. In a society where Muslims as a 
group have diff iculty being heard, Elforkani has acted as one of the main 
representatives of both the Moroccan and wider Muslim community in the 
Netherlands. Using a variety of platforms, he responds to diverse topics, such 
as radicalization of the youth, violent jihad, the (sexual) equality of men 
and women, liberal democracy, and political representation. In answering 
these calls, Elforkani has tried to provide several ‘counter-points’ against 
the essentialist and one-sided views on Islam and Muslims propounded by 
populist political parties. We have identif ied at least f ive ‘counter-points’ 
that Elforkani espouses.
First, he calls for the active participation of young Muslims in society. 
Elforkani expresses his view that Islam fits well within democratic societies. 
He urges young people to do their best to build a future for themselves in 
the country, go to school, and take up responsible jobs. He states that Islam 
encourages young people to integrate and help build the country in which 
they live. He calls upon young Muslims ‘to come out of their comfort zone 
to reach out to the other’, as he stated in a speech and interview in February 
2016.14 He conveys the importance of openly confessing belief in the Muslim 
faith in society, and participates in the ongoing public debate about the 
(in)compatibility of Islam and democracy, of which the equal treatment 
of women and homosexuals are core issues. Although he does not seem 
to take the initiative in expressing his opinion of the rights of these two 
groups, when confronted he states that everyone in the society has the right 
to live as he or she wants. While this is not the same as condoning these 
alternative lifestyles, it is Elforkani’s conviction that Islam and Muslims 
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of mutual acceptance. In this way, Elforkani tries to bring an essentially 
internal Muslim religious debate into the public space, which f its well in 
his vision that Muslims should not separate themselves from the rest of 
society. He also wants to show the non-Muslim part of society that these 
and similar debates do take place within Muslim communities, and that in 
his opinion it is important to hold these debates to f ind the place of Islam 
and Muslims within society.
Second, Elforkani f iercely expresses his disapproval of young Muslims 
travelling to Syria to join jihadi groups. In his view, these young people 
have not correctly understood the sources of Islam; in his sermons, he 
provides a contextual interpretation of the sacred texts. He also adds 
that the conflicts in Syria and the Middle East in general are not young 
Dutch Muslims’ conflicts. While condemning the possible support of the 
community for jihadists, he calls the community to provide a religious 
answer. He claims that it is not Islam but the interpretations of the sources 
that should be critically discussed, as these would lead to concepts as the 
Caliphate, Islamic State (IS), jihad in Syria and Iraq (interview February 
2016). ‘[The r]uthless reality is that the perpetrators of the attacks in Paris 
on 13 November 2015, have legitimized their acts theologically. We cannot 
sustain that all this has nothing to do with Islam,’ he said in the national 
newspaper de Volkskrant (Groen, 2015). ‘You have to come from another 
planet to not want to speak out as a Muslim […] you as Muslim can no 
longer look away.’15
Third, one of his major concerns stems from his realization that radi-
cal Muslims discredit ‘mainstream’ Muslims, which severely harms their 
position as equal citizens of the Netherlands. At the same time, he opposes 
the idea that Muslims should regard themselves as victims of discrimina-
tion or discriminatory attitudes, ‘wallowing in feelings of victimization’. 
He urges the Muslim community to vehemently resist the Islamic State’s 
interpretations of the Quran, ‘particularly in small circles, when you, parents, 
discuss with your children about faith, or during your conversations amongst 
yourselves in coffee- and teahouses’. Muslims should back off from their role 
as victims, and should not just keep whining that they are always singled 
out for wholesale condemnation (de Volkskrant, 14 November 2015).
His recommendation that Muslim communities put their own houses in 
order – concerning pedagogical weaknesses of the Moroccan community, 
for example – means that he brings internal community affairs and social 
15 http://www.nltimes.nl/2015/11/16/amsterdam-imam-we-cannot-say-this-has-nothing-to-
do-with-religion/.
the imam as an organic puBlic intellec tual 177
weaknesses into public discussions. He not only utters this critique towards 
his own community, but also directs it towards politicians, both right wing 
and left wing.
Fourth, his focus is on influencing policies relating to the prevention 
of radicalization. In a television documentary of the Muslim Broadcast 
Organization in November 2013, he expresses his concern as follows (our 
translation):16
We have a problem now, which politicians have as yet not even noticed 
[i.e. radicalization], let alone having thought of solutions for it. There are 
a number of smaller municipalities [in this case Zoetermeer] that face 
problems that politicians have no idea about. And if you do not know then 
you just cannot talk at all about it. […] they think they know, they talk about 
a phenomenon they have no sense of at all. So I would say: ‘politicians, go 
once again to the community, and see what exactly is going on.’17
Understanding these and other integration problems as a shared concern 
of the diverse Muslim communities and society at large is his f ifth ‘coun-
terpoint’. It formed an important part of his message in his political role as 
spokesman and board member of the CMO, in which he attempted to play 
the role of a liaison between the government and the Moroccan, Turkish, 
Surinamese, Bosnian, and other Muslim communities.
By attempting to provide a counter-narrative, Yassin Elforkani has clearly 
tried to act as an intermediary between various groups. He wants to play 
a bridging role that connects the social realities of the young and elder 
generations. He also tries to connect the worlds of the Muslim communities 
and the local municipalities. Finally, he attempts to defend the interests 
of Muslim communities at the national level. In these mediating roles, he 
manifests in both the internal socio-religious sphere of Muslim communities 
and in the public, secular context.
5 Recognition and rejection
Elforkani has gained support from Muslims and non-Muslims alike, who 
praise him for playing this intermediary role. However, he has also faced 
considerable criticism from many different sides, from anti-Islam circles to 
16 Muslim Broadcast Organization, 2-11-13.
17 Translation by the authors. Muslim Broadcast Organization, 2-11-13.
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Salaf i groups. Whereas voices such as the ones expressed by the populist 
website GeenStijl, which is close to the Party for Freedom, consider Elforkani 
a ‘wolf in sheep’s clothing’ and accuse him of ‘double-speak’,18 jihadi-radicals, 
low in number but strong in voice, are most likely the ones who have issued 
threats to stop him from talking in public. As he himself stated, ‘Syria 
radicals threaten [me] more than they threaten Wilders,’ in the Dutch 
newspaper Trouw on 18 December 2013.19
Mainstream groups of Muslims also do not spare him from critique, often 
through social media and in internal debates. On the one hand, there are 
young Muslims who in principle look at him in a favourable way, but are 
constantly confronted with prejudices and (hidden and open forms of) 
discrimination on the labour market (Siebers, 2010; Siebers and Dennis-
sen, 2012). These negative experiences make them turn against Elforkani’s 
discourse and lead to blaming him for supporting something that in their 
eyes is ‘just not realistic’: why support Western values if that same West 
does not give you a fair chance? Some Salaf is, in turn, accuse Elforkani of 
cooperating with the secular and therefore kāfir (‘unbeliever’) government. 
These circles have doubts about his formation and appointment as imam, 
holding the fact that he did not follow the right path to reaching this status 
against him. Furthermore, he is sometimes distrusted by a ‘moderate’ or 
mainstream Dutch public that is inclined to support him in his efforts, 
but still has continuous doubts about his integrity, and especially accuses 
him of being supported f inancially by the state of Kuwait in its attempt to 
spread a conservative form of Islam. This ‘conservative heritage’ of being a 
Muslim Brother is always attached to him.
It is not always easy to distinguish between the Elforkani who is a ‘youth 
imam’, the ‘imam of the Amsterdam Blue Mosque’, ‘spokesperson of the 
CMO’, and ‘interlocutor’ of the former Minister of Social Affairs, Lodewijk 
Asscher – making Elforkani diff icult to label. These different roles might 
be confusing for various audiences. As a journalist phrased it, ‘He wears so 
many hats that it raises doubt’ (van Walsum, 2015). Elforkani is a religious 
leader, a social worker, and a socio-political debater at the same time, and 
is involved in both the private and public spheres. The fact that he is so 
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6 Elforkani as an ‘organic public intellectual’
Elforkani presents himself in public debates as a supporter of the complete 
integration of Muslims into Dutch society. He believes that Muslim and 
Western values can meet and that young Muslims should do their best 
to build Dutch society at large. His positions as imam of the youth, social 
worker, and spokesman and board member of the CMO have given him the 
opportunity to express his views in an increasingly polarized public debate.
Actively bringing in a counter-narrative, this Muslim religious leader 
has become a pronounced public f igure in the debate about the status of 
Islam – and religion in general – in society. He has actively tried to influence 
public opinion and decision makers’ stances towards the highly debated 
topics of integration and radicalization. As such, he answers the definition 
of Heynders of a ‘public intellectual’: he intervenes in public debates and 
proclaims a controversial and committed stance. Elforkani moves in the 
public space; his presence is diff icult to ignore; he addresses non-specialist 
audiences through numerous interviews in the press, radio and television, 
and on the Internet. He presents critical knowledge and ideas concerning 
the subjects he tackles, i.e., Islam and Muslims in Western societies, daring 
to go beyond the lines of what many Muslims in particular consider to be 
permitted, and thereby showing what Heynders calls ‘cultural authority’.
Obviously, one of Hartung’s major objections to the idea of religious public 
intellectuals is that they would be stuck in their dogmatic convictions and 
therefore be unable to put things in different or progressive perspectives. 
However, we have seen that one of Elforkani’s characteristics is that his 
contribution to the public debate is contested in religious circles. At the 
same time, he does not confine himself to (purely) religious or theological 
matters, but also captures an externally focused public stage. Elforkani 
inserts controversial ideas into the public debate on Islam and Muslims. His 
arguments, basically an amalgam of Islamic and Western values, provoke 
f ierce reactions from both conservative Islamic circles, such as the Salaf i 
ones, and the populist circles who by def inition hardly trust Muslims 
anyway; he also provokes young Muslims who no longer have no faith 
in equal chances in society, as well as the part of the mainstream Dutch 
public that is infected by the virus of mistrust and suspicion of Muslims. He 
neither disposes of a strong support in his own community nor in society 
at large. This is part of Heynders’ concept of the ‘public intellectual’. At the 
same time, Heynders notices that public intellectuals almost inevitably 
show their ‘political feathers’ while giving voice to certain groups – in this 
case, religious groups.
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Be they secular or religious, public intellectuals’ most important charac-
teristic was ‘proclaiming a controversial and committed stance’, thus offering 
‘alternative scenarios’ (Heynders, 2016, p. 3). They present meta-narratives, 
maintaining debates based on arguments. Religious arguments, then, can 
make sense to a post-secular public debate. Applying Habermas’s view that 
public intellectuals necessarily use secular arguments in any societal debate, 
one could postulate that the debate on Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands 
is not led only by religious arguments. Elforkani seeks Quran-based argu-
ments, but he does so to improve the integration of Muslims into society. 
In fact, he contributes to a reconciliation between secular society and the 
religious, cultural, and social tenets of Muslim communities. In conclusion, 
we could classify Yassin Elforkani as an organic public intellectual, as he 
represents an important Muslim voice, even if some audiences are unwilling 
to accept his words – or maybe for exactly that reason.
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Abstract
Using Facebook as a case study, this chapter details how self-proclaimed 
jihadist women construct and disseminate an online discourse to engage 
their audience with jihadist ideology. The empirical data provide a glimpse 
into the mechanisms that enable female Islamic authority online, while 
the theoretical framework describes the elements of jihadist propaganda 
used to grant legitimacy to those who assume the roles of, in this case, 
female i-Imams. The study shows that female online authority promotes 
the transformation of women into warriors.
Keywords: i-Imam, i-Khutba, female virtual leadership, jihad, Islamic State
1 Introduction
Since the advent of the Internet, and with it Islamic websites, in the late 1990s, 
Islamic religious authority has acquired a new layer of complexity: cyber religious 
authority. Online spaces that are used by i-Imams to inform, lecture, and decide 
about Islamic subjects are very popular, particularly among Muslim youth. The 
online minbar (‘pulpit’) has become a virtual platform for the i-Imams: a (usually) 
hardly controlled space where communications formatted as fatwas are often is-
sued without any legal validation or guarantee of the professional or educational 
training of the issuers. The question of legitimacy and authenticity is even more 
pertinent because the Internet is an open, free, and global communication tool. 
Moreover, i-Khutbas (‘Internet sermons’) are attractively presented in simple 
English via Facebook, YouTube, or Google Plus and offer an interactive way to 
debate all aspects of Islamic living from rituals to sacred sources.
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More recently, these sites also serve the goal of the radicalization and 
online recruitment of young women to engage in jihadist war scenarios, 
including in Syria and Iraq. In this chapter, i-Imams, understood from 
a female perspective and as a virtual Islamic authority, and i-Khutba, 
understood as the various shapes virtual Islamic discourse may take, 
are central to a state-of-the-art study of the imamate in Western Europe 
(Carvalho, 2014). The present chapter approaches the online construction of 
female authority through the analysis of the online performance of young 
Spanish-speaking Muslim women, specif ically using Facebook as a social 
networking case study.
On Facebook, the female informants export similar rules of engagement 
to their online groups as those that prevail in their daily lives. The case study 
presented here concerns Spanish-speaking Muslim women of Moroccan 
origin, as well as convert Muslim women of Spanish origin, between the 
ages of eighteen and 40, counting in total 50 individuals, all of whom live 
in Catalonia. The women from both groups use similar building blocks 
of discourse and narratives, based upon ‘a true part of Muslim tradition’ 
(Mernissi, 1991, pp. vii-viii), in a self-constructed online participation that 
is not focused on gender opposition since they do not strive for a ‘direct 
struggle against men’ (Sadiqi, 2003, p. 35). Their online participation is part 
of an individual struggle to be mujāhidāt (‘female participants in jihad’), 
and even muqātilāt (‘women who f ight with arms’) – for the Quran does, 
they claim, call for qitāl (‘conventional f ighting’) (Cooke, 2002, p. 232). In 
this online space, authority is constructed through the pursuit of religious 
knowledge and religious education, with the highest regard awarded to 
the women who are prof icient in both Classical Arabic and Spanish. This 
model of authority founded on language competence was already noted by 
the Moroccan anthropologist Fatima Sadiqi, who acknowledged the social 
importance of code-switching among Moroccan women (2003, p. 39). The 
situation is similar on Facebook, where women who understand and write 
in Classical Arabic are seen as having a better understanding of the Quran, 
and therefore being more competent in interpreting the sacred sources.
Women who want to further their online role as i-Imams usually use a 
simple digital tool to achieve this goal: they make their Facebook prof ile 
public. Open access to their page implies that they are willing to give voice 
to their veil and claim their place among the religious authorities. The fact 
that the woman who wants to assume a distinctive online social status 
maintains a public Facebook page opens a bridge between the public 
sphere (polis), women (gender), and ritualization (religion). Public spaces 
and ritual practices in Islam are predominantly male. Hence, women are 
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developing new cognitive schemes to format contexts and contents that 
will confer meaning and authority to ritualization processes. In fact, these 
new cognitive schemes lead women to both religious knowledge and new 
learned performances that, in the case of jihadism, introduce them to 
violent behaviour patterns.
This model of Islamic online authority has two sides. On the one hand, 
it is a ‘bridge-building discourse’ framed by the faculty of ijtihād, def ined 
as reasoning and interpretation; on the other hand, it is a bridge-building 
network process framed by the ideology of jihadism (Ahmed, 2011, p. 7). For 
this reason, it is relevant to attempt to build an empirical study of the female 
ritualization of religious violence and female religious agency together with 
the notion of local cultures to unveil the identities, roles, and activities of 
self-proclaimed online female jihadists.
This chapter f irst explores online female religious authority, and then 
discusses how the study’s informants employ their online Islamic authority 
to direct their audience to migrate to Syria and become part of the offline 
jihadist f ight. Our attention then turns to the online space, or the Web 2.0, 
to understand how its specif ic features help in promoting jihadist discourse 
among young cyber users. All of this is discussed in the context of a case 
study that aims to demonstrate how Spanish-speaking Muslim women use 
Facebook to develop jihadist narratives and, through them, convince other 
women to transfer their jihadist performances from the online world to the 
offline world, or more concretely to the so-called caliphate of the Islamic 
State in Syria and Iraq.
2 Methodological considerations
The present study addresses the Facebook social media network as the 
specific f ield of research, focussing on Facebook accounts and/or pages from 
Spanish-speaking, Sunni Muslim women residing in Spain, specif ically in 
Catalonia. All of them were aware of my research activities and agreed to 
share the contents of their pages for the purpose of my study. Follow-ups 
were done in the shape of interviews (via private messages and Skype) to get 
to know the informants and their circumstances better, assess their actual 
religious knowledge, and clarify the goals of their performances online. In 
their study on the evolution of jihadism in Catalonia, Fernando Reinares 
and Carola García-Calvo (2015) wrote that between 2004 and 2012, ‘four out 
of every ten individuals sentenced for jihadist terrorist activities in Spain 
during the period were located in Catalonia.’ This high number of jihadist 
188 Claudia Carvalho 
individuals highlights the importance of the Catalan region to the study of 
jihadism in Europe. This number should also be interpreted in relation to the 
high presence of Salaf i imams in the area: ‘50 Salaf i worship places, half of 
all those currently in existence in Spain’ (Reinares and García-Calvo, 2015).
The dominant language of the informants is Spanish. They have some 
understanding of transliterated Arabic, although its syntax is frequently 
incorrect, and only a limited number have fluency in Classical Arabic – an 
important skill, since one’s prof iciency in Classic Arabic determines the 
individual’s capacity to achieve a position of authority. The language level 
reflects one’s hermeneutic competence in interpreting the sacred sources 
and indicates the possession of greater religious knowledge.1
In the offline context, language is also a crucial factor for understanding 
the role of imams in Spain, and more specif ically in Catalonia since the 
autonomous region’s off icial language is Catalan. The lack of training of the 
local imams can be detected directly through their communication tools, 
as not all of them are f luent in Spanish, let alone in Catalan. Originally 
from Morocco, many of the imams do not speak or understand Spanish and 
perform their sermons in Classical Arabic, hence creating a gap between 
themselves and the younger Muslim generations who prefer using Spanish. 
Another crucial factor is the role and the space of women in Spanish mosques. 
In 2014, when I conducted my fieldwork in the region, it was evident that the 
mosques were spaces reserved for male believers. Women are mostly only in 
mosques on Fridays and/or for Classical Arabic classes, which usually take 
place on weekday mornings. The perception of the ‘invisibility’ of women 
at the mosque was reflected in small details, such as the surprised and 
delighted reactions from children that were in clear contrast to the men’s 
noticeably hostile attitude towards my presence in the mosques’ courtyards.
During the period of data collection, none of the women declared that she 
had or was about to travel to the Islamic State controlled territory or that she 
was located in the region. Moreover, during the period of data collection, no 
information was shared that indicated that any of the informants had in fact 
travelled to the region. Still, because they expressed their desire to travel and 
to join the Islamic State, they are regarded as potential jihadist migrants. That 
was for example the case of S.C. (El Pais, 7 July 2015), a mother and converted 
Muslim who was in charge of the recruitment of young girls to the jihadist cause.
Even though there is no information on whether any of the informants in 
my study did in fact migrate to Syria, there are examples of Spanish-speaking 
1 I translated all the quotes of the informants, in Spanish, Arabic, or other languages, in the 
study and in this chapter into English. Original quotes are listed in my dissertation.
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women who were not part of the study attempting to travel to territories 
controlled by Islamic State. One example is S.Y., a Moroccan-born Muslim, 
married and the mother of a three-year-old child. She worked as an online 
recruiter for the Islamic State and was captured in December 2014 in Turkey 
(Audiencia Nacional, 2015). At the time of her arrest she was waiting to enter 
Syria together with her child. For the specif ic purposes of this chapter, and 
considering that Spain is the location of the case study, I use the definition of 
a jihadist according to the law Ley Orgánica 2/2015:2 it concerns individuals 
that are involved in ‘The act of accessing in a usual manner a website that 
has contents directed to promote recruitment to a terrorist organization 
or group, or to collaborate with it, or to pursue their goals. The facts will 
be understood as committed in Spain when the access to those contents is 
done from Spanish territory’.
The study also considers open source jihadist publications and comments, 
photos, and videos on Facebook that are posted online in a consistent and 
frequent manner. For this analysis, the publications that generate long 
threads of conversations, reactions, or a signif icant amount of ‘likes’ were 
given preference. Data collection was conducted between February 2013 and 
December 2014 through monitoring, selecting, collecting, and examining 
data posted on Facebook to get a representative view of the cyber jihad 
feminine sphere. Although this monitoring was aimed at Spanish-speaking 
Muslim women, I have also used information about and data from female 
Facebook users who expressed themselves in other languages. Even though 
the Spanish-speaking informants are in general not fluent in other languages, 
they frequently resort to the Facebook option of ‘see translation’, and in 
some cases ask other users to help with the translation. All informants use 
a kunya, or nom de guerre, to hide their true name. To protect the sources, I 
have opted here to designate them by using the Arabic word umm, meaning 
‘mother’, and adding a different letter to indicate each informant. In the 
end, the study aims to formulate answers to the following questions:
‒ What are the key concepts explored by women who aspire to a role of 
religious authority?
‒ What are the elements and the events, be they of a religious, political, 
social, or cultural nature, that lead to framing and developing the online 
relationship between the female i-Imams and their female audience?
‒ How does an i-Imam give shape to her online authority?
2 The text of this law is available from the website of the Agencia Estatal Boletin Of icial del 
Estado, https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/03/31/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-3440.pdf ‘Ley Orgánica 2/2015, 
de 30 de Marzo,’ BOE, 77 (2015), pp. 27177-27185.
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To attempt to answer these questions it is imperative to analyse both the 
textual and visual components of their narratives, identify the key concepts 
of the female jihadist narrative, relate their discourse to the construction 
of agency in an online environment, determine whether these reflect the 
objective of acquiring authority, and f inally relate this process of acquiring 
female authority to the female jihadist recruitment networks.
Gary Bunt’s Virtually Islamic: Computer-Mediated Communication and 
Cyber-Islamic Environments (2002), Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online 
Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments (2003), and iMuslims: Rewiring the 
House of Islam (2009) were the f irst scientif ic approaches to the online 
presence of Islam. Bunt introduced concepts such as ‘e-Jihad’ and ‘cyber 
Islamic environments’. Since then, there has been much development in 
the f ield of Digital Media Studies in general and digital Islam in particular. 
As a matter of fact, Digital Media Studies evolved to integrate studies of the 
‘Internet of Things’ with issues connected to the ‘mobile’ world (Carvalho, 
2015). Therefore, the ‘i’ in ‘i-Imam’ depicts the ‘i’ in interface communications 
that include both Internet and mobile services. Similarly, I apply the notion 
of ‘i-Khutba’ to the digital Islamic sermons that occur with frequency, that 
vary in length, and that the sisterhood community considers an authentic 
religious service. In the term ‘i-Imam’, I include the collection of women 
who have been invested with a role of religious authority through their 
Facebook connections and who guide their online performance through 
a jihadist narrative.
3 i-Imam: Female virtual leadership
In the Sunni Muslim tradition, an imam is def ined as the ‘leader who 
constitutes the community, and without him God’s ordinances cannot be 
implemented’ (Crone and Hinds, 2003, p. 33). At the beginning of Islam, reli-
gious authority was in the hands of the prophet’s companions, the individuals 
who had been in direct contact with him and thus could narrate his life’s 
deeds. The companions transmitted narratives about the prophet’s conduct 
to the people close to them, who in turn continued the chain of transmission 
to the next generations (Crone and Hinds, 2003, p. 2). For this reason, those 
who had learned from the sources closest to the companions could claim 
to have stronger religious authority. The same principle is respected and 
applied today by Salaf is, a religious Islamic line of conservative thought 
that aims at imitating the deeds of the prophet Muhammad and of al-salaf 
al-ṣāliḥ (‘the righteous predecessors’, including the prophet’s companions). 
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This is also the vision shared by the Spanish-speaking Muslim women in this 
study, who use Facebook, have mastered Islamic studies and Classical Arabic, 
observe the pious Salafi doctrine, and are entitled to lead the online minbar 
and to teach their sisters the ways of salvation. Teaching, disseminating, 
and defending Islam are the main actions of da’wa, a mandatory task for 
all Muslims. According to Wiktorowicz (2006, p. 212), part of Salaf ism is 
the task of the promotion of ‘a vast educational network’ that branches into 
jihadism and religious violence.
The cyber environment is ideal for the endorsement of violent mes-
sages and rituals because it offers a less visible identity, fewer controls on 
authority and legitimacy, and a more feasible, faster way of disseminating 
jihadist discourse to a growing virtual audience (Lawrence and Cooke, 2005, 
p. 23). However, other women publicly contest the women’s performance 
of religious authority, either about the correctness of their knowledge of 
Islam or about their language skills in Classical Arabic. In some of these 
public discussions men also interfere to set the tone of the arguments, 
recommending good manners, suggesting that they (i.e. the women) read 
other scholars’ works, or even praise the guidance of the woman who is 
leading the group’s conversation.
Leadership has always been a sensitive subject in the history of Islam, 
from the death of the prophet Muhammad. Like other forms, virtual Islamic 
leadership suffers from a lack of unifying religious guidance. Virtual leadership 
is, in the words of Philipp Holtmann: ‘a steady process of trend-setting and 
steering communication to influence the behaviour of individuals in order to 
achieve a goal. This process, [which] involves the target-oriented use of forces 
and resources, is rendered by a computer and independent of time and space. It 
is based on mutual information’ (2012, p. 72). Muslim women have transformed 
the problem of virtual Islamic leadership to their benefit by claiming a role of 
their own in the cybersphere. Islamic female agency is apparently evolving 
online, and the products of that evolution are being transferred into the 
offline world. One of those evolving products is ijtihād: allowing individuals 
to self-investigate the sacred sources. This is an important faculty that in the 
offline world is much more of a male domain. Cyber environments facilitate 
the exercise of ijtihād by women because they do not exert gender segregation. 
For that reason the cyber gates of ijtihād are accessible to Muslim women who 
wish to employ this theological tool. At the same time, the use of it grants the 
possibility for Muslim women to affirm their agency online.
Another religious argument that these women use to construct online 
leadership is supporting their authority on legal dispositions of Saudi 
scholars. This is a paradoxical situation because Saudi scholars have a 
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strict religious perspective on gender matters and contest any female re-
ligious authority. It is also a clear statement that proves that these women 
in particular, and sympathizers of Islamic State in general, have a basic 
level of religious knowledge and their interpretation method is reduced to 
‘cherry-picking extracts from the Quran’ (Duderija, 2015, p. 8).
These arguments, together with the jihadist actions in Syria, Iraq, and 
Europe, shape virtual female Islamic leadership and work as motivational 
factors for the recruitment of female jihadists – justifying the importance 
of the scope of the present analysis. The next section treats how these 
women frame their religious views in the online space and how they adapt 
the jihadist narrative for a youth audience.
4 The ‘Call of Duty’
Although the privatization and individualization of religious knowledge 
(Cesari, 2003, p. 138) are a dialectical component of living and experiencing 
the religious self (Campbell, 2012, p. 9), the reality is that the online indi-
vidualization of religious knowledge is succeeded by the online networking 
and connection to other individuals that have similar prof iles, group 
aff iliations, language, likes, and preferences. For example, the popular 
computer game Call of Duty serves as an encoding use of language to reach 
Muslim youth and encourage them to become jihadists. In the opinion of 
Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins, and Ben O’Loughlin (2011, p. 54), the utilization 
of references to youth culture is critical to attracting English-speaking 
‘diasporic Muslim audiences’. The Internet is the preferred means of com-
munication between young women, who use it to socially interact, develop 
networks, and access information (Lövheim, 2008). What is more, the 
online presence of Muslim youth ref lects the expression of what Jon W. 
Anderson labels the ‘“missing middle” between the Islam of intellectual 
subject to textual analysis (of thought) and Islam of the masses more 
likely to be examined in terms of social forces’ (2001). Facebook content 
created around the jihadist narrative is designed to be easily accessible 
to all types of audience.
The networks formed online by young Muslim women can be seen as 
‘neo-communities’ (Allievi and Nielsen, 2003, p. 21), as they are the result 
of participation in a high-tech-oriented society by a European Muslim 
minority that is more attached to the virtual space than to a specif ic 
urban environment. The Internet as a social, religious, and transnational 
space has challenged the pertinence, and even the authority, of the offline 
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imam (Sisler, 2007). The transfer of authority and legitimacy from the 
context of urban space into that of the Web 2.0 has induced alterations 
in the notions of authority and legitimacy (Bunt, 2013). These changes are 
also felt in jihadist discourse and practice. The online reformulation of 
authority, legitimacy, and authenticity imposes great challenges on the 
off line imamate in Western Europe. Or, as one of my informants said: 
‘To identify the genuine imam against the false one, the quality of his 
being endowed with the knowledge of everything, is clearly marked out 
in the Holy Quran, Sura Yasin, 36:12, which text reads as follows: “We shall 
surely raise the dead to life and We record what they did and the traces of 
their deeds that they have left behind.”’ This sura has a two-fold meaning: 
f irst, the virtue of having a solid knowledge of the sacred Islamic sources; 
and second, the virtue of practicing the good deeds transmitted by that 
learning experience.
The next section treats how authenticity (‘genuine Imam’) and authority 
(‘quality of knowledge’) are employed to promote a sense of belonging to 
the Islamic sisterhood.
5 Digital Umm, mother, and virtual sisterhood
Da’wa (religious narrative) is the preferred way to spread the Islamic word, 
and dedication to it is one of the main female tasks online. As Umm G. says 
in a written Messenger conversation:
I use the Internet all the time to search and to share information 
about da’wa or to watch what is going on in Syria and Palestine. I also 
use it to connect myself with the other sisters. We help each other to 
become better Muslim women. We all seek a deeper understanding of 
Islam and of how to engage in jihad and it is more comfortable to do 
it among ‘sisters’.
The dissemination of jihadism online is at full speed among women as 
a permanent reminder of the individual duty to pursue jihād f ī sabīl-
illāh (‘jihad in the path of God’). By using keywords such as ghurabā’ 
(‘strangers’) or kuffār (‘inf idels’), they reinforce a clear separation 
between ‘true Muslims’ and the rest, whether they be ‘weak’ Muslims, 
the followers of other Islamic sects, or non-believers. By participating, 
a sister is immediately integrated into the process of virtual sisterhood, 
or becoming a digital Umm. The ‘Umm sisterhood’ is a connection to 
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all the ‘mothers’ of jihadism who aim at achieving Paradise together. 
‘Imagine entering the gates of Jannah [paradise], hand in hand with 
those that you love. Yes, keep that in mind and continue to struggling 
[sic]’ writes Umm M., after posting an image of a Muslim couple walking 
hand in hand.
The communications of the digital Umm are linked to the perfor-
mance of religious rituals, the promotion of adab (‘good manners’), and 
the exteriorization of affection and solidarity. Anna Piela (2012, p. 119) 
indicates that ‘spiritual and emotional connection’ are two key features 
for def ining sisterhood. Even though the sisters are present online as a 
group, they also keep being individuals who have their own perceptions 
and experiences when it comes to letting these online narratives and 
practices structure their religious knowledge. The process called ‘Individual 
Rituality’ (Heidbrink, 2007, p. 177) is crucial for comprehending these 
religious manifestations online, and even more crucial for understanding 
the dynamic between off line-online-off line transfers of ritual activities 
(as will be seen below).
Another source of identif ication in the online sisterhood is the dress 
code. The sisters encourage each other to dress in allegedly Islamic clothing 
such as the hijab, the niqāb, or even the burqa. Indeed, to them a vital 
element of proper feminine religious behaviour is the use of garments 
such as the niqāb and the burqa as the exterior symbol of pious Islamic 
practice. The sisters employ this in their prof ile picture on Facebook or 
as a part of the messages they convey via imagery. The imagery refers to 
transformations, and reflects the stages of ever-deeper radicalization of the 
‘sister’. For example, they might begin by choosing cute Islamic cartoons 
or female Disney characters dressed in Islamic clothes as their prof ile 
picture before they move on to displaying women who are brandishing 
weapons. The central message of the photos or cartoons is the beauty 
of modesty: ‘Sisters don’t let your last day on earth be the f irst day you 
wore the hijab,’ said Umm F. to her female audience while reinforcing 
this principle of behaviour with a set of photos of women wearing the 
hijab. The apocalypse narrative, the idea that the world is coming to an 
end and that therefore the Last Judgement is imminent, is an integral 
part of the ‘Salaf i-Jihadi’ discourse. Through the act of posting videos, 
images, photos, or text online, these women form a new community, a 
virtual sisterhood, and this includes a new shape of online agency in the 
domain of jihadism.
In their analysis of the work of the scholar Tariq Ramadan, Mohammad 
Hashas and Jan Jaap De Ruiter (2014, p. 159) point to the relationship 
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between ‘secularism and the issue of women in Islam’ to explain that 
cultural practices should be distinguished from Islamic practices. In 
the off line realm, the Islamic community has always set limits on the 
presence and performance of women in jihad-related conflicts, framing 
these limits as in accordance with the principles of Islamic jurisprudence 
and cultural discourses. In addition, women who have digital agency and 
a digital authority framed by a jihadist narrative, pay for their religious 
activism with real-life costs to their personal safety and security. The 
vulnerabilities and risks they experience online are transferred into the 
off line world. The i-Virtue of the jihadist discourse deletes the innocence 
of the off line veil. Indeed, due to their typical Muslim attire they are 
directly identif ied and subject to public and off icial scrutiny, for instance 
by facing thorough airport security checks. Gaining ascendancy in the 
virtual world as well as relevance in the real world has important social, 
religious, and cultural implications that f irst and foremost affect European 
Muslim women.
The following section discusses how female authority is performed 
online and how that performance turns into an ef fective jihadist 
recruitment tool.
6 Repeat after me, ukhti, my sister: on performing 
female authority
‘Giving birth’, and ‘being a mother’ are expressions that help def ine 
jihad from a feminine perspective, in the opinion of my informants. A 
recurrent theme on many jihadist websites is inciting women to promote 
the love of martyrdom in their children. Moreover, mothers are also 
encouraged to accept their girl’s martyrdom. For example, informant 
Umm Z. wrote: ‘Mother do not be sad, Allah is with you! Prepare for 
my Janazah [burial]!! I am coming to meet you as a Shaheeda [female 
martyr]. Do not plan my wedding! As I chose my martyrdom day as my 
wedding day.’
The performance of each female i-Imam follows a very personal style. 
According to Umm T., her most important task while using her own 
online minbar, Facebook, was persuading other women to convert to 
Islam: ‘The woman also can use the adequate opportunities to educate, 
guide and invite others [to the faith].’ For some women, it is choosing 
and posting Quranic citations and/or parts of the hadiths. For others, 
it is spreading imagery and videos related to war scenes, jihadist f ights, 
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or just the visual symbols of jihadism (black banners, black horses, and 
swords, among others). Imagery plays a decisive role in the framing and 
legitimization of the jihadist narrative. Images convey messages without 
the need of translation, and often with a far more emotional impact than 
text. Arabic calligraphy and Islamic motifs are a constant presence in their 
online performance and narrative. The examples of Arabic calligraphy 
I collected during my research are usually in black and white, through 
the reproduction of small excerpts of the Quran. The Islamic motifs come 
from architectural details in symbolic mosques that have an important 
value in collective Muslim history. They represent ideological and political 
power, a strong past that is a reminder of the umma’s glorious moments 
and achievements (Fighel, 2007, p. 35). According to Jonathan Fighel, these 
visual elements are an important instrument of the indirect process of 
radicalization online:
The Islamic motifs, in a sophisticated manipulation, are embedded within 
propaganda; they can be easily recognized as legitimate Islamic historical 
symbols and factors that support a radicalized interpretation of Islam. 
The new radical motifs can easily gain legitimacy, as they appear to be 
authentic when they are used in proximity to widely accepted mainstream 
Islamic symbols and cultural references. (2007, p. 36)
One interesting common denominator in the imagery of the sisters, 
shared through posting the same items over and over again, is that they 
are accompanied and justif ied by comments related to religious texts. 
Citations from the Quran are usually posted without historical or spatial 
context and without regard for their sequentiality, i.e., without referring 
to the preceding or following verses. These disconnected citations are part 
of the strategy of framing Islamic knowledge in such a way that violent 
conceptions of jihad become acceptable (Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin, 
2011, p. 27). Umm C., for example, wrote her name surrounded by bullets 
and two modif ied rifles, and posted the photo on her Facebook wall. Awan, 
Hoskins, and O’Loughlin (2011, p. 28) argue that here we are in the pres-
ence of the ‘classical theory of cognitive dissonance which suggests that 
individuals seek out information conf irming beliefs or behaviours while 
actively avoiding contrary information, in order to mitigate uncomfortable 
psychological tension.’
The same happens with the citations of hadiths, narratives of the prophet 
Muhammad’s words and deeds, which should obey the authoritative 
criteria of analysis determined by the muḥaddithūn (‘scholars with great 
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expertise in hadith’) to evaluate the authenticity and the reliability of the 
hadiths. Umm B., who gradually acquired an online authority among the 
Facebook sisters, narrates for them the story of the best Muslim women 
in da’wa:
Umm Sulaim (one of the Prophet’s companions) would teach her son 
Anas Ibn Malik about Islam, this she was doing knowing that her 
husband refuted Islam. […] Her son Anas became a servant of the 
Prophet (pbuh). […] If we speak in general terms we f ind women who 
had a very strong role in their sacrif ice and service in the cause of Allah. 
Sumayyah was the f irst Muslim person to die for Islam. Khadija, the 
Prophet’s f irst wife who was very rich, spent all her money supporting 
the da’wa.
This post is from 2013 and has been extensively shared and commented 
upon by the sisters. My informants f irmly believe in the jihadist narrative, 
in the jihadist hero, and in the duty of doing da’wa for their spouses: ‘The 
work of the women in the f ield of da’wa is to give strength to the work of 
our men, and to expand it to areas where the eff iciency of women is higher 
than the eff iciency of men.’
Likewise, naṣā’iḥ (‘advices’) on how to promote their husbands’ ultimate 
sacrif ice and to help others who are willing to become a shahīd (‘martyr’) 
are kindly spread throughout the feminine jihadist cyber sphere. Women 
give advice as a part of the da’wa process (Becker, 2013), to transmit Islamic 
knowledge to the online sisters. The contents of the advice vary from 
regular daily life subjects (clothing, food, children, relationships) to the 
translation and interpretation of the Islamic textual sources. Translation 
is a vital step in the process of correctly transmitting any religious knowl-
edge, as many of the women are not f luent in Arabic. By translating and 
transliterating their comments, these women also broaden their audiences 
in number and diversify them in terms of both general education and 
physical provenience. In the sisters who are capable of translating from 
Classical Arabic, the women recognize a direct religious and linguistic 
authority. This authority is further bestowed on them when they bring 
into play jihadist linguistic terminology, which is perceived as proof of 
their absolute adherence to the jihadist narrative and above all their 
command of the subject. Table 1 summarizes words belonging to the 
jihadist vocabulary, the themes to which these words refer, and examples 
taken from the women’s posts on Facebook. The author has translated the 
examples from Spanish to English.
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The above table contains examples of jihadist narrative elements that 
stimulated long and pertinent threads of discussion among the inform-
ants. This illustrates the role of the leading female informants, who in the 
eyes of the audience have better Islamic arguments and answers. As such, 
the audience members trust their more educated sisters to teach them, 
smoothing the path to their assimilation into and understanding of the 
ritualization of jihad in the religious Islamic framework. Their acts and 
performances online respect the need for a temporal and spatial structure. 
For example, the online space is sacralized by the niyya (‘right intention’) 
that the performer should keep at all times and in all spaces if they are rightly 
and truly committed to act with respect and purity. The sisters constantly 
issue reminders of the relevance of their religious mission online, and of 
their need to be even more of a role model online than they are offline, since 
they define social media platforms as sacralized spaces. Similarly, in terms 
of respecting a temporal structure, the sisters follow a precise timetable. 
For example, every Friday before the regular sermon they remind the rest 
of the online community of the need to pray special suras.
Still, the authority established online by these women has a limited reach, 
as female i-Authority appears valid only in the virtual world. In the offline 
world, female authority is graded down. Women may have a determinant role 
in the task of mobilization and recruitment online, but the arrangements 
for travelling to and settling in Syria are conf ided in a network of men, 
as notif ied through a public male Facebook prof ile: ‘A salamou aleykum, 
the brothers that want to do the hijra send me a message, and for those 
who are sisters, my wife will take charge of you’. An additional fact that 
differentiates female authority and indicates that it is mostly only part of 
the virtual world is, for example, the question of using guns and women’s 
physical and direct participation in the frontline of the war. Upon their 
arrival in Syria, women have commented on their personal Facebook pages 
that they receive small calibre guns, while the modif ied assault rif les are 
reserved only for men. Clearly, physical jihadist combat is, in the majority 
of cases, thought to be a male task.
7 ‘Umm’ got married: Female authority and the jihadist 
recruitment
The perfect woman, the one that can be considered a female i-Imam, is, these 
days, the one who performs the hijra, supports her husband by cooking, 
raising jihad-loving children (Von Knop, 2007, p. 410), and posting all of 
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her jihadist i-Khutbas daily on Facebook. Their endeavour is to perform 
rituals in a pure way, transmit the right knowledge, be authentic when 
selecting the sources, and be modest in behaviour. ‘Good homes are built 
on the pious wife. Therefore, it is obligatory for a Muslim to choose a pious 
wife’ posted Umm H., quoting the fatwa ‘Advice to Muslim Women’ of the 
Saudi preacher Shaykh al-Fawzan (b. 1933). Al-Fawzan publishes his work 
on websites like https://salaf-us-saalih.com and www.fatwa-online.com, 
and the women focused in this case study prefer his religious guidance.
Women depart for the caliphate of Islamic State in search of a jihadist 
authority position in the f ight for Allah, and of a role of power in concord 
with their newfound online voice. After arrival, they again connect to the 
online world so that they can share their narratives of life in Syria. The 
other sisters are willing to listen, learn, and ask questions about the living 
conditions in Syria, and they urge those who are already there to f ill them 
in on all sorts of details – from the mundane to the theological justif ications 
of jihad. Historically, the idea of combining hijra (‘emigration’) with da’wa 
(‘proselytism’) and jihad is a tradition stemming from the prophetic times 
(Peresin and Cervone, 2015, p. 495).
The lives of the ‘sisters’ in Syria are described as happy and pious, just 
like in the time of the prophet Muhammad, as they constantly reassure the 
sisters online. Umm X. ‒ ‘Got married’ is the most frequent Facebook status 
of the sisters, and they try to illustrate how pleasant their lives are in the 
‘Sham’ (Syria) by posting photos that confirm this state of alleged happiness.
8 Conclusion
Female i-Imams that support the jihadist narrative in general and the ideology 
of the Islamic State in particular encounter an effective online space in which 
they can perform their religious authority and convince other women to enter 
jihadist recruitment networks. In that sense, the jihadist narrative has the 
elements and motivational factors to encourage individual participation in the 
jihadist f ight. Islamic online female authority is anchored in online Islamic 
female agency, i.e., the practice of taking independent action online and the 
goal of being recognized as a leading religious individual, as a female i-Imam.
However, this online female authority is contested. As one Moroccan 
female religious scholar living in Catalonia (I have chosen not to reveal 
her name or location out of safety considerations) explained to me in an 
interview, these individuals speak for themselves and should not be trusted 
by their audience. In her opinion, ‘wise imams’ should have the exclusive 
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right to issue fatwas about what is authentic jihad, and should condemn 
all forms of violence. Spanish mosques are controlled by the security and 
police forces, so the imams issue politically correct khuṭbas and coordinate 
statements that openly condemn jihadist discourses and activities. However, 
as mentioned before, this kind of khuṭba deals with the youth audience that is 
‘at risk’, in terms of its language and contents. These khuṭbas are not in tune 
with daily face-to-face communication, and more needs to be done in terms 
of socio-economic and political measures to prevent the grievances that 
ultimately degenerate into engagement with extremist Islamic narratives. 
It is exactly this void that is being f illed by jihadist sermons.
The vulnerabilities and risks associated with female online agency do not 
represent for these women an obstacle, but a concrete sign of their increasing 
power, authority, and value within the digital Islamic community. They 
feel they are on the right path to Allah, f ī sabīl-illāh (‘on the path of God’), 
whether in the virtual world and/or on territory controlled by Islamic State. 
They are no longer innocent, passive religious subjects; now they are the 
ones endowed with religious authority, transmitting their message through 
an online minbar, or platform of communication. Through their online 
performance, the young Spanish-speaking Muslim women shape a form 
of religious authority that is framed by the jihadist narrative and results in 
effective jihadist recruitment.
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Abstract
This chapter analyses the 2004 reform of the Moroccan Ministry of 
Endowments and Islamic Affairs, which established off icial women 
preachers and experts in Islamic Law. Based on ethnographic f ieldwork, 
I discuss whether these female religious authorities mark a real evolution 
in the traditional male monopoly of Islamic spaces and discourses. The 
study also explores some of the challenges that the adoption of a similar 
model would imply for Europe. With reference to the recent debates 
about multiculturalism, gender equality, and Islam, I f inish with a 
ref lection on the contemporary challenges of the eventual promotion 
of off icial Muslim women preachers and scholars in Europe and the 
changes they might bring to Islam, religious authority, and the gender 
equality debate.
Keywords: Islamic female religious authority, agency, dispositive of power, 
governmentality, multiculturalism
1 Introduction
In this chapter, I analyse the gender-based reform of the Ministry of Endow-
ments and Islamic Affairs of Morocco which, in 2004, institutionalized 
women’s participation in the off icial Islamic bureaucracy and knowledge-
production structures. This reform established murshidāt (sing. murshida), 
women preachers who have the task of teaching the ‘right’ Islam in mosques, 
as well as encouraging ʻālimāt (sing. ‘ālima), female scholars in Islamic Law, 
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to participate in the construction of a national Islamic discourse. The fact 
that a woman is allowed to speak about Islam off icially and in the public 
space of the mosque and other Islamic institutions, which are tradition-
ally monopolized by male voices, has been perceived as a signif icant step 
towards the application of gender mainstreaming in public – including 
religious – institutions, and as a form of ‘Islamic State feminism’ (Eddouada 
and Pepicelli, 2010). Islamic feminism aims at a deep egalitarian access to 
religious discourse and institutions based on the right to have the authority 
needed to interpret sacred texts, from a ‘gender jihad’ perspective (Wadud, 
2006). From this perspective, religious authority can contribute to questioning 
the Islamic patriarchal tradition and to aff irming gender equality in society 
(Mir-Hosseini, 1999). In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate that the Moroccan 
reform analysed here does not aim at establishing respect for legal gender 
equality in public and private spaces, however inclusive it may be of women 
religious authorities: it merely renders it in continuity with the patriarchal 
conception of the gendered division of labour in the country. Therefore, the 
reform of the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (2007a, 
2007b, 2007c, 2011) appears to be one of the results of a bi-dimensional political 
strategy, interested f irst in disciplining the national Islamic discourse – a 
project that is contested by some Islamist movements, such as Al Adl wal 
Ihsane (the ‘Justice and Spirituality Movement’) –, and second in showing that 
Morocco is respecting the universal gender equality narrative recognized by 
international conventions on human rights. During ethnographic f ieldwork, 
I consulted the voices of women preachers and scholars of Islam to compare 
their personal views on women’s rights and liberties in the public and private 
spheres with those expressed in their functional discourse. In particular, I 
aimed to problematize whether or not this 2004 reform produces a female 
religious authority that marks a real evolution of the traditional discourses 
on gender relations, which have been based on the male monopoly of Islamic 
spaces and discourses. I have come to consider women preachers and scholars 
as agents of both central state power and changes in religious authority. I also 
explored some of the challenges that the adoption of a model similar to the 
Moroccan one would imply for Europe. Even though the presence of Muslim 
women in pious movements is increasing in Europe, their claim to religious 
authority seems to still be contested. With reference to the recent debates 
about multiculturalism, gender equality, and Islam (Abu Lughod, 2010; Bracke 
and Fadil, 2012; Jouili and Amir-Moazami, 2006), I f inish by reflecting on 
the contemporary challenges of the eventual promotion of off icial Muslim 
women preachers and scholars in the European context and the changes they 
might bring to religious authority and the gender equality debate.
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2 The dispositives of Islamic power in Morocco
The 2004 reform was meant to restructure the ‘Islamic f ield’, and was ad-
vanced by the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs of the Kingdom 
of Morocco. It institutionalized the murshidāt (‘female religious guides’), 
who were charged with irshād, the function of guiding and orienting the 
believers. They have the task of teaching other women ‘right’ Islam in the 
public space of the mosque. Moreover, murshidāt work in other domains of 
the welfare state, such as hospitals, schools, and prisons. At the same time, 
the reform encouraged the presence of ālimāt, women scholars and experts 
in Islamic Law, in the national network of ulama councils, off icial Islamic 
training schools, and other institutions of Islamic power. The difference 
between ‘ālimāt and murshidāt resides in the fact that ‘ālimāt have an 
off icial religious authority to elaborate the interpretation of sacred Islamic 
sources based on ijtihād (‘individual reasoning’), while murshidāt spread 
the off icial religious discourse. In addition, murshidāt’s work is controlled 
hierarchically through periodic meetings with local ulama councils and 
delegations from the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs. This 
reform is relevant, because the presence of women in the traditionally 
male-dominated off icial and public Islamic space and discourse seems to 
be a symbolic change that could influence the patriarchal organization of 
society, which is also legitimized by the gender divide in religious authority 
(Mernissi, 1987).
In Morocco, as in all Muslim-majority countries, it is possible to identify 
a close relationship between Islam, central power, and the patriarchal 
social order. First, the construction of Islamic legal and ritual knowledge 
is very important for the legitimation of the central power: Morocco is a 
monarchy, in which Islam’s central role emerges from the king’s double 
title of ‘Head of State’ and ‘Commander of the Believers’ (in Arabic, amīr 
al-mu’minīn). Rather than following the common description of the Moroc-
can political system as a theocracy, I argue that it makes more sense to 
speak of a nomocracy, following the def inition of Muhammad Talbi (1996, 
pp. 109-112). This term (which comes from the Greek words nomos (‘law’) and 
kratos (‘power’)) indicates a mixed regime, in which an elected parliament 
exercises legislative power under the patronage of a f igure – the king, in 
this case – who guarantees the conformity of state laws with a higher law, 
in this case inspired by Islam. This conformity is present in the Moroccan 
Constitution, including the most recent version of the text (1 July 2011) that 
was approved after the uprising sparked by the 20th February Movement 
in 2011. It is possible to observe the accordance of this last version of the 
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constitution with the historical symbolic pillars of the nation based on 
the Islamic legitimacy of the central power, territorial continuity and 
integrity, and the monarchy – well explained by the national formula ‘God, 
Homeland, King’.
These constants are strictly linked to the foundations of the state’s 
off icial Islamic discourse, which are the Quran and Sunna, the dogma of 
the king’s role of ‘Commander of the Believers’, the theological doctrine 
of Asharism, the Maliki madhhab (‘juridical school’), and Suf ism. At a 
social level, the family represents the institution that maintains the 
social patriarchal order which, after the achievement of independence 
in 1956, was codif ied in the Personal Status Code (1957), later reformed 
and renamed as the Family Code (1993, 2004) thanks to the lobbying 
activity of the feminist movement. This code is inspired by Islam, as 
well as by the political power that is nourished by the structures that 
produce, organize, and spread off icial Islamic discourse: therefore, 
Islamic power in Morocco is a guarantee of both central and patriarchal 
power (Charrad, 2001).
A review of Moroccan religious and political studies (Belal, 2012; Darif, 
2010; Laroui, 1977; Zeghal, 2005) shows that in postcolonial Morocco 
off icial Islamic power functions through some structures that, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, we can consider dispositives (Agamben, 2006; 
Foucault, 1976). According to this notion, central power acts through 
‘dispositives of control’ that are useful for the production and consolida-
tion of the national ‘regime of truth’, namely the discursive narratives 
that inf luence and discipline the worldview, behaviours, and relations 
between citizens. Specif ically, a ‘dispositive of control’ is def ined as a set 
of technologies and mechanisms of the production of truth, namely rules, 
rituals, and institutions that are simultaneously imposed by an external 
power and internalized by the citizens through systems of beliefs and 
feelings (Foucault, 1976, pp. 72-76). In this sense, the ‘dispositive’ can be 
interpreted as the main instrument of a repressive power that, through 
its own governmentality – the art and processes of governing – controls 
and disciplines the sets of values and attitudes of the faithful and citizens. 
Thanks to these Foucauldian concepts, it seems possible to interpret as 
dispositives the following seven structures of Moroccan Islamic power:
1 The Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 
2011). It manages the system of awqāf (sing. waqf, ‘endowments’) and 
mosques, and supervises all off icial religious activities in the country 
through its mandūbiyyāt (‘local delegations’). It provides competitive 
examinations and training courses for imams and murshidāt. The 
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ministry also provides for some institutions of the ‘Islamic legitimiza-
tion system’ (Darif, 2010): for example, it organizes local and national 
awards for Quran readings and publishes journals like Daʻwat al-ḥaqq 
(Spreading the truth) (Fernandez, 2012).
2 The Superior Council (al-majlis al-‘ilmī al-a‘lā) and the local councils of 
ulama. The Superior Council of ulama is the high council that has the 
power to issue legal opinions, fatwas, on the conformity of national life 
and policies with national Islam. It is composed of the most prestigious 
ulama in the country, while the regional councils of ulama work at a 
local level.
3 The al-rābiṭa al-muḥammadiyya li-l-‘ulamā’: an association of ulama that 
is considered independent from the central power, but whose general 
secretary is appointed by the king. According to the secretary Ahmed 
Abbadi, whom I interviewed, ‘this institution has the role of adapting 
Islam to modernity’ (Rabat, 4 May 2012).
4 The dār al-ḥadīth al-ḥassaniyya. Established in Rabat, this is the main 
institution in Morocco for Islamic training of the off icial ulama.
5 The al-durūs al-ḥassaniyya. Every year at the Royal Palace in Rabat, the 
Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs organizes a set of daily 
conferences and meetings on Islam. These conferences, f irst initiated by 
King Hassan II, take place during Ramadan in the presence of the king, 
and Moroccan and foreign ulama. During the conferences, distinguished 
scholars are invited to speak on issues related to Islam and political and 
social life.
6 Islamic TV and radio. In 2004, the religious channel Al-Sādisa (‘The 
sixth’) was founded as the sixth national television channel in honour 
of King Muhammad VI. There is also the radio station Muhammad VI 
du Saint Coran, which broadcasts Islamic contents.
7 University courses in Islamic Studies. Departments of Islamic Studies 
are part of the Faculties of Humanities, in addition to courses in Islamic 
studies and Islamic thought offered by other departments.
Women are now part of these different structures through which the of-
f icial Islamic discourse is produced and articulated. In the next section, 
I analyse their different roles and the discourses that – depending on the 
level of religious authority – are both opening space for the participation 
of women in the national Islamic discourse and reinforcing that same 
national discourse.
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3 Mapping women’s Islamic professions in Morocco
During four years of f ieldwork (2008-2012), I analysed the participation of 
women in the seven dispositives of off icial Islamic power described in the 
last section. My research particularly focused on Rabat, the capital of the 
kingdom and the core of national Islam, where the central off ices of the 
Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs that organizes the training 
course for murshidāt and imams are located. In total, I interviewed more 
than twenty murshidāt in Rabat, Meknes, Fes, Tanger, Tetouan, and Tata. 
I also interviewed f ifteen ‘ālimāt, including members of the superior and 
local ulama councils. I also interviewed two imams, three male scholars 
and academics in Islamic Studies, and nine off icials of the Ministry of 
Endowments and Islamic Affairs. This led me to draw a cartography of 
women’s participation in off icial Islamic professions, in which I analysed 
the work experience and discourse of women preachers and scholars in the 
seven dispositives of Islamic power described above:
1 At the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, women are preachers 
in mosques and other educational centres. According to Aziz Darwiche, 
the ministry’s General Director of the Division for Mosques from 2005 
to 2012, 1,021 imams and 359 murshidāt have been trained: women 
therefore make up 26 per cent of the total number of those trained 
(interview, Rabat, 23 April 2012). Women are employees as well as of-
ficials. No woman, however, is in the highest levels of the administration, 
as emerges from a United Nations study (UN-Women and Ministère de 
la Fonction Publique, de la Modernisation et de l’Administration, 2012).
2 In the network of ulama councils, women exercise the role of employees 
and, more importantly, ʻālimāt, thanks to a quota system that provides 
for the presence of at least one woman in every council. Three women 
are currently (i.e. in 2017) in the Superior Council.
3 In the al-rābiṭa al-muḥammadiyya li-l-‘ulamā’, women are researchers, 
‘ālimāt, and employees.
4 In the dār al-ḥadīth al-ḥassaniyya, women are students; there is one 
female professor of sharia.
5 In the al-durūs al-ḥassaniyya, women are allowed to participate in 
personal conferences since of 2003, but only one woman has ever 
delivered a speech during the period of the monthly conference.
6 In religious TV and radio programmes, there are female tele-preachers 
and speakers.
7 In university courses in Islamic Studies, women are both students and 
professors of f iqh, sharia, and Islamic thought.
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In Table 1, I summarize the in-depth interviews that I conducted with 55 
actors in the Islamic f ield in Morocco.
Table 1  List of in-depth interview participants
Institution Total interviews: 55 Female: 35 Male: 20

























al-durūs al-ḥassaniyya 2 scholars 2 -
religious tv and radio some interviewed female 
preachers work here
- -
university islamic courses 1 professor 1 -
The interviews were conducted in three different sections corresponding 
to the individuals’ socio-economic origins, personal motivation to be part 
of Islamic dispositives, and individual opinions about women’s rights 
in Islam and in Moroccan families and society. In particular, I checked 
if the individual agreed with the gender equality or with the gender 
complementarity principle. The principle of takāmul (‘complementa-
rity’) provides for rights and duties related to the sexual and biological 
characteristics of women and men, respecting the primary male role of 
breadwinner and the primary female role of family care and reproduction. 
This last section was articulated through three dimensions related to 
the following points:
1 Marriage. Questions such as the following: Do women have the right 
or duty to share responsibilities with their husband, or do they have to 
accept his decisions? Do women have a role in decision-making processes 
inside the family? Do women have the right to divorce? Do they agree 
to the principle of polygyny?
2 Economics. Questions such as the following: Do women have the right to 
work without male permission? Do you think that the unequal system 
of inheritance is right?
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3 Body and sexuality. Questions were asked about issues like abortion, the 
obligation to respect the ̒ idda,1 the relationship between female virginity 
and family honour, and the phenomenon of violence against women.
Finally, I related the analysis of the views emerging from these perspectives 
with general questions about the self-representation of the informants as 
feminists, as Moroccan citizens, and as Muslims. In particular, I asked 
religious actors whether and in what sense giving women religious authority 
could change the patriarchal organization of society.
4 Women’s religious authority between piety and agency
In the scenario described above, I analysed the discourses of women 
preachers and scholars, paying attention to variations in their approaches 
depending on their different authority levels. These correspond to their 
different roles, which for murshidāt consist of irshād (‘guidance in under-
standing and simplifying Islam’), and for ʻālimāt consist of the production 
of ‘ilm, Islamic knowledge based on the capacity to interpret sacred texts 
through ijtihād (‘juridical reasoning’). I conducted my analysis from a gender 
history perspective, highlighting the historical gender divide in the religious 
f ield and in religious authority that ref lects the gendered divide of the 
public-private continuum of the social and political spheres (Butler, 2006; 
Harding, 2012; Mernissi, 1975; Scott, 1988). In Genèse et structure du champ 
religieux Pierre Bourdieu underlines the interests of those who produce and 
spread religious discourses that are useful to maintaining the social order, 
contributing to the ‘legitimation of the power of dominant groups and to the 
domestication of the dominated’ (1971, p. 299). Inspired by Marx and Weber, 
he defines the ‘religious f ield’ (le champ religieux, in French) as a market of 
religious goods, in which symbolic values and ritual practices are produced, 
sold, and demanded according to the need of producers to symbolically 
dominate others. This hegemony is established thanks to a prof it derived 
from a surplus of religious authority capital (Bourdieu, 1971). In this system 
of power relations in Muslim majority societies, we observe a historical 
‘gender division of religious labour’ that Fatima Mernissi explains through 
a kind of ‘elite’s theory’. According to this perspective, the professionalized 
1 This is the sexual abstinence period of three menstrual cycles that women must follow after 
divorce or the death of the husband. The reason for this social practice is to demonstrate that the 
woman is not pregnant by her earlier husband so that there is no confusion in the patrilineal line.
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male elite of ulama and imams works with the central power to marginalize 
women from the construction of religious knowledge and legal scholarship 
(Mernissi, 1987). In the Maghreb, Bruno Etienne observed that the ‘sacred’ 
f ield has been historically associated with written discourses produced by 
men, while female religious roles have been limited to an informal space, 
with the consequent exclusion of women from off icial religious authority 
(Etienne, 1990). Indeed, in the Moroccan tradition female religious works 
have been mainly oral and based on memorization of the Quran and Sunna, 
but at the same time they have also been crucial for the survival of what we 
can call ‘national Islam’. In fact, some Moroccan historical sources testify 
to the historical continuity of women’s participation in the construction 
of Islamic knowledge as mufassirāt (‘female exegetes’), qāriʻāt (‘female 
experts in the Quran’), muḥaddithāt (‘female experts in the transmission 
of the sunna’), and female experts in tajwīd (‘Quranic psalmody’), sīra 
nabawiyya (‘prophet biography’), and as teachers of Islam in private houses 
(Al-Matimāh, 1978; Lakhmari, 2012; Zahrawi, 2008) – like in the entire Islamic 
world (Nadwi, 2007). Nonetheless, some Moroccan scholars also observe a 
historical ‘invisibilization’ of women from the main Islamic functions and 
related religious authority (Chickhaoui, 1999).
From this perspective, in the introduction of Speaking for Islam: Religious 
Authorities in Muslim Societies, Gudrun Kramer and Sabine Schmitdkte 
answer the question ‘Who speaks for Islam?’ by affirming the male monopoly 
of religious knowledge and authority (2006, pp. 1-14). According to them, 
religious authority is the
capacity to influence others’ conduct without the use of coercive power, or 
the ability – chance, power, or right – to define orthodoxy and orthopraxy; 
to identify, marginalize, punish or exclude deviance, heresy and apostasy. 
In the monotheistic religions founded on revealed scriptures, religious 
authority further involves the ability – chance, power, or right – to define 
the canon of authoritative texts and the legitimate methods of interpreta-
tion. (Kramer and Schmitdkte, 2006, pp. 1-2)
At the same time, religious authority can also contribute to bringing Islamic 
patriarchal traditions into discussion (Abou El Fadl, 2001). In this framework, 
Islamic feminists and reformist scholars like Nimat Barazangi, Asma Barlas, 
Riffat Hassan, Asma Lamrabet, Ziba Mir-Husseini, Amina Wadud, and many 
others aim for egalitarian access to religious discourses and institutions 
and the necessary authority to interpret sacred texts from a gender equality 
perspective (Barazangi, 2006; Lamrabet, 2012; Mir-Hosseini, 1999; Wadud, 
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1999, 2006; Webb, 2000). The supporters of an Islamic feminist approach 
emphasize the compatibility between the claims of gender equality in 
international discourse on human rights and Islam, which is conceived as 
a moral and spiritual system of values promoting social justice, solidarity, 
and non-discrimination against women (Badran, 2002; Mir-Hosseini, 1999).
Based on these considerations, I evaluate the potential and limits of the 
reform of the Moroccan Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, which 
appears to aim at modifying the basis of traditional religious authority to 
create a more equal gender perspective. What content do Moroccan women 
preachers and scholars profess? Is this content oriented towards gender 
equality? Can we speak about a new women’s religious authority, and in 
what sense? I attempt to answer these questions in the next section.
5 The gender-based reform of the Moroccan Ministry of 
Endowments and Islamic Affairs
Royal decrees 1-03-103 of 4 December 2003 and 1-03-300 of 22 April 2004 
started the reorganization of the Islamic bureaucracy in Morocco. The f irst 
decree reorganized the f ields of intervention of the Ministry of Endowments 
and Islamic Affairs, while the second strengthened central control over 
the councils of ulama by redefining their functions. After the implementa-
tion of the New Family Code in 2004, the Moroccan Islamic sector was 
also restructured through a gender-based reform that included women 
in the activity of spreading and producing the content of off icial national 
Islamic messages.
A new training programme for preachers has produced 50 women 
murshidāt and 150 imams every year since 2005. To be admitted to the 
programme, candidates are required to hold a bachelor’s degree and be no 
older than 45 years. They take exams that assess their knowledge of the 
Islamic sciences and their capacity to memorize the Quran. Because men 
can become imams, they are required to memorize the whole sacred text, 
while women are only required to memorize half. The programme consists 
of a one-year training in religious and social disciplines, such as the Islamic 
sciences, Arabic, sociology, economics, law, and history, as well as the arts 
of preaching and public speaking. This course allows graduates to serve as 
religious guides across the country. After the training, murshidāt receive 
a monthly salary of nearly 5,000 Dirhams (nearly €450) for their work in 
mosques, which consists of teaching the basics of a modern, non-violent, 
and moderate Islam in conformity with the pillars of national Islam, which 
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are articulated in the manual Dalīl al-imām wa-l-khaṭīb wa-l-wāʻiẓ (Guide for 
the Imam, the Preacher, and the Spiritual Guide; Ministry of Endowments 
and Islamic Affairs, 2007a). The classes taught by murshidāt in mosques 
are structured to address specif ic disciplines: fiqh al-usra (‘family law’), 
ethics, and relations within the family and with neighbours. Classes often 
include explaining and reciting the Quran and exegesis; using Moroccan 
colloquial Arabic, the dominant language of communication in Morocco, 
is useful for better conveying their message. There are also counselling 
sessions where women discuss their social and psychological problems. 
The work of murshidāt is organized through commissions in partnership 
with other ministries: women preachers work in prisons, hospitals, schools, 
orphanages, and nursing homes.
Even though the f irst women had access to the Islamic University of 
Al-Qarawiyyin in Fes in 1956, in an interview Hanan Haddad, the national 
Coordinator of the network of the Units for Women, Family and Children 
of the ulama councils of Morocco, told me that the ‘ālimāt (female Islamic 
scholars) accounted for around 13 per cent of the total ulama (Rabat, 6 July 
2012). Haddad has introduced a journal for women scholars, guides, and 
preachers called Majallat al-‘ālimāt wa-l-wāʻiẓāt wa-l-murshidāt (Review of 
Female Experts in Islamic Law, Spiritual Guides and Preachers), published by 
the Superior Council of Ulama since 2011. In this journal, the ʻālimāt write 
comments and opinions on different issues related to women’s conditions in 
society and the Islamic f ield, such as women’s access to religious professions 
and authority throughout history and in contemporary society, or specif ic 
questions related to women’s rights in Islam. The review has proven to be 
a f irst step in the passage from ‘invisibilization’ to public recognition of 
women’s role in the f ield of off icial Islam. However, it is noteworthy that 
although Haddad had been working on this project since 2004, the f irst 
issue of the review was published only seven years later, in 2011 (interview, 
Rabat, 6 July 2012). In the f irst issue of the review there is a report on the 
f irst national meeting of ‘ālimāt, murshidāt, and wāʻiẓāt (‘female experts 
in Islamic law, preachers and spiritual guides’), which was organized in 
Tetouan in 2009. On this occasion, the king encouraged women to actively 
take part in the off icial Islamic space and discourse to contribute to the 
struggle against social exclusion and violence, to guide people and awaken 
their religiosity. The king’s message testif ies to the clear intention of the 
central authorities to support women’s participation in the Islamic f ield.
Nonetheless, beyond this rhetoric, the gender-based reform of the Min-
istry appears to be a result of a bi-dimensional political strategy that was 
established with a double political purpose. At a national level, this reform 
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was aimed at disciplining the internal Islamic discourse in the country and 
was contested by some Islamist movements that are very critical of the 
monarchy. One example is Al Adl wal Ihsane, the Justice and Spirituality 
Movement; Nadia Yassine, the well-known daughter of the movement’s 
founder, created a programme of religious training for women that was later 
forced to stop functioning due to state repression and resistance within the 
movement (conversations with author, Rabat, 2012). At an international level, 
the government’s reform may be meant to show that Morocco is respecting 
the gender mainstreaming proposed by the universalizing narratives of 
international conventions.
Although this reform could effectively be perceived as a signif icant 
gain in the application of gender mainstreaming in public secular and 
religious institutions, my interviews demonstrate that the discourse of 
female religious actors complies with the traditional principle of gender 
complementarity – rather than gender equality – and male dominance 
in decision making in both the family setting and the state. Based on this 
observation, the question is whether it is possible to consider women preach-
ers and scholars as not only agents of the central power but also agents of 
change, and in what ways their female religious authority could help to 
improve women’s rights. Even though Moroccan women preachers and 
scholars cannot become imams, they could be considered, and do consider 
themselves, examples of a new female religious authority that is based on 
their religious agency.
This religious authority can be identified through three traits: piety, social 
recognition, and civic engagement. First, a central element in preachers’ 
religious authority is the spiritual sentiment of piety, conceptualized by 
Saba Mahmood in terms of the cultivation of religious virtues embedded 
in a specif ic Islamic tradition (Jouili and Amir-Moazami, 2006, p. 619; 
Mahmood, 2005, p. 148). Rausch indicates that piety could manifest through 
all f ields of participation in public life, in which these women represent 
a model of Muslim citizens conforming to Islamic morals (Rausch, 2011). 
An interesting aspect of preachers’ and ‘ālimāt ’s agency is their capacity 
to negotiate the recognition of their authority, adapting the contents of 
their discourses to different audiences through what Mahmood calls the 
‘pedagogy of persuasion’ (Mahmood, 2005, pp. 79-117). The second trait of 
the religious authority of murshidāt and ‘ālimāt is the social recognition 
and admiration directed towards them, which I observed when following 
some of them in their daily work in mosques and at the university of Rabat, 
as well as during a sermon in an association in Meknes, and in a school 
and a prison in Salé during Ramadan. Indeed, I found that the students, 
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families, and neighbours of women preachers and scholars communicate 
a deep respect and reverence for them. The third trait of civic engagement 
emerged in their self-representation: murshidāt and ‘ālimāt are visibly 
enthusiastic about their work, which is perceived by them as key factor in 
the progress of the whole society. In the interviews I conducted, religious 
guides and scholars proved very conscious of their subjective and collective 
role ‘f irstly as Muslims, then as women and as Moroccan citizens’ (interview 
with a woman preacher, Rabat, 2012).
These aspects of the agency of female religious authorities show that 
these women are able to redefine the relationships between the public and 
private spheres of Islamic authority by inhabiting and performing in religious 
spaces, such as mosques and councils of ulama, as men do amidst other 
males. Thus, they could be considered ‘docile agents’ – the protagonists of a 
process of change that concerns the whole society – because the recognition 
of women’s religious authority could also underline women’s empowerment 
(Mahmood, 2001), hence further facilitating the acquisition of women’s rights. 
This is a valid argument, even though they spread values and social visions 
that are generally in conformity with the hegemonic patriarchal discourse.
6 Institutionalizing Islam in Europe: What space is there for 
female religious authority?
In the European context, especially in Germany, France, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, Spain, and the Netherlands, the presence of Muslims is increasing 
due to immigration f lows and religious conversion (Allievi and Nielsen, 
2003; Nielsen, 1992; Pew Research Center, 2010). The cultivation of pious 
sensibilities by Muslim women within liberal-secular European societies, 
in particular, emphasizes the central role of Islam in public life and in 
def ining women’s identity and trajectories (Aune, 2011).
In general, western liberal discourse is presented as opposed to any 
religious consciousness or spiritual dimension. Secular modern values 
and Islam are therefore often imagined as incompatible. The secularity 
of the public sphere and women’s equality with men are considered to 
be chief among European values, while the ‘religionization’ of the public 
sphere and intrinsic discrimination against women are considered chief 
among Islamic values. Secular liberalism in particular, too easily juxtaposes 
Islam with gender-egalitarian regimes (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Ahmed, 1992), 
opposing modern assumptions (regarding personal autonomy, freedom, self-
realization, and equality) against their traditional counterparts (submission, 
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lack of freedom, and so forth) (Jouili, 2011). This attitude has contributed 
to a ‘moral panic’ towards the growing presence of Muslims in Western 
Europe and towards Islam more in general (Reilly, 2011). In the post 9/11 
‘war on terror’ context, and from the ‘clash of civilizations’ perspective, the 
growing visibility of Muslims in Europe has often been analysed through the 
lens of an essentialist assumption that Islam is regressive and intrinsically 
opposed to human rights and women’s rights ‘frame’ (Abu Lughod, 2010).
European debates on multiculturalism are profoundly infused with 
questions of gender and Islam, while public discourses aimed towards 
Muslim women highlight women’s empowerment as an achievement of 
secular modernity and something that Islam supposedly lacks (Jouili, 2011). 
This is exemplif ied in the frequency with which topics like the ‘headscarf’ 
are broached in relation to multiculturalism (Bracke, 2011). The European 
practice of distinguishing between multicultural, as a description of situa-
tions, and intercultural, as a description of a process (Nielsen, 1992, p. 152), 
could be critically conceived (Bracke and Fadil, 2012). According to Bracke 
and Fadil, multiculturalism ‘could be understood as a dispositive that creates 
distinctive f ields of problematization […], identif ies a particular set of actors 
(“the immigrants” or “Muslims”) and is accompanied by an institutional 
apparatus that seeks to transform the non-integrated “other”, in order to 
include it into the social body’ (Bracke and Fadil, 2012, p. 42).
In the recent debates about multiculturalism, the rhetoric of Muslim 
women’s emancipation continues to be inspired by the colonial narrative 
of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’ (Spivak, 1988), 
under the influence of an orientalist theoretical framework that conceives 
Muslim women as a homogeneous group of eternal victims that have to 
be accompanied to emancipation (Mohanty, 1988), with the exception 
maybe of educated covered Muslim women (Bracke, 2011). This kind of 
attitude also emerges in nation-states’ attempts to institutionalize Islam 
in Europe. Despite European Muslims’ relatively low levels of formal 
membership in any religious organization, including mosques, the ties 
between European Muslims and religious networks and movements is 
perceived as controversial, or as an obstacle to integration and intercultural 
processes (Nielsen, 1992; Pew Research Center, 2010). Muslim movements 
and networks often exert signif icant influence by setting the agendas and 
shaping debates within Muslim communities in Western Europe. Whether 
or not they ref lect the views of most Muslims in the community, they are 
often instrumental in determining what ‘Muslim issues’ are addressed 
by the media, in government circles, and in the broader public debate 
about Islam in Europe. They are also instrumental in the construction 
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of an ‘Islamic other’ in the West, and specif ically in Europe. Over the last 
few decades, states and civil societies in Western Europe have focused on 
the ‘integration’ of Islam through its institutionalization in the European 
context (Amir-Moazami, 2011; Karlsson Minganti, 2012; also see Sunier 
and Laurence, Part I). For example, through the Deutsche Islam Konferenz 
(German Islam Conference), initiated in 2006, Germany has undertaken 
some initiatives with the objective of entering a structured conversation 
with Muslim communities and f inding spokespersons who can serve as 
partners for the political authorities (Amir-Moazami, 2011). The process of 
an emerging ‘institutionalization’ of Islam has been analysed in its micro 
political articulation and in regards to its primary goal of institutional-
izing the communications between local state actors and Muslims to 
improve the conditions in which Muslims practice their religion as well 
as regulate their conduct (Amir-Moazami, 2011). Using Foucault’s category 
of governmentality, the German initiative becomes a tool of a broader 
hegemonic civilizing liberal project, not an instrument of a realistic 
dialogical encounter that is necessary for real intercultural processes 
(Amir-Moazami, 2011).
The articulation of the relationship between gender and Islam has been 
(and still is) a main aspect of the attempt to regulate Muslim subjects’ 
and communities’ presence in the European context (Amir-Moazami, 
Jacobsen, and Malik, 2011; Amir-Moazami and Salvatore, 2003; Jouili, 2011). 
This especially emerges in the way in which gender and Islam have played 
out in initiatives like the German one, where, according to Amir-Moazami, a 
hegemonic civilizational discourse has taken up concrete forms of political 
action with the goal of ‘smoothly but authoritatively transform[ing] Mus-
lims into liberal democratic subjects’ (Amir-Moazami, 2011, p. 20). In the 
Netherlands, as Bracke explains, over the last few decades Muslim women’s 
emancipation narrative has been used as part of a wider ‘arsenal of tools to 
control Islam’, linked to the surveillance of mosques and Islamic associations 
(Bracke, 2011, p. 35). Other sociological studies emphasize the subjectivity 
of women and of female religious authorities in Islamic groups in France, 
Germany (Jouili, 2015), Flanders (Jacobsen, 2011), the Netherlands (Bracke, 
2008), Norway (Vanderwaeren, 2011), and Sweden (Karlsson Minganti, 2012). 
In countries like France and Germany, prayers rooms, religious instruction, 
and other services exclusively for female believers started to appear in 
the f irst decade of the twenty-f irst century in some mosques and Muslim 
organizations (Jouili and Amir-Moazami, 2006). Muslim women participate 
in the Islamic life of their community; organize religious activities; deliver 
sermons and lectures in mosque associations, study circles, informal groups, 
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or other grassroots associations; and participate in daʻwa activities within 
the Islamic revival movement in Europe (Jouili, 2011; Karlsson Minganti, 
2012; Vogt, 2010).
These ‘religiously committed women’ (Jouili, 2011) face multiple obstacles 
as a result of patriarchal dynamics both inside and outside their community, 
in concert with racist and islamophobic prejudices. Concerning religious 
authority, they face a twofold pressure: from inside their community, 
they face obstacles to their active participation in Islamic discourses and 
practices because their claim to religious authority is often contested by 
their brothers in faith (Jouili, 2015; Karlsson Minganti, 2012; Vogt, 2010). 
From outside, pious Muslim women, especially young, highly educated 
pious Muslim women, face the imperative of emancipation following the 
secular European model. In this sense, Bracke explains that they could 
be considered a ‘disturbing presence in relation to the hegemonic “saving 
Muslim women” script as they interrupt the linear time of emancipation 
upon which the dominant script relies’, i.e., a linear time of emancipa-
tion distributes emancipation unequally and in a binary way between 
an emancipated ‘us’ and a non-emancipated ‘them’ (Bracke, 2011). Some 
sociological studies call into question this secularization thesis based on 
the narrative of a single modernity, whereas religion is expected to be a 
private aspect of individuals’ lives (Reilly, 2011). They testify that discourses 
about women, gender, and Islam imply multiple reflections about religion, 
culture and state. This has given urgency to debates on the contradictions 
between discourses on women’s rights and Muslim religious practices, 
spirituality, and forms of religious life in Europe, but also to possibilities of 
reconciliation between them (Amir-Moazami, Jacobsen, and Malik, 2011). 
Research on female religious authorities in France and Germany shows that 
the acquisition and dissemination of Islamic knowledge are not elements of 
women’s subjection to authority; on the contrary, they could themselves be 
elements of the acquisition of religious authority (Jouili and Amir-Moazami, 
2006). Some women interviewed by Jouili and Amir-Moazami (2006) claim 
that the acquisition of religious knowledge reinforces their faith and makes 
them resist secularist ‘temptations’.
7 Islam and gender equality as objects of governmentality 
in a multicultural context
In this discussion of off icial Moroccan women preachers and scholars, I 
have interpreted them as having agency and the ability to perform their 
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identity f irst as Muslims, then as women and as citizens. Their acquisi-
tion of Islamic knowledge is directly connected to their acquisition of a 
religious authority that, depending on the role they play as a preacher or 
scholar, challenges and reconf igures the hegemonic male-monopolized 
Islamic discourse. I observed that the work of the off icial Moroccan women 
Islamic scholars and preachers has a high impact on their community 
life, because it goes beyond the walls of the mosque and thus takes on a 
wider social scope. As Miriam Al-Haitami argues, women religious guides 
and scholars in Morocco construct a third space between the public and 
private (Al-Haitami, 2012). Here public and private spaces are conceived 
from a praxiological perspective that considers the def inition of public 
and private as a contingent categorization, depending on the interaction 
between people, contexts, and situations (Dupret and Ferrié, 2005). The 
mosque, in fact, is effectively reconf igured: its public role could change 
and it could become an intimate and private and even collective space, as 
Amina Wadud suggested (interview, London, 11 September 2012). In this way, 
the space of the mosque could change from a symbol of the crystallization 
of a past where men monopolized Islam to a performative space of change 
and the reform of ‘tradition’ in a process of internal negotiation (Bano 
and Kalmbach, 2011; Holmes Katz, 2014). I also observed that Moroccan 
women religious authorities’ discourse about gender relations is inspired 
by gender complementarity, not gender equality, and that they support a 
gender-based division of labour and a gender-based system of duties and 
obligations. In their vision, motherhood represents a fundamental value for 
women, in which an Islam-based educational model is preferred because 
of its capacity to serve the community. The high sense of responsibility 
that these women attribute to the role of a mother comes close to ‘political 
motherhood’ (Jouli and Amir-Moazami, 2006, p. 622), because motherhood 
and its manifestation in domesticity have a public impact on the whole 
community. Teaching the ‘right’ Islam to children through education 
and family care activities makes the private/domestic sphere capable of 
significant societal impact. Therefore, being a pious subject who is conscious 
of her Islamic knowledge reflects the ability of a female religious authority 
to go beyond the private/public binary, and could also have an impact on 
the redef inition of the patriarchal social order, which dictates the strict 
separation of the two social dimensions.
The post-colonial approach results in a more relevant framework for 
analysing the spectrum of female agencies in Morocco. Some studies of 
Islamic female experiences and discourses return respect to the voices 
that promote an ideal female model by appropriating Islamic symbols in 
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the public sphere (Gole, 1996) or through Islamic pedagogy in the space of 
the mosque (Mahmood, 2005). In analysing female participation in Moroc-
can religious institutions, I consider women preachers and female Islamic 
experts as both agents of central power and agents per se, far from any 
perspective that considers only liberal secular feminists as the unidirectional 
perspective for the evolution of society. I consider all of the women religious 
authorities I encountered in Morocco to be agents of change. The result of 
the study is, then, a complex interaction of convergences and divergences 
of discourses, systems of values, experiences, and agencies that leads to 
considering women’s bodies and subjectivities as ‘contested spaces’ in the 
debate about equality of citizenship – a focal element of any transition to 
democracy or, much more important, of any possibility of real respect for 
women’s rights in Morocco.
Comparing the Moroccan case with the European context, we observe 
that both Islam and gender equality still appear to be objects of state gov-
ernmentality, governmental techniques in a top-down political dynamic. In 
Europe, there are some national attempts at the institutionalization of Islam 
through a liberal discourse of gender equality; in Morocco, it seems that 
dispositives of Islamic power are useful to manage, control, and re-signify 
gender equality. In the European context, the interaction between the claim 
of women’s equality and the claim of religion is a contested issue that some 
scholars have problematized by exploring the attempt of some states to create 
an institutional apparatus that seeks to discipline Muslim communities 
while instrumentalizing values of gender equality and promoting Muslim 
women’s participation in a ‘post-secular’ public life (Amir-Moazami, 2011; 
Bracke and Fadil, 2012; Habermas, 2008). The European context could be 
defined as ‘post-secular’ because secularism is not a sine qua non condition 
for modernity, which could be – and practically is – more characterized by 
spirituality, pious identities, and piety movements. A more vital presence 
of female religious subjectivities could re-signify patriarchal dynamics 
within their community of faith, and at the same time the meaning of 
women’s emancipation in Europe. The ways this process could interact 
with different European social contexts and institutions, or, in other words, 
how female religious leadership can contribute to the European inter- or 
multicultural process and the amelioration of women’s lower status within 
their citizenship and faith communities, remain an open question that is 
worth researching further.
At the institutional level it could be very diff icult to imagine a singular 
European model of ‘state-sponsored Muslim women religious authorities’ 
as implemented in Morocco. The national institutions of the different 
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states play a role in how politics manages internal minorities. In this sense, 
the German case explored by Amir-Moazami presents some potential 
normative and normalizing implications of national initiatives for dialogue 
with Muslim minorities (Amir-Moazami, 2011). For example, there could 
be obstacles to the effective capacity of Muslim representatives chosen 
by the state to represent the whole community of faith, and the power-
related implications of the acquisition of this possible role are not easy to 
manage. It could be possible to imagine the creation of a board of Muslim 
women spokespersons that would point European policies towards a more 
intercultural society, struggling against both stereotypes and islamophobia 
and the instrumental and patriarchal use of Islam within their community 
of believers. Encouraging a European process of dialogue between female 
religious authorities, women active in piety movements, Muslim and secular 
feminists, and activists in Islamist movements could provide different 
perspectives of women’s rights and eventually arrive at a confrontation 
about women’s common emancipatory priorities. Rather than constituting 
monoliths, Islam and gender equality values are continuously re-signified by 
individual and collective performances and agencies beyond the boundaries 
of public and private spaces, beyond the juxtaposition that perceives Islam 
as traditional and gender equality and liberal Western values as modern. 
In this regard, it is worth recalling that a segment of Muslim women so-
cialized in Europe also redef ine liberal values by articulating their piety 
and being fascinated by liberal discourses on dignity and self-realization 
(Jouili, 2011; Salih, 2010). In both Europe and Morocco, female religious 
authorities appear to be pious subjects and active citizens. Even though 
they may appear to not yet have produced a legitimized or very visible 
religious knowledge, their activity has an impact beyond the boundaries 
of Islamic costumes, religious discourses, or the socio-political division 
of spaces. Through the acquisition of religious knowledge, they appear as 
agents of a redef inition of the Islamic tradition while confronting their 
own pious subjectivities with the imperative of secular gender equality. 
At the same time, they are the protagonists of their own empowerment 
through a trajectory that is mainly religious: an empowerment that, in 
the long run, could match Islamic feminism’s aims to promote gender 
equality also thanks to an equal access to the knowledge needed for the 
interpretation of sacred texts. Because of their dynamic capacity to bridge 
Islamic communities and women’s empowerment, the very potential of 
Muslim women’s authority should be far more recognized and discussed 
in contemporary Europe.
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Abstract
To understand the relevant and signif icant differences between imams 
of the West, this chapter suggests a typology of imams according to 
variations of institutional authority – that is, the signif icant dimensions 
of institutionally embedded authority available in the West – and what 
has been called epistemic authority, which emphasizes the primacy of 
knowledge-based authority in Islam. Focussing specif ically on Islamic 
authority and providing relevant examples of imams that embody author-
ity, the typology expresses the cross tabulation between the diverse 
institutional frameworks in the West and Islamic knowledge personi-
f ied. This relationship between institutional authority and epistemic 
authority, its explanatory power and the actual imams, who exemplify 
them, is a telling indicator of the directions and future challenges of 
Islam in Europe.
Keywords: Imams in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria, typology 
of imams, chaplaincy, institutional and epistemic authority
1 Introduction
This chapter draws on the preliminary interviews from the research project 
titled ‘Imams of the West’ (2014-2017) and is an attempt at structuring and 
ordering the diverse types of imams in the West. The objective of the overall 
research project is to explore how imams are understood in the divide 
between Islamic authority and Muslim leadership in the West. Based on 
qualitative interviews of about 50 imams in Europe and North America 
(‘the West’), the study falls at the intersection between Islamic studies and 
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sociology of religion. It investigates how the Islamic religious institution of 
the imam changes in the challenging encounter with a global, multicultural, 
and post-migration ‘Western’ world.
The argument in this chapter is that one meaningful and appropri-
ate way of organizing the diverse types of imams in the West – as well 
as, perhaps, in the rest of the world – is according to the relevant kinds 
of authority at play amongst them in the religious-organizational f ield 
(Rosenow-Williams, 2012; Vinding, 2013). Exploring authority with its 
associations of power, control, or legitimate rule is an especially acute 
concern for any study of imams that seeks to understand how and to what 
degree diverse types of imams have authority through delegation, and to 
what extent they are authorities because of certain qualities or capacities 
that they have as individuals. Therefore, this chapter organizes imams 
according to (a) variations in their institutional authority, that is, the 
signif icant dimensions of institutionally embedded authority available 
to them in the West, and (b) what has been called epistemic authority, 
which emphasizes the primacy of knowledge-based authority in Islam 
(Hallaq, 2001, 2009; Wilson, 1983, p. 13). Theoretically, and at this point 
in reporting of the project, the typology of imams is presented through 
these two parameters of authority. In the f inal reporting on the results 
of the ‘Imams of the West’ research project, this typological framework 
of authority will be discussed against the third dimension of the actual 
issues of Muslim leadership that are needed and demonstrated in Muslim 
communities in the West. The question of leadership is acute in many 
Muslim communities and, taking the typology presented in this chapter 
as a point of origin, will be the object of study in the upcoming book, 
Imams of the West.
This chapter opens with a preliminary discussion of what typologies do, 
what analytical contributions they can make to the ordering of empirical 
material in qualitative studies, and how to construct typologies. Rather 
than the simple categorization that just puts imams in pre-labelled boxes, 
this chapter builds a typology as a theoretical instrument that is both 
conceptualizing and classif icatory, while also resonating with the empirical 
material drawn from the interviews so that it, in turn, describes the reality 
of imams’ experiences. Therefore, in constructing the typology, this chapter 
makes explicit the theoretical implications of the empirical f indings that 
merited a typology in the f irst place.
Then the chapter explores some of the most signif icant instances of 
state-of-the-art typologies of imams in the literature, including examples 
of chaplaincy in the United Kingdom, and typologies of imams in Turkish 
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networks in Germany and at mosques in Austria. Each of these supplies 
highly relevant perspectives for creating a more complete typology of imams 
in the West.
Applying institutional and epistemic authority to the empirical material 
provided in the interviews, the chapter unfolds the typology and further 
discusses the chart, its dimensions, and its implications. The imams in-
terviewed for the project are not everyday, average imams chosen to be 
proportionally representative of the many thousands of imams in the West; 
rather, they are key informants that reflect and critically engage in debate, 
and exercise in their religion not just one but many kinds of authority in an 
array of relations. As such, the interviews explore the depth and breadth of 
the f ield of imams, and the choice of each interviewee must be understood 
within the specif ic contexts, circumstances, and conditions that qualify 
the material.
Knowing this, it is important to stress that the typology created here 
remains ideal-typical, and that each of the imams discussed f its only to the 
extent that they exemplify the characteristics of the type. The contribu-
tion of the chapter remains a frame for thinking about and ref lecting 
on imams in the West and the central aspects of being an imam. Before 
concluding, therefore, a number of caveats and problems with the typology 
are discussed and evaluated, and the chapter closes by highlighting some 
steps taken towards a meaningful and appropriate ordering of imams in 
the West.
2 Types, typology, and constructing typologies
Types and their internal relationships are constructs applied in qualitative 
studies, which are used to comprehend, understand, and explain complex 
social realities (Kluge, 2000). They offer a description of the similarities 
and differences in whatever is studied. As such, typologies are theories, 
that is, ref lections on an empirical world, and not just simple categoriza-
tions or classif ications of something we know to exist (Doty and Glick, 
1994, p. 230). Simply put, typologies are organized systems of types that 
are analytically useful in the formation of theories, because they clarify 
concepts and create groupings based on empirical data (Collier, LaPorte, 
and Seawright, 2012).
At f irst glance, typologies look like simple categorizations and have a 
certain appeal as reasonable reductions of complexity. As with all catego-
rization and ordering of empirical material, typologies come with a risk 
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of generative structuration (Bourdieu, 1985, p. 13; Giddens, 1984, p. 25). 
The danger is that, in the theorization and building of the categories, the 
scholar forces a foreign structure onto the data, in turn misrepresenting it 
by labelling it. Unless very carefully constructed, the typology will produce 
its subject matter as the types themselves are theorized, thereby pushing 
description to become prescription. The typology might very well end up 
glossing over much of the grey zone and ambiguous cases between the 
predefined boxes and theorized types – in effect, missing the whole point. 
In addition, the step from simple categorization to essentialization is very 
short, and very dangerous in the light of the essentializations that have 
done so much damage to a nuanced understanding of Islam (Jung, 2011; 
McKelvey, 1982; Said, 1979).
D. Harold Doty and William H. Glick argue that seeing typologies as 
mere categorizations misunderstands what typologies are and thus fails 
‘to take full advantage of the unique form of theory building represented 
by the typology approach’ (1994, p. 231). Classif ication implies a scheme of 
mutual exclusion and apparently exhaustive sets (Doty and Glick, 1994, 
p. 232) on the basis of a predef ined rule or maxim that decides which is 
which. By contrast, typologies do not provide clear rules for classif ication 
that assume that the constructed classes are mutually exclusive, exhaustive, 
or discretionary. Rather, typologies have the analytical and theoretical 
benef it of identifying ‘multiple ideal types, each of which represents a 
unique combination of the […] attributes that are believed to determine the 
relevant outcome(s)’ (Doty and Glick, 1994, p. 232). Typologies reflect the 
variance in one or more specif ied dependent variables and thereby organize 
identif ied types into a scheme of the governing rationales or dimensions at 
play (Doty and Glick, 1994, p. 232).
The core constructs of typologies are ideal types, but there are many 
other kinds of types, such as real types, prototypes, extreme types, and 
so on. However, the ideal types constructed in the typology are exactly 
that – ideals – and therefore of a theoretical nature; the types are ab-
stract, hypothetical concepts (Weber, 1978). Ideal types are theoretical 
products of typology building that point to the descriptive elements 
that are common features of most cases of the type. This is in contrast 
to the empirical examples, which invariably deviate in one aspect or the 
other from ideal-types (Doty and Glick, 1994, p. 233). These in turn are 
the ‘normal-types’ of the empirical material, that is, the object of a study 
ref lecting the real world, which remains different from the ideal-types 
that seeks an explanation or understanding of the real world in conceptual 
terms (Etzkorn, 1973, p. 137).
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In specif ic terms, the process of constructing typologies is delicate work 
and must be done with academic rigor and consistency, lest it becomes a gross 
approximation or haphazard misrepresentation of the material. According 
to qualitative methodologist Susann Kluge (1999, 2000), the virtue of the 
typology as a four-step process of systematization is that the divisions it 
proposes come from the def ining or meaningful properties and attributes 
that describe the specif ic empirical data. These are the dimensions of the 
typology that order the material and make the types distinguishable by 
virtue of their similarities and differences.
In the construction of a typology the types should be as internally ho-
mogenous as possible, in addition to the internal similarity of the variable 
dimension. At the same time, the differences between the diverse types 
must be equally well def ined in the external heterogeneity at the level of 
the typology, clearly demonstrating the variations in the empirical material 
(Kluge, 1999, 2000). This is what gives the dimensions their regularity. 
Simply put, the different boxes in the typology must reflect both distinct 
features and meaningful differences on a spectrum of variance, with an 
increasing degree of complexity in unfolding a multidimensional typology 
that combines the interplay of two kinds of variables in what will become 
a chart (see Table 1 below).
After that, a reduction of complexity might be needed. The cross-
tabulation of two dimensions leads to the combination of attributes into a 
number of types and spaces that are theoretical by nature, but which must 
be empirically verif ied. The ideal types must correspond to normal types. 
If no empirical case falls into a certain ‘box’, then it is not meaningful to 
include that type in the typology. Finally, the constructed types should 
be def ined through reference to both their combined attributes and the 
empirical world that they propose to describe (Kluge, 2000).
3 ‘Typologizing’ attempts so far in Europe
While imams in Europe remain a neglected and understudied topic of quali-
tative social and humanities research, the last decade or so has seen some 
solid pioneering steps in not just studying imams, but also in ordering and 
categorizing them into more or less coherent typologies. Some of these typolo-
gies are somewhat undeveloped, while others demonstrate careful, systematic 
attempts at establishing analytical types that cast light on the complex social 
realities of imams. While there may be more such typological undertakings 
in Europe, this section presents three of the most substantial examples so far.
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3.1 Understanding Muslim chaplaincy in the United Kingdom
Sophie Gilliat-Ray, Muhammad Mansur Ali, and Stephen Pattison have 
studied Muslim chaplaincy in the United Kingdom in their work Understand-
ing Muslim Chaplaincy (2013), which is concerned with ‘Muslim chaplains 
employed in British institutions […] working full-time. Part-time and volun-
tary roles can be found in prisons, hospitals, educational institutions, HM 
courts, shopping centres and airports, while others have formal association 
with police forces and leisure attractions’ (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison, 2013, 
p. 1). This is highly relevant for the development of a typology of imams, 
because it constitutes a recent development of a signif icant category of 
institutional authority amongst imams of the West.
Although Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison do not develop their profile of the 
chaplains as a typology, they do draw a very comprehensive portrait of the 
characteristics of who Muslim chaplains are, what they think, and what they 
do. Perhaps the most central contribution in their book is the understanding 
of the relationship between the religious authority, qualif ications, and 
training of the imams and the expectations, developments, and needs of 
the wide sector of institutions and organizations that employ imams as 
chaplains. The conversation or relationship between imams and public 
institutions is very much developing, producing ‘a new Muslim professional 
religious role’ (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison, 2013, p. 7). The relatively new 
involvement of Muslims in pastoral care raises signif icant questions with 
regard to the educational background, religious training, and ‘authorization 
of chaplains’ (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison, 2013, p. 43). Summarizing their 
study, it seems that imams’ production of Islamic knowledge and successful 
acquisition of a reputation as a legitimate religious authority are paramount 
for the success of this new Muslim professional role. Simultaneously, the 
study shows the ability of public institutions and employers of Muslim 
chaplains to establish an overdue ‘pattern of institutionalized Islamic 
pastoral care’ while still maintaining their multi-faith and public secular 
norms (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison, 2013, p. 43).
To stress personal, professional, and theological differences, Gilliat-Ray, 
Ali, and Pattison differentiate between the chaplains’ various sources of 
education and training. Among their sample of chaplains, 58 per cent were 
recognized religious professionals who had trained in ‘a formal programme 
of confessional Islamic Studies, and had acquired the title or recognised 
position of ʿalim or ʿalima’ (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison, 2013, p. 46). Such 
formal training seems increasingly to be a requirement and part of a growing 
‘professionalization’, perhaps corresponding to a growing recognition of 
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this kind of Islamic religious authority by employers. Equally, the study 
concerned itself with the secular educational qualif ications of the chaplains, 
which it – and many of the informants – distinguishes from traditional 
training. The study f inds that 46 per cent had received a mainstream higher 
education degree, thus demonstrating that ‘the vast majority of chaplains 
either have a traditional religious qualif ication, or a more advanced main-
stream educational qualif ication’ (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison, 2013, p. 47). 
There is very little overlap between these two kinds of qualif ications. The 
remaining category of chaplains who perform the role with no training 
but the relevant experience is also there, but they are very few. Many of 
the chaplains in the study add relevant experience to their qualif ications, 
and many have been teachers or educators of sorts – in public institutions, 
the private sector, or within Muslim communities or in mosques. There is 
clearly a movement of professionals and chaplains from mosques to public 
and private sector institutions, and vice versa.
Becoming a chaplain in these institutions is increasingly formalized 
and standardized, with competitive salaries, compensations, employee 
rights, job descriptions, and transparency in the employment. This includes 
a rigorous selection and recruitment process with the increased use of 
aptitude testing and an emphasis on pastoral care skills (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and 
Pattison, 2013, p. 50, 53). While most clearly seen in the HM Prison Service, 
where security is a signif icant issue, this is part of the recruitment process 
in other sectors as well. Chaplaincy employment caters to a specific segment 
and accentuates the difference between institutional employment and 
mosque-based, ‘traditional’ imam positions. The increasing expectations 
of institutional employers pose challenges to otherwise well-qualif ied 
religious scholars, the ulama whose ‘training will have largely involved 
the acquisition of religious knowledge and etiquette’ (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and 
Pattison, 2013, p. 51). On the other hand, those who seek and get employment 
in institutions also express an increasing dissatisfaction with the terms and 
conditions of mosque-based jobs in Britain; work as a chaplain contrasts 
signif icantly with mosque positions, where the patronage of the committee 
and community relations are vital.
Looking at the changing expectations of Muslim professionals in more 
general terms, it seems clear that the opportunities and conditions of 
employment will be a signif icant factor in def ining Muslim professionals 
in the future, essentially changing how religious authority and knowledge 
is produced and legitimized. The different demands of institutional employ-
ers bring into question the necessity of being a qualif ied cālim in order 
to work as a chaplain, marking a shift away from the epistemic virtues 
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of traditional training to a growing focus on the needs of the institution. 
However, notwithstanding the requirements of the job and the authority 
the chaplains wield on behalf of institutions, Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison 
found that amongst their interviewees authoritative religious knowledge 
was essential for establishing legitimacy in their work as chaplains. A good 
chaplain with worth and confidence is one whose authority is also based 
on substantial religious knowledge.
While Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison never develop their work as a typology 
as such – nor they are concerned with the kind of theoretical reflection 
pursued here –, their portrait of Muslim chaplaincy corresponds nicely to 
the f irst row-category of what I call institutional imams and chaplains in 
the typology presented here (see Table 1 below), highlighting a high degree of 
institutionalization and a close relationship with the institutional employer.
3.2 Ceylan’s fourfold typology of imams in Germany
As a pioneer in research on imams in Germany, Rauf Ceylan constructed a 
typology of imams based on years of f ieldwork with Turkish networks and 
umbrella organizations in Germany in his book Die Prediger des Islam (The 
Preachers of Islam; 2010). Ceylan classif ies imams as theological authorities 
and important social and political agents (Ceylan, 2010, p. 17). He sketches 
the diversity of the functions and extensive use of imams in Germany, as 
preachers, educators, pastors, and life and marriage counsellors. Drawing 
on such initial observations, and on the basis of his qualitative interviews, 
Ceylan constructs four types of imams that are very much centred on 
Germany, but certainly relevant to the rest of Europe.
Ceylan’s f irst group of imams, ‘traditionally conservative imams,’ are 
often associated with bilateral networks or umbrella organizations, and 
connected to their dogmatic and liturgical traditions. Conservative imams 
are challenged by the diversity of their social tasks and responsibilities in 
accommodating believers who live in a completely different world culturally, 
linguistically, and socially (Ceylan, 2010, p. 51). Ceylan estimates that these 
imams make up about three-quarters of German imams.
The second group of imams is ‘traditionally defensive imams,’ who are a mi-
nority amongst German imams. They represent an unresolved, anti-intellectual 
Islam in which traditional nationalism, occultism, and end-of-day worldviews 
are central to the defence of true Islam against moral decay. This is expressed 
as an incoherent opposition to a ‘Germanification’ of Islam and Muslims. 
Based on his select, non-representative interviews, Ceylan pejoratively labels 
these imams ‘medicine men and exorcists’ (Ceylan, 2010, p. 79).
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The third category of imams, ‘intellectual-offensive’ imams, accounts for 
15 per cent of German imams, whom he describes as progressive, offensive, 
and rationally critical (Ceylan, 2010, p. 110). These intellectual preachers 
have demonstrated how imams can promote integration in a non-Muslim 
majority society and reinterpret Islam in the context of its diaspora existence. 
With both the Quran and the constitution in hand, Ceylan sees these as 
the imams that can f ight growing extremism.
The fourth category is the ‘neo-Salaf i imams,’ who seek to reconstruct 
a mental framework of an original Islam of the f irst, pious Muslim genera-
tions. This is a product of much later modern interpretations and customs 
and promotes a fundamentalist, extremist, and revolutionary Islam. This 
category is distinguished from the second group by its willingness to use 
violence and its uncompromising view of the West. Ceylan stresses that they 
have acquired their theological knowledge auto-didactically and that they 
maintain contact with violent jihadi groups, who ultimately seek to leave 
Germany to immigrate to a ‘proper Islamic State.’
Ceylon’s typology is more a portrait of the imams that he knows from his 
own context and experience than a systematically constructed typology 
that follows the rigid demands of typology construction. In the typology 
developed in this chapter (see Table 1, below), the imams at umbrella 
organizations and networks in Germany studied by Ceylan correspond in 
principle to what I call ‘ambassador or network imams’ in the second row: 
imams who are employed by national, bilateral, or larger international 
networks of mosques, associations, or ministerial departments. There is, 
however, a substantial overlap into other types in the typology, mostly due 
to the lack of a clear methodological selection by Rauf Ceylan.
3.3 Typology of Austrian imams
As part of the Wiener Beiträge zur Islamforschung (the Vienna Contributions 
to Islam research), Ednan Aslan, Evrim Ersan-Akkılıç, and Jonas Kolb (2015) 
explore Imame und Integration (Imams and Integration) in Austria. The 
object of this very thorough study is to explore what contribution the imams 
from mosque communities could make to integration in a plural society, 
so that Islam might no longer be seen as foreign, but rather as part of the 
social reality of Austria.
In all, 43 mosques were chosen with a solid ethno-religious and geo-
graphical spread, and imams were interviewed following a methodologically 
solid and well-designed semi-structured guide. Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, and 
Kolb carefully follow Kluge (1999) in grouping their cases according to the 
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principles of internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity (Aslan, 
Ersan-Akkılıç, and Kolb, 2015, p. 89). Following Kluge’s analytical framework, 
Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, and Kolb f irst mapped biographical backgrounds, 
structural conditions, the work of the imams, theological questions, and 
positions on integration and strategies in integration policy. From that, the 
researchers grouped concrete cases together and analysed the extent to 
which these could be ordered, and what kind of variations and regularities 
there were amongst the imams. Then the differences and commonali-
ties were explored, leading to an appropriate reduction into the relevant 
categories and characteristics that made sense to the objectives of the study, 
which was concerned with the question of integration.
From these preliminary exercises a coherent, fourfold typology was 
distilled. Their typology of imams in Austria comprises (1) imams with 
iṣlaḥ-missions (reform-missions); (2) imams as bridge builders; (3) imams as 
guardians of religious identities and traditions; and (4) imams with limited 
manoeuvrability. In their study, Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, and Kolb illustrate 
the substance of these types by investigating just a few named imams as 
concrete cases of the types.
The f irst type is imams with iṣlaḥ-missions, who seek to reform their 
mosques and communities by bringing about new, critical interpretations of 
the Islamic sources in light of the new contexts and conditions of Muslim life. 
In general, these imams consider the communities in Austria to be religiously 
ignorant and misled. They consider it their duty to guide Muslims on the 
right path and to bring them back to a true Islam (Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, 
and Kolb, 2015, p. 94).
The second type is imams who work as bridge builders in their mosques. 
These imams promote both integration into the Austrian context and 
connections with the countries of origin, building bridges between the 
two. Bridge-builder imams are attentive to the questions and problems 
of integration that are often accompanied by conflicts in the everyday 
life of Muslims in a migration context. A great number of activities take 
place with their mosques that are open to the wider Muslim public, which 
includes education, consultation, and social work for women, children, and 
newcomers to the Muslim community. Such activities of bridge-builder 
imams enable the members of the community to integrate themselves into 
the wider Austrian society (Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, and Kolb, 2015, p. 152).
The third type is the imam as a guardian of religious identity and tradition. 
Significant to this kind of imam is that they consider mosques and their facilities 
the heart of a protected Islamic identity. Within a protective framework, these 
imams defend their ethnic, cultural, and religious identities and the traditions 
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connected thereto. Religion does not take priority, but remains part of a heritage 
to be preserved. Patriotic or national identities are found in this context, and 
these imams play the role of transmitting a traditional understanding of 
religion to the next generation (Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, and Kolb, 2015, p. 213).
The final type in this typology is imams with limited manoeuvrability. The 
key characteristics of these imams are that the integration of the members 
of their communities has very little to do with their functions as imams. For 
these imams, none of the relevant dimensions of integration – on cognitive, 
identif iable, social-interactive, or structural levels – are addressed in the 
mosque community (Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, and Kolb, 2015, pp. 270-271). The 
core assignments of these imams are the conduct of the communal prayers, 
the khuṭba, and the teaching of the Quran. Activities related to issues of 
integration are not part of their area of responsibility.
In light of the study’s concerns, this typology very much reflects the 
specif ic societal problem of integration. As such, it speaks mainly, if not 
only, to aspects of the integration work of imams associated with mosques. 
In the typology developed in this chapter (see Table 1 below), the imams 
from mosque communities as studied by Aslan, Ersan-Akkılıç, and Kolb 
correspond in principle to what in the third row is called imams with local 
mosques, associations, or organizations, separately or organized into smaller 
networks. There is, however, an overlap with other subtypes in the typology.
4 Theorizing institutional and epistemic authority
The typology presented in this chapter is multidimensional and captures 
the meaningful interplay between institutional authority, on the one hand, 
and epistemic authority, on the other. These are the two overall rationales 
that distinguish and differentiate imams in the West in a meaningful way.
Inspiration is drawn from Bruce Lincoln’s work Authority: Construction 
and Corrosion (1994), which understands authority as a capacity to perform 
(p. 2) with a desired effect in a ‘frame’ or on a ‘stage’ dependent on time and 
place (p. 5). Lincoln elegantly presents an understanding of authority as 
both performance and effect, that combines the understanding of being ‘in 
authority,’ as a wielder of a delegated authority, and of being ‘an authority,’ 
as a wielder of an internalized authority (pp. 3-4). Simply put, the effect 
that is authority is the product of the relationship between position and 
qualif ications. This in turn demonstrates one of Lincoln’s key points, namely 
that the discursive nature of authority rests between its performance or 
application and its effect or perception (p. 10).
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This works very well as a prerequisite for the following typology of imams, 
which uses the dimensions of institutional authority and epistemic authority as 
the appropriate and significant variable identifiers of imams in the West. Most 
imams wield both kinds of authority, but in very different ways and to greatly 
varying degrees. This typology develops the complex confluence between these 
two kinds of authority. Although discussions of authority very much lead to 
questions of actual leadership, such a perspective is beyond the present chapter; 
it will, however, be the topic of future reporting on ‘Imams of the West.’
4.1 Institutional authority
By ‘institutional authority’ is understood the institutional power of the 
employer, organization, or network that engages the imam and therefore 
delegates unto and authorizes the imam in his conduct and business as 
an imam. This kind of institutional authority is qualif ied in degrees of 
institutionalization, ranging from deep institutional embeddedness within 
a state or national framework such as in hospitals, prisons, armed forces, 
and universities, at one end, to having no relation with any governing or 
organizing structures, at the other – accentuating the individual, informal, 
non-institutionalized, and commonplace practices of imams that have ‘no 
relation with any governing or organizing structures.’
Institutionalization is characterized by convention and congruence with 
existing social patterns and stability in the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of certain 
social facts or aspects of social life (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Applied to 
the context of imams, institutionalization speaks to the relative strength of 
the employing organization or institution to frame the work and function of 
imams relative to the wider surrounding society. Institutional authority is 
delegated authority that is socially approved and accepted as legitimate by the 
wider society, drawing explicitly on the ethos, conditions, and purpose of the 
employer institution. Patrick Wilson makes clear that ‘the point of a formal 
organisation is to give authority to off ices that do not depend exclusively on 
the characteristics of the individuals occupying their off ices’ (Wilson, 1983, 
p. 81). As such, the authority of imams in institutions stems from the fact 
that society as a whole accepts that those very institutions have a legitimate 
right to such authority, including when it is delegated to the imams.
4.2 Epistemic authority
In contrast to institutional authority, ‘epistemic authority’ is the kind of 
training (formal or informal), accumulation of knowledge, or recognition 
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of merit that demonstrate that the qualities of an individual are suf-
f icient for him to conduct the business of an imam, regardless of what 
kind of employment or function as imam or chaplain he might have. 
By ‘epistemic’ I mean ‘pertaining to or related to knowledge or know-
ing,’ particularly in relation to acquiring, producing, or disseminating 
Islamic knowledge. Authority and knowledge are profoundly linked in 
Islam, to the extent that in his The Prophet’s Pulpit Patrick D. Gaffney 
notes that ‘the one notion that probably summarizes the predominant 
ideal associated with Islamic authority would be the concept of ʿilm, or 
knowledge’ (1994, p. 34). Concerning the concept of knowledge in Islam, 
Franz Rosenthal writes:
There is no branch of Muslim intellectual life, of Muslim religious and 
political life, and of the daily life of the average Muslim that remained 
untouched by the all-pervasive attitude toward ‘knowledge’ as something 
of supreme value for Muslim being. ʿIlm (knowledge) is Islam, even if the 
theologians have been hesitant to accept the technical correctness of 
this equation. (1970, p. 2)
Obviously, there are multiple and concurrent kinds of knowledge in Islam 
with numerous definitions that draw on the divine and secondary sources 
of knowledge in Islam, on the didactics and epistemology of the different 
schools of Islamic thought and mystic circles of learning, and even on the 
modernist, traditionalist, fundamentalist, and secularist views of each 
of these. Equally, there are many strategies for obtaining, producing, and 
applying Islamic knowledge as teaching, counselling, interpreting, and 
preaching, but – akin to Bruce Lincoln – Gaffney stresses the eff icacy of 
knowledge itself as a distinct sort of authority:
For knowledge to be socially effective, it must be converted into authority 
and for authority to be established it must be projected as knowledge. 
Thus a preacher’s influence in a local context depends fundamentally on 
the concepts of knowing that are found there and on how these qualities 
are understood to be portrayed. (Gaffney, 1994, p. 35)
It is fair to hold that ʿilm as Islamic knowledge is one of the most important 
sources of Islamic authority for the imam. In qualifying the credentials, 
merits, and capacity to perform as an imam, training becomes central 
to appropriating this Islamic knowledge, which is specif ied as Islamic 
epistemic authority.
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Wael B. Hallaq is concerned with understanding the genealogical origins 
of Islamic law, including the question of why and how the different doctrinal 
schools of law, the madhhabs, came into being in the first place (Hallaq, 2001, 
2009). His explanation is that the law and legal authority were constructed 
through ijtihād – that is, as knowledge production – and not contingent on 
political, social, or religious circumstances, Legal authority in Islam is therefore 
epistemic authority. He even goes so far as to say that ‘epistemic authority is 
the defining feature of Islamic law […] masterly knowledge of the law was the 
sole criterion in deciding where legal authority resided’ (Hallaq, 2009, p. 35).
In contrast to institutional authority, epistemic authority is a personal 
authority that is not delegated by some external power. It is of course very 
likely to be dependent on the merits of a number of external factors and 
institutions, but it shows itself as a kind of capacity. Simply put, epistemic 
authority expresses the degree to which imams have expert knowledge and 
how aptly it is applied in their work.
5 Applying institutional and epistemic authority to the 
typology
This typology is based on interviews with almost 50 imams as part of the 
qualitative sociological study ‘Imams of the West.’ The interviewees were 
drawn from a long list developed since 2014 that includes over 300 imams 
in Europe and North America, each of whom has contexts and insights 
that are relevant to the objective of the study. From this list, the imams 
actually interviewed were those who had previously ref lected publicly 
and systematically on what it means to be an imam, so that the interview 
for this study would be able to go into much greater detail and invite the 
interviewee to a deeper reflection on being an imam and the challenges that 
come with a global, multicultural, and post-migration ‘Western’ world. As 
mentioned, sociological questions of leadership amongst Muslims remains a 
continuous third perspective, but at present the typology is only concerned 
with the cross-tabulation of authority.
Institutional and epistemic authority are the dimensions depicted in the 
rows and columns of the typological chart in Table 1 below. As such, these 
depict degrees of institutionalization and categories of qualified knowledge. 
Each dimension of variables has then an interval that locates the positions of 
the chart, giving way to both poles as well as intermediate types. At the poles of 
each is the highest and lowest degree of institutionalization or kind of training 
from formal to informal, with the possibility – in theory – of the extreme of 
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no institutionalization and no training. These are not in any way meant as 
absolutes for either institutional or epistemic authority: newer, more extreme 
positions may develop or the chart may be in need of further elaboration or 
nuance. For each, an example is given from the empirical interview data to 
illustrate the characteristics and approximations to the ideal-types.
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From the spread of the chart, it becomes clear that, from the top left corner 
to the bottom right, we see a shift from highly institutionalized and well-
trained imams with close proximity to formal structures to imams who 
are distanced from such structures because they are independent or have 
informal qualif ications, or both.
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From the dimension of institutional authority, the imams whose author-
ity is most contingent on their employment are the chaplains and Muslim 
professionals employed in hospitals, prisons, universities, armed forces, and 
elsewhere. While they bring different educational backgrounds and different 
sources of epistemic authority into their work to varying degrees, they are 
nonetheless legitimate in their position of authority because what they do 
is publically accepted, including that they align themselves with the ethos, 
conditions, and purpose of their employer institutions. As mentioned above, 
Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison (2013) explore this much further in Understanding 
Muslim Chaplaincy. One example of such an imam or chaplain is Monawar 
Hussain from the UK, who is Muslim chaplain and advisor with Oxford 
University Hospitals and the NHS Foundation Trust as well as a Muslim tutor 
at Eton College1. He has vast organizational experience in both business and 
local affairs. Equally, his epistemic merits and authority are derived from the 
University of Oxford, where he received a Bachelor of Theology with a focus on 
Islam and the West. On paper, he is an example of an institutionally aligned 
imam, although the interview revealed that he was also closely connected 
to Zaki Badawi, who was the principal of the Muslim College in London, 
suggesting an additional albeit less formal source of legitimacy (interview with 
Monawar Hussain, 16 December 2015). Another example is Asim Hafiz, who is 
a chaplain at the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom; he was trained 
at the Darul Uloom al-Arabiya al-Islamiya seminary in North Manchester, 
but supplemented his traditional training with a Master’s in Islamic Studies 
(interview with Asim Hafiz, 15 December 2015). One of the few self-trained 
institutional imams is Tanvir Ahmed, an engineer who was a chaplain with 
the HM Prison Service, with which he has been working since the early 1990s, 
f irst as a volunteer and then as an employee. Until recently, he was the chair 
of the Muslim Chaplains Association, and has supplemented his career with 
further qualif ications in Islamic Studies (Ahmed, 2012). These imams have 
influence in the system and structures they work in, but are also challenged 
by the fact that they must follow the institutional line in a number of cases 
that might conflict with more traditional Islamic interpretations. Asim Hafiz, 
for example, is charged with the diff icult task of explaining how and why 
it is legitimate for Muslim soldiers and servicemen and -women to join the 
British efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.
1 All interviewees were given ample information about the purpose of the research, confidential 
treatment of private information, the intended use of the results, and the consequences of participa-
tion in the research project. They consented to participation freely, knowingly, and without coercion. 
Also, it was agreed that the interviewees would confirm any explicit quotes or citations.
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It is a short step from the f irst category to the second, ambassador or 
network imams, as they too are in a sense aff iliated or employed, except 
through bilateral relations between the established religious authority of a 
country of origin (e.g. Turkey, Morocco, Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the country 
of residence. These are visiting, semi-permanent, or permanent residents who 
have an obligation to lead both the prayer and the community in a pastoral 
sense, in agreement with the national office and the international agency that 
sends these expatriate imams. The Diyanet of Turkey provides an excellent 
example of these ambassador-imams and the soft power they resume in the 
international relations of Turkey (Ceylan, 2010; Gözaydın, 2010). However, 
the Diyanet imams are far from the only examples. The ‘Imams of the West’ 
research project includes several Bosnian imams who follow a similar post-
Ottoman organization of pastoral service to international communities around 
the world. There is also one example of also a Tatar imam, Ramil Balyaev, from 
the Tatar Community in Helsinki in Finland, who was trained in Moscow (see 
Martikainen and Latvio, in Part II on Tatars in Finland). In 2006, he was sent 
to Helsinki by his chief-mufti as an official delegate (interview with Ramil 
Balyaev, 18 August 2016). Similarly, Senad Kusur in Austria is an imam with 
the Verband der Bosniakischen Islamischen Vereine in Österreich. He trained as 
an Islamic theologian in Sarajevo, with a significant emphasis on traditional 
training – an important part of the educational structure of Bosnian imams 
(interview with Senad Kusur, 8 April 2016). I also count Ani Zonneveld, a 
female imam of Malaysian-American origins from Los Angeles amongst 
these imams. She is the president and founder of Muslims for Progressive 
Values (MPV), a faith-based, grass-roots human rights organization that 
embodies and advocates for the values of social justice and equality for all 
as they find them in the Quran, for the twenty-first century.2 The foundation 
has affiliates in Canada, Europe, Chile, Australia, and Malaysia. Zonneveld 
studied economics and political science in college, but she is also a professional 
Grammy Award-winning singer and songwriter and works as an imam in the 
local community around the MPV (interview with Ani Zonneveld, 7 July 2016).
In the third row are the imams at local mosques and associations. These 
are locally organized and part of a local Muslim community in the West, 
which is usually def ined by one distinguishing set of features: ethnic, na-
tional, or ‘Western’ for converts or native speaking communities. An example 
here is Brahim Laytous, who is imam and the director of a local Mosque in 
Ghent in Belgium. He is a PhD student at the University of Antwerp and 
2 Muslims for Progressive Values, ‘Who are we ?’ http://www.mpvusa.org/who-we-are/ (accessed 
1 December 2017)
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is writing about radicalization. He very much bridges the local mosque 
community with the local political and media environment, nimbly keeping 
conservative elements in the mosque in check by opening the mosque to the 
public (interview with Brahim Laytous, 12 November 2015). Another example 
is the Swedish convert Muhammed Muslim Eneborg, who is an imam at 
the smaller Masjid Aysha in Stockholm. He converted in 1980, is trained at 
Islamic colleges in England, learned Arabic, Urdu, and Islamic Sciences, and 
is qualif ied as an cālim. He is also a Sufi. Eneborg holds progressive opinions; 
he advocates for Islamic training for Muslim women and argues that the 
unionization of imams will improve their integration into the structures 
of society (interview with Muhammad Muslim Eneborg, 23 October 2015).
The example of a self-taught mosque imam is a highly interesting case. Tareq 
Oubrou is an autodidact imam of Moroccan origin at the mosque in Bourdeux, 
France; he has proven himself to be brilliant Muslim thinker and intellectual. 
He is trained in biology and medicine, and describes himself as a product of 
secularization. He feels lucky that he did not inherit any theological biases as 
part of a specific religious education and that with his Western thinking he 
can critically interrogate and revise his Islamic religion (interview with Tareq 
Oubrou, 22 April 2015). The product of this rethinking and his intellectual 
work has had a significant impact (see Baylocq, Part II, and Hashas, Part I).
In the fourth row are the independent imams, who are either loosely or 
not at all associated with any kind of institutional authority and are therefore 
autonomous in their work as imams. These are hard cases that are difficult to 
pin down, and imams with this kind of loose institutional authority represent a 
residual category to some extent. An example of a Western trained, independent 
imam is the German imama Halima Krausen from Hamburg. She is an early 
convert from a Christian upbringing and studied Arabic and Islamic Studies 
through extensive travels. She graduated in Islamic Studies, Islamic Law and 
Theology, and is considered a Muslim scholar with the title sheikha. In 1983, she 
was one of the founders of the Inter-Religious Dialogue Center at the Department 
of Theology at Hamburg University, where she was later employed as a research 
associate, working on interreligious dialogue and Quran exegesis. She also works 
as the imama of the Congregation of German-Speaking Muslims, and has been 
called ‘Europe’s Leading Muslim Woman Scholar’ by the Radical Middle Way 
and An-Nisa Society (Spielhaus, 2012, p. 443). In this typology, Krausen is a hard 
fit and her profile is ambiguous: a clear indicator of the limits of theoretical 
typologizing when looking at the empirical realities. She draws institutional 
authority from a number of contexts but remains employed as an academic, and 
is equally authoritative through both her Western academic merit and Islamic 
religious knowledge and studies (interview with Halima Krausen, 8 April 2016).
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An example of a traditionally trained, independent imam is sheikh 
Salahuddin Barakat, a Swedish imam of Lebanese origin who grew up in 
Malmø in southern Sweden. He has travelled in Turkey, Lebanon, Pakistan, 
Mauretania, and Yemen, and his formal merits are from Dar al-Mustafa and 
Ribat in the Hadramaut Governorate in Yemen. Barakat lists a number of 
important teachers; he has his ijāza and is therefore authorized by a higher 
authority to transmit Islamic knowledge. Barakat actively teaches in a 
number of different mosques, associations, and high schools in both Sweden 
and Denmark, and he works for a number of councils and religious projects. 
In 2013, he founded Islamakademin, a rapidly growing Islamic school with a 
vision of becoming the foremost traditional Islamic school in Sweden. Again, 
Barakat is associated with a number of institutions and organizations, but 
he is not delegated an off ice or ministry from them; rather, it is his Islamic 
epistemic authority that these institutions seek.
The self-taught, independent imam in this typology is exemplif ied by 
Abdul Wahid Petersen, who functions as an imam in Nørrebro, a popular 
Muslim area of Copenhagen. He runs a bookshop, is the general secretary 
of Danish Muslim Aid, and is very much a provocateur and free intellectual 
(Vinding and Christoffersen, 2012). He was born into a non-religious, Danish-
Finnish, working class, socialist family in the countryside of north-eastern 
Jutland and was baptized and confirmed in the Church of Denmark, but 
chose to become a Muslim at the age of 28 in 1982. While he has no formal 
education, Petersen is associated with a number of mosque associations, 
including the Danish Islamic Centre,3 which caters to converts and a Danish-
speaking congregation. Here he calls himself an imam by popular election 
and considers himself a ‘Hillbilly’ Muslim convert. He insists that ‘islam is 
not different. And therefore for me, being a Dane and being a Muslim is 
just expressing Islam in a Danish way of living.’4
6 Caveats and problems with the typology
After exploring some of the specif ics of the typological chart of imams in 
the West, it becomes clear that there are certain limits to the explanatory 
power of this kind of typology. It concerns itself with the authority of imams 
3 Dansk Islamisk Center, http://dicenter.dk/, (accessed 1 December 2017)
4 Akbar Ahmed, 2017, ‘This Self-Described ‘Hillbilly’ Muslim Convert Is A Refreshing Link 
Between Islam And His Danish Culture,’ Huffington Post, http://www.huff ingtonpost.com/entry/
muslim-convert-denmark-islam_us_5935ba70e4b0cfcda916c756# (accessed 1 December 2017)
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and is an appropriate analytical tool for discussing the interplay of Islamic 
epistemic authority within a religious-organizational setting in the West. 
The typology does not, however, look at the functions and tasks of imams, 
which would be an entirely suitable basis to differentiate imams, especially 
with a view to leadership. Do they work pastorally? Do they teach? How is 
the imam recognized as a legitimate authority by Muslim congregations? 
Additional relevant perspectives to be included are the age, ethnicity, and 
gender of the imams in question. As this research project is a qualitative 
study, the interviewees all reflect their own specif ic stories and contexts, 
which call for much deeper discussions about the history, geography, current 
events, and political and media trends that inform the circumstances of 
imams in the West.
The question of conversion has not come into play in this chapter, although 
it very much seems to be a factor in the distribution across the different 
types. Nor have I included information about how imams see their work 
in terms of activism, production of knowledge, or other forms of active 
leadership. Neither do theological positions feed into the typology. A relevant 
and productive alternative typology of imams could discuss whether they 
are they are modernist, traditionalist, fundamentalist, and so on. Such 
distinctions have much wider applications, and are not just limited to 
imams, but also to the Muslim communities in the West of which imams 
might be seen as indicative.
Fundamentally problematic to the dimensions of the typology is that the 
imams plotted in them are very likely to change or migrate across the types 
across time. An imam may accept another position or resign from his work 
to become more independent. Also, he is likely to pursue further education, 
perhaps a ijāza or a master’s degree or Ph.D. at a Western University. Equally, 
an imam may be employed part time with a local mosque and part time 
as a chaplain, which makes it impossible to f it him into a single category. 
These perspectives and problems – and many more – will be discussed in 
the much more detailed and comprehensive monograph that will be the 
result of the research project.
7 Conclusions
This typology is work in progress and an invitation for further discussion on 
how, and according to which parameters, to systematize the study of diverse 
types of imams in the West. The applicability of a typology like this one 
depends on its ability to make meaningful distinctions in the often-blurry 
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f ield of imams. The typology presented here is an attempt at a meaningful 
and appropriate ordering of imams in the West, based on the signif icant 
dimensions of institutionally embedded authority available in the West and 
what has been called epistemic authority, which emphasizes the primacy 
of knowledge-based authority in Islam.
In deciding to focus on these two expressions of religious authority, 
and arguing for their centrality to the legitimacy of imams in their work, 
this typology expresses a cross tabulation between diverse institutional 
frameworks in the West and Islamic knowledge personif ied. This relation-
ship, its compatibility, and the concrete imams who exemplify the types, 
are telling indicators of the directions of Islam in Europe.
Analytically, this typology opens highly relevant distinctions for 
navigating the study of imams of the West. With an understanding of the 
institutional context of imams as well as the kind of epistemic authority they 
bring with them, it becomes apparent how much distance there is between 
institutionally aligned imams with secular training and well-paying jobs 
in the context of the modern Western state and self-taught, independent 
imams, who f ind another basis for the leadership they seek to present to 
the Muslim communities.
Many people and organizations have a vested interest in Islam in the 
West, and therefore also in imams and Muslim leadership. There are diverse 
expectations for imams in different institutional settings in the West, which 
lead to a significant competition of various kinds of authority. Looking at the 
changing expectations of the Muslim professionals in more general terms, it 
seems clear that the opportunities and conditions of employment will be a 
significant factor in defining Muslim professionals in the future, essentially 
changing how religious authority and knowledge is produced and legitimized. 
The different demands of institutional employers bring into question the 
necessity of being a qualif ied cālim(a) to work as a chaplain, marking a shift 
away from the epistemic virtues of traditional training to a growing focus 
on the needs of the institution. Equally, the chaplains themselves highlight 
the importance of their religious knowledge, and many seek to not only 
demonstrate this in their work, but also to convince their institutional 
employer of the strong convergence between the two kinds of authority.
This typology is relevant not just for analysing who authorizes imams 
and what kind of authorities they are, but also for the wider discussion of 
legitimate authority in Islam in the West. Institutional authority as context-
contingent delegation and epistemic authority as the qualif ied capacity to 
speak or perform is not just about the authority of imams in their leadership 
challenges, but also about the very future of Islam in the West. Simply said, 
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if authority derives from authorship, then the key questions become to 
whom, by whom, and how is the authorship of Islam in the West delegated, 
and what kinds of freedom, responsibility, and limitations come with such 
delegation? What kind of leadership will arise based on these issues of 
authority? Resolving these central questions of legitimate authority will be 
essential for any kind of future leadership of Islam in the West.
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Abstract
Many imams attempt to promote the visibility of Islam in the public 
space, both in France and in other European countries, and this issue has 
become the subject of heated debates. Imams participate in the search for 
recognition based on their ability to embody an ‘acceptable Islam’: one 
that is supposedly acceptable for all actors in the public debate. To reverse 
the discourse that describes Islam as a religion that is foreign and maybe 
even incompatible with the principles of western democracies, imams 
in France aspire to the acculturation of Muslim identity or identities, 
while at the same time stimulating the Muslim faithful to integrate into 
French society.
Keywords: Islam in France, religious authority, militancy, secularization, 
Muslim identity
1 The expression of Muslim identity in the public space
In many respects, the practice of Muslim worship in public spaces causes 
concerns for European democracies, but as well for imams because the state and 
the surrounding society expect them to facilitate the ‘integration’ of Islam into 
national realities. France is no exception to this phenomenon. Imams adjust 
their roles in response to these pressures; indeed, far from perpetuating North 
African or Middle Eastern norms, as debates on imam training often continue 
to assume, their ways of showing their Muslim identity in the public sphere 
reflect their involvement in the emergence of what is sometimes called (in 
the case of France) a ‘French Islam’. More specifically, the changing stances of 
imams are involved in the negotiation of the place of Islam in a secular society.
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The place of Islam in France is not always obvious, despite the fact that 
Muslims have been present in French territory for several decades. On 
the contrary, the visibility of religions, and of Islam in particular, is now 
more than ever a cause of dissension in the country. The veil, for example, 
has probably never been so widely worn as it is now; at the same time, it 
has never generated so many prohibitive laws and controversies. Never 
have ‘great mosques’ been so numerous or given rise to so many protests 
and desecrating acts. Prayers in the streets of Paris, Nice, and Marseilles 
have suddenly become an unprecedented political problem. Debates arise 
from these conflicts, even within mosques themselves. For example, in 
2014 the Rencontre annuelle des musulmans du Sud (Annual Meeting of 
Muslims living in the South of France) hosted a conference entitled ‘Islam 
and Muslims – what visibility?’ Tareq Oubrou, the imam and director of 
the Mosque of Bordeaux who has become famous for his work on Islam 
in France, has declared himself in favour of a ‘discreet Muslim visibility’ 
(Oubrou, 2013; see also Baylocq, Part II, and Hashas, Part I). Naturally, the 
views of different imams also differ. There are Salaf i prayer rooms where 
preachers dictate increased religious ostentation, and there are some imams 
who regularly advocate the abandonment of identity markers that provoke 
negative reactions in public spaces. Oubrou (2013) claims that the hijab is 
not an Islamic obligation; Hassen Chalghoumi, the imam of the Mosque of 
Drancy, is publicly against the wearing of the niqāb (‘full-face veil’).1 The 
purpose of this chapter is not so much to provide an overview of these 
debates as to explain what is at stake in the discourses of French imams.
This chapter is based on research carried out between 2006 and 2012 
in France. During that period, I conducted 60 semi-structured interviews 
with 30 imams considered to be ‘moderates’ and I undertook as well a 
series of observation sessions, paying attention to their various functions, 
including khuṭba (pl. khuṭab; ‘sermons’), legal consultations, discussion 
groups, classes, interreligious meetings, and social gatherings. All of the 
interviewed imams were born abroad, mostly in Morocco, Algeria, and 
Turkey, but also in West Africa and a few other countries. They fall into two 
main sociological profiles. First there are the ‘imam-workers’, who account 
for approximately a third of the interviewed imams. These immigrants 
came to France in the 1960s and chose the profession of imam because of 
the practical necessity of leading prayers, without being well trained. These 
imams generally practice in small prayer rooms. They originally followed the 
1 http://www.leparisien.fr/societe/drancy-l-imam-qui-dit-non-a-la-burqa-22-01-2010-787034.
php, consulted in August 2014.
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unoff icial route of peer networks, f inally f inding opportunities in French 
mosques. The other two-thirds of the interviewed imams were immigrants 
who had received training in the Islamic sciences in their home countries. 
Some of them had also practiced as imams in their country of origin. They 
are hired and supervised by consular networks in France for periods of four 
years. These imams exercise responsibilities in large mosques where various 
religious, cultural, educational, and other services are offered.
After the end of these investigations, the results of which have been 
published (Sèze 2012, 2013, 2014a), I continued to meet with some of the 
imams, and in some cases with their successors, and have cultivated op-
portunities for informal exchange with other imams. It appears that over 
the past decade, imams have made efforts to communicate their speeches 
in the public space by diverse means, set up websites for mosques, and use 
social networks like Facebook, hosting sites like YouTube, and other media.
The present chapter is structured as follows. The f irst part shows how 
imams in France have gradually come to embody community leadership. 
Since the public expression of Muslim identity is currently a source of dispute 
and sometimes even of struggle, imams tend to position themselves as the 
leaders of an oppressed minority. It is in the light of this observation that 
the second part analyses the ways imams promote or manifest Muslim 
identity in the public space. Generally, during the interviews or in their 
sermons, interactions with the faithful, and public statements, imams 
promote discourses that lie between two poles: denouncing the injustice of 
laws that tend to evict religious expression from public spaces, on one end, 
while not hesitating to denigrate the ‘excessive’ visibility of some Muslims, 
on the other. What remains in the space between these two poles is likely a 
matter of ‘ethical exemplarity’, civic participation, and other exhortations 
inspired by the shahada (‘testimony’) and consistent with many initiatives 
undertaken by Muslim associations since the 1990s, such as interreligious 
meetings, social work, and humanitarian aid. Muslims are therefore called 
upon to appear as such in the public space through actions that will bring 
them recognition. In other words, the imams’ speeches belong to a particular 
moment in the history of the Muslim presence in France, in that they ques-
tion and try to negotiate the position of Muslims in a minority context.
2 Becoming minority leaders
During the institutionalization of Muslim worship in France, imams have 
gradually emerged as congregational leaders whose legitimacy depends 
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largely on their ability to deliver speeches that make sense to all of the faith-
ful. In doing so, they tend to behave like leaders of an oppressed minority. 
The importance of this position for the legitimacy of imams can be observed 
in the criticisms attracted by those who refuse to appear as such.
2.1 Structuring French Muslim leadership
Although Muslim worship in France dates back to the Middle Ages (Renard, 
1999), Islam became a major social phenomenon with the migratory flows 
between 1950 and the 1973 oil crisis. The number of prayer rooms expanded 
signif icantly, especially in hostels for migrant workers such as those built 
by the Société nationale de construction de logements pour les travailleurs 
(Sonacotra; National Company for the Construction of Workers’ Housing) 
in response to the strikes that regularly broke out in the 1970s.2 In 1976 
there were 90 prayer rooms in the country, and by 1980 this number had 
increased to 150 (Legrain, 1986). In the absence of substantial support from 
the countries of origin and from transnational Muslim associations, Muslim 
immigrants themselves had to lead the worship. This was the origin of 
the ‘imam-worker’ – a man appointed as a leader because of the practi-
cal necessity of directing collective prayers, rarely qualif ied in religious 
sciences but endowed with social qualities such as humility, charisma, 
respectability, and notability, all of which gave him a certain pre-eminence 
over his coreligionists.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a new organizational model for worship 
was born. The economic crises caused (in part) by the 1973 oil shock led to 
a review of immigration policies. The massive f lows of immigrants were 
stopped, and family entry was encouraged.3 France’s Muslim population 
was growing in numbers and included women and children; the newcomers 
sometimes had new academic and professional prof iles (Cesari, 1997)4. 
In this context, the visibility of Islam and its management by the authori-
ties, the countries of origin, and transnational Islamic organizations were 
2 Sonacotra is a semi-public company created in 1956 to address the issue of Algerian immigrant 
slums. It began with the construction of the f irst workers’ hostel in 1959 (Argenteuil) and has 
built 450 dwellings to date.
3 The mass regularization of immigrants, easing access to the right of permanent residence (i.e., 
cancellation of the Bonnet Law), suppression of assistance for return, project for a foreigners’ right 
to vote, and establishment of residence permits that are valid for ten years (Law n° 84-622, 1984).
4 Turkish migrants mostly came after North African migrants and often hold more favourable 
professional and economic positions. These policies also lead to the presence of students from 
North Africa who came to France to pursue higher education (Geisser, 2000).
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simultaneously redef ined. Islam became emancipated from workers’ 
hostels and moved into districts where Muslims were concentrated in 
large numbers (Kepel, 1991), and it became more autonomous. At this time 
the development of mosques was based on the initiatives of Muslims who 
formed associations,5 with the help of foreign institutions like the Muslim 
World League; these associations increasingly became the owners of their 
places of worship. This gave rise to ‘mosques’ that were recognized at both 
the legal and institutional levels.
There were 500 Muslim places of worship in France in 1985 and 2,368 
in 2011, including 316 in the French overseas territories, according to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs.6 It is diff icult, however, to provide an exact 
number of imams because of the many forms their leadership can take. 
In some small prayer rooms, for example, it is not uncommon for two or 
three volunteers to share this responsibility, while larger mosques often 
have professional imams (and there are of course many cases that fall in 
between these two). The only reliable census concerns consular network 
imams, who numbered 300 in 2014. The Ministry of Internal Affairs uses a 
‘professional’ definition of an imam, i.e., the one who usually gives sermons. 
Using this def inition, a survey commissioned by the Direction centrale des 
renseignements généraux (Central Directorate of General Intelligence) 
managed to identify 1,026 imams and 1,685 Muslim places of worship in 
2004. This is, of course, less than the actual f igure, which is ultimately 
impossible to rigorously quantify.
In any event, ‘new generation’ imams gradually supplanted the f igure 
of the ‘imam-worker’. A ‘new generation’ imam is rarely trained in France, 
and is more often recruited through Turkish and North African consular 
networks, or through peer networks that feed on the pool of graduates in 
Islamic sciences that are disappointed by the saturated labour market in 
their home country (Roy, 2002). These imams are duly trained in the Islamic 
sciences and considered professionals who work full-time, and are even 
protected by an employment contract and paid by the mosque’s association. 
More than their predecessors, the ‘imam-workers’, these professional imams 
were placed in the position of acting as a community leader. In the absence 
of theological and legal central authorities in a society where Islam is a 
5 This was promoted by the 1981/09/10 Law, which includes associations created by foreigners 
under the law of associations of 1901. This was the end of the law of 1939, which stated that foreigners 
had to obtain permission from the Ministry of Internal Affairs if they wanted to form an association.
6 This census was based on participation in the elections of the Conseil Français du culte 
musulman (French Council of Muslim Worship). http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/
q13/13-15308QE.htm.
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minority religion, they seem to be a point of reference – for the faithful, 
who urge them to def ine acceptable norms in a non-Muslim society; for 
the media, which broadcasts concerns about the ‘Islamic threat’; for Islamic 
organizations, as shown in the ‘Charter of Muslim Worship’ (Boubakeur, 
1995);7 and for the French State, which would like to have them as partners 
working towards the development of a civil religion that would be easy to 
integrate (Peter, 2006).
In the framework of efforts to classify the different kinds of religiosities 
that shape the diversity of Islam in France, imams have often been presented 
as the guardians of what is supposed to be immutable (i.e., Islamic laws 
and rituals), and therefore out of touch with the expectations of young 
Muslims who are trying out different ways to reconcile religious and civic 
identities (Venel, 2004) and who are longing to hear discourses that make 
sense of their own experiences (Babès, 1996, 1997). In her ethnographic 
survey of French mosques, Solenne Jouanneau (2013; see also her chapter 
in Part I) clearly shows that imams de facto have only the authority that the 
faithful give them, circumstantially, and no more. This being the case, the 
institutionalization of Muslim worship in France has progressively led to 
the emergence of community leaders who propose more interactive kinds 
of speeches to keep in touch with their audiences. In the following section, I 
demonstrate that imams hold views that reflect the common denominator 
of their audience, namely the experience of being a minority.
2.2 Internalization of a minority consciousness
The collective feeling of a minority consciousness in France is rooted in 
the ‘making of the Muslim problem’, which dates back to the 1980s and 
is still relevant today (Hajjat and Mohammed, 2013). Debates regarding 
Islam and Muslims are occurring at such a hectic pace that they inevitably 
impact interviews with imams, to the point that my f ield notebook turned 
into a list of grievances. There are also new issues for controversy, which 
are often related to the visibility of Islam. The issue of the hijab has been 
recurring since 1989 due to a series of disputes in which head-teachers 
7 The Charte du culte musulman (Charter of Muslim Worship) is a document written with 
the advice of university scholars, comprising 37 articles on the organization of Islam in France. 
This charter includes the willingness to ‘clericalize’ Muslim worship (such as the appointment 
of muftis at the regional level and the def inition of imams’ roles), based on the Algerian model. 
Although this initiative initially spanned the main Islamic federations of the day, in the end 
it sanctioned the hegemony of the Great Mosque of Paris. Therefore, other Islamic federations 
refused to sign the document.
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refused to allow veiled students into their schools. These disputes were 
f inally ‘settled’ by the 2004 law that banned ‘obvious [in French: ostensibles] 
religious symbols’ (including the veil) at school.8 Still, the issue has remained 
highly controversial, as shown by the ‘Baby Loup case’ (a nursery where 
an employee was dismissed in 2008 because the director considered her 
wearing of the veil to be an infringement of the laws applying the principle 
of secularism). Then the niqāb (‘full-face veil’) was banned by a 2012 law on 
the ‘concealment of the face’ in public spaces.9 Although most imams call 
for laws to be respected, they sometimes state that such laws that ban the 
wearing of religious signs at school specifically target Islam (Sèze, 2013). They 
hold similar views in regard to the ban on ‘concealment of the face’ in public 
spaces (interview, Paris region, May 2014). This feeling is maintained by 
debates about the possibility of veiled mothers accompanying their children 
on school trips, by the imprecations of politicians against Islam, and also 
by the increase in attacks against veiled women (particularly in 2014).10
The same tension is expressed around mosques. While they initially 
blended inconspicuously into the urban landscape, ‘Great mosques’, i.e., 
mosques with explicit if not spectacular architecture, have been on the rise 
since the 2000s.11 This sudden visibility has engendered negative reactions, 
such as graffiti urging Muslims to leave France, insulting letters, and desecra-
tions (Godard, 2015). During a conversation about the many desecrations 
of his mosque, a Moroccan-born imam denounced such acts and described 
society at large as increasingly ‘racist’ (interview, East of France, March 
2014). The ‘street prayer case’ is another example. Although the situation 
is improving, the size of the mosques is insuff icient in some districts, and 
8 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aff ichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977& categorie 
Lien=id.
9 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/aff ichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670.
10 Collectif contre l’islamophobie en France, Annual report, 2014. http://www.islamophobie.
net/sites/default/f iles/CCIF-RAPPORT-2014.pdf.
11 Since the 2000s, the following cities (among others) have been the site of Great Mosque con-
struction (including mosques in service, under construction, and at the planning stage): Alençon, 
Avallon, Amiens, Aubervilliers, Aulnay-sous-Bois, Avignon, Béthune, Blois, Boulogne-Billancourt, 
Bobigny, Bordeaux, Brive-la-Gaillarde, Bussy-Saint-Georges, Caen, Cannes-la-Bocca, Carcassonne, 
Carpentras, Carrières, Cergy, Charleville-Mézières, Choisy-le-Roi, Clamart, Decazeville, Déchy, 
Décines, Épinal, Évreux, Gennevilliers, Grande-Synthe, Grigny, Guéret, Hérouville-Saint-Clair, La 
Réole, La Roche-sur-Yon, Le Havre, Le Mans, Limoges, Lorient, Marseille, Massy, Metz, Mérignac, 
Mons-en-Barœul, Montigny-Lès-Cormeilles, Mulhouse, Nanterre, Nantes, Narbonne, Niort, 
Nogent-le-Rotrou, Orléans, Ostricourt, Paris, Poitiers, Reims, Robertsau, Roubaix, Saint-Louis, 
Saint-Quentin, Sarcelles, Saint-Denis, Saint-Etienne, Saint-Florentin, Sète, Sochaux, Stains, 
Strasbourg, Tours, Toulouse, Ulis, Valence, Vaulx-en-Velin, Vernouillet, Vigneux-sur-Seine, 
Villefranche-de-Rouergue, and Villeneuve d’Ascq.
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on busy days Muslims pray in the streets. These ‘street prayers’ have been 
taking place in Paris since the 1990s, but they suddenly became problematic 
in the winter of 2010, when both far-right leaders and ‘identity groups’ 
initiated a massive campaign in which they denounced what they felt to be 
the illegitimate desire to ostentatiously occupy public space for a religious 
reason. Following the declaration by Marine Le Pen, president of the French 
populist party Front National, that ‘it is not Islam that is the problem, but 
its visibility’,12 another imam (born in Turkey) did not see anything in her 
words that reflected the French principle of laïcité (‘secularism’), but rather 
a ‘hatred of Muslims’ (interview, East of France, January 2014).
In imams’ off ices, therefore, protest flows easily; this feeling of injustice 
feeds the defining of a collective identity. Favourite stories related in imams’ 
speeches include Egypt during the reign of Pharaoh (which was then poly-
theistic), events like the Expedition to Tabuk and the Battle of Badr, and the 
prophet Muhammad’s life in Mecca, during which the early Muslims were 
persecuted. All of these references are presented as foundational experiences 
of a minority status that are useful for making sense of the present at the 
local level, with reference to islamophobic attacks; the national level, with 
reference to the imprecations of politicians who are hostile to Islam and 
laws against veils; and the international level, with reference to armed 
conflicts in the Arab world and Western imperialism (Sèze, 2013). When, 
in addition to debates over the visibility of Islam, the decisions of school 
leaders, mayors, judges, the National Assembly, and the Senate are added 
to the mix, Muslims’ ‘possibility of participating as equals with others in 
social interaction’ (Fraser, 2011, p 54) is challenged. In this sense, French 
Muslims are not only a minority because they are quantitatively fewer; they 
also become a minority because of these structures of power (Asad, 2003) 
and because they internalize the resulting feelings of being dominated 
(Akgönül, 2007). Imams’ sermons express this collective consciousness by 
def ining Muslim identity in opposition to a ‘them’, with Islam becoming 
the ‘religion of the oppressed’13 (Sèze, 2013).
Imams talk to a ‘community of experiences’ in the sense that ‘beyond the 
simple relationship to an inherited identity, it is the experience of discrimina-
tion and social contempt that is the source of a shared sense of unworthiness’ 
(Boubeker, 2011). Reference to Islam was not a component of the collective 
identities of immigrants on their arrival in France in the 1970s, which was 
12 Interview published by Zaman France in April 2013. http://www.zamanfrance.fr/article/
marine-pen-n-est-pas-l-islam-qui-pose-probl-me-visibilit.
13 This expression comes from Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997).
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instead marked by the predominance of Arab nationalism. Following the 
failure of Arab nationalism in the 1980s, however, the countries of origin 
started to include references to Islam in the construction of their collective 
identities, in which Muslim immigrants in France, and today some of their 
children, have reinvested (Cesari, 1997). However, this religious identity is 
also sometimes formulated in terms of race (Asal, 2014), and is now the target 
of both the new European populism and widely disseminated attitudes. 
According to the Institut français d’opinion publique (French Institute for 
Public Opinion) survey in 2012, 43 per cent of the French people interviewed 
said the presence of Muslims was a threat to the identity of their country; 
68 per cent stated that they were poorly or not integrated; 68 per cent said 
that if Muslims were not well integrated it was because they refused to 
integrate; 63 per cent associated Islam with the rejection of Western values, 
57 per cent with fanaticism, 46 per cent with subjugation, and 38 per cent 
with violence; 60 per cent said that the influence and visibility of Islam 
were too great; 68 per cent would have been hostile to the existence of 
political parties or trade unions based on Islam; and 33 per cent would 
have been hostile to the election of a Muslim mayor in their municipality.14 
Imams can hardly evade this reality. Their positions are also linked to the 
collective aspirations that, as leaders, they are required to channel and 
that involve their legitimization. ‘In order to be authenticated [recognized 
as such], the authority must be received by those to whom it is addressed, 
and this “reception” involves the faithful body,’ writes sociologist Danièle 
Hervieu-Léger (2003, p. 289). Manifesting as a minority religion is a way to 
unite a plural audience under one banner. In this context, imams are not 
only congregational leaders, but also minority leaders.
2.3 ‘Corrupted imams from the West’
The authority of an imam can always be subject to dispute, because being 
an imam is an adventitious function that is accessible to ‘lay people’. This 
sometimes makes this kind of authority fragile. It is relatively common for 
imams to face neo-fundamentalist Muslims who challenge their authority, 
and who are in fact intent on contesting and appropriating it15 (Sèze, 2013). 
Faithful support is not always enough to oppose these destabilizing attempts, 
although cooperation with intelligence services (Sèze, 2014a) and the more 
14 Ifop, ‘L’image de l’islam en France’, 2012. http://www.ifop.com/media/poll/2028-1-study_ 
f ile.pdf.
15 Imams’ power, authority, role.
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professional and solid organization of mosques limit the risk that small 
militant groups will try to seize power (Godard, 2015). Yet it is these same 
imams who have the feeling of betraying an oppressed minority and who 
are sometimes the most severely challenged – to the point that they are 
presented by radical groups as ‘corrupted imams from the West’. There are 
two imams in France who are particularly exposed to this rhetoric, albeit 
to different degrees: Tareq Oubrou and Hassen Chalghoumi.
Tareq Oubrou was born in 1959 in Morocco. He came to France to study 
medicine and biology, but quickly dedicated himself to the Muslim com-
munity by taking on the role of imam in several cities before settling at the 
Mosque of Bordeaux. The author of several books and known for holding 
‘liberal’ public positions, he is France’s only imam who has publicly chal-
lenged the obligation to wear the hijab (Oubrou and Lieven, 2012; see also 
Baylocq, Part II, and Hashas, Part I). He argues that the veil is related to a 
‘minor and ambiguous prescription’, and that it is only advisable as part of 
an ethic of decency. The ethic, he argues, has now been lost because the veil 
is sometimes worn with presentations of the self that contradict this value 
(i.e., slinky, provocative clothes), or because it is worn as part of a search 
for ‘oppositional identities’ (Oubrou, 2013) by looking to break from society 
– neither of which conforms to the message originally conveyed by Islam. 
For this reason, Oubrou no longer considers the wearing of the veil to be 
obligatory. He even questions whether it might be a ‘divine [and obligatory] 
requirement’ today (Babès and Oubrou, 2002, p. 216). This position is part 
of his general call for a ‘moderate’ (Oubrou and Lieven, 2012) or ‘discrete’ 
(Oubrou, 2013) visibility of Muslims, in line with what he f irst termed a 
‘sharia minority’ (which consists of adapting Islamic laws to a non-Muslim 
society: Oubrou, 1998, 2004; see Auda in Part I) and that he has continued as 
part of what he calls a ‘theology of acculturation’ (2013). Oubrou tries hard 
to provide a normative framework that will facilitate the easy integration 
of the practice of Islam into the French context – by ‘erasing’ norms that 
are, from a theological point of view, unnecessary sources of blockages. In 
this, however, he has exposed himself to criticism, a signif icant example 
of which comes from the anonymous author of an article posted on the 
website Oumma.com.16 This author f irst criticizes Oubrou’s position on 
the veil for not being consistent with the title of his book An Angry Imam 
(Un imam en colère; with Lieven, 2012), in which Oubrou def ines himself 
as a ‘protester’. The critic further declares that Oubrou’s view leads to the 
16 ‘Tareq Oubrou, l’imam qui veut rendre le foulard et les barbes invisibles’, November 2012. 
http://oumma.com/14717/tareq-oubrou-limam-veut-rendre-foulard-barbes-invisibl.
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‘dehumanization of Muslims’. Another anonymous detractor accuses Oubrou 
of ‘despising’ Muslims and wanting to make them into ‘ghosts’.17 It is not 
Oubrou’s arguments themselves that are discussed by these critics, but rather 
the purpose of his reasoning, because being visible is not automatically 
reducible to a defensive identity reaction; it is also seeking to exist in the 
eyes of the other, sometimes even through reactions of rejection (Monnot 
and Piettre, 2014). Visibility is also an aspect of the social construction of 
the self, as a subject (Honneth, 2013).
The debate aroused by Oubrou’s positions is nowhere near the vast and 
sometimes acrimonious disputes among Muslim associative networks 
concerning Hassen Chalghoumi. Born in 1972 in Tunis, Chalghoumi was 
trained in the Islamic sciences during several stays in different Muslim 
countries. Having arrived in France in 1996, he f irst preached at a workers’ 
hostel, while cultivating a close relationship with the Tablighi Jamaat (a 
pietist and proselytizing movement). In 2008, he was placed at the head of the 
Mosque of Drancy by its mayor Jean-Claude Lagarde (rather than ‘appointed’ 
by his co-religionists); this, in addition to his position in favour of banning the 
niqāb18 (sometimes perceived as discriminatory, particularly among people 
sensitive to the defence of ‘Muslim causes’) and his publicized proximity 
to state bodies and Jewish authorities like the Conseil représentatif des 
institutions juives de France (Representative Council of Jewish Institutions 
in France), and the Union libérale israëlite de France (Liberal Israelite Union 
of France), which awarded him the Copernic Prize for Dialogue, Peace, and 
Brotherhood in 2013, has significantly eroded his legitimacy, especially when 
populist and conspiratorial fantasies had the wind in their sails. The vast 
smear campaign initiated by the sheikh Yassine Collectif (a militant group 
for the defence of Muslims), which demonstrated in his mosque in 2010 and 
disseminated videos supposed to prove his duplicity, has highlighted and 
reinforced the unease generated by Chalghoumi’s commitments. This led to 
his labelling as a ‘state imam’, stigmatized for his alleged lack of loyalty to the 
umma. In June 2012, the Collectif pour la dignité des musulmans (Collective 
for the Dignity of Muslims) wrote an open letter calling upon Chalghoumi 
to resign that was signed by Muslim militants and intellectuals.19 He is 
often repudiated in discussions both inside and outside of the mosques, 
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mass of invectives, insults, and hate he is confronted with. This also led to 
him – involuntarily, obviously – appearing in recruitment videos for jihad 
in Syria20 as one of the ‘corrupted imams from the West’, as well as his 
placement under police protection.
3 Protest speeches in French mosques
Imams’ position is often the basis of protest speeches, which are driven by 
a search for recognition and formulated in socially acceptable categories. 
In sermons, the definition of religious identity is not reducible to dogmatic 
criteria, but is put into perspective through exhortations to ‘exemplary 
ethics’ that invite Muslims to appear in an environment where their identity 
is sometimes belittled. This goes hand-in-hand with frequent exhorta-
tions for their participation in social life, the aim of which is to concretely 
demonstrate this daily exemplarity by assuming the status of full partners 
in social interactions and thereby encouraging Muslims’ full belonging to 
the national community. The following three subsections look at different 
aspects of these developments.
3.1 ‘Exemplarity’ as a logic of engagement
Based on Muslims’ ‘minority consciousness’, there are at least two possible 
horizons (Roy, 2014) of ‘ideal types’ that can be used to identify dynamic 
working commitments in the name of Islam in France, both of which can 
be found in the sometimes-contradictory speeches of imams. The f irst 
possibility is neo-fundamentalism, that is, withdrawal into an identity at 
odds with an environment perceived as pagan; some imams who are close 
to Salaf ism or radical Islam adopt this approach. The second possibility is 
not to break away from mainstream society, but instead try to build bridges. 
Most imams favour this second possibility, and criticize the zeal of some 
young converts who want to socially exalt their religious differences. These 
imams are challenged by the teenagers who choose to wear the veil because 
of an ‘identity crisis’ more than because of virtues (see also Lieven and 
Oubrou, 2012), or they condemn ‘victimizers’ views’ for calling for Muslims 
to be held accountable if they want to see the world change (Sèze, 2013).
20 ‘19HH’, edited by Omar Diaby and available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=GtIDBTkthbo&t=15s
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As it appears in sermons, Muslim identity is not limited to dogmatic 
criteria such as observing fundamental beliefs and obligatory practices. 
Instead, Muslims are also defined as worthy, just, good, fair, honest, tolerant, 
patient, and chaste beings. Religious identity is also made up of ethical 
references; as such, it supposedly becomes audible to the majority. This is 
what imams are aiming at in their appeals to Muslims to embody socially 
attractive behaviours. This purpose is sometimes explicit; indeed, in a 
sermon in September 2014, Tareq Oubrou said ‘you have to be visible in the 
sense of generosity, kindness and dialogue’.21 One mosque director (born 
in 1958 in Morocco, with no training in the Islamic Sciences) urged the 
faithful ‘to remain dignif ied in the face of polemics that disf igure Islam’ 
by never ceasing to present themselves as ‘models for society’ (sermon, 
June 2011). A relatively young imam, born in Algeria, prefers to talk about 
an ‘exemplarity’ that involves acting every day in such a way that Muslim 
identity will be associated with socially valorized behaviours (sermon, June 
2013), while one of his colleagues, a mosque director born in 1958 in Morocco, 
likes to promote the ideas and concepts described by Tariq Ramadan in 
his ‘testimony’ (2003)22 and of the Union des organisations islamiques de 
France (Union of Islamic Organisations of France). Leaders of the Ahmadi23 
minority have issued a ‘call for jihad’ (often translated as ‘holy war’, but in 
this case implying struggle with the ‘pen’ and not the ‘sword’) with exactly 
the same concern of spreading the peaceful message of their ‘community’ 
and ‘mak[ing] the Truth triumph’ over the misrepresentation of the media 
(Sèze, 2015, p. 250-258).24
21 Sermon delivered in September 2014, and consulted on YouTube in August 2015. No longer 
available on the Internet, but the author has saved a copy.
22 According to a classif ication of the world produced by Muslim jurists, France is not part of 
the Muslim countries (Dar al-Islam), but is included either among territories with which Muslim 
countries are at peace (Dar al-ʿAhd) or the territory of war (Dar al-Harb). Tariq Ramadan has 
challenged this division of the world. He states that Muslims are at home in France and suggests 
considering France as part of what he calls a ‘space of testimony’ (Dar al-Shahada). Muslims 
are asked to ‘testify’, i.e., to demonstrate to non-Muslims their values and the greatness of their 
faith, and thus to contribute to their society (Ramadan, 2003).
23 The Ahmadiyya is a reformist and missionary community founded in the late nineteenth 
century in Punjab by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who proclaimed himself Mahdi (guide) of Islam, and 
which has been banned from the umma (Muslim community). Ahmadis have been established 
in France since the 1980s.
24 ‘L’islam en quête de repères: le rôle de la jeunesse islamique Ahmadiyya’: http://www.
islam-ahmadiyya.org/conseils-aux-jeunes-ahmadiyya/95-islam-terrorisme-musulmans-occidents-
intolerance.html (August 2010); http://www.islam-ahmadiyya.org/commuiques-ahmadiyya/394-
appel-au-jihad-lance-par-le-calife-de-la-communaute-islamique-ahmadiyya.html.
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This definition of Islamic identity is, f irst, a self-presentation to the extent 
that it is aimed at an audience. To def ine a Muslim visibility that is not 
disruptive (Göle, 2013), but rather in the register of ‘exemplarity’ in French 
society, also means encouraging a revision of the pejorative meta-discourses 
about Muslims and making them able ‘to relate positively to [their] special 
qualities and [their] practical abilities’ – in other words, to obtain social 
recognition (Honneth, 2006).
3.2 Participation in social life in imams’ speeches
The exhortations to ‘exemplarity’ outlined above are manifested in the col-
lective impetus for participation in social life that is conveyed by a growing 
number of Muslim leaders. The start of the school year, such as those in 
September 2007 and September 2008, presented an opportunity for sermons 
urging young people to achieve academic success and to become influential 
members of their societies (Sèze, 2013). Another sermon from an imam 
born in Morocco glorif ied the value of work and promoted participation 
in unions during a conversation group (personal observations, 2012). One 
of his colleagues, an ‘imam-worker’ born in Algeria, used a sermon about 
alms to encourage solidarity, such as food distribution to the homeless by 
local services (personal observations, 2012), while another imam, born in 
Morocco, encouraged women to achieve academic and professional success 
(using examples of ‘sisters’ becoming doctors and teachers), to ‘get out’ of 
their homes and take part in activities offered by the mosque, and not to 
withdraw from public life, including educational institutions.
Participation in social life also represents a collective commitment. Dur-
ing the French presidential elections of 2007, one mosque director exhorted 
the faithful to what he called ‘positive citizenship’ (sermon, 2007). In concrete 
terms, he meant ‘contribut[ing] to the development and prosperity of their 
society’ by establishing a presence in educational bodies, socio-cultural 
centres, ‘civil society institutions and organizations that defend just causes 
and by participating in all elections’.25 Along the same lines, in a sermon 
before the departmental elections in March 2015 Farid Darouf (imam at the 
Mosque of Montpellier) urged the faithful to vote, saying to his coreligionists: 
‘[y]ou must be present in the ballot box on Sunday. […] You must be active 
citizens. […] You must participate and give value to your citizenship. […] 
You are great people! You are in France! You must express your citizenship 
25 Sermon delivered on 20 April 2007, rendered in full in Sèze, 2013, pp. 159-163.
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with your ballot.’26 Mohammed Khattabi, another imam at the Mosque of 
Montpellier, exclaimed in a sermon early in 2015:
How can French society trust in Muslims if Muslims are disconnected? We 
do not participate in anything! ‘The election is haram! The army is haram!’ 
[…] If we keep this spirit, we are condemned to suffer. […] Either we are 
an integral part of this society [French society], its defence, its stability, 
its integrity, its prosperity, or we are nothing! And if we are nothing, one 
day we will get thrown out! […] It is important for Muslims to be aware of 
this European reality in 2015. […] And believe me, in twenty years’ time, or 
f ifty years’ time, things will change, and Muslims will be recognized as a 
European community and not as people who have come to work, to make 
money and to go back home! All of that is now over!27
Not only imams, but also occasional preachers, dāʿī (pl. duʿāt, ‘itinerant 
speakers’), and mosque directors encourage the faithful to adopt such an 
attitude of engagement in society. Rachid Abou Houdeyfa,28 Mohamed 
Bajraf il,29 Dalil Boubakeur, Hassan Iquioussen,30 Ahmed Mikhtar,31 Tareq 
26 Sermon delivered in March 2015, and consulted on YouTube in August 2015. The sermon is 
no longer available on the Internet, but the author has saved a copy.
27 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zexjARppF3c&feature=share&fb_ref=share.
28 Sermons at the Mosque of Brest: ‘Doit-on voter?’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=qWiZVi3xb6Y); ‘Respecte les non-musulmans’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=ZKGbwMX_kCM); ‘Réagir aux agressions islamophobes’ (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=KF7S7dWpxEY)..
29 A number of lectures and sermons are available on YouTube:
‘L’Islam, citoyenneté et démocratie’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyvtTGdn2x0);
‘Allez voter!’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tr55rEJfx38);
‘Le musulman, citoyen avant tout’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffvVCbfpaMI);
‘Le musulman, un acteur positif dans sa cité’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=15KnQOr9RNw)
30 ‘La France, tu l’aimes ou tu l’améliores’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rek-iOH5BXU);
‘La participation citoyenne: un devoir’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iR8s5Ethubs);
‘Musulman et citoyen’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUCeIAQrlfk);
‘Le rôle de la mosquée dans la société’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nP3J_s2cwtc);
‘La responsabilité individuelle, familiale et sociétale’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=6yvFc7F1fJc);
‘La participation citoyenne à la lumière des textes’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=pTz4FMJIOVA);
to some extent ‘S’engager pour l’islam, une nécessité’ (https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=ef39qkZJydg). 
31 Sermon at the Mosque of Villeneuve d’Ascq: ‘Soyons acteurs pour l’intérêt general’ (December 
2013). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FNxgt6O1smk.
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Oubrou (2013), Dhaou Meskine (Bowen, 2010), Tariq Ramadan (2003, 2009)32 
and others have incorporated participation in social and civic life into their 
speeches to varying degrees, even while they disagree on many other issues; 
being a responsible citizen, voting, f ighting discrimination, acting in the 
public interest, and ‘improving France’ are among the common exhortations 
of Muslim leaders.
Such speeches have a normative character, the f ield of which exceeds the 
framework of worship in the strict meaning of the term. The aim of these 
performances cannot be reduced to a worship-related issue.
The possibility of actors managing to forge a self, a conception of them-
selves in an inter-subjective relationship, and entering into relationships 
of recognition with others depends on their ability to make themselves 
visible, to exist and to be seen and heard. The f irst condition of a relation-
ship of recognition is the ability to exist in a world of speech and action, 
to ‘count’ to others and to contribute thereby to the collective practice. 
(Voirol, 2005, p. 117, my translation)
The aim of such speeches is to concretely demonstrate this daily exemplarity 
by participating in social life, and so to assume, as Muslims, the status of 
full partners in social interactions.
3.3 The issues associated with involvement in city life
The issue of participating in social life is not limited to certain imams’ 
speeches; it is also sustained by initiatives on the part of many mosques. 
From the late 1980s and early 1990s, the organizational processes of Muslim 
worship in France adjusted themselves to their minority condition. This is a 
process common to all Western countries that have experienced recent Mus-
lim immigration – and that is why it has attracted the interest of observers 
in both Western Europe and North America (see Laurence, Part I). In France, 
mosques started offering services that are traditionally entrusted to different 
institutions in Muslim countries (Cesari, 2004), including prayers, religious 
celebrations, births, weddings, and funerals; legal advice; conflict mediation; 
lessons in Arabic and religious courses, often offered on the weekend, for 
children and teenagers, and sometimes also for adults; conferences for both 
young Muslims and more diverse audiences; fun activities such as cultural 
32 See also: ‘Il y a un vrai djihad de la citoyenneté active à mener.’ http://www.lepoint.fr/societe/
tariq-ramadan-il-y-a-un-vrai-djihad-de-la-citoyennete-active-a-mener-27-09-2014-1867221_23.php.
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and sporting events, sometimes organized during school holidays; chaplaincy 
services; and women’s groups which conduct activities for themselves. Far 
from being limited to places of worship, mosque associations are keen to 
respond to the diverse needs of local Muslim communities based on the 
model of immigrant associations. This dynamic has led to the view that 
Muslim communities are organizing themselves based on the pattern of 
Catholic parishes (see in particular Cesari, 2004, pp. 183-205; Étienne, 1989, 
p. 98; Frégosi, 2006, pp. 65-67; and Laurence, Part I).
Yet it must also be noted that this process is the result of many initiatives 
designed to encourage involvement in city life and the development of activi-
ties aimed at a non-Muslim environment. Mosques organize conferences 
where Muslim leaders, scholars, believers, and curious citizens can meet; 
festivities such as iftar meals for breaking the daily fast during Ramadan 
and the celebration of the Mawlid (anniversary of the prophet Muhammad’s 
birth), to which local elected off icials are invited; and events such as ‘open 
days’, which are both social gatherings and places of exchange. Since the 
1990s, Muslim leaders have participated more frequently in religious meet-
ings, the challenge of which is to show that they can also be engaged in the 
initiatives of living together (Lamine, 2005) and in parity with other religions. 
This parity was an explicit issue of debate in September and October 2014 
(Sèze, 2014b) after protests against atrocities perpetrated by the Islamic 
State, as well as following the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. Mosques 
also participate in humanitarian endeavours such as collective donations 
to southern countries in the wake of natural disasters. They have developed 
partnerships with non-governmental organizations such as Islamic Relief 
Worldwide, Muslim Hands France, and Ummah Charity, as well as taking 
part in food distribution during the winter. Some mosque directors have also 
created partnerships with the French Blood Establishment (Établissement 
français du sang) blood bank system. All such practices are a manifestation 
of the faith, and also show the solidarity and ‘public utility’ of Muslims. This 
is the value of their activities in partnership with socio-cultural associations, 
through which Muslim leaders want to lead young people, who are often 
considered an ‘at-risk population’, to both social and religious conformity, 
thus contributing to social peace (Bowen, 2010; Kepel, 2012).
These scattered initiatives on the part of Muslim leaders are not only 
the answer to prosaic and occasional needs. All of them are driven by the 
same concern, namely a desire for recognition. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
this quest brings few results. Imprecations against Muslim leaders remain 
common; indeed, while imams miss a certain ‘openness’, they allegedly 
do not suff iciently condemn the crimes perpetrated in the name of Islam, 
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especially those of the Islamic State, and they make ‘inappropriate’ speeches 
in the French context. All of these efforts therefore seem to remain ‘dead 
letters’. After the French sociologist Vincent Geisser denounced the role 
of the media in the making of a ‘new islamophobia’ (2003), the journalist 
Thomas Deltombe showed how the production of attitudes that involve 
Islam and Muslims still largely escapes them (2007). Hence the efforts of 
Muslim leaders to bring their actions to the attention of the media. Most 
mosques have a website and sometimes a Facebook page that attest to the 
republican values of the association. Mosque leaders are accustomed to 
speaking, mainly in the local media, whenever the opportunity arises – to 
condemn terrorism, for example. They communicate via social networks 
and community websites regarding the events planned by their mosques, 
and sometimes broadcast their sermons on YouTube. While Muslims are 
suspected of ‘communitarianism’ (in the French context, this means forming 
a solidarity group that is disloyal to the French Republic), Muslim leaders 
who urge their faithful to demonstrate ethical exemplarity and increase their 
participation in society intend to confirm that their ‘values and abilities’ 
correspond to those of France (Honneth, 2013). In so doing, they seek to 
legitimize their presence in the public space and more fundamentally 
to have their full belonging to the national community recognized. The 
publicizing of all of these initiatives is part of a ‘struggle for visibility’, 
def ined as the
[s]pecif ic dimension of an action which, starting from an experience of 
invisibility or symbolic depreciation, deploys practical techniques and 
communication processes to manifest in a public scene and have political 
practices or guidelines recognized. (Voirol, 2005, p. 108; my translation)
This public presence thus becomes an additional resource in the quest 
for recognition.
4 Conclusion: Imams as a ‘medium for political 
communication’?
While Muslim worship has been institutionalized and has become more 
autonomous in France, imams have gradually emerged as congregational 
leaders and, in this minority context, also the leaders of an oppressed com-
munity. There are, however, different ways of representing a minority. The 
few studies since the 1990s that have examined sermons note that imams 
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could be part of a political protest that echoed the Algerian civil war (1991-
2002), protect Muslims against temptations in a non-Muslim environment, 
or fall back on casuistry (Babès, 1997; Ismaïl, Chaabaoui, N’Diaye, and Diop, 
2002; Reeber, 1993, 2005; Ternisien, 2002). During that period, the horizons 
of their lives seemed to lie outside of France. There was no question of 
getting involved in it. But the time for ‘withdrawal’ has passed; even Salaf is 
have now entered the processes of acculturation in France (Godard, 2015). 
A new search for recognition has emerged, and this paradigm shift means 
the stakes have changed. The ‘objective conditions’, the fact that material 
resources are distributed in order to guarantee individuals the independence 
and the ability to express themselves, are no longer a serious obstacle to 
‘participation parity’. The challenge is now to act on the ‘inter-subjective 
conditions’, i.e., the institutionalized patterns of interpretation and evalu-
ation that widely deprecate the quality of Muslims and that do not ensure 
equality of opportunity in the pursuit of social esteem (Fraser, 2011). Nancy 
Fraser (2011) considers the denial of recognition to be an injustice that is 
rooted in social relations. She states that the mobilization of imams is 
needed not only to challenge hostile attitudes towards Muslims, but also to 
assert the legitimacy of their presence in the public space and therefore to 
negotiate their place in a minority context. This shift occurs with Muslims 
who understand that France is their ‘national space’ too, and who reject 
the implications of the ‘minorization’ discourse. The dynamism described 
in this chapter reflects the ability of imams – though mostly foreign and 
sometimes untrained – to support Muslims in the challenges they face 
in their struggle for recognition and integration in the French Republic 
(Schnapper, 2007).
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Abstract
This chapter sheds light on a well-regarded French imam of Moroccan 
origins and his growing leadership in society, not only at the local but 
also at the national level. It locates Tareq Oubrou’s unique trajectory 
and discourse within the f ield of contemporary Muslim leadership, and 
examines his key contributions to the institutionalization of Islam in 
France – if not his founding role in the birth of ‘French Islam’. The chapter 
outlines Oubrou’s progressive shift from a conservative understanding 
of Islam in his early twenties to playing a leading role in the theologi-
cal ‘acculturation’ and ‘secularization’ of Islam in France, a process he 
considers necessary and even urgent in light of the growing tensions in 
French society.
Keywords: Islam in France, theology of acculturation, Tareq Oubrou, 
sharia of minorities, secularization
1 Introduction
On 25 February 2015, one-and-a-half months after the 7 and 9 January 2015 
terrorist attacks in Paris led by three French Muslim young adults, the French 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Bernard Cazeneuve, chose to visit the mosques 
of Bordeaux and Cenon in South-Western France to publicly announce the 
creation of a ‘National Dialogue Commission with French Islam’ (Instance 
nationale de dialogue avec l’islam de France). This commission gathered 
for the f irst time on 15 June 2015, and aims to supplement the work of the 
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existing Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM), a representative body 
of the main Islamic federations in France, created in 2003, by dialoguing 
more broadly with French Muslims in order to tackle pressing issues such 
as imam training, countering islamophobia and radicalism, searching for 
solutions to the lack of mosques in certain parts of the country, or facilitating 
the organization of religious feasts. This was a new turn for France. By 
making such an important announcement in those particular mosques, 
the French Minister of Internal Affairs might have been suggesting that 
the local clergy there are good examples of Republic-compliant imams.
A renowned imam leads the f irst mosque, which was visited by Minis-
ter Bernard Cazeneuve in Bordeaux. For almost a quarter century, Tareq 
Oubrou has been acting as El Huda Mosque’s main imam and rector. Its 
representatives commonly refer to it as the ‘Mosque of Bordeaux’ to foster 
its local rooting and facilitate its symbolic appropriation by the non-Muslim 
neighbourhood. This mosque was established in 1982 in a former wood 
factory in Bordeaux. Born in 1959 in Taroudant, Morocco, Oubrou has been 
recognized as a local and national f igure – if not role model – in the French 
imamate. Oubrou progressively shifted from holding a conservative, if not 
rejectionist, understanding of Islam in his early twenties to playing a leading 
role in the theological ‘acculturation’ and even assumed ‘secularization’ of 
Islam in France – a process he has deemed necessary and even urgent in 
light of growing tensions and conflicts. The second mosque visited by the 
Minister is located in Cenon, a popular neighbourhood facing the wealthy 
city of Bordeaux on the other side of the Garonne River where a signif icant 
number of North African migrants settled during the 1970s and 1980s. Like 
the El Huda Mosque, it is owned and run by the Fédération musulmane de la 
Gironde (FMG), the former Association des musulmans de la Gironde (AMG), 
which changed its name in 2010 as a result of a clash between the followers of 
Oubrou and his local opponents. The French-Mauritanian cleric Mahmoud 
Doua, Oubrou’s closest disciple, is the imam in chief at this mosque.
In this chapter, I locate imam Tareq Oubrou’s unique trajectory and 
discourses within the f ield of contemporary Muslim leadership in France 
and examine his key contributions to the institutionalization of Islam in 
France, if not his founding role in the birth of ‘French Islam’.
2 Biographical elements and pastoral trajectory
His father, who was the director of an elementary school, and his mother, who 
taught French in the same school, brought up Tareq Oubrou in Taroudant. 
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As a result, ‘books have always been part of [his] environment’ (interview 
with Oubrou, Bordeaux, March 2003). While Taroudant is known for training 
Maliki clerics, nothing in Oubrou’s early life predestined his later embrace 
of a clerical vocation. His father was ‘not deeply religious’ (ibid.), and his 
mother wanted him to become a physician, certainly not an imam. In fact, 
they would even consider his current profession to be a social disgrace, as 
his migration to France was initially in the pursuit of higher education.
Oubrou left Morocco at the age of nineteen and settled in Bordeaux in the 
South of France, where he studied biology and medicine. It was in Bordeaux 
that Tareq Oubrou experienced what he called ‘the encounter with God, 
a mystical experience’ (interview, Bordeaux, March 2003), which would 
radically transform his life and change his trajectory. At that time (in the 
early 1980s), Islamic organizations were not yet well established or were 
about to emerge in France. Local Muslim communities mostly consisted of 
North- and West-African migrant workers, some French Muslims born in 
France, and students who mostly came from North Africa (such as Oubrou), 
Lebanon, and Syria. At that time, Muslims living in France lacked clerics 
who could lead the prayers and provide basic teachings about Islam. It is in 
this context that Oubrou began his journey in the imamate, moving from 
Bordeaux (1980-1982) to Pau (1983-1986), Nantes (1986-1987), and Limoges 
(1987-1992), and eventually returning to Bordeaux to take up a position as 
the resident imam at El Huda Mosque. Beginning as the imam in charge of 
leading the prayers, he became an imām al-aṭfāl (‘imam for kids’), and then 
served as the imām khaṭīb (‘sermon imam’). Eventually he became the main 
f igure of the local Muslim community, and started to provide legal consulta-
tions (Baylocq, 2008), courses, and conferences on traditional disciplines 
such as the general approach to the Quran (rather than tafsīr), elements 
of fiqh, and kalām (‘Islamic theology’), in addition to his continued role in 
preaching and leading prayers. Furthermore, he increased the realms of own 
expertise to encompass Islam and secularism, the sharia of minorities, and 
the theology of acculturation/secularization. Following Frégosi’s typology 
(2004), Oubrou combined at least three functions that are usually divided 
among distinct clerics: imam, jurist, and lecturer.
Oubrou’s work has received little attention in the academic community 
(Bowen, 2004; Caeiro, 2006; more broadly, Hashas, 2014; Sèze, 2013). While 
these studies shed much-needed light on his intellectual project, it is 
important to note that the practical and theological aspects of Oubrou’s 
activity are inseparably intertwined, as we will see below.
From the beginning of the 2000s, Oubrou became involved in the broader 
local landscape: participating in interfaith dialogs, organizing conferences 
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outside the mosque, engaging in debates with academics, and participating 
in institutional meetings, most notably with Alain Juppé, the mayor of 
Bordeaux since 1995 who later became a Minister. Since late 2009, Oubrou 
regularly gives interviews to newspapers and frequently participates in 
media programmes, particularly on the radio station France Culture and a 
weekly programme on Islam that is broadcast by the state-funded television 
channel France2. He has become increasingly regarded as the articulate, 
outspoken, and moderate Muslim interlocutor that non-Muslim audiences 
were looking for.
Apart from these public activities, most of his time remains dedicated 
to his function as the imam of the Bordeaux mosque. There, he has imple-
mented bilingual sermons in French and Arabic and was the f irst in France 
to designate a room for Muslim women on the same floor as men (at the 
back of the ground floor, their space being differentiated by a small step of 
about 30 centimetres). Yet, his lay involvement beyond the strict borders 
of the Muslim community has brought scathing criticism from his local 
opponents. He has been particularly accused of being more oriented ‘toward 
the outside’ than towards the needs of his Muslim fellows, as well as being 
‘compromised’ by his activities in the political f ield. These allegations and 
tensions eventually led to clashes with threats and rushes in 2010 inside the 
Association des musulmans de la Gironde (AMG) – an organization related 
to the Union des organisation islamiques de France (UOIF), which is usually 
considered an avatar of the Muslim Brotherhood. Jawad Rhaouti, a teacher 
of mathematics and former president of AMG, wanted to wrest control of 
this local institution from Oubrou and his followers, whom he accused of 
not doing enough for the community and for abusing the money collected 
as zakat. Oubrou and his coalition took the case to court and won the right 
to continue leading the organization.
But Oubrou’s personal and social trajectory has not always been a success 
story. Until his return to Bordeaux ten years after beginning his clerical 
career there, he endured social hardship: ‘I was a homeless imam without 
even realizing it’, as it was at that time ‘considered normal for an imam to 
work for free’ and an honour to hold that position (Oubrou, 2009, p. 27). 
The poor socio-economic conditions of Muslim communities in France at 
the time should not be overlooked, a situation exacerbated by the fact that 
French law forbids the public funding of religions (the 1905 law on ‘the separa-
tion between the Churches and the State’). Oubrou would regularly sleep in 
mosques or, at best, in a flat provided to him by one of his coreligionists. A 
number of French Muslim activists from the 1980s and 1990s acknowledge 
the challenges he faced and the poor social conditions he experienced during 
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this period. While some of these activists did not share his liberal opinions, 
they kept his past experiences in mind and did not reject him, unlike the 
new generation of the French Muslim Brotherhood and, more notably, the 
Salaf is. Oubrou therefore gained his religious legitimacy through acting 
directly in the French Muslim f ield before he started thinking and making 
theological propositions.
Yet a symbolic element could also explain Oubrou’s current place in 
the French Muslim f ield. David Henning Fluharty has established the 
conditions that lead to the advent of a charismatic religious leader: ‘The 
charismatic leader f inds the living conditions of certain people objection-
able and seeks modif ication of their conditions’ (1990, p. 63). Fluharty 
then draws on the f igure of the Zaddik (‘exemplary men of good acts’ in 
the Hebraic tradition) as a paradigm for understanding what constitutes 
religious charisma:
In general terms, prior to becoming recognized by many people, the 
potential charismatic leader must become aware of the earthly conditions, 
the good and the bad, and commit himself to improve – for his people 
or tribe – those conditions he f inds objectionable. (Fluharty, 1990, p. 63)
While Oubrou eventually came to be widely recognized at the state-
institutional level for his reformist approach towards Islam in a secular 
context, his legitimacy as an engaged imam at the grass-roots level preceded 
this recognition. This partly explains why he allows himself to be provoca-
tive about sensitive issues within the Muslim community such as the veil 
or minarets. Accordingly, one of the reasons for Oubrou’s founding of the 
Association des Imams de France (The Association of imams in France) in 
the 1990s was to tackle the social issues faced by imams in France and to 
foster collective discussions on imam training. Yet, he deliberately kept this 
association quiet to avoid competition with the Chateau Chinon Institute 
for Human Sciences – an imam-training institute associated with the Union 
des organisations islamiques de France, believed to be the French branch of 
the Muslim Brotherhood – and with Dar al-Fatwa (Interview, November 14th) 
the religious theological body from the same organization – even though 
these two institutions had failed to address the issue of the socio-economic 
status of imams in France or to establish themselves as the uncontested 
religious authorities in the country.
Oubrou positions himself not only on theological matters but also at the 
crossroad of different areas of knowledge. For instance, in a conference 
organized in 2014 he characterized postmodernity as follows: the advent of 
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‘technics’, ‘emotions’, and ‘tensions’.1 Ongoing secularization has generated 
a religious backlash, and modern imams must according to him, carefully 
handle this process by issuing relevant religious fatwas that will not exac-
erbate social, religious, and intercultural tensions. In Oubrou’s view, one 
cannot frame sermons and disseminate religious opinions in abstracto or 
by referring to the ninth- and tenth-century ‘episteme’ (that is, the classical 
founding period of the traditional Islamic schools of law), as he likes to 
phrase it in a Foucaldian fashion. One should rather use the term of what 
he calls ‘proximal theology’. He therefore advocates the advent of Islamic 
scholars who are both cālimūn bi-l-caṣr wa cālimūn bi-l-sharīca (scholars of 
contemporary times and of Islamic law), by which he means that European 
imams of the twenty-f irst century should be knowledgeable in both the 
profane and religious sciences and should apply their profane knowledge to 
the interpretation of their religious traditions. While Mohammad Arkoun 
(1984) dreamed about a secular and deconstructionist approach – which 
would hardly be followed by a large section of observant Muslims – Oubrou 
wishes to accomplish this goal from the inside, that is from the inner circle of 
observant Muslims and through the use of traditional disciplines such as fiqh.
3 Classical Ikhwanis discourse from the 1980s
Oubrou did not always hold reformist and ‘liberal’ views, however. In an 
old video f irst released by a local member of the Muslim Brotherhood and 
circulated in 2007 by a far-right website through the Google Video online 
platform, we can see and hear Oubrou debiting the all-encompassing 
‘conspirationnist’ and hegemonic themes consistent with classical radical 
Islamist thought of the 1970s-1980s.2 Examples of his comments in this video 
are the following: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who abolished the last Islamic 
Caliphate, is ‘in reality a Jew disguised as a Muslim’; anti-Western statements 
and moral panic discourse about ‘the decadency of moral values in Western 
1 ‘L’Islam est-il sécularisable? Une approche à travers le concept de furūqyyia’, 9 October 2014, 
‘The people, the State and Politics in the Mediterranean. Between Islam and Secularization?’ 
colloquium organized by the Center Jacques Berque for the Study of Human and Social Sciences 
(CNRS USR 3136), the Institut Français in Morocco, and Mundiapolis University, under the 
supervision of the author.
2 Available at: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1y9qq_hasan-al-banna-conference-en-
franca_news (the other links are indicated at the bottom of this link). The video is presented 
as having been recorded at the beginning of the 1990s, but it is possible that it was recorded in 
the late 1980s, when Oubrou was about 27 years old.
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societies’; and assertions that the truth comes only from Islam and that what 
comes from the outside is ‘misguiding’. He further states that ‘the umma was 
in an illegal situation, I would even say in a sinful situation as the caliphate 
is an obligation’. He dwells upon an apology of the founding father of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, whom Oubrou used to consider a 
‘saint’ and even to have abilities similar to those of the prophet Muhammad 
in shaping human behaviours. He then develops the usual Islamist holistic 
conception of Islam as regulating every aspect of life, which is a leitmotiv in 
Islamist organizations and political parties (see, notably, Pontif icio Istituto 
di Studi Arabi e d’Islamistica, 1981-1982; and Tibi, 2014, pp. 259-260).
Oubrou quite visibly no longer holds these views. When questioned about 
this early period, he stated that this logiciel islamiste (‘islamist hardware’) 
had wasted his time, and that he now urges young French Muslims to refrain 
from similar wasted efforts.
4 Oubrou’s key theological concepts
At the beginning of the new century when Oubrou f irst started to introduce 
reformist views on Islam into the public debate, he was initially reluctant 
to use the term ‘adaptation’, or even ‘reformation’, instead choosing to talk 
about ‘revisiting’ the tradition. However, he progressively took up those 
terms (adaptation and reformation) to def ine his work and, since 2010, has 
even bypassed them by forging a notion of the ‘theology of acculturation’ 
and stressing the need for a ‘secularization of Islam’ in the contemporary 
French and European contexts. Later, he even used the term ‘endogenous’ 
to refer to the much-needed separation between politics and/or traditional 
Arabic culture on one hand, and Islam as a faith and spirituality on the other 
hand (lecture, Casablanca, 2014). His book on this matter is still pending; 
he has spoken of its publication but it is not yet released. In addition to my 
own enquiry (Baylocq, 2008), the originality of Oubrou’s theological and 
canonical reflections have been noted by several scholars (Bowen, 2004; 
Caeiro, 2006; Hashas, 2014). The following sections discuss some of the 
core theological principles through which he approaches Islamic sources.
4.1 General hermeneutical approach towards the Quran
To better understand Oubrou’s approach towards traditional Islamic sources 
in contemporary contexts, it is crucial to stress his attempt to distinguish the 
content of revelation that is dedicated to the f irst receptors of the message 
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– that is, the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula in the seventh century – from 
the Quranic content that is dedicated to humanity as a whole. This distinction 
is fundamental: here lies the major divide between Oubrou and tradition-
alist trends such as classical Ikhwanis or Salaf is, who decline to apply a 
hierarchical reading of the verses of the Quran. Oubrou aims at qualitatively 
distinguishing two levels of Quranic discourses from those delivered by 
God to humanity through its f irst Arab recipients. Accordingly, his return 
to foundational principles is a literalist one. In this regard, Oubrou is not 
thoroughly innovative, as classical traditionalists have already forged the 
notion of asbāb al-nuzūl (‘the circumstances of revelation’) to determine the 
specif ic historical and political circumstances under which each verse was 
revealed. But Oubrou has articulated a more extensive concept than asbāb al-
nuzūl; instead, he speaks of ‘the Quranic moment’. This particular ‘moment’ 
requires reflecting upon the whole anthropological, cultural, socio-economic, 
and political living conditions of the Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula 
at that time. Oubrou’s key idea is that God not only delivered a universal 
message, but also took into consideration the cultural reality of the time of 
the revelation. This is a recurrent view that Oubrou often expresses during 
sermons, courses of Islamic theology, and public talks, notably through the 
sentence: ‘The fact that God took into account the context of the revelation 
does not mean he canonized it’ (interview, Bordeaux, August 2007). Here 
lies a subtle indication of the ‘divine intention’, which Oubrou uses to offer a 
paradigm for organizing, classifying, and giving a hierarchical structure to 
the vast normative material provided by the Quran. Without this paradigm, 
Oubrou asserts, the divine words become unintelligible and lead a lot of 
young Muslims to misguided behaviours in the contemporary world.
To put it differently, to be understood and obeyed by the f irst recipients 
of his divine message, God had to take into account the anthropological 
background of Bedouin society (Oubrou, 2006b, pp. 66-70).3 Oubrou considers 
this a token of God’s great wisdom, as it would ease the reception of his 
message. If the revelation intended to transform the seventh-century Arab 
pagan context and to challenge Judaism and Christianity (while accepting 
them as part of its own genesis), it did not aim at radically revolutionizing 
this context, in Oubrou’s views. God would not have intended to implement 
a brutal rupture through his revelation and take the risk of his prophet being 
definitively misunderstood, as other prophets had been before him. In this 
3 See our English translation of ‘A brief historical overview of the birth of Islamic theology, 
its adaptation and formalization’, translated from Oubrou, 2006b, and published as an annex 
of an interview with the imam at http://iqbal.hypotheses.org/842 (March 2013).
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regard, relying on Ibn Taymiyyah, Oubrou says that God and his prophet 
applied a universal paradigm of ease of religion for people, based on the 
verse: ‘Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship’ 
(Quran 2:185). In Oubrou’s views, this indicates ‘the divine pedagogy’, a 
closely related concept that he often stresses. Muslim individuals are urged 
to be inspired by this gradual perspective in relation to their faith. God is 
the omniscient and omnipotent and could have imposed everything at once 
if he wanted to, and yet he did not. For Oubrou, this attitude is exemplif ied 
by the fact that God did not abolish slavery, even though he is ‘the most 
merciful’. Abolishing slavery would have imperilled the whole economic 
system of the Arabs from the Peninsula at the time. But he did open up a 
possibility for enslaved people to be freed. Building on key principles of 
late Mu‘tazili thought, Oubrou stresses that God allowed human beings 
to make use of their autonomy of judgment and reason. This also helps 
in accounting for what can appear to contemporary believers as an abuse 
(slavery) that is tolerated by the Quran. This hermeneutical paradigm, i.e., 
‘The fact that God took into account the context of the revelation does not 
mean he canonized it’, predicated upon the contextualization of the sacred 
words of God (whether in their original context or in the contemporary 
context), constitutes a starting point for Oubrou’s thought, rather than 
an all-encompassing and static theology. Consequently, Oubrou asserts 
that ‘Islam must be disentangled (désenveloppé) from the Arab culture of 
the Quranic moment (la culture du moment coranique)’,4 which has been 
canonized together with the core tenets of revelation – that is, the revealed 
universal principles that are applicable to all times. This step aims at subtly 
differentiating the intangible parts of the divine message from the contextual 
and cultural circumstances of the Arab Peninsula in the seventh century. 
Ultimately, this désenveloppage (‘disentanglement’) process of Islam from 
its ancient cultural pellicle needs to go further: the core Islamic intangible 
values and principles should be réenveloppé (‘re-entangled’) into the local 
contemporary culture in which Muslims are living (in this case, France).
In short, it is necessary to return to the sources to discriminate what has 
been incorporated into the discursive vehicle of Islam, its traditional con-
struction that is closely intertwined with specif ic historical circumstances, 
to better highlight the intangible and universal aspects of the divine message. 
Thus, this return to the sources does not intend at all following the literal 
4 This idea was f irst articulated at the Congress of the former Association des Musulmans de 
la Gironde (AMG), ‘Espace Marx’, in Bordeaux, 5 March 2003, and then reiterated during several 
public occasions and further developed in an interview with the author in October 2006.
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behaviour of the prophet like Salafis do. This line of thought would eventually 
lead Oubrou to advocate an ‘acculturation of Islam’ into Europe in general 
and France in particular. Such an ‘acculturation’ implies that Islam would 
be peacefully integrated into new cultural contexts and thus more easily 
accepted, and would also be transmissible within new contexts as ‘there is 
no transmission of religion without culture’ (interview, Bordeaux, June 2009).
4.2 ‘Sharia of minorities’
Though ‘sharia’ has become a rather worrisome term, in Oubrou’s thought 
it does not involve the all-encompassing meaning usually found in tradi-
tional Muslim jurists’ def initions or in classical discourses of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Pakistani scholar Muhammad Khalid Masud, who is both 
traditionally and academically trained, framed the problem with classical 
hegemonic views of sharia in the following way:
Muslim jurists in the past were quite aware of the constant need to rec-
oncile contradictions between social and legal norms. They continuously 
adjusted laws to bring them in line with the customs and norms of the 
people. The normative basis of the institutions and concepts such as family, 
property, rights, responsibility, criminality, civil obedience, social order, 
religiosity, international relations, war, peace, and citizenship have changed 
signif icantly over the last two centuries. The weakness of the traditional 
construction of the sharia in meeting social expectations stresses the need 
for a fresh quest for the normative basis. Consequently, Muslim views on 
the position of sharia in Muslim polity have become increasingly polarized 
between secularist and traditionalist viewpoints. (Masud, 2001, pp. 4-5)
In other words, Muslim thinkers should not replicate classical representations 
of sharia in a non-Muslim, secular country. Sharia cannot substitute for French 
secular positive law since, as Oubrou argues, ‘The judgment of the judge is the 
only broadsword imposed upon people’ (AMG Congress, Bordeaux, March 
2003). Oubrou considers this situation as an opportunity and intellectual chal-
lenge, rather than a constraint. A key notion he has been keen on propounding 
is sharia de minorité (‘sharia of minority’). In his own words, Oubrou aims
to draw the canonical basis for a canonico-legal Islam, that is to say 
conform to a sharia thought and elaborate it in the global French juridical 
and constitutional context. The goal is to realize a double conformity to 
sharia’s canon and to the law of the Republic, showing there is neither 
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antimony nor fracture between Islam and its secular context. This vision 
of sharia is dominated by an ‘ethic of conciliation’, oriented by the concern 
of Islam as a religion and spirituality totally integrated into the French 
reality. (Oubrou, 2006b, p. 420)
The term ‘sharia of minority’ refers to a revised version of Islamic normativity 
that is available for the use of a minority and operates at the individual level. 
A Muslim minority must refrain from challenging the current (secular) laws 
of the society it lives in.
Oubrou stresses that his thought is influenced by the reality of French 
Muslims and his day-to-day activity as an imam, rather than the reverse. This 
is what he refers to as a théologie proximale (‘proximal theology’) as men-
tioned earlier, a theology as close as possible to the people and their context. 
The outcomes of his canonical and theological reflections, themselves based 
on his observations and practices as an imam, are then worked back into his 
pastoral activity. For instance, he has created four types of legal responses 
(fatwas) to concrete problems and questions raised by French Muslims 
during his legal consultations: (1) ‘the positive fatwa by articulation’, the most 
simple type of fatwa, which is directly related to a formal, unambiguous, 
and available legal Islamic content and therefore generating an ‘automatic 
enunciation’, a quite direct answer; (2) the ‘positive common fatwa’, which 
appraises the general level of practice of the worshiper so that the fatwa will 
not destabilize his social life; (3) ‘the positive situational or individualized 
fatwa’, which is a biodegradable fatwa that should only be used in that one 
particular situation by the individual who requested it; and (4) ‘the canonical 
mutism’ or ‘silence’. Response (4) is the most original: Oubrou theorizes 
the necessity for a mufti to sometimes keep silent to avoid disrupting the 
daily life of a fellow Muslim with non-adapted and unnecessary norms (see 
Oubrou, 2004, pp. 205-230, for this typology and Baylocq, 2008). Through this 
innovative attitude, he deliberately aims at tackling the ‘normative cancer’ 
(interview, Bordeaux, November 2006) that is often propagated within his 
community; this would eventually lead to the ‘contraction of the domain 
of sharia’ (to echo Abdolkarim Soroush’s concept).
Applying Andrew March’s model of ‘Theocrats living under secular law’, 
Oubrou’s work would more or less fall under the ‘Thicker Social Contract 
Model, or Overlapping Consensus’ category, def ined as ‘a doctrine of af-
f irming the substantive justness or legitimacy of a politico-legal system not 
based on one’s own theocratic doctrine, but without abandoning, dissolving 
or moving beyond the terms of that theocratic doctrine’ (March, 2011, p. 32) 
– although probably in a more secular-friendly fashion.
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4.3 Toward a theology of acculturation/secularization
The notion of a ‘sharia of minority’ has attracted the attention of a number 
of scholars (Bowen, 2004; Caeiro, 2006; Hashas, 2014), as it is the f irst serious 
European attempt to provide a solid theoretical foundation for the practices 
of and discourses on Islam in European secular contexts. Sheikh Fayçal 
Mawlawi, with whom Oubrou was acquainted in the mid-1980s (when the 
Lebanese scholar was the guide of the Union des organisations islamiques 
de France), was more circumspect in using the classical tool of the fiqh 
al-aqalliyyāt. Yet Mawlawi was the f irst to pave the way for an adaptation 
of Islamic normativity in line with the new European landscape at the 
theological and canonical levels; Oubrou also stresses the need to adapt 
discourses and practices.
In Oubrou’s view, the culture and political philosophy of the majoritarian 
‘host’ society must be taken into account by Muslim jurists and second-
generation, French-born Muslims, who are likely to adopt and adapt a version 
of Islam forged in their parent’s homelands or in Saudi Arabia (through the 
influence of cassette sermons; the Internet, particularly sermons on YouTube; 
Wahhabi books translated into French; Arab satellite television channels; 
and the like). In this regard, a footnote in his 2006b book arouses some 
interest. This quote is significant as it reveals Oubrou’s subversive reading of 
Islamic history (here, of the Al-Andalus period) vis-à-vis Muslim apologists 
and even the majority of his community. By contrast, we can discern the 
kind of acculturation processes he advocates for Muslims living in Europe:
Islam did not invariably succeed in integrating into other cultures. Despite 
eight centuries in Spain, Muslims did not integrate themselves definitively. 
They stayed culturally self ish, anthropologically Arab-Berbers, linguisti-
cally Arabs, and ethnically community-based. The so-called model of 
Andalusian Islam, often depicted as a historical success, should not be 
considered as such. It is more to be considered a failure to be meditated 
upon. This presence, we admit, contributed to the progress of the West. It 
even indirectly contributed to the advent of the Enlightenment, thanks to 
its intellectual and scientif ic contribution, but at the same time it partici-
pated in energizing a hostile Christianity – which was not originally so – that 
expulsed it from Europe as a result. On the contrary, Islam succeeded in 
settling definitely in other civilizations and linguistic areas where it was 
acculturated and consequently still exists nowadays… Of course, Christian 
fanaticism played an important role in this rejection of Islam in Spain 
because, after the Reconquista, Christians were not as tolerant as the 
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Muslims had been when they conquered Spain. But we did not mention this 
aspect in our critique because it is not directly related to our issue, dealing 
only with intrinsic factors of adaptation. (Oubrou, 2006b, p. 70, my italics)
As a consequence of this failure, Islam as a civilization collapsed while 
Islam as a religion survived. It has to borrow from the civilization or local 
culture in which Muslims are settled (in this case, Europe), if they wish to 
deep-root their religious belonging and make it accepted (rather than only 
‘tolerated’). Moreover, this process represents for Oubrou the only chance 
for Islam to be transmitted, disseminated, and reproduced.
Oubrou outlines one f inal step after the reconciliation of cultural and 
religious belongings: Muslims should seize the opportunity of living as a 
minority in a secular state to modify their episteme and adjust their approach 
to their religion. He remains aware of the fact that the current historical 
phases experienced by the Arab world (before the 2011 Arab Spring, at least) 
do not facilitate this project of reappraisal. Thus, the next and f inal phase 
of his theological project is to initiate a process of secularization that will 
ultimately end in merging the secular and the religious. Yet this process 
must be conducted within Islamic categories to be valid and fully accepted. 
Oubrou certainly anticipates that a ‘savage secularization’ would lead to a 
severe backlash. He is thus very careful in this project:
What I mean by ‘intrinsic theological secularization’ is a secularization 
that does not leave Islam. It remains fully intra-Islamic, in the sense 
of a relation of discernment and distinction between the sacred and 
the profane, the divine and the human, whose repertoires could join 
as well as depart from one another. It seems necessary in particular to 
distinguish the permanent matters from the temporary in the Quran and 
the Sunna. In this perspective, secularization is the result of interactions 
between different dimensions of Islam – notably between the theological 
and canonical, the metaphysical dogmatic and the practical sharia – in 
historical and anthropological conditions, which determine its shape 
and scope. Thus, it allows a perpetual renewal of Islam by a conscious, 
perspicuous, and humble interpenetration able to sort immutable divine 
principles from circumscribed thought. (Oubrou, 2006b, p. 102)
Here are the lineaments of an adaptation, a reformation of the traditional 
concept of sharia in the light of secularization, but still relying on the main 
Islamic ethical views and the maqāsid al-sharīca perspective, using fiqh rather 
than a completely secular approach such as those developed by modernist 
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intellectuals like Malek Chebel, Abdenour Bidar, or Abdelmajid Charfi. The 
notion of ‘sharia of minority’ appears to be the first step toward the notion of 
a ‘theology of acculturation, which goes much further. The latter notion, as we 
have just seen above has the ambition to be the blueprint for a harmonious 
integration of Islam in the abode of secularism (i.e. France). It could thus be 
the occasion for a new case study once the present imam and theologian would 
have developed this notion in the future whether in publications, conferences, 
courses or sermons. In an anthropological perspective, the reception of this 
work among Muslim groups also promises to be an interesting point to work on5
5 Conclusion: Pursuing liberal reform in a time of tensions 
and violence
To understand Oubrou’s positions on sensitive issues that have arisen in 
the French public debate, such as the veil or minarets, one must locate 
them in his broader theological project. Regarding the veil, he claims that 
a hierarchization of norms and practices is required in Islam. The veil, he 
f irst recalls, has not to be confused with al-‘ibādāt (‘the ritual norms’), 
as it instead pertains to the domain of al-akhlāq (‘the moral norms’). He 
is therefore highly critical of his coreligionists erecting this practice as a 
symbol, even as ‘a flag of Islam’ (interview, Bordeaux, May 2009). This position 
has caused him trouble with the French Muslim Brotherhood, up to the 
point that he was about to be expelled from the UOIF – particularly after an 
interview released in the newspaper Le Monde on 16 October 2009, in which 
he declared: ‘If I were to be provocative, I would tell women: Put your veil 
in your pocket! Today I would rather say it is an implicit recommendation, 
which corresponds to an ethical modesty from the Quranic moment. Yet, 
women who do not wear a hijab do not commit a sin.’ Less than a year after 
this statement, his disciple Mahmoud Doua, the imam of Cenon, organized a 
meeting at the Mosque of Bordeaux (14 June 2010) for Oubrou to theologically 
address the problem of the hijab. He developed his views on the hijab during 
a three-hour conference, facing some f ifty local Muslims, more than half 
of whom were women. The transcript of this lecture runs to eight pages.
5 He has not written extensively on that particular question since, but has developed the 
idea on different occasions: Oubrou Tareq, ‘La sécularisation de l’Islam à travers la charia de 
minorité’, Conference at the International Summer School of Anthropology (5th edition), Irissary 
(French Basque Country), July 2010 (dir. Pierre Bidart and Abel Kouvouama), and ‘L’Islam est-il 
sécularisable? Une approche à travers le concept de furuqiyya’, October 2014, op.cit.
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As for minarets, the question is even easier to solve, as there is ‘no canoni-
cal obligation (for a mosque) to display a minaret’ (interview, March 2009). 
As a result, the new mosque project in Bordeaux, although bigger and more 
accessible through providing parking facilities, does not display a minaret. 
Coherent with his conception of acculturation and integration, he oriented 
the architect of the future mosque toward a locally embedded and modern 
style of architecture, stressing at the same time the fact that the building 
must be identif iable as a mosque from the outside, as the processes of 
integration and acceptance must be reciprocal, in his view.
This positioning on matters relating to the question of Islamic visibility – 
which Oubrou wishes to be ‘discrete’ (Le Monde, October 2013) – in a secular 
public sphere must be read in relation to his ambition of progressively 
facilitating a peaceful and harmonious integration of Islam in France at a 
time characterized by conflicts (which Hashas examines as a ‘Geotheology’, 
2014). In addition to this reformist project, he is committed to forming a 
theological and canonical perspective – in which one might also hypothesize 
that there is some influence from his Sufi orientation, an aspect that would 
require a separate inquiry.
In the aftermath of the Paris attacks in January 2015, the UOIF (with 
which he is aff iliated) announced the creation of a Muslim Theological 
Council of France (Conseil théologique musulman de France, CTMF). It will 
be interesting to observe whether this structure will operate as a ‘driving 
belt’ of Oubrou’s current line of thought, or if the conservative trend in UOIF 
will have the upper hand. The series of attacks in downtown Paris on Friday, 
13 November 2015 illustrated the ever more urgent need for the propagation 
of a critical approach and liberal reforms among Muslim youth – a paradigm 
that would be likely to counter pervasive radical approaches and theologically 
accompany the current processes of secularization and acculturation overall.
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Abstract
What is the role of an imam? What is expected from an imam? How can 
an imam meet the expectations of the community? This chapter argues 
that the current state of imamship in the United Kingdom is in dire need 
of a model that could help imams understand and practice their role 
better. While there are many models available, this chapter considers 
the model provided by Muslim chaplaincy. It argues that current imam 
training is stuck in liminality; by employing an approach to spirituality 
(to be read as imamship) that is immanent (to be read as chaplaincy), as 
opposed to transcendent, imams will be better able to reconnect with 
their congregation.
Keywords: Islam in the United Kingdom, chaplaincy, chaplains, Darul 
Uloom, liminality
1 Introduction
You need to decide whether you are a mosque imam or a chaplain. If you 
believe you are a mosque imam, get the hell out of here! (f ield notes, 2011)
The above quotation is indicative of a possible confusion between the role 
of a mosque imam and the work of a Muslim chaplain. The context of the 
quotation happened to be a counselling session conducted by a senior 
Muslim hospital chaplain with a junior colleague who was facing formal 
disciplinary action (Ali and Gilliat-Ray, 2012, p. 90). Despite the apparent 
296 Mansur ali 
differences between the two roles, in this chapter I provide evidence that 
mosque imams can immensely benefit from Muslim chaplains and propose 
that Muslim chaplaincy is a good model for imams to follow. This chapter 
builds on the work of Asim Hafiz (2015) and provides support for his thesis, 
albeit using a different dataset and theory (that Muslim chaplaincy is a 
good model for imamship). The empirical evidence for the chapter comes 
from the dataset of a research project on Muslim chaplaincy conducted 
at Cardiff University between 2008 and 2011. The training of imams and 
the contributions of Muslim chaplains were theorized using variations 
of Victor Turner’s ‘liminality theory’ (1967, 1991) and Sherman Jackson’s 
theory of ‘immanent spirituality’ (2005). From the outset it is important to 
mention that when I use the word ‘imam’ in this chapter, I am referring to 
either those mosque imams in Britain who are from South Asia and have 
studied the Dars-i Nizami curriculum in a traditional seminary known as 
a Darul Uloom, or to their British colleagues who have studied in similar 
institutions in the West. Darul Ulooms, literally meaning a ‘House of Sci-
ences’, are traditional Islamic seminaries found throughout the Indian 
subcontinent as well as in the diaspora where children are sent to train 
as imams and religious leaders (Geaves, 2008; Gilliat-Ray, 2006; Metcalf, 
1982; Zaman, 2010). A chaplain can loosely be def ined as a person who 
provides spiritual and pastoral care within an organization. Although 
chaplaincy traditionally evolved out of Christianity, the term ‘chaplain’ 
is now increasingly associated with other faith traditions (Gilliat-Ray, Ali, 
and Pattison, 2013).
With the ‘securitization’ of the Muslim community in European policy 
since the 1990s (Birt and Lewis, 2010), much interest has been shown in the 
public role of imams and their training. In recognizing the important role 
imams play in the community, the British Home Off ice acknowledged that 
‘Imams are the religious leaders of the Muslim community’, but they are ‘in 
need of coordination and unity’ (Home Off ice 2005, cited in Rahman, Syed 
Tohel, and Shaynul, 2006, p. 7). Despite this acknowledgement, imams and 
Muslim religious leaders were considered part of the problem and not the 
solution, and the plethora of reports and policy documents produced on 
them can almost certainly be said to be driven by security concerns (Birt, 
2006) and a number of them are directly related to a counter-terrorism 
agenda (Dyke, 2009; Hussain, 2010; Hussain and Tuck, 2014). The concern 
with imams and their training is not confined to the United Kingdom, but 
has been the subject of much discussion in Europe (Husson, 2007).
The above notwithstanding, some policy makers have shifted their focus 
from viewing imams as a part of the problem to part of the solution. Birt 
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(2006) argues that the government’s ideal ‘good imam’, as opposed to a ‘bad 
imam’, was modelled on an Anglican template, so therefore a ‘good imam’ is 
understood in terms of what a ‘good priest’ should be. He argues that civic 
religion has def ined the remit of the role envisaged for the ‘good imam’, 
which according to the government is: ‘to embody civic virtues, interfaith 
tolerance, professional managerial and pastoral skills, possibly become 
involved in inner city regeneration, work as an agent of national integration 
(most importantly on behalf of his young unruly f lock), and wage a jihad 
against extremism’ (Birt, 2006, p. 687).
This has been aptly reiterated by the authors of a government report 
undertaken by the Department of Communities and Local Government 
entitled The training and development of Muslim faith leaders: Current 
practice and future possibilities (Scott-Baumann, Mukadam, Chowdhary, 
and Contractor, 2010). An assessment by Ataullah Siddiqui of Islamic Studies 
provided by higher education institutions in the United Kingdom and the 
possible accommodations that could be made for the training of imams in 
higher education (Siddiqui, 2007) led the then-Minister for Education, The 
Right Honourable Bill Rammell, to announce a grant of £1M for the Higher 
Education Funding Council (HEFCE) to address gaps in Islamic Studies 
teaching and research (Lipsett, 2007).
Additionally, Muslim organizations have also been involved in conducting 
their own research on imams and mosques (Rahman, Syed Tohel, and 
Shaynul, 2006), as well as on imam welfare (FAIR, 2002). Most reports 
acknowledged that, while the imams’ role is important to the health of the 
community, there needs to be major changes in how imams are trained and 
how they administer their responsibilities to their congregation. Despite 
this acknowledgement, there is some form of consensus that the onus to 
develop imams should organically grow out of community incentives and 
not from the pressures of government.
This chapter aims to contribute to this body of knowledge by proposing a 
model for imamship based on Muslim chaplaincy work. Tacit in this proposal 
is the assumption that current imamship practices are problematic (Hafiz, 
2015), although these problems have less to do with government security 
concerns and more to do with being in tune with community concerns and 
possessing the skills to lead. Before I proceed, it is necessary to mention that 
the criticism of mosque institutions as not relevant to the concerns of the 
community is levelled at two groups of people: the mosque committee and 
the imams. Nearly all of the reports I have referenced note complaints about 
the lack of proper management and lack of professionalism of mosque com-
mittees (Donnelly, 2011). The Muslim Council of Britain report highlights a 
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possible reason for this (Rahman, Syed Tohel, and Shaynul, 2006). It mentions 
that 50 per cent of mosque imams are under 40 years old, while 43 per cent 
of committee members are over 60 years old with very little knowledge of 
English (Rahman, Syed Tohel, and Shaynul, 2006, p. 10). This reinforces the 
prevalent view that mosques are still under the control of f irst-generation 
migrants (Geaves, 2008, p. 102). The above notwithstanding, my focus in 
this chapter is the imams, who are vested with a sense of authority through 
their specialist knowledge of the religion and have the potential to lead the 
community despite the shortcomings of the mosque committees.
2 Current imam training and the responsibilities of imams
A quantitative study of mosque imams in Britain (Geaves, 2008), shows that 
out of the 300-plus participants, 83.3 per cent were of South Asian origin 
and 8.1 per cent were British-born. Ron Geaves discovered that both the 
British-born and South Asian imams had gone through a system of study 
known as the Dars-i Nizami (Geaves, 2008) – amounting to 91.9 per cent 
of all of his respondents going through the same system. For this reason, I 
have chosen to confine my use of the title ‘imam’ in this chapter to South 
Asian-imported imams or their British counterparts who have gone through 
this system of education. I make no claims about imams who have had 
training outside or beyond this particular type of curriculum, as I have not 
consulted research regarding them.
The Dars-i Nizami syllabus was founded in 1695 by Mulla Nizamuddin (d. 
1748) of the Farangi Mahall in India,1 and originally comprised a f ine bal-
ance between the macqūlāt (‘rational sciences’) and the manqūlāt (‘revealed 
sciences’) (Geaves, 2008; Robinson, 2001; Zaman, 2010). Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman remarks that the syllabus was originally flexible and meant to train 
scholars to work in the administration of the Mughal Emperors (1526-1857) 
as lawyers, judges, and religious professionals. However, as a reaction to 
British educational policy in British India the Dars-i Nizami became more 
or less standardized and started to function as a curriculum in the Darul 
Ulooms. The f inal, standardized version of the Dars-i Nizami curriculum 
has been adopted in the 25 or so Darul Ulooms in the United Kingdom.
1 The scholars of Farangi Mahall (English Palace) were a family of religious scholars in Lucknow, 
India, who were famous for their interest in the rational sciences. Their name is derived from 
a sequestered property belonging to a European merchant, which was gifted to them by the 
Mughal Emperor Aurengzeb in 1695. 
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The purpose of these Darul Ulooms, and by extension the adopted Dars-i 
Nizami curriculum, is to ‘strengthen one’s own identity, to internalise 
excellent human qualities, and to realise one’s potential’ (Moosa, 2015, 
p. 4). The Darul Uloom is vital for two aspects of the student’s life: ‘First, it 
is central to the acquisition and circulation of knowledge, and second, it is 
vital to the personal spiritual growth or self-formation of the individual’ 
(Moosa, 2015, p. 9). Muhammad Taqi Usmani believes that the virtues and 
skills learnt in the Darul Uloom make ‘each individual serve not only their 
own countries and communities but […] the whole of humanity’ (Usmani, 
cited in Moosa, 2015, p. 4). In essence, the Darul Uloom is a bastion of religious 
learning that cultivates a deep religious internalization of knowledge that 
becomes embodied in the student. This embodied knowledge becomes the 
foundation for the new scholar to lead his community.
While I am not in a position to comment on the level of internalization of 
this learning, it is easier to gauge whether what is being taught and how it is 
taught is relevant and beneficial, and whether it fulf ils the broader aims of 
these Darul Ulooms, i.e., to serve humanity. Much has been written about 
the cilm nāfic (‘utility of knowledge’) in British India (Zaman, 2010). Where 
once the Dars-i Nizami functioned as a training programme for those who 
wanted to serve in the Mughal administration, with the rule of the East 
India Company being transferred to the British Empire after 1857, religious 
learning became a critical means of safeguarding Muslim identity and 
practice in British India (Zaman, 2010, p. 66). How is this being translated 
into the current British context, and how much do these concerns mirror 
Muslim conditions in contemporary Britain?
A number of researchers writing about British Darul Ulooms and the 
Dars-i Nizami (Geaves, 2008; Gilliat-Ray, 2006; Lewis, 2004), as well as Darul 
Uloom graduates (Mahmood, 2012), have identif ied the persistence of a 
yawning gap in the curriculum and pedagogy, which functions as a barrier 
for relating the teachings of the Darul Ulooms to the current concerns of the 
Muslim community. The relevance of certain topics taught in Darul Ulooms 
to the needs of the community is questionable. For example, what purpose 
does a detailed examination of what happens when a rat falls in a well serve 
for the modern Muslim community living in the West? One can argue that 
the f ixation with this and other medieval issues creates a chasm between 
what the community wants from imams and what imams are able to offer.
So what does the community want from its imams? What are their 
responsibilities and duties? In 1989 an imam identif ied the role as carriers 
of ‘vicarious memory’ (Davie 2000, cited in Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 168) and 
‘bearers of cultures’ (Schoenherr 1987, cited in Gilliat-Ray, 2010, p. 168), 
300 Mansur ali 
such as: leading the f ive prayers, teaching children, delivering the Friday 
sermon in Arabic with an accompanying lecture in Urdu, presiding over 
rites of passage such as calling the adhān, solemnizing marriages, prepar-
ing the dead for burial, preparing amulets, and in general offering advice 
on the application of Islamic law and teaching (Birt and Lewis, 2010). 
Adding to this list, in the twenty-f irst century another imam discussed 
the heavy demands of his job, including dealing with drug abuse, youth 
problems, black magic, family breakdowns, mental health issues, bereave-
ments, counselling, business disputes, and offering fatwas. The imam 
also mentioned that there are no appointed times for these activities 
and that the imam must be on call 24 hours a day, but for him it is most 
satisfying to see that he has made a positive change in people’s lives 
(Syed and Ali, 2014).
3 Models of imamship
There are certainly a number of models that can be adopted to address the 
concerns raised by young British Muslims about leadership. Jonathan Birt 
(2005, p. 187) and Philip Lewis (2004, p. 179) have identif ied two strands 
of avant-garde imams who are adopting alternative models of leadership 
to meet the expectations of the younger generations. The f irst strand of 
ulama administers their religious work in a number of innovative ways 
that are different from normal mosque procedures. These include setting 
up in venues away from the mosque environment (Ali, 2013; Birt, 2005) 
and circulating Islamic knowledge through different forms of media and 
pamphleteering (Birt and Lewis, 2010). The second strand of ulama who are 
attempting to fulf il the new expectations of the young Muslim community 
are employed as Muslim chaplains or Muslim faith advisors in the chaplaincy 
departments of public institutions (Birt, 2005; Lewis 2004). I discuss the full 
details of the roles of Muslim chaplains below. What is common between 
these two strands of religious leaders is that they are moving away from 
the restrictive environment of the mosques to public spaces where they 
can fulf il the needs of the community without any hindrance. There is 
evidence to suggest that this has not always been a smooth transition; 
many of them have been criticized by the elders in the community (Birt, 
2005, p. 190; Lewis, 2004, p. 178) or have even found their relationship with 
the community to be strained. Adam Dinham makes a generic observation 
that is reminiscent of Christian chaplain’s experiences of often feeling that 
their work is undervalued or not recognized at all:
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Many faith-based projects, even where they started as initiatives directly 
arising from congregations, become dissociated, even divorced, from these 
roots as they grow and expand. Often by the time they have come to the 
attention of others outside of faiths they have travelled some considerable 
distance from the community of worshippers whose regular communion 
is a separate matter. (Dinham, 2009, p. 9)
Another, more targeted, model of addressing young Muslims’ concerns 
has been suggested by Atif Imtiaz, the academic director at Cambridge 
Muslim College. In his typology of Muslims in Bradford, Imtiaz identif ies 
three types of young Muslims: ‘rude boys’, ‘coconuts’, and ‘extremists’ 
(Imtiaz, 2011, pp. 84-90). ‘Rude boys’ are a hybrid mix of three cultures: 
South Asian, African-American hip-hop, and Northern Industrial England. 
Imtiaz believes that to help these youths a certain type of ‘rude boy imam’ 
is needed, who can talk the street language and understand their issues 
related to things like gang culture, drugs, and spiritual shallowness. The 
term ‘coconut’ is used pejoratively to describe a class of Muslims who are 
in danger of assimilation through social and economic progress. They have 
a different set of issues and concerns that only an imam who is trained in 
their f ield can tackle, such as the philosophical, scientif ic, and intellectual 
challenges to Islam (i.e., the notion of liberalism, human rights, and gender 
relations). These Muslims are the most prone to an assimilationist identity, 
and an imam who understands their worldview will be able to effectively 
steer them to the ‘right’ path in times of spiritual crisis. Imtiaz’s third 
category of Muslims in Bradford is the ‘extremist’, described as such by 
those who are less practicing and who consider them to have developed 
an unbalanced approach towards religion. Imtiaz notes that those who are 
in this third category face a dual risk, which is also the greatest challenge 
for the British ulama: ghettoization and assimilation. Extremism is one 
outcome of this process and is caused by the total incomprehension of how 
to integrate into the wider society (Imtiaz, 2011, p. 88). For Imtiaz, this is 
equally about political and cultural engagement. He suggests that a class 
of ulama and religious leaders are needed who can develop a language and 
nomenclature that will allow Muslims to be able to express their religious 
sentiments while still feeling like they are part of the wider society. Imtiaz 
also mentions that the training provided by the Cambridge Muslim College 
addresses some of the issues and challenges mentioned above in some ways2 
(see Ebbiary, Part II).
2 See the Cambridge Muslim College website, http://www.cambridgemuslimcollege.org/. 
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4 The Muslim chaplaincy model
If Islam does not have an institutional role known as chaplaincy, how can 
it be used as a model for the role of the imam? While it is certainly true 
that Islam does not have a tradition of chaplaincy, it most certainly has a 
tradition of pastoral care (Gilliat-Ray et al., 2013; Winter, 2014). In addition, 
Muslim chaplains have been employed since the 1970s (Gilliat-Ray, 2008) 
long enough to warrant the designation of ‘Muslim chaplain’; with their 
everyday involvement, the silhouettes of a slowly emerging distinctively 
Islamic practical theology can be observed (Abu-Ras and Laird, 2011; Ansari, 
2009; Dudhwala, 2006; Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and Pattison, 2013; Hamza, 2007; 
Harris, 2009; Kowalski, 2009; Kowalski and Becker, 2015).
4.1 The Muslim chaplaincy project
As mentioned above, the data for this chapter came from a research project 
on Muslim chaplaincy conducted at Cardiff University from 2008 to 2011. 
Although the research on Muslim chaplaincy was not conducted with ques-
tions related to this chapter in mind, mining the archives of that research 
has provided rich material for writing it. The Muslim chaplaincy project3 
was jointly funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the 
Economic and Social Science Research Council as a part of their ‘Religion 
and Society’ programme.4 Over 28 months, the research team interviewed 
Muslim chaplains and stakeholders from different sectors in an attempt to 
establish the answers to four questions: who decides to become a chaplain; 
what is involved in chaplaincy work; how are Muslim chaplains able to 
negotiate institutional and state politics; and what impact are they having on 
their institutions, the Muslim community, and the wider British community?
To answer these questions, the research team interviewed 65 Muslim 
chaplains from a wide range of sectors and public institutions, including 
3 Award reference: AH/F008937/1: ‘Leadership and Capacity Building in the British Muslim 
Community: The Case of Muslim Chaplains’ (2008-2011). The Principal Investigator was Professor 
Sophie Gilliat-Ray at Cardiff University; the Co-investigator was Professor Stephen Pattison at 
Birmingham University; and Dr. Mansur Ali was the full-time Research Assistant.
4 http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/. The quotations in this chapter come from the Muslim 
chaplaincy project conducted between 2008 and 2011. The corpus and transcripts on which the 
quotations in this chapter are based are not available to anyone outside of the research team, 
since the data consists of sensitive and conf idential material. This was agreed upon by the 
researchers and the two funding bodies mentioned above. The research f indings, however, have 
been published in numerous publications, which are listed in the references of this chapter. 
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prisons, higher education institutions, hospitals, airports, the military, 
courts, and community-based chaplains. Both male and female Muslim 
chaplains were interviewed, as well as part- and full-time chaplains from dif-
ferent Islamic schools of thought. In addition, the research team interviewed 
and observed some students who were training to be Muslim chaplains, 
especially through the Certif icate Course offered by the Markfield Institute 
of Higher Education in Leicester.
Another group of interviewees included ‘stakeholders’, by which we mean 
those who have observed, or who have been directly involved in manag-
ing, the work of Muslim chaplains from a policy, training, or institutional 
perspective. The research team also spent short periods of time ‘shadowing’ 
Muslim chaplains at work, typically for two or three days at a time. This 
enabled them to have a more contextualized understanding of the Muslim 
chaplain’s role, while offering Muslim chaplains themselves an opportunity 
to comment on their work. In a small number of prisons and higher education 
institutions, the team also conducted focus groups with the ‘clients’ of 
Muslim chaplaincy, and with key senior managers. Finally, one member 
of the research team travelled to the United States to interview Muslim 
chaplains there for comparative purposes. Below, I look at a segment of the 
data relating to the impact of Muslim chaplaincy on imams and mosques.
4.2 Findings
In what ways can Muslim chaplaincy be replicated as a model for mosque-
based imams to adopt? The following vignette sheds some light on the 
effectiveness of Muslim chaplaincy for the mosque imam. I quote the 
narrative in its entirety as related to the research team in 2011 by a Muslim 
prison chaplain:
We have somebody who was released who was a chronic alcoholic but 
he was Asian. He was getting abused by the local community so I called 
the imam for a meeting from the local mosque, and I said to him, look, 
you know and I know that alcohol was drunk in the time of our prophet, 
where some of our prophets had a struggle issue to say ‘don’t’. But there 
was this way of, not abstinence straightaway, but you went through a 
process of detox. And I said to him this [is] what I’m requesting from 
you, is that you can only help this guy, because alcohol is only cushioning 
and bottling up his pain. Every time you lot slam the door in his face or 
you’re beating him up in the community, you are making him feel that 
the cancer that is inside him, the issues, he can’t talk to anybody about.
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And as a result, this imam, a young lad, recently qualif ied, said you’re 
right. And he got in touch with Alcoholic Anonymous; he went on the 
soup kitchen duty. He saw poverty. He came out of his comfort zone. 
When this guy was released, he made an effort to go and see him. And 
even though the guy was drunk on one occasion, he just said to him, 
I’m going to come back another day. I just thought I would drop you off 
some food. And he said, you know, slowly from the crack of a door, he 
started opening up. And we found out that the guy had lost his family 
when he started drinking at the age of 17. He was now 47. He had been 
on the slide and he had just messed up his life. And we found out where 
his family were, started talking to them and saying, you know, he’s in a 
really bad state. His liver is not going to hang on for much longer if he 
keeps drinking like this.
And that’s what I can do. Because I’m not attached to a mosque, I’m not 
attached to any denomination of Islam, I’m not attached to any group of 
Muslims or anything like that, I can instigate these conversations, knowing 
that I’m doing it for the best interest of that person who is leaving prison, 
or that family, or that individual, or that congregation that is supporting 
that. And they get an equal share of me.
A number of issues can be gleaned from the above interview extract. First 
of all, the narrative is revealing of how the mosque community and imams 
generally view people who have been incarcerated or who have (or have 
had) addiction-related problems. Second, it demonstrates the imam’s lack 
of knowledge in such situations. Finally, it showcases the impact that a 
Muslim chaplain can have on the overall mentoring and development of 
an imam. Mining the data from the Muslim chaplaincy project, there is a 
ubiquitous feeling amongst most Muslim chaplains about mosque imams’ 
lack of understanding of pastoral care. Furthermore, Muslim chaplains 
complained about the inability of imams to deal with complex situations 
brought to them by their congregation, which is mainly a result of their 
Darul Uloom training’s focus on textual studies over pastoral issues.
Imams’ lack of professionalism is another major criticism from Muslim 
chaplains. This is aptly captured in the quote at the beginning of this chapter, 
in which the senior Muslim chaplain reprimanded his junior colleague for 
acting in a conservative manner regarding gender interactions, which goes 
against both the ethos and the equality laws that regulate public institu-
tions. One Muslim chaplain distinguishes the role of the chaplain from 
that of the imam by drawing attention to the way they converse with the 
people they minister to: ‘Muslim chaplains speak with people, whereas 
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imams speak to people’ – thereby hinting that the hierarchy between the 
imam and the congregation might not always be healthy. Another Muslim 
chaplain describes how the imam ought to be as opposed to how they are 
by contrasting their understanding of the needs of the community in their 
country of origin with the needs of the community in modern Britain. By 
way of example, the chaplain picks the case of a parent who drops their child 
off late to the maktab (‘evening supplementary school’) because of a doctor’s 
appointment. The chaplain argues that rather than disciplining the child for 
coming late, the imam should recognize the constraints on working parents, 
and instead thank the parents for bringing their child to the class at all.
A possible cause for imams’ lack of professionalism, as identif ied by the 
Muslim chaplains interviewed for this research, is their lack of exposure to 
people and institutions beyond their own congregation and mosque. One 
hospital chaplain made the following observation in 2011: ‘[T]here is maybe 
a bit of an advantage that Muslim chaplains have, is that they are exposed, 
and they are more outgoing and see more than the imams in the mosque, 
so I think that’s where maybe there needs to be a little change where the 
imams are exposed to people of different faiths.’ In discussing a situation 
faced by both Muslim chaplains and imams in their line of work, another 
hospital chaplain ruminated over the markedly different responses elicited 
by each of them, which is revealing of the different types of people and 
institutions they have been exposed to:
I think I mentioned once about, for example, termination [of pregnancy], 
if I was asked a question about termination here, if the same people went 
to the mosque and asked the question about termination then they might 
get a different answer, because they’re not exposed to the healthcare 
environment whereas I’m exposed to the healthcare environment and I can 
contextualize the question and give an answer according to the context, 
whereas they cannot contextualize that situation because they have been 
within the four walls; that’s where the disadvantage is for an imam. (2010)
The interviewed Muslim chaplains listed what congregations expect of their 
imams, such as the ability to deal with (or at least some working knowledge 
of) the issues facing the community, including housing issues, domestic 
violence, youth problems, alcohol- and drug-related problems, and illicit 
sexual relationships, in addition to performing the purely religious elements 
of their role. The Muslim chaplains felt that imams are not adequately trained 
to tackle these issues, although, surprisingly none of them criticized the 
actual training that the imams went through in Darul Ulooms. A possible 
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reason for this may be that Muslim chaplains do not view the training as 
irrelevant; they believe that it just needs a little bit tweaking. In fact, one 
Muslim hospital chaplain from London stated in 2011:
I was working in a hospital and I was also working as an imam in a mosque, 
and I had the same skills, the same knowledge but I had to move out of 
the mosque because I felt that the institution was restricting my skills 
and my capabilities. It wasn’t allowing me the freedom to do what I felt 
was good for the community. So it’s not the imam that is at fault, it was 
the institution that needed to change slightly from within.
Another possible reason for their lack of critique of the education system 
is that some chaplains may feel that their Darul Uloom education is sup-
plemented with the training provided in chaplaincy sectors.
Nevertheless, Muslim chaplains do see themselves as the role models for 
mosque imams. Dinham’s observation about chaplains’ lack of recognition 
rings true in the case of Muslim chaplains, who appear frustrated since 
they are not understood or given a voice in the mosque despite the fact that 
they could contribute a lot by bridging the gap between the imams and 
their community. They suggest that allowing them to talk about their job 
in the mosque would function as an eye opener for the imams, who could 
subsequently raise the community awareness of important issues in their 
Friday sermons. One Muslim hospital chaplain responded to the question 
about Muslim chaplaincy’s impact on the mosque as follows:
Well I think the main thing they can learn is […] the chaplain in the hospital 
is there as a responsible person, he or she has a great responsibility and in 
fact we’re here taking the responsibility from the community, doing the 
work of the Prophet ṣallā allāhu calayhi wa-sallam, visiting the sick, visiting 
the poorly, asking them how we can help them fulfil their needs, so I think 
that’s very helpful and important that they understand that what we’re doing 
is part of Islam and it’s not for any other different reason, it’s here. We’re 
representing that community in the hospital and to the sick and the elderly.
One almost gets the feeling from this quotation that Muslim chaplains are 
trying hard to get recognition from the imams and the Muslim community. 
However, research has shown (Ali and Gilliat-Ray, 2012; Gilliat-Ray, Ali, and 
Pattison, 2013) that there is not yet the critical mass of Muslim chaplains 
needed to influence a major shift in practices, although anecdotal evidence 
(Birt and Lewis, 2010) of good practice does emerge from time to time.
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5 Theorizing a model for imamship: liminality and 
immanent spirituality
To bring some clarity to the discussion of imamship, and a plausible model 
for imams, I analyse the above discussion using two concepts: ‘liminality’ 
(Turner, 1967, 1991) and ‘immanent spirituality’ (Jackson, 2005). The f irst 
helps in understanding the current crisis of the imamship model, while 
the second assists in comprehending why chaplaincy is a good model for 
imamship. In this section, I discuss liminality and how it applies to the 
imams’ situation; in the next section, I discuss immanent spirituality and 
its application.
The French anthropologist Arnold Van Gennep (1873-1957) gave the world 
the phrase ‘rites of passage’ (Turner, 1967). Van Gennep observed that in a rite 
of passage ritual, a beginner known as a neophyte goes through a three-fold 
process that involves separation, marginality, and aggregation. ‘Separation’ 
is when the neophyte leaves behind his or her previous life and enters a 
transitory phase, such as rituals involving boys progressing to adulthood. 
The ‘marginal’ situation where the ‘not-boy-not-man’ has to do certain 
things to prove himself (hunting, for example) is def ined as ‘liminality’ 
by Victor Turner. According to Turner, liminality is an ‘interstructural’ 
situation where normal structures of society do not function and new forms 
of structures are erected. In a liminal situation the liminal persona is ‘no 
longer classif ied and yet to be classif ied’; they are ‘betwixt and between’ 
(Turner, 1967, p. 48; 1991, p. 95). In this phase, there is a relationship of total 
submission to the master, as well as a complete equality among neophytes 
which Turner calls communitas (Turner, 1991). Turner writes, ‘the authority 
of the elders is absolute, because it represents the absolute, the axiomatic 
values of society in which are expressed the “common good” and the common 
interest’ (Turner, 1967, p.100).
Liminality does not necessarily need to be restricted to the individual. 
Bjørn Thomassen (2009) argues that it can be both temporal and spatial, 
involving individuals, larger groups, whole societies, or even entire civili-
zations. Turner acknowledges that although most liminal situations are 
temporary, it can also take a permanent form, which Erving Goffman calls 
‘the characteristics of total institutions’ (Goffman, 2007). Turner writes: 
‘With the increasing specialization of society and culture, with progres-
sive complexity in the social division of labour, what was in tribal society 
principally a set of transitional qualities “betwixt and between” def ined 
states of culture and society has become itself an institutionalized state’ 
(1991, p. 107). The idea of a permanent liminal state was further developed 
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by the sociologist Arpad Szakolczai (2005), who identif ied three forms of 
permanent liminality that correspond to Van Gennep’s three stages of 
rites of passage. Szakolczai notes that: ‘Liminality becomes a permanent 
condition when any of the phases in this sequence becomes frozen, as if a 
f ilm stopped at a particular frame. This can happen both with individuals 
undergoing an “initiation rite” and with groups who are participating in a 
collective ritual, “a social drama”’ (2005, p. 212).
Szakolczai identifies the f irst kind of permanent liminality in the segrega-
tion phase as the monastic way of life, where the desire to transcend the 
mundane becomes permanent. The second phase of permanent liminality 
corresponds to Norbert Elias’ ‘court society’. Exploring the writings of Nor-
bert Elias on ‘court society’, Szakolczai identifies it as in a permanent liminal 
condition, in the actual performance or ‘staging’ of the ritual. Szakolczai 
argues that when such a performance becomes permanent and individuals 
are stuck in their roles, the performing character of the ritual disappears. 
Individuals are required to identify with their role, which is no longer a 
play and becomes their life, permanently (Szakolczai, 2005, p. 213). Finally, 
the third possibility of permanent liminality, frozen in the f inal stage of 
the ritual where one is re-assimilated into society, is what Szakolczai calls 
‘Bolshevism’ – a form of societal and cultural liminality that cannot proceed 
to a normal way of life. In this analysis of the roles of the imam, I focus on 
the f irst two kinds of permanent liminality.
6 Imams and liminality
Turner’s liminality theory can be applied to mosque imams who have gone 
through the Darul Uloom Dars-i Nizami system. When students enter a 
Darul Uloom for the f irst time, they are required to leave their previous 
lifestyle at the gates of the institution. The students now have to embody a 
worldview and practice that is totally ‘segregated’ (both in terms of gender 
segregation and in Van Gennep’s use of the term) and different from their 
pre-Darul Uloom days. This includes shedding their normal attire and 
adopting what they consider to be Islamic sartorial practices. Any kind of 
media devices such as smart phones or Internet access are forbidden unless 
under strict supervision. The only connectivity allowed is one that builds 
the student’s connection to God and the Islamic tradition. The student has 
to follow a strict regime of habits including eating, studying, and resting, 
punctuated by the f ive daily prayers (Moosa, 2015). During the course of their 
stay in the institution, students are exposed to the works of classical Islamic 
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scholars through pious hagiography and the framing of these narratives 
(Moosa, 2015), as well as through the unbroken human chain of transmission 
known as the isnād (‘chain of authorities’) system (Brown, 2009; Graham, 
1993). The student, who is now different from the lay person but not yet 
a scholar, develops a communitas, friendship, and fellowship with other 
students that may last a lifetime in addition to cultivating a strong f idelity 
to the hierarchy and authority of the elders, similar to Turner’s description 
of the neophyte.
Once a student completes the course successfully, he or she graduates as a 
scholar ready to lead the community with newfound authority. To celebrate 
this auspicious moment, some Darul Ulooms hold a graduation ceremony 
that begins with the reading of the f inal few hadiths of Sahih al-Bukhari, 
the most authentic book in Sunni Islam after the Qur’an (Brown, 2009), and 
concludes with the student’s teachers placing a turban on the head of the 
graduate – an emblem of religious authority on the one hand and a symbolic 
gesture of the heavy burden the new scholar must shoulder, on the other.
One may argue that these phases are a normal part of the process for 
any student. While that may be true, the fact that imams are the objects of 
a deluge of criticism, both in reports and from their chaplain colleagues, 
is evidence that imams are stuck in the second phase of liminality, similar 
to Szakolczai’s ‘court society’. The ceremonial rituals of graduation help 
graduates identify with their role, but their actions in the mosque betray a 
permanent liminality in the staging phase. In this chapter, I have demon-
strated that there are a number of ways for graduates to break out of this 
permanent liminality. One example is Muslim chaplaincy; graduates model-
ling themselves on Muslim chaplains are able to tweak their knowledge 
and skills to better align with the needs and concerns of the community. 
I believe Muslim chaplaincy is a good model because it adopts a working 
ethos that can be loosely def ined as ‘immanent spirituality’.
7 ‘Immanent spirituality’
‘Immanent spirituality’ is a term coined by the American Muslim intel-
lectual Sherman Jackson (2005, p. 183) to address the ‘spiritual health’ of 
what he terms the ‘Black American’ Muslim community. Jackson argues 
that the mystical tradition in Islam, known as Sufism, advocates a type of 
spirituality that depends solely on transcending the physical body to become 
one with God. This form of spirituality emphasizes that human beings 
are insignif icant in the grand scheme of things, and that total spiritual 
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experience lies in fanā’ (‘obliteration of the self) in the love of God, which 
eventually results in a mystical union with God that transcends the human 
body. In other words, the transcendental spirituality of mystical Sufism is 
predicated on the belief that experiential knowledge is superior to conceptual 
knowledge (Jackson, 2005).
Jackson f inds the transcendental spirituality of the Sufis to be out of sync 
with and not suitable to the Black American Muslim experience. For him, 
the Black American is already someone who has been haunted by a nagging 
sense of nobodyness (Jackson, 2005, p. 184), and who has only recently come 
to terms with his selfhood and self-identity. A spirituality that demands 
the annihilation of this selfhood and transcending of this identity will not 
work well. In response, Jackson proposes an ‘immanent spirituality’, where 
the struggles of the Black American are seen as a spiritual exercise. For 
Jackson, this is a spirituality that celebrates the Black American identity and 
makes their struggle into a religious vocation. In other words, for Jackson, 
spirituality can reside in ‘walking with’, as opposed to ‘transcending to’, 
God (Jackson, 2005, p. 185).
Jackson’s ‘immanent spirituality’ helps explain why chaplaincy is a good 
model for imams. The Muslim chaplaincy research revealed that a good 
Muslim chaplain is one with knowledge of and credibility in the local Muslim 
community in addition to possessing good communication – especially 
listening – skills. The Muslim chaplain manifests the qualities of respect, 
patience, tolerance, non-judgement, and confidentiality, features that are 
found in counsellors and chaplains of other traditions. The chaplain is also 
flexible and willing to work in a complex environment in which he or she 
needs to understand his or her institutional and social context. Demonstrat-
ing resilience and determination as well as diplomacy and f lexibility in 
approaching their complex, diverse role and environment is also seen as 
a quality of a good Muslim chaplain. All of these acquired skills showcase 
that the chaplain is one who will be able to ‘talk with’, as opposed to ‘talk to’, 
the people. In contrast, rigorous scholastic training in authoritative books 
and absolute submission to the teacher develop a sense of hierarchy in the 
student where scriptural knowledge dominates and where the ulama reign 
as masters. This attitude is not helpful for dealing with people’s concerns 
and problems, or for people who seek in their imams, not an authoritarian 
f igure, but a pastoral shoulder with whom to share their burdens. In other 
words, imams’ adoption of the chaplaincy model will enable them to realize 
that spirituality is immanent and lies in their everyday struggle of walking 
with their congregation, understanding their concerns, and at times sharing 
in the shedding of spiritual tears.
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8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that chaplaincy can function as a good model 
for imams. I argue that the current imams who are graduates from Darul 
Ulooms in South Asia and the United Kingdom are f ixed in a liminality 
where their training involves regurgitating materials that are best suited 
to rural conditions. There are a number of methods and models available 
to pull these imams out of their liminality, and one example is brushing up 
their skills and knowledge by following the professional attitude of their 
colleagues in the chaplaincy sectors in the United Kingdom. The chaplaincy 
model, I argue, is one that can be called a model of ‘immanent spirituality’, 
where struggle is a part of the spiritual vocation of the chaplain and the 
chaplain ‘talks with’ the people as opposed to ‘talking to’ them. As one 
hospital chaplain says about his role:
With their own existing faith within God, it’s about restoring that faith 
that they have and for a slight moment they are not lost, but there’s a 
shadow, it’s cloudy. It’s like you’re on the motorway and you think, am 
I on the right route or not? You’re still travelling until your satnav says, 
take the next left in 200 yards or something and you think, yes, I am on 
the right route and I see that I am that satnav.
Compared to the number of imams, there is not yet the critical mass of 
Muslim chaplains necessary to make a signif icant dent in the current 
religious leadership exercised in the community, although anecdotes of 
good chaplaincy practice seeping into the community provide a glimmer 
of hope for the future (Ali and Gilliat-Ray, 2012; Birt and Lewis, 2010).
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Abstract
The Cambridge Muslim College was established in 2011 with the purpose 
of giving a contextual ‘update’ to the heavily text-based training of British 
Muslim seminary graduates. It has been called a ‘f inishing school’ that 
provides a higher education experience for graduates of the traditional 
Indian-style Darul Ulooms in the United Kingdom. The college offers 
a one-year programme for both men and women with a curriculum 
emphasizing citizenship, political and cultural awareness, interfaith 
understanding, community building, counselling, and other pastoral 
skills. This chapter discusses the Cambridge Muslim College programme 
and how it relates to earlier, more traditional imam-training programmes 
in the United Kingdom.
Keywords: Cambridge Muslim College, Darul Ulooms, imam training in 
the United Kingdom, Deobandi school
1 Introduction
It is graduation day at the Cambridge Muslim College,1 marking the end 
of a year of intense intellectual growth and personal introspection for the 
cohort of students receiving diplomas in Contextual Islamic Studies. Like 
other graduation ceremonies held every year in Cambridge, this one is 
marked by grandeur and solemnity; unlike the other ceremonies held in 
1 This chapter is based on f ieldwork undertaken in the United Kingdom in 2015. My meth-
odological approach was primarily participant observation, supplemented by interviews.
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this scholarly city for centuries, however, the graduating students mounting 
the stage to receive their certif icates are all bearded Muslim men wearing 
topi and jubba and Muslim women wearing niqāb or jilbāb.2
‘I have been pleasantly surprised over this year, in my engagement with 
the graduates’ a research fellow of the college commented in his speech. ‘The 
Darul Ulooms [religious seminaries] have taught their students adab [‘good 
etiquette’] and it’s important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. 
This institution is not here to correct or replace the Darul Uloom learning, 
it is here to augment and to take it further.’
To ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’ suggests discarding what 
is valuable along with what is no longer useful. This is a theme that has 
preoccupied attempts at institutional and religious reform in the Muslim 
world over the last one-and-a-half centuries. But what exactly is considered 
to be the ‘baby’ and what constitutes superfluous ‘bathwater’ is subject to 
constant debate. In the context of Islamic higher education in Britain, the 
changing roles of imams and ulama have been central to this debate.
Since Muslims began settling in the United Kingdom in signif icant 
numbers, the training of religious leaders has been a hurried but neces-
sary process. The f irst Islamic seminary was established in 1975 in Bury, 
near Manchester in northern England. According to one survey, there are 
currently 24 Islamic seminaries in the United Kingdom (Birt and Lewis, 
2010).3 The survey authors reveal that
A sectarian analysis immediately reveals the domination of the Deobandi 
movement – sixteen Deobandi seminaries, f ive Barelwi, one Azhari, one 
Nadwi, one Shiite, and one Ikhwani (Muslim Brotherhood) – and the 
list as a whole largely reflects the predominance of Muslims in Britain 
with roots in South Asia, 74 per cent of the total in the Census of 2001. 
The seminaries reflecting traditions other than the main South Asian 
ones have smaller constituencies and therefore struggle to f ind broader 
acceptance. (Birt and Lewis, 2010, p. 92)4
2 The topi is the name common in South Asian languages for the short, round cap often worn 
by Muslim men. Jubba and jilbāb are Arabic names for the long loose gown commonly worn by 
men and women in the Arab and Muslim world. The niqāb is the face veil.
3 However, they assert: ‘This is a conservative estimate mostly compiled from seminaries that 
are formally registered as they provide statutory education up to sixteen years of age. However, 
there is no requirement of registration for those that only provide formal seminary studies for 
students older than 16’ (Birt and Lewis, 2010, p. 93).
4 The proportion of South-Asian Muslims as a percentage of all British Muslims has gone 
down to 68 per cent in the 2011 census, but the older statistic better illustrates the influence of 
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The Darul Ulooms in the United Kingdom represent a particular model of 
Indian Islamic higher education.5 21 of the United Kingdom’s 26 Islamic 
higher education institutions follow this Indian seminary tradition. The 
institution of the Darul Uloom garners considerable controversy within the 
Muslim community in Britain.6 At worst, the tradition is described as an 
alien, outdated institution that has been transplanted into Britain with the 
arrival of post-colonial migration. It follows a syllabus calcif ied in Victorian 
India and is severely limited by conditions and assumptions that are both 
archaic and irrelevant to modern Britain. It is in desperate need of reform 
but is dragging its feet at the prospect of change.7
At best, the Darul Uloom tradition is seen as an intellectually empow-
ering feature of the British Muslim educational scene. According to this 
view, British Darul Ulooms provide rigorous traditional training that has 
credibility not only in Islamic South Asia, but weight in other parts of the 
Muslim world. It democratizes religious knowledge, making it accessible 
to a generation of diaspora Muslims who might otherwise have lost touch 
with their textual religious heritage. It enriches the community with cālims 
and cālimas (‘male and female religious scholars’) who are licensed to teach 
Islamic studies – that is, by studying at a Darul Uloom they receive a verif i-
able intellectual lineage. In an age of an international crisis of authority in 
the Sunni Muslim world, the Darul Uloom is a much-needed connection 
to the past. In this chapter I do not take either ‘side’ in the debate on the 
Darul Ulooms, instead aiming to show that the reality is far more complex 
than indicated by these two extremes.8
In Sophie Gilliat-Ray’s study of this phenomenon, one of her interviewees 
suggests that Darul Uloom graduates are disenfranchised and need some kind 
of ‘rehab’ after their experience of studying. She writes: ‘There are a number of 
initiatives outside of the Darul Uloom that are attempting to address that, but 
they’re like sticking plaster’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 71). This begs the question, 
why does a ‘traditional’ education need to be remedied? Across Western Europe 
there have been a number of initiatives to train imams (see Martikainen and 
Latvio, Part II), which have attracted more attention since 9/11 for ‘reasons of 
both security and integration policy’ (Van Bruinessen, 2010, p. 9). But beyond 
the Indian subcontinent on Islamic institutional life in Britain.
5 Darul Uloom translates from Arabic as ‘house of sciences’.
6 There is a strong academic argument that there is no such thing as a singular ‘Muslim 
community’ in Britain. Though I am wary of the dangers of essentialism in this case, I use the 
label ‘Muslim community’ in this chapter as it is used by my research participants.
7 See Birt and Lewis (2010), Geaves (2012), and Gilliat-Ray (2005, 2006).
8 See Robinson (2009).
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state concerns, there is an increasingly vocal discontent within the British 
Muslim community. Many Muslims are demanding better-trained imams who 
are more equipped to deal with the challenges posed by modern British society 
and to serve a quickly changing and overwhelmingly young community.
2 The decline narrative
Once upon a time, Islamic scholars were innovative pioneers in the f ields 
of science, mathematics, and linguistics. Now they are arguing about beard 
lengths and the like. This is a crude caricature, but one that can be heard 
regularly in British mosques, at Muslim civil society meetings, and over 
dinner tables. The state – or lack – of a highly educated religious elite to 
match the polymaths of the so-called Muslim ‘glory days’ is a common lament 
of many a second-generation Western Muslims, and one that feeds into ideas 
of identity and communal self-esteem. Whatever happened to the ulama?
The ulama have historically taken up the role of Islam’s ‘guardians 
of literary memory’ (Waines, 1995). However, a narrative of decline has 
dominated the history of Islam’s religious elite. The narrative begins at the 
height of Islamic civilization and intellectual achievement, with the likes of 
Al-Ghazali and Ibn Sina.9 As Muslim empires flourished, so did intellectual 
and cultural production. As Muslim empires receded and European colonial 
encroachment increased, particularly from the eighteenth century onward, 
Muslim rulers became disempowered, as did the centres of religious learning.
During the colonial period, traditional systems of learning were devalued 
in favour of European-style schooling. This led to an inevitable change in 
the perceived hierarchy of vocations and valuable knowledge in the Muslim 
world.10 Subjects that were once collectively taught in ostensibly religious 
institutions (such as history, medicine, mathematics, and geometry), went 
through a division into sacred and secular learning. The education and sub-
jects offered in ‘secular’ institutions became more sought after and prized by 
socially mobile and able students. The establishment of secular education also 
created a space for a new breed of moral authority: the ‘Islamic intellectual’.
9 There is no room here for a full appreciation of the complexity and development of medieval 
Muslim education and knowledge transmission; this has been adequately dealt with elsewhere 
(see Berkey, 1992; Makdisi, 1981).
10 There are a number of assumptions underlying this historic narrative that require decon-
structing. Normative/lived Islam, traditional/modern, conservative/‘progressive’, etc. are not 
mutually exclusive categories, nor are they static, consistent terms. I reference them here as 
they appear in the literature and discourse surrounding these narratives of Islamic history.
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Meanwhile, the waqf or endowment system that ensured the f inancial 
independence of Muslim civil society and scholars was dissolved; the 
decreasing resources and poorer student intake of the institutions added 
to their fall in status.11 This, in turn, led to a change in the values and aspira-
tions of Muslim elites. During the postcolonial independence period, newly 
independent nationalist secular governments continued the process of 
disempowering the religious class, which was often seen as a threat to 
state power. In many Muslim countries, the historic institutions of Islamic 
learning became nationalized and thus under the tutelage of temporal power.
The above is a brief synopsis of the key overarching themes surrounding 
the changing status of the ulama; it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
discuss it in greater historic detail or regional variation. Suff ice it to say 
that during the last century and a half there have been numerous threats 
to and competitors for the roles of Islamic religious leaders and scholars 
throughout the Muslim world. Is this narrative of decline simply about 
Muslims losing temporal power? To the contrary, there are many cultural 
and social forces that can explain this so-called decline.12
The apparent demise of Muslim worldly power and intellectual leadership 
has often been laid at the feet of the traditionally trained religious elites. A com-
mon trope among Muslim reformists over the last century has been the need 
to bypass the last thousand years of accumulated legal and literary canon and 
return to the key sources. Carol Kersten and Susanne Olsson (2013, p. 2) point 
out that two influential movements on opposite ends of the spectrum have 
contested established or ‘traditional’ authority: the Salafi movement and the 
university-educated Muslim intellectuals. One of the reasons for the decline 
of the ulama is the rise of new ‘Muslim intellectuals’ who directly challenged 
the ulama and their monopoly on Islamic interpretation – causing what some 
have termed a ‘fragmentation of authority’ (Kersten and Olssen, 2013, p. 11). 
The literature tends to pit ‘Muslim intellectuals’ with no formal religious 
training against the ‘traditional ulama’. But the example of the Cambridge 
Muslim College, as I detail later, may help to disturb this neat dichotomy.
11 In some contexts this was even added to with occasions of ‘eliticide’, in which Islamic scholars 
were assassinated along with other educated elites as a result of colonialism, coups, or political 
upheaval (i.e., during the 1920s ‘Kemalisation’ in Turkey, 1880s British India, and the Bangladeshi 
War of Independence). It is worth noting that these historic incidents are not restricted to the 
Muslim world. There are similar patterns of discrediting the literate ‘knowledge’ elites within 
the Buddhist and Jewish traditions that are worthy of further study.
12 There is much scholarship on the dwindling credibility of traditional Islamic elites. See 
Eickelman and Piscatori (1996); for a focus on Syria, see Pierret (2013); and for a more global 
perspective, see Kersten and Olsson (2013).
320 AlyAA EbbiAry 
Much of the scholarship from both the East and the West on the role of 
the ulama has sidelined the former guardians of Islamic literary heritage. 
Khaled El-Rouayheb’s (2015) recent work on the intellectual history of the 
Ottoman Empire and North Africa has done much to question the narrative 
of decline.13 He argues that three independent critiques of decline – the 
Ottomanist, the Arabist, and the Islamist – have together aggravated a harsh 
historic narrative that assumes the period after Islamic intellectual flores-
cence and before colonial encroachment (i.e., the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries) to have been barren in terms of cultural and intellectual output. 
Many of the reformist and revivalist movements of the modern period 
see this age as ‘marked by unthinking scholarly imitation (taqlīd), crude 
Sufi pantheism, and “syncretic” and idolatrous popular religious practices’ 
(El-Rouayheb, 2015, p. 2). I would add that the ever-present elevation of the 
Muslim past as ‘ideal’ has further accentuated these damning assessments 
of the ulama, as well as the current moral health of the umma in the modern 
Muslim imaginary.14
One of the key historians of Islam’s scholarly class, Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman, argues that generalizations about the adverse impact of modernity 
on the ulama’s influence and authority are suspect (2002, p. 58). There can 
be little doubt that the ulama’s authority has come under ‘severe pressure 
and unprecedented challenges’ in the age of mass education and new 
technologies, but the ulama also have a lot to gain. For example, Zaman 
explores how Muslim scholars in the Indian subcontinent, before and 
after independence, rose to the challenge of the print media by producing 
more works for both learned and lay audiences. But the critical ques-
tion, for Zaman, is not whether the ulama’s authority has increased or 
decreased, but how that authority is constructed, argued, displayed, and 
constantly defended.
I draw on El-Rouayheb and Zaman’s analyses to argue that the decline 
narrative, although very real on a structural level, is more complex and 
fluid than a simple linear sequence of events. What counts as ‘normative’, 
‘traditional’ Islam is not a static f ixed entity, but rather a process. This 
can also be said for notions of religious authority. My research with the 
13 I am grateful to Yakoob Ahmed, Ottoman historian at the School of Oriental and African 
Studies, University of London, for helpful discussions and critique of the ‘decline narrative’.
14 Idealization of the past is a common trope that is not restricted to the Muslim historical 
imagination. What period ‘the past’ refers to depends very much on which Muslims are speak-
ing. I use it here to refer to the ‘golden age’ so often held up to contrast with the present in 
contemporary Muslim discourse. However, the ‘golden age’ for other groups (such as Salaf is) 
would be considerably earlier.
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Cambridge Muslim College and other examples shows how the discursive 
process of def ining what constitutes ‘normative Islam’ is both continuing 
and incrementally eroding the historic divide between ‘intellectuals’ and 
the ‘ulama’.
3 The Indian experience
The historic narrative of the rise of seminaries in South Asia is key to un-
derstanding the Muslim institutional (as well as civil society and mosque) 
landscape in the United Kingdom. These seminaries grew in a climate 
of encroaching colonialism, widespread perceived syncretism, and the 
decadence of indigenous rulers. As a result, many of their teachings speak 
to these concerns.
Because the Deobandi school (and its missionary offshoot the Tablighi 
Jamaat) dominates the scene of advanced Islamic religious training in the 
United Kingdom, it requires special attention here. The Islamic currents 
that originated in the Indian subcontinent are all based in the Hanaf i 
madhhab (‘school of thought’), one of the four major schools of legal thought 
in the Sunni Muslim world. The genealogy of Deobandism descends from 
the Hanafi School and its unique development in India under the Mughal 
Empire. In the literature on Islamic movements, it is often described as 
‘revivalist’, ‘reformist’, or ‘puritanical’ (and by the less nuanced as ‘fundamen-
talist’). It can rightly come under these broad categories, but in its original 
manifestation it was more a ‘readjustment to political disempowerment’ 
and a movement against syncretism.
The movement was concerned with the moral reform of the Muslim 
individual – a personalization of religion that is consistent with ‘modernity’. 
The combination of mass education and a cosmology of self-reliance and 
defiance are fused together in the Deobandi worldview (Metcalf, 1996). Its 
origins and the historic circumstances of its development have a considerable 
influence on the way Islam is taught and learned in Britain. Partly due to 
their emphasis on right knowledge and strengthening normative Islam 
in India in the British context, the Deobandi are the sect that has most 
emphasized the importance of social reproduction through the formal 
apparatus of schooling.15
15 I use ‘sect’ here only for convenience. My research participants would often use the Christian 
term ‘denomination’, or sometimes maslak, which is more common to South Asian Islamic 
understandings of movements and sectarian differences.
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Deobandi seminaries were designed for mass education, borrowing 
selectively from Western educational models (Birt and Lewis, 2010, p. 92). 
Though ‘traditional’ in their educational aims, they were thoroughly modern 
in their methods, and they used the example of British educational institu-
tions and missionary societies as sources of organizational inspiration 
(Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 56). The curriculum of most of the South Asian Darul 
Ulooms, both in India and in the United Kingdom, owes its origins to the 
work of the eighteenth century Farangi Mahall scholars who trace their 
lineage to Lucknow, India. The genius of this scholarly movement was its 
ability to draw from the rationalist tradition of scholarship associated with 
Persia (and characterized by an emphasis on logic and philosophy) and 
combine it with the traditional Islamic sciences of Quran, hadith, and f iqh. 
The resulting syllabus was known as Dars-i Nizami (see also Ali, Part II).
This syllabus was an ideal educational training ground for the production 
of legal professionals to serve in the public institutions of the Mughal Empire. 
However, with the collapse of the Mughals and the influence of colonialism, the 
nature of the Dars-i Nizami curriculum changed. The tradition of combining 
rational sciences with Islamic sciences, along with a growing emphasis on 
a contextual understanding of the Islamic texts was ‘eroded in favour of a 
renewed emphasis on the Quran and hadith and the preservation of the core 
Islamic sciences in what they viewed as a hostile climate’ (Birt and Lewis, 2010, 
p. 111). A curriculum and educational philosophy that had been interdiscipli-
nary and interpretive, and that provided training in the skills of reasoning 
and understanding, gradually mutated into ‘a curriculum which focused on 
the acquisition of information, and the ability to commit this information 
to memory’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, pp. 64-65). It is not surprising to find that the 
curriculum of many Deobandi seminaries in Britain involves the study of 
commentaries; while it is still called ‘Dars-i Nizami’, what is actually studied 
is a shortened and adapted form of the curriculum (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 65).
Different sectarian groupings and movements always exist within commu-
nities of a single national origin, and this is quite marked among Britain’s South 
Asian Muslims. The core support for the Deobandi movement, whether for its 
ulama or lay preachers, comes from the Indian Muslim communities (Gujaratis, 
East African Asians, and some North Indians), who form only a fraction of 
the British Muslim community as a whole, less than 9 per cent – although it 
also has support from Bangladeshis and, to a much lesser extent, Pakistanis 
(Birt and Lewis, 2010, p. 109). Geographically, the centres of Deobandi influ-
ence in the United Kingdom are the post-industrial mill-towns of the North 
West, Bolton, Preston, and Blackburn; Leicester in the East Midlands; and 
West Yorkshire (Dewsbury and Batley in particular). Today these towns have 
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become centres of learning and nodes for the dissemination of the Deobandi 
message nationally and even abroad; the ulama are at the centre of the Gujarati 
community and are able to determine the scope and direction of the further 
Islamization of these communities (Birt and Lewis, 2010, p. 111).
4 The British context
As mentioned earlier, the Indian Deobandi tradition has established more 
Islamic seminaries in Britain than any other sect. However, Jonathan Birt 
and Philip Lewis argue that the graduates produced by these seminaries 
far outnumber the imam positions available, and that most Darul Uloom 
graduates do not f ind employment in mosques or other sectors where they 
can apply their knowledge base (Birt and Lewis, 2010, p. 97).16 As one former 
Darul Uloom student told me, many of his peers ended up ‘packing bananas 
or stacking shop shelves’. Gilliat-Ray (2005, 2006) points out that there are 
vast differences in the level, type, depth, and school of education offered 
by various Deobandi Darul Ulooms in the United Kingdom. The ones she 
surveyed have a curriculum and teaching staff that are bound very closely 
to their institutional and school origins in the Indian subcontinent, and in 
particular Gujarat. By contrast, the Muslim College in Ealing, West London 
(related to the Al-Azhar tradition) and Hawza Illmiya (a Shia institution)17, 
also in London, are both non-South Asian Islamic colleges, and both are 
seeking or have acquired validation from established secular universities – a 
process that involves an overhaul of curriculum and teaching methods.18 
They attempt to combine theoretical and practical experience and show 
an appreciation of religious diversity and sources of knowledge outside of 
the Islamic tradition (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 64).
What explains the differences between the ‘South Asian’ Darul Ulooms 
and the others? Is it related to a die-hard devotion to an outdated and 
anachronistic curriculum, or something deeper? According to Gilliat-Ray, 
the crucial difference is in their attitudes towards the need for training to 
have external validation from other Higher Education institutions and for 
16 Ironically we have a similar situation in British academia, which has an over-emphasis on 
Ph.D. funding opportunities and very few post-doctoral and other academic opportunities for 
early career researchers.
17 Shia institutions produce more academically competent individuals. For more on this see 
Van den Bos (2015).
18 For a thorough exploration of the process and politics of the university validation of UK 
Islamic higher education institutions, see Scott-Bauman and Cheruvallil-Contractor (2015).
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contextualization. Islamic colleges such as the Muslim College and Hawza 
Illmiya have thus ‘met some of the challenges that South Asian dar ul-ulooms 
are now facing, though the extent to which this challenge is recognized 
differs’ (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 74).
Gilliat-Ray argues that Darul Ulooms in the United Kingdom are inad-
equate, anachronistic, and, in essence, backward. This portrait links to her 
key argument that times are changing too fast for the calcified Darul Ulooms:
The traditional role of the imam in Britain is in many cases expanding 
beyond mosques, to include more pastoral and youth work, chaplaincy, and 
involvement in local community projects. The curriculum of the dar ul-uloom 
is barely adapting to meet this changing role; the emphasis in the curriculum 
remains on inherited knowledge and textual study, and any modification 
of the curriculum would necessarily involve revision of a syllabus that has 
been actively preserved over generations. (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 67)
Despite this strong critique, Gilliat-Ray was unable to gain f ieldwork access 
to the Darul Ulooms she writes about. These remain shrouded in mystery 
for, and thus often forgotten by, many British Muslims – let alone the wider 
British public. This is, however, changing with recent media and government 
interest in Deobandi chaplains and how they are educated.
Gilliat-Ray did, however, conduct extensive interviews with community 
leaders and activists about their opinions about and relationships with these 
institutions – and her f indings tell us a lot about how they are perceived 
within Muslim circles. She demonstrates that many in the wider Muslim 
community are (or should be) stakeholders in the project of building ad-
vanced religious training colleges, and how the Deobandi Darul Ulooms have 
not reached out to the majority Muslim community. Gilliat-Ray attempts an 
interesting democratization of critique by asking the Muslim civil society 
interviewees how they would like to see Darul Uloom training. Her survey 
shows that many Muslims want Darul Ulooms to connect more with the 
realities faced by the community and to include a practical placement in 
their training (Gilliat-Ray, 2006, p. 71). Many of the criticisms offered by 
those interviewed coincided with the linguistic and citizenship demands 
of the British government.19 However, these issues can sometimes be ‘red 
herrings’, because imams trained in the United Kingdom are not necessarily 
‘better’ educated than those trained abroad.
19 These include the expectation of English language prof iciency and legal residency.
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The studies by Gilliat-Ray and by Birt and Lewis both agree that the 
forms which the Darul Uloom model has taken in Britain are broadly out 
of touch with modern Britain and the current challenges facing the Muslim 
community. There is little research on the Darul Uloom tradition in Britain, 
but other analyses generally correspond with the above (see Bowen, 2014, 
and Geaves, 2012, both of whom are somewhat more critical).20
5 Religious leaders’ challenges
From the production of imams, we now turn to the challenges these religious 
leaders face. The role and expectations of the imam have changed drasti-
cally through the process of immigration and mass settlement in Western 
Europe. For many, the once-humble position of prayer-leader has been 
plunged into the status of community representative and problem-solver 
by both congregations and state authorities. At Regents Park Mosque, 
one of London’s largest and most famous mosques, an imam forum was 
held in 2015 to connect and share experiences among imams.21 A sense of 
heavy responsibility was in the air, tinged with the sound of desperation. 
Serving mosque imams from all over Greater London were present, from 
a kaleidoscope of backgrounds – Nigerian, Somali, Palestinian, Egyptian, 
Sierra Leonean, Moroccan, and the usual Pakistani and Bangladeshi – all, 
however, foreign-born and foreign-trained. Amongst the proceedings there 
were theological treatises and service delivery advice, and in between were 
questions and comments from attendee imams. Many complained about 
undemocratic mosque management committees, increasing demands for 
time and services with no extra support, as well as the constant piling-up 
of new legislation and calls for accountability. The message coming from 
the f loor was a strong feeling of being under-resourced, under-paid, and 
over-burdened, as well as ill equipped and under-trained for the challenges 
laid at their feet.
As one prominent imam told me, most of his fellow imams are oblivious 
to the degree to which problems like drugs, teenage pregnancy, and domestic 
abuse are rampant in the Muslim community. Considering that the seminar-
ies ban all use of social media within their grounds, it is not surprising there 
is a lack of awareness of these issues. At one lecture I attended, the speaker, 
20 There is a dire need for more research on the topic of the UK’s Darul Ulooms, particularly 
from the perspective of their enduring signif icance and influence.
21 This is based on participant observation at the event held on 15 March 2015.
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a prominent and learned British-born Islamic scholar, lamented about the 
number of young men who come to the mosque and yet also have girlfriends. 
He stated that he tries to encourage them to marry. ‘He’s really out of touch,’ 
a young activist told me afterward. ‘This imam doesn’t realize that most of 
the audience here are probably also in non-marital relationships.’
6 The Cambridge Muslim College
In 2011, the Cambridge Muslim College (CMC) was established to deal with 
precisely these challenges by giving a contextual ‘update’ to the heavily textual 
training of British Muslim seminary graduates. It has been called a ‘f inishing 
school’ that was established to provide a higher education experience for 
graduates of the traditional Indian-style Darul Ulooms in the United Kingdom. 
The college offers a one-year programme for both men and women with a cur-
riculum emphasizing citizenship, political and cultural awareness, interfaith 
understanding, community building, counselling, and other pastoral skills.
Cambridge Muslim College recruits the crème de la crème of the United 
Kingdom’s Darul Ulooms, those who should go on to become religious 
leaders and scholars, but who often f ind their legitimacy questioned by 
their peers on the ‘streets’ and by the more educated members of the Muslim 
community.22 Many Muslims regard these graduates as ill equipped by 
the archaic curriculum offered at the Darul Ulooms, which are famously 
insular and closed institutions. All of the enrolled students are cālims and 
cālimas (male and female scholars) who have graduated from Darul Uloom 
seminaries and completed the Dars-i Nizami curriculum.
The Darul Uloom graduates have been trained mainly in the Deobandi 
or Barelwi traditions in institutions arguably more conservative, both 
culturally and religiously, than that offered by the CMC and its staff, who 
are part of Cambridge’s relatively liberal and Sufi-inclined Muslim scene. 
The college is therefore in a position where it teaches mainly students 
from one particular denominational background, but does not necessarily 
share or promote that particular school of thought. This demonstrates an 
impressive degree of credibility and stakeholder relations with the ‘feeder’ 
seminaries – something that much of British Muslim civil society has been 
unable to achieve; in a highly fragmented and embattled Muslim community, 
this cannot be underestimated.
22 For more on contestations of authority in the UK Muslim community, see Ahmad and 
Evergetti (2010) and Jones et al. (2014).
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Cambridge itself has a small but burgeoning Muslim community with 
a relatively high educational and Islamic literacy level. They are linked 
through Sufi networks to other communities in the United Kingdom and 
internationally. The ethnic, regional, and class origins of the CMC students 
differ markedly from most of those in the wider Cambridge Muslim com-
munity, the majority of whom are connected in some way to the university, 
or to Cambridge’s growing hospitals and science parks.
The culture of the college is decidedly English, and middle-class. The 
building itself is a converted vicarage, which has been islamicized with 
wuḍūc washrooms, a prayer room, and gender-specif ic common rooms. It 
is heavily influenced by the vision of its founder and dean Timothy Winter, 
Chair of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Divinity in Cambridge University. 
Winter, also known as sheikh Abdal Hakim Murad, is, outside the ivory 
tower, a well-known and respected British Islamic scholar who appeals 
to a considerable audience in the British Muslim community and wider 
Anglophone Muslim world.
7 Transforming Islamic education
Cambridge Muslim College is modelled on the example of the Cambridge 
University colleges, but has no formal aff iliation to the university. Students 
each have a tutor with one-to-one supervision sessions every week. The col-
lege employs a handful of staff and appoints two research fellows annually. 
This feature makes the college drastically different from its Darul Uloom 
forebears. The research fellows are usually postdoctoral or other early 
career researchers who have completed PhDs in Islamic Studies or related 
disciplines in universities in the United Kingdom, and who spend a year at 
the college working on their own research as well as providing occasional 
lecturing and supervisory duties. With these fellows the college positions 
itself as an aspiring higher education institution, with research output and 
the legitimacy to compete with universities in what constitutes ‘Islamic 
Studies’ in the academy.
Another key pedagogical difference is the emphasis on skills acquisition, 
as opposed to solely knowledge acquisition as taught by the Darul Ulooms. 
Students are expected to give presentations, have mock counselling sessions, 
and even produce creative work as part of their Art and Architecture module. 
A more holistic approach to educating the ‘whole’ student is also evident 
with the inclusion of Tai Chi and other martial arts as an obligatory part 
of the weekly timetable for all students. This is supplemented further with 
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college trips to historic landmarks, museums, and even churches – a new 
experience for most of the seminary graduates.
The CMC is a small institution with a capacity of twenty students in 
the annual programme, although most years there are approximately ten 
men and f ive female students enrolled. The majority of these students are 
British nationals, but most years they also accept one to three students from 
overseas. For the majority of the students, their secondary education was 
boarding in a seminary for four to seven years. Unlike CMC, the seminaries 
were located outside an urban centre and allowed little to no contact with 
the wider community during their training. Almost all the enrolled students 
were from a South Asian ethnic background at the time of my f ieldwork, 
and most of them came from suburbs or attended primary schools that were 
dominated by their own ethnic group. For many, it is likely that until their 
CMC experience they had very little educational or professional fraterniza-
tion with people outside their own immediate communities.
One seminar I attended on medical ethics was particularly illustrative 
of the evolving pedagogical paradigm evident at the CMC. The visiting 
lecturer looked and sounded like a Darul Uloom graduate – he studied 
in Dewsbury and Karachi – and sported a white shalwar kameez, turban, 
and a long beard.23 However, he also had several years of experience as a 
hospital chaplain and in offering counsel to Muslims and non-Muslims in 
diff icult medical and ethical situations, setting him apart from the students.
A number of key ethical questions were discussed concerning organ 
donation, infertility treatments, and euthanasia. The teacher asked the 
students a series of hypothetical questions, positing a scenario and asking 
whether it would be acceptable to: (a) the sharia; (b) to their local mosque 
communities; and (c) to the wider British public. Example scenarios included: 
a Muslim woman being examined by a male medical practitioner, the routine 
use of contraception within marriage, taking a second wife, and leading 
a congregational prayer dressed in Western dress rather than ‘traditional’ 
or ethnic dress.
It became clear that most of the opposition lay in having new or unfamiliar 
interpretations and rulings accepted by the ‘community’. The ‘community’ in 
many of the students’ case meant their mosque congregations, the congrega-
tions who had supported them to study for so many years and which were 
invariably dominated by community ‘elders’. Considering the fact that most 
British mosque committees are run by men over the age of 50, for many 
23 Dewsbury has the oldest and largest Islamic seminary in the UK and is Europe’s key centre 
of Tablighi Jamaat preaching.
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of them this is the audience they would ultimately be accountable to. For 
many of these leaders-in-training, the ‘community’ may oppose a fatwa 
allowing contraception without ‘valid reason’ – even if it could be justif ied 
in Islamic jurisprudence.
‘These are all aspects of curf [custom]’ said the teacher, ‘if norms change 
then so can the ḥukm [ruling]. Just because the ṣaḥāba [companions of the 
prophet] didn’t practice something, doesn’t mean we can’t practice by default,’ 
he continued. ‘But Mufti Saab’, one of the students asked, ‘what if we have 
different norms in the same society due to immigration and multicultural-
ism?’ The students buzzed with tentative legal solutions. The mufti continued:
Then we have to ask, what reasons make something permissible. Why 
do we need a reason to use contraception? Why are we so strict about it? 
Everybody is doing it. Otherwise you’d all have twenty siblings! Did the 
ṣaḥāba practice family planning? No very much, but they needed numbers 
for honour and protection. Just because they didn’t do something, doesn’t 
mean we can’t do it today.
The teacher pushed them further: ‘What if a woman wants to have an 
abortion just to keep her f igure?’ Discussion ensued, suggestions, giggles. 
‘Surely that is a cosmetic and superf icial concern?’ protested one of the 
students. ‘But Maulana so-and-so has permitted it,’ the teacher said, ‘Are 
you stricter than our pious predecessors?’ This was a rhetorical question not 
meant to be answered, and rightly so. No one is going to position themselves 
as superior, because part of the narrative of decline that exists internally 
within Muslim discourse is that the piety and spiritual insight of the umma 
is continually diminishing. A deep sense of humility is ingrained into the 
students of the Darul Uloom tradition, a humility so pervasive that it can 
sometimes make students hesitate to unsettle perceived norms. This fear 
of departing from what is acceptable is in part addressed pedagogically by 
having teachers from positions of authority in the Islamic tradition and/
or who are practicing Muslims themselves. The teacher in this case had 
achieved the rank of mufti, an Islamic scholar licensed to use independ-
ent reasoning to offer new legal opinions – the highest rank in Islamic 
scholarship. He upholds the sharia and applies it every day in his work. 
He speaks the technical language of Islamic jurisprudence and is not 
overtly pushing a ‘liberal’ agenda, which is often perceived by self-conscious 
upholders of the tradition as compromising their integrity and authenticity 
as Islamic scholars. This is tension no doubt common among many religious 
traditions today, but one that is particularly acute in this context.
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Hierarchy is important in the Deobandi and Barelwi traditions (the two 
most dominant Islamic interpretational traditions in British Muslim civil 
society). Being instructed in some of the most controversial modern issues 
by a scholar who is recognizably senior in the hierarchy is signif icant. First, 
it gives the students a familiar and authoritative framework through which 
to question and push boundaries; second, it provides adequate continuity 
with the hierarchical tradition they come from. It is even more interesting 
to see how the British context is taken into account and how students 
are encouraged to use their learning, while also being able to question 
and think beyond the arguably inflexible framework inherited from their 
home institutions.
We have here unfolding a unique approach to higher Islamic education, 
one that weaves together authentic Islamic learning that is considered cred-
ible by both the students and their communities with the expectations and 
know-how that characterizes modern British society. To better appreciate 
this approach, the next section takes a closer look at the differences between 
the CMC and the Darul Ulooms in Britain.
8 Comparison to the Darul Ulooms
The curriculum taught at the Cambridge Muslim College is vastly different 
from the students’ prior education in the Darul Ulooms. In the seminary, 
the timetable starts after fajr (‘dawn’) prayer, and the morning and early 
afternoon are dominated by Islamic Sciences according to the Dars-i Nizami 
curriculum. In the mid-afternoon, usually after the caṣr (‘mid-afternoon’) 
prayer, National Curriculum lessons commence until the evening.24 CMC 
students’ prior learning was primarily a strict and disciplined regimen of 
lessons in the Islamic sciences, prayer, and other devotional practices in 
addition to homework time.
In comparison to the Darul Ulooms, ‘worldly’ knowledge is foregrounded 
though not necessarily prioritized at the CMC. At f irst glance, the timetable 
seems to show that explicitly religious learning is confined to the Quranic 
memorization class and Ihya Uloomuddin (‘revival of religious sciences’) 
session. From attending an average week of classes, however, I discovered 
that so permeating is the spiritual ethos of the institution that it is diff icult 
24 The National Curriculum is a common programme of study in schools that is designed to 
ensure a nationwide uniformity of content and standards in education in the United Kingdom. 
See: https://www.gov.uk/national-curriculum/overview.
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to go from a lesson on community leadership to the ethics of stem cell 
research and forget that we are in an Islamic institution. The college day 
f its around prayer times, and the teachers, whatever their own confessional 
backgrounds, make a point of acknowledging and working with the students’ 
prior religious training. Lessons taught by non-Muslim lecturers take the 
form familiar to any college or university in the United Kingdom, though 
many of them try to anchor new material in something familiar to the 
students, or inquire whether similar concepts exist in the Islamic tradition. 
This is another aspect of the ‘bridging’ approach that characterizes the 
college. The division between worldly and religious knowledge is almost 
irrelevant in this context, where subjects like biology and astronomy are 
taught by practising Muslims and the teachers are comfortable using differ-
ent genres of inquiry and analysis. Islamic education can be seen, through the 
example of CMC, to have come full-circle: from an approach that originally 
offered ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ sciences together, then to their separation in 
the post-colonial era, and to their unif ication once again.
Another key difference between CMC and the Darul Ulooms is that all 
lessons, except the hifẓ (‘memorization’) class, are taught in a mixed-gender 
classroom. The signif icance of this arrangement in relation to the history of 
modern Islamic learning cannot be underestimated. Of the United Kingdom’s 
25 Darul Ulooms, four are female-only institutions. In the Darul Uloom 
setting, male students are not taught by female cālimas. However, female 
Darul Uloom students can be taught by male cālims. To enable this they 
often wear niqābs in the male teacher’s presence, or the teachers arrange 
an audio link to the classroom so that the students can hear the male cālim 
but he does not have to be present in the classroom. At CMC, the male and 
female students sit on parallel sides of the classroom, and both male and 
female teachers teach them. Even outside of the Darul Uloom tradition, it is 
very common to f ind that British Muslim civil society, charitable, and other 
community events are often segregated, whether explicitly by organizers or 
voluntarily by attendees. However, it would be misleading to assume that 
this gender segregation is always male-imposed. Even casual conversations 
with Muslim women in mosques and Islamic events around Britain show 
that there is widespread support for it. There is evidently also strong support 
for educational gender segregation among the potential applicants to CMC, 
as I was told that some female students felt discouraged from applying 
because it was a mixed classroom setting.
My interviews with CMC students showed that they value and are grateful 
for the opportunity to expand their skills and knowledge base. However, 
when asked whether they would be able to recommend these courses to 
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their alma maters, most believed that such constructive criticism would 
not be considered, though one student proposed going back and doing so 
after he moved up in the ranks of teaching staff.25 Change is uncommon 
and very slow at the Darul Ulooms, and would need to happen from the 
top-down rather than the bottom-up. Despite mounting evidence of alumni 
disgruntlement and wider community criticism, the Darul Uloom model 
remains very much intact and even flourishing, because they have credibility 
within the communities that support them. There is evidence to show that 
some Darul Ulooms have incorporated courses on professional skills, but 
whether this is due to the feedback from former graduates is unclear.
It is important at this point to note that the students who have gradu-
ated from Darul Ulooms and undertaken the Dars-i Nizami syllabus have 
been instructed as trainee ulama, and not so adequately as imams. These 
are both key roles in Islamic religious authority – and they can coincide 
in the same person – but they are not the same. The ulama are a class 
of religious intellectuals who, historically at least, could also have legal, 
academic, or even political-administrative functions. The imam is more 
of a community f igure, whose basic function is leading the prayers in the 
mosque. With the growth of mosques as civil society institutions in their 
own right, particularly in minority Western contexts, the role of the imam 
has become more demanding.
While the Darul Uloom model emphasizes the acquisition of and proficiency 
in the Islamic sciences, at the CMC the professional acumen and wider-world 
knowledge of graduates is a key priority, as evident from the role it plays in their 
curriculum. However, a background in seminary education is a prerequisite 
for entry to CMC, because they are trying to offer a ‘top-up’ course of sorts. 
Students partake in lessons such as communication skills, community leader-
ship, and counselling. During the course all students gain work experience 
as teachers or preachers in the local Muslim community of Cambridge, and 
more formally through a work experience module as a trainee chaplain with 
Cambridge’s largest hospital. Students reported that the parts of the course that 
were based on direct contact with members of the public, such as chaplaincy 
and community placements, or that provided heavy pastoral skills training, 
such as counselling, were some of the most transformative in terms of personal 
growth and questioning their previously held assumptions.
Though there is an obvious emphasis on professional ‘polishing’, this is 
not to say that the diploma in Contextual Islamic Studies offered at CMC is 
a vocational course – quite the contrary. Over 60 per cent of the curriculum 
25 Interviews with CMC students, July 2015.
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consists of academic subjects such as British political history, world history, 
science, social sciences, and English literature, which is designed to update 
their academic knowledge and expose them to other disciplinary traditions. 
These modules are all examined through essays and exams, as they would 
be in a British secondary school or university. ‘We weren’t taught to write 
essays at Darul Uloom, we didn’t know how to order our thoughts and make 
an argument’ one of the students told me, somewhat perplexed, when several 
impending deadlines were looming. One of the explicit purposes of this is 
to ref ine and practice their written academic English, which is highlighted 
as a weakness by most Darul Uloom graduates.
CMC has fostered a relationship with the famously insular Darul Ul-
ooms, which generally rely on personal networks rather than institutional 
alliances, and has attempted to cultivate a sense of trust where other 
parts of the British Muslim community have failed. This creates neces-
sary tensions, as the CMC has to maintain a delicate balance between 
honouring the past and innovating for the present. One example of this 
delicate balance is gender segregation. The students come from institutions 
where they have no contact with the opposite sex. While the lecture hall 
and canteen of the CMC are mixed, the prayer and common rooms are 
segregated. The CMC pushes limits, but not too far. While the CMC relies on 
the Darul Ulooms to provide students, its existence implies that the work 
of the Darul Ulooms is unf inished; they have to f ind a balance between 
traditions and moving forward – but not too fast. This potentially puts 
limitations on the kind of work the CMC can do, but – as bef its such an 
institution – it is self-consciously evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, 
in its approach.
9 Conclusion: The baby and the bathwater
In the midst of such substantial pedagogical and curriculum developments, 
how is the Cambridge Muslim College managing to keep the ‘baby’ and 
dispense with the ‘bathwater’? By emphasizing context while simulta-
neously upholding the traditional canon. The students’ prior learning 
is celebrated, valued, and expanded upon; though there is pedagogical 
innovation, book learning is still central, and the inclusion of memorization 
classes in the curriculum is a nod to more ‘traditional’ Islamic learning 
methods. The broad legal and doctrinal premises of the normative Islamic 
worldview as expounded by the Darul Ulooms is shared by the College, 
as is an impetus to ‘preserve’ and ‘protect’ the tradition in the modern 
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world. The College has undertaken extensive outreach efforts to connect 
with mosques and local communities around the country who send their 
children to, and support, the Darul Ulooms. As an institution, the CMC is 
a unique and innovative model that has nevertheless gained considerable 
respect and credibility from some of the most conservative sections of the 
Muslim community.
So what makes the Cambridge Muslim College different from its ‘feeder’ 
colleges? Both represent essentially two different educational approaches, 
but with broadly similar aims. Both aim to create a religious elite, but the 
emphasis of the CMC is on the training of leaders who have the knowledge 
and skills to serve the community in the time and space they are in now 
(hence the pioneering qualification received by the graduates, the diploma in 
Contextual Islamic Studies). The existence of the CMC is an acknowledgment 
that the knowledge base inherited from the ‘old world’ – the homelands 
of the f irst generation of migrants – is not enough. The establishment of 
institutions of higher learning (in this case the Darul Ulooms) is itself an 
acknowledgment that the migrant community has settled and no longer 
needs to send its religious trainees abroad. However, the establishment of a 
hybrid institution aimed at both ‘raising the bar’ and serving an increasingly 
younger, more educated, and professionalizing Muslim community is a 
further development in this direction. The relevance and implications of 
this difference can be numerous and consequential for both the Muslim 
minority experience in Britain and the wider Islamic narrative of religious 
expertise and leadership.
So are initiatives like the CMC stemming the narrative of decline that 
has so beleaguered Islamic religious leadership? It is too early to say. It is, 
however, possible to conclude that dramatic ruptures with the past do not 
seem to be favoured, but that there is enough support and willingness to give 
the traditionally trained ulama a chance to update and contextualize their 
knowledge and practice with an initiative like the CMC. A careful balance 
of aff irming and upholding the old as well as valuing and promoting the 
new has shown the CMC to be a highly effective and quite unique bridging 
institution. Evidence suggests that the CMC is pragmatic about the changes 
it can bring about in one generation, but by pursuing such changes they will 
be more effective in the long run. If nothing else, it is clear from my research 
that the CMC has built up the confidence of this group of overlooked Muslim 
students and trainee religious leaders. In the process, it is also redressing 
the balance of the inverted education hierarchy – one that separates the 
sacred from the secular – and nurturing religious scholars’ attempts to 
regain their rightful place in the Muslim imagination.
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Abstract
In this chapter, imam training in Spain is treated following three questions 
and lines of argumentation: How does the university system in Spain 
look like? What kind of religions are present in the country and how are 
imams getting trained?1
Keywords: Islam in Spain, Church State relations, Catholic Church, 
constitution, religious freedom
1 The university system in Spain
The Spanish university system consists of both public and private universi-
ties. There are 51 public universities, of which one (Universidad Nacional 
de Educación a Distancia, or UNED; the National University of Distance 
Learning) is an open university, and seventeen private universities. There 
are also two summer universities: Menendez Pelayo University and the 
International University in Andalucía. Of the seventeen private universities, 
one (the University Oberta de Catalonia) is an open university and seven 
belong to the Catholic Church. The Agreement of 3 January 1979 between the 
Spanish State and the Holy See concerning education and cultural affairs 
stipulates the following: ‘State universities, with prior agreement from the 
1 This chapter has been written as part of the research project ‘The Arab Spring: integra-
tion of Fundamental Rights and Church-State relationship in the constituent processes of 
the new democracies’, funded by the MINECO ‒ Spanish Ministry of Economy and Finances 
(Ref.: DER 2012-33513).
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competent church authority, may establish centres of higher learning for 
the study of Catholic theology’ (Article XII).
The Catholic Church thus has the right to establish faculties of theology 
within public universities, but has chosen not to do so. Instead, the church 
created faculties of theology within its own universities. There are three 
other groups – Jews, Protestants, and Muslims – that signed a Cooperation 
Agreement with the state in 1992. According to these Cooperation Agree-
ments and the Organic Law 6/2001 of 21 December 2001, these groups are 
also allowed to establish university centres for theological studies, where 
their religious ministers can be trained and can receive a state-recognized 
certif ication after completion of the training. However, as of the moment 
of this book’s publication, none of these groups have acted upon this op-
portunity. Protestants and Muslims have established their own theological 
centres, but without off icial recognition.
2 Religions in Spain
Article 16 of the Spanish Constitution recognizes the fundamental right 
of religious freedom for not only individuals, but also groups and com-
munities.2 The only limits to manifestations of religious freedom, both 
for individuals and for groups, are those necessary for the maintenance of 
public order: ‘Freedom of ideology, religion and worship of individuals and 
communities is guaranteed, with no other restriction on their expression 
than may be necessary to maintain public order as protected by law.’ Law 
7/1980 of 5 July 1980 (the Religious Freedom Act) implements the concept 
of public order as mentioned in the Constitution. This act enshrines two 
kinds of limits on religious freedom:
‒ Respect for the fundamental rights of others (like physical integrity, equal-
ity, and freedom of expression). All manifestations of religious freedom 
should respect, and thus not undermine, the fundamental rights of others.
‒ Public order, which is presented as a kind of triangular concept with 
the following sides: public health, public morality, and public security.
Thus, everybody can express his or her religion as long as he or she respects 
the area of this ‘triangle’.
2 For information on the constitution, laws, decrees, and legal issues in Spain in several lan-
guages, see: http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/es/areas-tematicas/libertad-religiosa/
normativa-materia-libertad.
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2.1 Register of religious entities
In Spain there is a ‘Register of Religious Entities’ (referred to hereafter as RER, 
its abbreviated form in Spanish), as stipulated by Royal Decree 594/2015 of July 
3th 2015. This register falls under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. To 
qualify for protection under the religious freedom laws, groups do not need to 
adopt any special legal form, but they do have the option to enrol in the Register. 
Registration is not compulsory, and registered denominations have only a limited 
number of legal advantages over non-registered ones. The main advantage is that 
after registration they are guaranteed legal representation as religious entities.
There are diverse requirements for enrolment in the Register of Religious 
Entities. The f irst step in the registration process is for the religious entity 
to submit a written request. This written application must be accompanied 
by a document containing data such as:
‒ Notice of the foundation or establishment of the organization in Spain.
‒ Entity name. The chosen name should be appropriate. This means that 
the entity’s name cannot already be in use by another group, which could 
lead to misunderstandings. The religious entity should also present the 
address of its main location, or at least an address to receive notifications 
from the Ministry of Justice.
‒ Declaration of religious purposes. The expressed religious goals obviously 
must be considered in line with Spanish law. Therefore, they cannot go 
beyond the limits established in the Religious Freedom Act: respect for 
the fundamental rights of others and for public order.
‒ Representative bodies of the religious entity. The document should 
contain the procedures established according to the relevant internal 
norms, including the powers of the representative bodies and the 
requisites for a valid designation thereof.
According to the same Royal Decree (594/2015), there are, among others, 
these kinds of groups eligible to enrol in the Register:
‒ Churches, denominations, and religious communities
‒ Their respective federations.
‒ Religious congregations and their institutes.
‒ Religious associations that have been constituted as such under the 
ordinance of the churches they are linked to.
‒ Worship training centres.
However, there is a norm that allows only foundations associated with 
the Catholic Church to be enrolled in the Register of Religious Entities. As 
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most of the religious foundations existing in the past were linked to the 
Catholic Church, Royal Decree 589/1984 of 8 July was passed. To counter this 
problem, other royal decrees can be passed that would allow the enrolment 
of foundations related to other denominations in the Register of Religious 
Entities. However, until now there have been no new royal decrees allowing 
the registration of Jewish, Protestant, or Islamic foundations.
2.2 Relations between political powers and denominations
All relations between religious groups and public powers such as the central 
government, autonomous regions, or municipalities are expected to respect 
the tenets enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution of Spain. It should be 
taken into account that the Religious Freedom Law (7/1980) does not only refer 
to those with religious creeds, but also to those who do not have them, i.e., 
to non-believers. Religious freedom is not only the right to believe, but also 
the right to not hold any religious creed. The law protects those two options 
in the same way, with the same strength. The second paragraph of Article 16, 
also referring to individuals, bans forced professions of personal beliefs: ‘No 
one can be forced to declare his/her ideology, religion or beliefs.’ This article 
specifies that neither the public powers nor any individual can force someone 
to make declarations about his or her beliefs. But it should also be taken into 
consideration that the consequences of keeping silent can sometimes be 
negative or harmful. For example, Spanish legislation permits individuals to 
get an identity card (DNI) with a passport photo in which they are wearing 
a headscarf, as long as the face is visible and the person in question can be 
easily identified. There have been some cases, however, of women presenting 
a photo of themselves wearing a headscarf to the police station when applying 
for an identity card and the police not only inquiring whether or not they 
are Muslim, but also requiring the presence of a document from the official 
representative of Spanish Muslims, i.e. the Islamic Commission of Spain, as 
testimony to the fact that they are, in fact, Muslim. If the woman refuses to 
answer or does not present the certif icate, she will not get her identity card. 
In other words, she is being punished for her silence regarding her creeds – a 
practice that is clearly banned by the Spanish Constitution.
The third paragraph of Article 16 proclaims the following: ‘No religion 
shall have a state character. The public authorities shall take into account 
the religious beliefs of Spanish society and shall consequently maintain 
appropriate cooperation relations with the Catholic Church and other confes-
sions.’ This paragraph deals with the constitutional model of the relationship 
between the state and religious denominations at three levels: municipalities, 
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autonomous regions, and the central government. These relationships 
should be developed within the framework of two constitutional tenets: the 
principle of the non-confessional state, also called ‘Secularism of the State’, 
and the principle of cooperation between the state and religious groups.
2.2.1 Principle of the non-confessional state
During the dictatorship of General Franco (1939-1975), the fundamental laws 
proclaimed Catholicism to be the official religion of the state. After the death 
of the dictator, Spain went through a transition from a confessional to a non-
confessional state, which was ultimately established in the constitutional 
principles. The principle of the non-confessional state is based on two pillars: 
the separation between church and state, and the neutrality of the state 
vis-à-vis religious affairs. This tenet is contained in the f irst sentence of the 
Constitution’s third paragraph: ‘No religion shall have a state character.’ The 
formula established in the draft constitution was even stricter: ‘The state is 
to be non-confessional.’ However, that expression was not retained in the 
f inal version, perhaps because it was too close to the formula that had been 
coined in Article 3 of the Constitution of 1932 (The Second Republic): ‘The 
State has no off icial religion’ (Ferreiro Galguera, 2005, p. 62).
The formula adopted by the Constitution of 1978 to dictate the non-
confessional nature of the state could be considered ‘shy’ or modest for two 
reasons. First, because that paragraph was not included in the Preliminary 
Title. The Preliminary Title is the part of the Constitution where the State 
presents itself – in other words, where the State shows its ontological fea-
tures, including its relationship with the sacred. Second, the expression ‘No 
religion shall have a state character’ is considered ‘shy’ or modest because 
it avoids focusing on the word ‘state’, which should be the subject of the 
sentence. Perhaps this ‘modesty’ is the result of the Constituent Assembly’s 
attempt to f ind a middle ground between the Members of Parliament who 
wanted to maintain Catholicism as the religion of the state, as in the previous 
regime, and the ones who fought for a strict secularism and the removal 
of any mention of the Catholic Church from the text of the constitution. 
Taking into account that some principles are diff icult to reconcile, it was 
decided to adapt the core of secularism to the needs of cooperation in the 
attempt to avoid traumatic changes and preserve the social peace. The 
memory of the unfortunate Spanish Second Republic, which ended in a 
civil war (1936-1939), seemed to enhance this.
In spite of its modesty, the constitutional expression ‘No religion 
shall have a state character’ perfectly reflects the secularism of the non-
confessional state. The basic idea encapsulated in this principle is that 
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religious denominations and public powers (represented by the central 
government, autonomous regions, and municipalities) are independent and 
autonomous from each other. There is a consequence to this: the principle 
of non-interference in both directions. The state must not interfere in the 
realm of faith, and religious denominations must not meddle in the sphere of 
the state. In other words, the public powers cannot interfere in the internal 
realm of churches, which are entitled to organize themselves freely, and vice 
versa. As the Spanish Constitutional Court has reiterated in its decisions, 
the public powers must avoid any kind of confusion between state and 
religious functions.3 However, by virtue of the principle of cooperation, it 
is common for state powers to offer legal advice to denominations – but 
only if such legal advice is requested. On the other hand, no off icial posts 
may be reserved for religious ministers. However, they do have the same 
rights to participate in public affairs as any other citizen, for example by 
being a Member of Parliament or an off icial. Rabbis, priests, or imams may 
become civil servants if they pass the ordinary public examinations, which 
are inspired by and based on the constitutional principles of equality, merit, 
and capacity.
In some European countries, there are still remnants of a less clear-
cut relationship between church and state. In Denmark, for example, the 
laws that regulate the Lutheran Church are based on parliamentary acts. 
Moreover, the House of Lords in Great Britain still reserves seats for Anglican 
bishops. In Spain, seats are no longer reserved in Parliament for the high 
representatives of Catholic bishops (as was the case during Franco’s regime), 
for doing so would go against the spirit of the separation between church 
and state and thus undermine the principle of the non-confessional state.
Neutrality is the other column on which the non-confessional principle 
rests. But what does neutrality mean? The Spanish Constitutional Court has 
described it as follows: ‘The state is not competent in religious affairs.’4 Thus, 
(not) believing in a religious creed is only a choice (a right) for individuals 
and communities. As the Constitutional Court has established through its 
verdicts, individuals and groups are the real holders of the right to religious 
freedom, and consequently the only ones who can assess or evaluate whether 
religion is true – not the state.5
3 Among others, STC 24/1982 F.J.I. http://tc.vlex.es/vid/1-2-15034884.
4 STC 46/2001. http://mbarral.webs.ull.es/stc46-2001.html.
5 ‘The articulation of a Register […] does not empower the State to undertake an activity of 
control to determine the legitimacy of religious beliefs […] but only to verify, deriving to that 
end a mere act of stating and not rating, that the applicant group is not one of those entities 
excluded by Article 3.2 of the LOLR, and that the activities and behaviours developed for its 
imam traininG in the leGal contex t oF islam in spain 343
For this reason, the term ‘sect’ – which has negative connotations – is 
not considered a legal term but rather a sociological one (Martí Sánchez, 
2014, p. 13; Motilla, 1999, p. 112). The state cannot distinguish between the 
heterodoxy and orthodoxy of a specif ic religious group. So the state should 
accept that religious communities are groups if they consider themselves 
to be so. They can enrol in the Register of Religious Entities that falls under 
the Ministry of Justice once it is verif ied that they comply with the formal 
requisites imposed by the current legislation. Of course the state does 
control whether any group (religious or not) is acting within the limits of 
the law or is breeching a law or undermining public order or the human 
rights of others.
Off icials must examine whether groups applying for inclusion in the 
RER fulf il the legal requirements described above. They are required to 
proclaim that they follow religious purposes, but the state cannot assess 
whether that statement is true. As long as it cannot be proven that the 
declared religious goals are illegal, off icials belonging to the RER have 
to register them. The Scientology Church, for example, was registered in 
2007 after having been rejected three times – after the National Court 
(Audiencia Nacional), which is lower in hierarchy than the Constitutional 
Court, ruled that it should be included in the RER.6 As Article 22.2 of the 
Spanish Constitution proclaims, associations (of any nature, including 
religious ones) pursuing goals or using means that can be considered 
criminal will be deemed illegal, and will therefore not only be prevented 
from registering, but may also be prosecuted.7 So, should the RER, in the 
absence of evidence, detect indications that suggest the applicant group 
is undertaking activities against the public order, it would be legitimate 
for the person in charge of the RER to suspend the application and send 
the dossier to the Public Prosecutor. Basic Law 1/2002, which regulates the 
Right to Association f ixes this for associations (Articles 30.3 and 4; Pelayo 
Olmedo, 2007, p. 313).
practice do not threaten the rights of others in the exercise of their fundamental freedoms and 
rights, nor do they threaten the security, health and morality of the public, as elements that 
enshrine the public order protected by the law in a democratic society, which are referred to in 
Article 16.1 CE.’ (STC 46/2001 FJ 8º). http://mbarral.webs.ull.es/stc46-2001.html.
6 Sentencia Audiencia Nacional of 11 October 2007. http://audiencia-nacional.vlex.es/vid/
inscripcion-registro-entidades-religiosas-34438671.
7 As the Constitutional Court decrees (STC 46/2001): ‘Only when the existence of a certain 
danger against the public security, health and morality, as they should be recognized in a 
democratic society, has been accredited before the court, it is pertinent to invoke public order 
as a boundary to the exercise of the right to religious freedom and freedom of worship’ (FJ11).
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A lot of religious entities are registered in the RER: 13,101 of them belong 
to the Catholic Church, and 2,462 to non-Catholic religious groups.8 As 
already indicated, the Register is like a cupboard where the entities that 
consider themselves religions and comply with the legal requirements are 
registered. The main civil advantage that religious organizations obtain 
from being registered is the acquisition of a legal personality as religious 
entities, and thus the possibility of organizing themselves in an autonomous 
way.9
Neutrality has certain consequences for the state. First, from an institu-
tional point of view, public authorities are, as citizens, free to (not) follow 
any faith. Second, the state is neither confessional nor atheist; only citizens 
and groups can adopt these ideological positions. Lastly, the state should 
not maintain a radically secularist attitude towards its citizens. In this 
sense, it is important not to confuse the terms laico (‘neutral’) and laicista 
(‘radically secularist’). For example, the state has a laicista attitude when 
it shows prejudices against religious groups in the state’s administrative 
performance, laws, or courts. A laicista attitude would, for example, be at 
play when the state treats religious groups unequally, i.e., worse than it treats 
sports, cultural, or culinary associations. The principle of equality allows 
public authorities to establish differences between people or groups, but 
the differences should be proportional and reasonable. If these differences 
are not reasonable or are based on reasons related to birth, gender, race, 
or religion, they turn into discriminatory differences. Another example 
of a radically secularist attitude would be the conf inement of religious 
manifestations to the private sphere, understood as the intimacy of the 
home, by forbidding religious manifestations in the public sphere, i.e., in 
the street. The state would in that case not be neutral because religious 
groups can obviously express themselves in the public sphere as long as 
they do it within the legal limits of the fundamental right of demonstra-
tion. Relegating religious expressions to the private realm would then be 
a kind of prejudice, because it denies the group the fundamental right 
of demonstration.
8 Recurso 352/2005.
9 Article 6 of Law 7/1980: ‘Registered Churches, Faiths and religious communities shall be 
fully independent and may lay down their own organizational rules, internal and staff by laws. 
Such rules, as well as those governing the institutions they create to accomplish their purposes, 
may include clauses on the safeguard of their religion identity and own personality, as well as 
the due respect for their beliefs, without prejudice to the rights and freedoms recognized by 
the Constitution and in particular those of freedom, equality and non-discrimination.’
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2.2.2 The principle of cooperation between State and denominations
The second area of relations between church and state is cooperation. This 
principle is implicitly reflected in Article 9.2 of the Spanish Constitution,10 
but it is enshrined in a more convincing way in the second sentence of 
Article 16.3. After the establishment of the non-confessional state – i.e., ‘no 
religion will have a state character’ – the Constitution gives two very clear 
orders to the public authorities:
‒ To take into account the religious beliefs of the Spanish population.
‒ To maintain relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and 
other denominations.
The Constitution does not declare how cooperation with denominations 
should be developed. But from this double mandate, it is possible to extract 
the following consequences:
‒ Cooperation refers to religious faiths. It is referred to as the ‘faith option’. 
Although the state can obviously cooperate with non-religious ideologi-
cal groups as well, Article 16.2 specif ically refers to the cooperation of 
the state with the Catholic Church.
‒ Relations of cooperation imply the existence of two different subjects, 
public authorities and religious groups, both of which are independent 
and autonomous. In other words, the principle of cooperation further 
strengthens the principle of separation.
‒ The order to cooperate implies a positive appreciation of religions on the 
part of the Constitution. The Constitution recognizes that denomina-
tions are at least potentially positive; otherwise, it would not have made 
it imperative to cooperate.
‒ In line with the principle of freedom, cooperation of the state with 
denominations should only take place at the request of the denomina-
tion; some denominations, by virtue of their autonomy, may not want 
to cooperate with the state.
The direct mention of the Catholic Church in this article of the Spanish 
Constitution has not been a peaceful issue. Some people considered it 
an implicit declaration that Spain was a confessional state. Those in the 
Constituent Assembly who had declared themselves against such an idea 
10 Article 9.2 of the Constitution: ‘It is the responsibility of the authorities to promote the 
conditions for the freedom and equality of individuals and the groups they conform to be 
real and effective; to remove the obstacles which impede and complicate their plenitude; and 
facilitate the participation of all citizens in the political, economic, cultural and social life.’
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argued that it was contradictory to the already-proclaimed principal of 
the non-confessional state. In the end, it was decided that the mention of 
the Catholic Church would remain. Some of the supporters argued that 
even though the mention was problematic from a legal point of view, from 
a political point of view it was reasonable because the intention at that 
moment was for the transition from a denominational state, i.e., the previous 
regime, to a non-denominational or secular state to be accomplished in a 
way that would not lead to future traumas.
In this sense, the attitude of Santiago Carrillo, the Communist Party’s 
representative in the Constituent Assembly, can be considered wise. He 
supported the specif ic mention of the Catholic Church mainly, he declared, 
to avoid the possibility that those who had sided with Franco at the end 
of the Second Republic would support the reactionary forces that were 
opposed to democracy.11
In the end, the tenet of cooperation that was initially meant to temper 
secularism turned out to be a very effective tool in the integration of immi-
grants into Spanish society. Evidently, when the Constitution was approved 
in 1978 nobody foresaw the high numbers of immigrants that would come to 
Spain after 2000. The Constitution stipulates that the state must cooperate 
with denominations in terms of future action (i.e., ‘the authorities will take 
into account …’), but does not suggest any specif ic way to cooperate. The 
Parliament has ‘answered’ this open question on two different occasions.
Five days after the Constitution entered into force, on 3 January 1979, 
the Holy See signed four Cooperation Agreements with the Spanish State 
concerning legal affairs, educational and cultural affairs, economic affairs, 
and chaplaincy in the Armed Forces and the military service of clergymen 
and members of religious orders. Of course, these agreements were not 
prepared in f ive days; negotiations were held during the formation of the 
Constitution. Because the Holy See is a state, the Cooperation Agreements 
have the legal status of international treaties, so they enjoy a higher status 
than ordinary national agreements. They cannot therefore be abrogated or 
modif ied by an ordinary law.
The second step to implementing the constitutional mandate of coopera-
tion was the enactment of the Religious Freedom Act of 1980, one year after 
the ratif ication of the Cooperation Agreements. According to Article 7.1 
of the Religious Freedom Act, the state may establish Cooperation Agree-
ments with registered religious entities that, given their scope or number 
11 Diary of the Members of Parliament’s Congress Sessions. Year 1978, Nº 106. Plenary Session, 
p. 3994.
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of followers, obtain the classif ication of a notorio arraigo (‘deeply rooted’) 
denomination. Such Cooperation Agreements have to pass as laws in the 
Parliament. To sign a Cooperation Agreement with the state, a religious 
group must fulf il two requirements:
‒ To be registered in the RER located in the Ministry of Justice (Depart-
ment of Relations with Denominations).
‒ To obtain the recognition of a notorio arraigo (‘deeply rooted’) denomina-
tion in Spain.
This ‘deeply rooted condition’ was a new legal concept, for the definition of 
which the Religious Freedom Act only offers two hints: the scope or extent 
and number of believers. This vagueness gave the Ministry of Justice the 
opportunity to develop the concept of ‘deeply rooted’ through the implemen-
tation of a regulatory norm, but in the end it failed to do so. The convenience 
of def ining the objective requirements for a ‘deeply rooted’ denomination 
through an administrative norm was discussed in the Advisory Commission 
of Religious Freedom on 23 June 1982, but the outcomes of the discussion 
were rejected. Some believed that this should instead be done through a law 
of Parliament. Others thought that with the approval of such a regulation 
the government, specif ically the Advice Commission of Religious Freedom 
provided by Article 7 of the Religious Freedom Act,12 would lose the small 
amount of discretionary power it enjoyed. The Advisory Commission of 
Religious Freedom is a consultative body appointed by the Ministry of Justice, 
whose task and mission is to undertake studies, reports, and proposals for 
all issues applicable to the Religious Freedom Act, particularly the prepara-
tion of mandatory reports about future Agreements of Cooperation.13 The 
Advisory Commission proposed that, given the ambiguity of the term, it 
should be applied to each case separately – but it did offer some interpretive 
criteria for the legal terms ‘context’ and ‘number of believers’ (Fernandez 
Coronado, 1995, pp. 45-47). For example, the ‘context’ was not only used 
to refer to a number of followers suff iciently and signif icantly extended 
throughout the Spanish territory, but also to aspects such as the historical 
12 This commission was created by royal decree 159/2001 on 26 October 2001: http://mbarral.
webs.ull.es/calr.html.
13 Article 8.2: ‘Created within the Ministry of Justice, this Advisory Commission of Religious 
Freedom is composed of pair numbers and with a stable character by representatives of the State’s 
administration, churches, denominations, religious communities or federations, within which 
will certainly be those with a well-established following in Spain, and by people recognised as 
competent in the f ield whose advice is considered to be of interest and relevance to the material 
related to the present law.’ Royal Decree 932/2013 currently implements this article.
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presence of the denomination in the country, the importance of its social, 
charitable, and cultural activities, the number of places of worship, and the 
number of religious ministers in proportion to its members.
Even though there was no specif ic legal prescription, the de facto govern-
ment body that granted ‘deeply rooted’ denomination status turned out 
to be that same Advisory Commission for Religious Freedom. It therefore 
played an important role in the cooperation between the state and religious 
denominations. This ambiguity ended in 2015 when the Government issued 
the Royal Decree 593/2015 of July 3th that regulates future declarations of 
deeply rooted character by the Ministry of Justice.
The Catholic Church did not need to obtain the classif ication of a ‘deeply 
rooted’ denomination because it was obvious, and was already specif ically 
mentioned in Article 16 of the Constitution. In 1984, the Advisory Council of 
Religious Freedom granted the Jewish community and Protestant churches 
the classif ication of ‘deeply rooted’ denominations. Muslims received the 
classif ication of a ‘deeply rooted’ denomination in 1989. In 1992, three agree-
ments came into effect that were signed by the Spanish State and the Jewish 
Community, the Protestant churches, and the Muslim Community of Spain, 
respectively. As set out in the Religious Freedom Act, these agreements were 
approved by Parliament as Laws 24, 25, and 26/1992 on 10 November 1992.
The negotiations preceding these agreements were held with the following 
entities, each representing their respective denomination: the Federation of 
Jewish Communities in Spain (Federación de Comunidades Judías de España, 
FCJE); the Federation of Evangelical Religious Entities of Spain (Federación de 
Entidades Religiosas Evangélicas de España, FEREDE); and the Islamic Com-
mission of Spain (Comisión Islámica de España, CIE). When the agreement 
was signed, two other Muslim federations integrated into the CIE: the Union 
of Islamic Communities in Spain (Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, 
UCIDE) and the Spanish Federation of Religious Islamic Entities (Federación 
Española de Entidades Religiosas Islámicas, FEERI). The three organizations 
were compelled to unify into one commission to sign the agreement with 
the state. Otherwise, the agreement would not have been signed.
2.3 Classification of religions in Spain from a legal perspective
Four types of religions can be distinguished in Spanish law. First there are 
non-registered religious entities. Instead of registering, religious entities 
may choose to become an association under the Law of Association.14 To do 
14 Organic Law 1/2002, 22 March 2002, on the Right of Association.
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so, they must submit an agreement between at least three individuals and a 
plan for internal regulation (in a public or private document) approving the 
organization of the association. If they choose to become an association, they 
can enrol either in the National Registry of Associations of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, if their sphere of activity refers to the whole country, or, if 
their sphere of activity is located in one of the seventeen autonomous regions 
of Spain. Intervention or approval by a public authority is not necessary 
for the group to be entitled to the fundamental right of religious freedom; 
the Constitution guarantees the right of religious freedom for all religious 
communities, whatever legal form they adopt, on the condition that they 
respect public order and the fundamental rights of others. Article 2 of the 
Religious Freedom Act refers to several manifestations of the religious 
freedom of individuals and communities, including the right of religious 
groups to hold worship celebrations, commemorate feast days, celebrate 
marriage rites, impart religious teachings, establish places of worship, 
appoint and train ministers, spread the group’s creed, maintain relations 
with their own organizations and with other religious denominations, and 
provide religious assistance in public institutions such as the army, prisons, 
and hospitals.
Second are the religious entities enrolled in the Register of Religious Enti-
ties (RER). The most controversial aspect of the requirements for registration 
in the RER is the so-called ‘declaration of religious purposes’. According to 
the Spanish Constitutional Court, the administration does not have the 
right or ability to assess religious purposes. Thus, registration can be refused 
only if the applying religious group does not meet the requirements, or if it 
can be legally proven (for example by a legal sentence) that the applicant 
group seeks to carry out illegal activities or goals.
Third type are the registered religious groups that also have the status of 
‘deeply or f irmly rooted’ denominations. Based on the already mentioned 
Royal Decree 593/2015 of July 3th, the Ministry of Justice can grant a ‘deeply 
rooted’ status to a registered religious group. These denominations will 
subsequently benefit from two main further legal advantages: the right to 
have a representative member in the Advisory Commission of Religious 
Freedom; and the possibility of reaching a Cooperation Agreement with the 
state. So far, four denominations – Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Buddhists, 
and Christian Orthodox churches – have obtained a notorio arraigo (‘deeply 
rooted’) status, under the umbrella of the previous regulation, but have not 
yet signed a Cooperation Agreement with the state.
Fourth type are the religious groups that have been registered in the RER, 
received ‘deeply rooted’ status, and signed a Cooperation Agreement with 
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the state. At this point, we can distinguish between the agreements signed 
by the Catholic Church and the three Cooperation Agreements signed by 
the off icial bodies of Jews, Protestants, and Muslims.
2.4 Cooperation agreements
The four Cooperation Agreements between the Holy See and the Spanish 
State have the legal status of international treaties, and so contain more 
privileges than those reached with Jews, Protestants, and Muslims in 1992. 
In the agreement concerning economic affairs, for example, the Spanish 
state promises to collaborate with the Catholic Church to obtain ‘its ad-
equate economic support’. This agreement foresees a system that has been 
implemented by further norms, and which is now formulated as the ability 
of all taxpayers to allocate a percentage of their income tax – currently 0.7 
per cent – to the Catholic Church and/or to NGOs (including Catholic ones). 
Other important benefits of the agreements include religious education in 
public schools. The Agreement on Educational and Cultural Affairs foresees 
an educational system in which all public and private schools – the last ones 
called concertados – that receive funding from the state must offer classes 
on Catholicism although taking such courses is voluntary for the pupils. 
Other benefits refer to chaplaincy: according to the system established in the 
Cooperation Agreements and implemented by several norms, Catholic reli-
gious assistance in public establishments is regulated and paid by the state.
Once the respective federations representing Jews, Protestants, and Mus-
lims received ‘deeply rooted’ status from the Advising Council for Religious 
Freedom, the three denominations negotiated three different but basically 
similar Cooperation Agreements that were immediately passed as laws in the 
Parliament (Laws 24, 25, and 26 on 10 November 1992). Some of the special 
rights enshrined in the three Cooperation Agreements are the following:
‒ Legal def inition (juridical status) of places of worship and religious 
ministries.
‒ Civil effects of weddings celebrated according to the respective religious 
ceremonies.
‒ Spiritual guidance in public establishments.
‒ The right of parents to demand religious education for their children 
in public schools.
‒ Tax exemptions: more or less the same as those granted to the Catholic 
Church – except for the possibility of taxpayers to donate 0.7 per cent 
of their income taxes, which has so far only been prescribed for the 
Catholic Church.
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‒ Celebration of religious festivities and protecting respective cultural 
and historical heritages.
The benef its of the agreements only affect those religious communities 
that belong to the federations or commissions that signed the agreement 
with the state.
3 Islam in Spain
This section describes the diverse characteristics of the Muslim community in 
Spain. Islam was present in Spain from 711, when the Muslim leader Tariq Ibn 
Ziyad landed at Gibraltar, until 1502, when Muslims were told to choose be-
tween exile and conversion to Catholicism. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century Islam made a comeback in Spain through the process of migration.
Numbers. There are no off icial data about the number of Muslims in the 
country, as the Spanish census does not record the religion of the citizens. 
The f igures offered here are merely estimates inferred from the immigration 
figures. Spain has a population of 47 million people,15 of which approximately 
1.4 million are Muslim: 2.5 per cent of the population. 30 per cent of the 
Muslims are Spanish citizens and 70 per cent are immigrants from different 
national origins: largely Morocco (717,992), but also Algeria, Pakistan, and 
Senegal. They mainly live in Catalonia, Andalusia, and Madrid. There are 
also about 5,000 converts.
Organizations. In 1989, Muslims associations organized under two big 
umbrella organizations: the Islamic Communities Union of Spain (UCIDE) 
and the Spanish Federation of Religious Islamic Entities (FEERI). In 1991, the 
Government forced these two associations to join the Islamic Commission 
of Spain (CIE) to sign the Cooperation Agreement (Law 16/1992 10 November 
1992). In 2011 another f ifteen Muslim religious federations were integrated 
into the Islamic Commission of Spain so that their members could enjoy the 
benefits of the Cooperation Agreement. In 2016 there were about 1,316 Muslim 
religious communities (associations) in the country, but only 900 of them 
were listed in the Register of Religious Entities of the Ministry of Justice.
Mosques. According to Article 2 of the Cooperation Agreement, mosques 
are buildings that are used exclusively and regularly for prayer, religious 
education and training, and spiritual guidance. Mosques are certif ied as 
such by the Muslim community in question, with the endorsement of the 
15 46.771. Off icial data according to Royal Decree 1007/2014 of 5 December 2014.
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Islamic Commission of Spain. There are twelve mosques with minarets in 
Spain: two in Madrid, one in Valencia, three in Andalucía, four in Ceuta, 
and two in Melilla. According to the Observatorio del Pluralismo Religioso 
en España, there were 1,313 mosques or Islamic prayer halls in Spain as of 
January 2015.16 The registration of mosques in the Register of Religious 
Entities (RER) is voluntary. In July 2009, 176 mosques were registered: 113 
from communities under CIE’s umbrella and 57 from other communities 
that were not entitled to the benefits of the Cooperation Agreement.
Cemeteries. According to the Cooperation Agreements, Muslims have the 
right to their own cemeteries. They are also entitled to a reserved space for 
Muslim burials in municipal cemeteries. Currently there are f ive private 
Muslim cemeteries in Spain: in Cádiz (Islamic cemetery of Jerez), Málaga 
(Islamic cemetery Suhail in mezquita de Fuengirola), Madrid (cemetery of 
Griñón, built by General Franco after the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 
as a reward for the Moroccan soldiers that fought on his side), and two 
in the autonomous cities of Ceuta (cemetery Sidi Embarek), and Melilla 
(Islamic cemetery of Melilla). There are spaces reserved for Muslim tombs 
in municipal cemeteries in Bilbao, Barcelona, Manresa, Tarrasa, Burgos, 
Zaragoza, Alicante, Valencia (2), Cádiz, Málaga (2), Sevilla, Córdoba, Granada 
(2), Palma de Mallorca, Las Palmas de Gran Canarias, and Logroño.
Imams. According to Article 3 of the Cooperation Agreement, Muslim 
religious leaders and imams who lead prayers, oversee religious education and 
training, and provide spiritual guidance must be in possession of a certificate 
stating that they can fulf il these duties. The Muslim community to which 
they belong must issue this certif icate with the endorsement of the Islamic 
Commission of Spain. Imams are covered by the social security system with 
a status akin to that of employees. Their respective Muslim communities 
assume the rights and obligations of employers under the social security 
system, as stipulated in Article 5 of the Cooperation Agreement. Imams and 
Muslim religious leaders are entitled to the right to secrecy as stipulated 
in Article 3.2: under no circumstances may religious leaders and imams 
‘be forced to reveal information disclosed to them in the exercise of their 
duties as prayer leaders, preachers and spiritual counsellors, by virtue of the 
privilege of confidentiality conferred on them by law.’ Royal Decree 176/2006 
of 10 February 2006 sets out the terms and conditions for the inclusion in 
the social security system of religious leaders and imams from communities 
that are members of the Islamic Commission of Spain. As of December 2009, 
there were 109 imams that had been registered for Social Security.
16 http://www.observatorioreligion.es/..
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Prisoners and chaplaincy. Muslim inmates are entitled to receive spiritual 
guidance from imams or persons duly appointed by Muslim communities, 
subject to the authorization of the Islamic Community of Spain (Article 9). 
These spiritual authorities must be approved by the prison authorities and 
must meet certain requirements, such as not having a criminal record. 
While the 140 currently employed Catholic chaplains are paid by the state, 
the two Jewish chaplains and 250 Protestant chaplains do not receive any 
state salary because their respective Cooperation Agreements established 
that their respective churches and synagogues would cover the chaplaincy 
expenses.17 This is not the case for the Cooperation Agreement with Islam, 
where it is stipulated that the expenses of spiritual guidance would be covered 
in a way agreed upon by both the representatives of the CIE and the prison 
establishments (Article 9.3). While implementing this article, an agreement 
was reached on 12 July 2007 stating that Muslim chaplains can be paid by 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs provided they gather a group of ten or more 
prisoners.18 In 2016 there were seven imams offering religious counselling at 
prisons who were covered by this agreement. There were originally nine of 
them, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs suspended two for security reasons.
Education. In the Spanish educational system there are three types of 
schools: public schools, private schools without state funding, and concer-
tados (‘private schools with partial funding from the state’). So far, there 
is no private or concertado Islamic school within the Spanish educational 
system. However, Muslim pupils are entitled, upon request, to receive Islamic 
religious instruction in public schools, at the pre-school, primary, and 
secondary levels. Teachers of Islam in public schools are paid by the state 
as long as they have at least ten students.
For the school year 2013-2014, there were 45 Muslim teachers in primary-
level public schools in the following autonomous provinces: Andalucía (18), 
Aragon (3), Canary Islands (1), Basque Country (1), Ceuta (10), and Melilla 
(12). These f ive autonomous provinces are the only ones (out of seventeen) 
in which the payment of religious teachers in public schools has not yet 
been decentralized in compliance with the new norms of the educational 
system in Spain. Thus, the employer of these Islamic teachers is still the 
Ministry of Education of the central government.
17 Royal Decree 710/2006 of 9 June 2006 implements the right of inmates of prisons to receive 
spiritual guidance as established in the Cooperation Agreements with Jews, Protestants, and 
Muslims. Article 11 of this Royal Decree rules that the funding of this spiritual guidance shall 
follow the regulations established in the respective Cooperation Agreement.
18 Cooperation Agreement between the Spanish State and the Islamic Commission of Spain 
(CIE) in order to fund religious assistance in State prisons (12 July 2007).
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4 Imam training centres in Spain
This section briefly describes the situation of imam-training centres in 
Spain as they developed in the near past (4.1) and as they are now (4.2).
4.1 The situation in the near past
There used to be programmes of Islamic studies offered by two universities: 
the public National University of Distance Learning (UNED), and the private 
Camilo José Cela University. The latter organized a course on ‘Islamic religion 
and culture’. Further, there were two courses offered by two Islamic organiza-
tions, the Islamic Council of Catalonia and the Islamic Federation of Murcia. 
None of these courses exist anymore, and none had off icial recognition.
The National University of Distance Learning (UNED) and the Pluralism 
and Living Together Foundation (a public foundation under the Ministry 
of Justice) organized a course called ‘Islam and Democratic Principles’ 
that was taught in the 2009-2010 term, after which it was suspended. It 
was not a course about theological studies or sharia, but about Islamic 
culture. The diplomas obtained by students of both university centres 
were not off icial, but were private documents recognized only by the two 
participating universities.
The Islamic Council of Catalonia19 ran an imam-training course starting 
in 2005. Some of the teachers were from Spain, such as the imam of Mataró 
(Barcelona), but there were also teachers from abroad, i.e., from Ibn Zohr 
University in Agadir, the University of al-Qarawiyyin in Fez, and Qatar 
University. The diplomas received did not have off icial recognition, and 
the course is no longer in process.
The Islamic Federation of Murcia is the second umbrella organization 
that provided imam-training courses. It did not originally belong to the 
CIE, but in 2015 it joined the Islamic Commission of Spain, so its community 
members are now entitled to all of the rights proclaimed in the Cooperation 
Agreement. Initially, the objective of the courses from the Murcia Federation 
was not only to provide theological training, but also to provide a basic 
education about Islam. The teachers who f irst participated in these courses 
came mainly from Belgium, France, Spain, Morocco, and Egypt. They offered 
the following subjects: the prophet’s teachings, interpreting the Quran in the 
Western context, Spanish, computer science and Internet skills, and oratory.
19 It did not belong then to the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE), but it is one of the f ifteen 
federations that entered the Commission later.
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4.2 Existing imam training centres
In November 2013, the Spanish Federation of Religious Islamic Entities 
(FEERI, which is one of the umbrella organizations under the Islamic Com-
mission of Spain) started a two-year course (i.e., running until December 
2015). The classes were held mainly in weekends in the Assalam mosque 
in the city of Valencia. This two-year course is organized in cooperation 
with the Muslim Federation of the Valencia Community (FEMCOVA), the 
Spanish League of Imams, the European Institute of Islamic Sciences, and 
the Islamic University of Rotterdam. During the f irst year, a student can 
get a diploma in the following specialties: Quran and its Science, Islamic 
jurisprudence, Arabic Language and hadith, sīra (‘biography of the prophet’), 
and history.20 Successful students receive a diploma in Islamic Sciences that 
is recognized by the European Institute of Islamic Sciences and the Islamic 
University of Rotterdam – which so far do not have full off icial recognition 
in the university system of the Netherlands (Ferreiro Galguera, 2011, p. 298). 
This diploma allows them to attend another year of superior level studies. So 
far, the diplomas received by the students of these courses are not off icially 
recognized by the Spanish State.
5 Recommendations
Islam is part of the history and culture of Spain. It is taught at public schools; 
there is Islamic chaplaincy in prisons and hospitals. And yet Spain still lacks 
deep and serious Islamic theological studies. As a result of my experience in 
the Ministry of Justice, where I was the deputy director of relations between 
the State and religious denominations, and at the request of the Commis-
sion of the European Union, I had the opportunity to research imams in 
the European Union. I wanted to formulate answers to questions such 
as how many imams there are in the European Union, where they come 
from, and where they had been trained, In my book Islam and State in the 
European Union, I tried to map the imam training centres in the European 
Union (Ferreiro Galguera, 2011). In that book, I pointed out that even when 
we f inally have a clear idea about the real face of ‘academic Islam’ in our 
countries, we would still have two very important challenges ahead of us.
20 To obtain the diploma in hadith, sīra, and history, the student has to attend and pass the 
following weekend courses: terminological science of hadith, content of hadith, sīra, history of 
the Caliphate, and history of Al-Andalus. http://feeri.es/.
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The easiest and most feasible recommendation would be to draw up 
general guidelines related to aspects like advice for obtaining legal recogni-
tion of Islamic study programmes. A more ambitious objective would be 
to start a debate about the possibility of establishing a European Institute 
or University of Islamic Studies. This would be a university or institute 
similar to Al-Azhar University in Cairo, but in Europe. This initiative could 
possibly be developed within the framework of a cooperative project between 
European Islamic faith leaders and the institutions of the European Union. 
Such an institution would be of interest not only for imams, but also for any 
other European citizen looking for a solid Islamic theological training. Such 
a university might also work in close collaboration with other prestigious 
Islamic universities all over the world. The closer these collaborations, the 
better it would be for conveying knowledge and a sense of transparency 
about Islam. This could also be a platform for the convergence of all imam 
training centres and Islamic curricula in one common European context 
as an example of tolerance and intercultural dialogue.
If this project is to be established according to the principle of cooperation 
between political and religious authorities for the sake of promoting religious 
freedom, it would, naturally, require the agreement of both European public 
authorities and Muslim religious leaders. We should take into account that a 
project of this nature cannot be achieved if European Muslim representatives 
do not request it themselves. Everybody is aware of the diff iculties involved 
in creating a representative Muslim voice in Europe; the network of leaders 
in European imam-training centres would be a useful tool for forming one. 
Once initiated by a representative Muslim academic authority, the project 
would also need the consensus of the pertinent political representatives 
in the European Union to participate in this endeavour for the promotion 
of religious freedom. I have in this chapter already identif ied some of the 
diff iculties and challenges of the steps that follow. In any case, the next 
stage should be approached in a spirit of dialogue, cooperation, and unity. 
This is epitomized in the old but wise saying: ‘If you want to walk fast, you 
walk alone. If you want to walk far, you walk together.’
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Abstract
Nearly all imams in Italy are self-educated. In their everyday life they 
often have precarious jobs, and they perform their religious functions in 
their spare time. In their role as imam they play a very important role in 
local Muslim communities. This chapter analyses the status of imams in 
Italy, underlining how the social context and the legal framework that 
regulates church-state relations deal with non-Catholic issues in Italy.
Keywords: Islam in Italy, church-state relationship, Catholic Church, 
constitution
1 Religious ministers in Italy
Italy has a long and well-established tradition of church-state relations, 
which has been strongly influenced by the role played by the Catholic Church 
(Dalla Torre, 1995; Glenn, 2014; Netton, 2006). The most important results 
of this peculiar legal system are found in Articles 7 and 8 of the 1948 Italian 
Constitution. Article 7 is devoted to the relationship between the state and 
the Catholic Church, whose organization and structure are considered the 
prototype for religious denominations by the Italian government (Colaianni, 
2012). The f irst section of Article 7 establishes the mutual independence and 
sovereignty of both the state and the church. The second section of Article 8 
states a similar (albeit less strong) principle guaranteeing the free organiza-
tion of denominations other than Catholicism. The second section of Article 7 
aff irms that the relationship between the state and the Catholic Church is 
‘regulated by the Lateran Pacts (1929)’ and that any change to these pacts, if 
accepted by both parties, ‘does not require the procedure of constitutional 
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amendments’. In other words, in case of a bilateral agreement, a legislative 
– not a constitutional – act is suff icient to amend the pacts and regulate the 
connection between the state and the Catholic Church. The third section 
of Article 8 aff irms that the relationship between religious minorities and 
the state is also regulated by legislation. This legislation must be based on 
specif ic agreements called intese (singular: intesa), which can be literally 
translated as ‘agreements’ between the state and religious denominations 
(Casuscelli, 2008). In other words, both the second section of Article 7 and 
the third section of Article 8 establish the ‘bilateralism principle’, which is 
a direct consequence of the religious autonomy established in the f irst and 
the second sections of the same articles (Bouchard, 2004; Varnier, 1995).
The ‘bilateralism principle’ requires the state to regulate questions 
regarding the specif ic needs and peculiar identity of a denomination 
through agreements with the concerned religious authorities. Once they 
have been signed by the Prime Minister and the representative of a religious 
organization, both Accords (which regulate the relationship between the 
state and Catholic Church) and intese (which regulate the relationship 
between the state and religions other than Catholicism) need to be ratif ied 
(Article 7, Section 2) or approved (Article 8, Section 3) by a legislative act 
of the Italian Parliament. This kind of act is an atypical form of legislation 
because, once approved, it can only be amended through a new agreement 
between the state and the concerned denominations: it is not possible for 
the parliament to make an amendment through unilateral legislation. In 
this way, the Catholic Church and some other denominations (i.e., those 
that have signed an intesa) have the guarantee that their legal status cannot 
be altered without their consent (Ferrari, 1993).
Now, with this system of bilateralism two main problems arise. First, it 
presupposes the existence of a relatively comprehensive religious institution 
that is capable of representing a denomination at a national level. This is 
a requirement that has proved problematic for some religions, including 
Islam (Decaro Bonella, 2013). The second problem is generated by the exces-
sive amount of discretion given to the government to decide whether to 
accept or reject a denomination’s proposal of entering into negotiations.1 
Furthermore, these problems decrease by the principle stated in the f irst 
1 In fact, so far as the relationship between the State and confessions is concerned, legislative 
Act no. 400 of 1988 attributes the general competence to the Council of Ministers. Legislative 
Decree no. 300 of 1999 gives some specif ic competences to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, such 
as those referring to the ‘guarantee of the order and public safety’ and the ‘guarantee of civil 
rights, including those of religious confessions, of citizenship, immigration and asylum’.
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section of Article 8, under which ‘all religious denominations are equally 
free before the law’. This principle implies that there cannot be a non-
constitutionally based distinction between not only the Catholic Church and 
other denominations, but also between minority religions that have signed 
an intesa with the state and those that have not yet done so (Tozzi, 2011).
As a matter of constitutional principles, the absence of an intesa can-
not affect the right of a religious group or its members to worship freely; 
Articles 19 and, above all, 20 of the Italian Constitution clearly aff irm that 
the religious character or religious aim of an association or institution 
cannot justify either special legal limitations or greater f iscal tax on their 
constitution, status, or any of their activities (Di Marzio, 1999; Finocchiaro, 
2012; Fiorentino, 2006; Ricca, 2000). Yet the practical implementation of these 
constitutional principles has revealed many interconnected diff iculties.
2 The intese and the 1929 Act
One of the diff iculties regarding the practical implementation of the con-
stitutional principles is the fact that agreements based on both Article 7 
(Section 2) and Article 8 (Section 3) are used by the state to concede a set of 
rights or benefits. In this way, the principle of religious freedom becomes a 
matter of specif ic accords that are subject to the will of public actors such as 
the Italian Government – which, as mentioned above, has great discretion 
in the implementation of Section 3 of Article 8.
In the last 30 years the practical enactment of Section 3 has been charac-
terized by the phenomenon of intese fotocopia (‘photocopy agreements’): the 
substantial similarity of all twelve intese2 that have been signed by minority 
religions. As a result, the large majority of these agreements have established 
a de facto common legislation, when approved by the parliament, which is 
far from being considered general legislation (Carnelutti, 1951; Crisafulli, 
1968). In other words, while this legislation is common to all of the religious 
denominations that have an agreement with the state, the provisions of the 
legislation cannot be applied to denominations that have not yet signed an 
intesa (Randazzo, 2008). This is why minority religions see the intesa more 
as an instrument of political legitimation than as a legal opportunity to 
express their specif ic needs and identity in the Italian legal system, which 
also explains why common legislation has given rise to a rush of requests 
for intese (Alicino, 2013a).
2 See http://www.governo.it/Presidenza/USRI/confessioni/intese_indice.html
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The absence of any procedure regulating the negotiations between the 
state and religious denominations can turn the discretion of the government 
into obviously non-constitutional and unwanted forms of discrimina-
tion towards religious denominations that are excluded from the system 
of common legislation established through the photocopy agreements 
phenomenon. In fact, these denominations are regulated by the 1929 Act 
(no. 1159) on ‘admitted religions’, approved during the fascist regime, which 
legitimizes even greater discretionary power of the Minister of Internal 
Affairs. These denominations are excluded from the more favourable provi-
sions of the legislation that is based on agreements between the state and 
some religions – a phenomenon that becomes even more evident in the 
fact that denominations possessing an agreement are no longer subject to 
the 1929 Act, the provisions of which are entirely replaced by the far more 
favourable rules in the legislation that approves an intesa.
We must keep in mind that the 1929 Act was designed to regulate tra-
ditional denominations other than Catholicism – a conceptualization of 
minority denominations based on the religious geography of the f irst half 
of the twentieth century. This geography has now changed completely 
(Laurence, 2006b) under the pressing processes of immigration and the 
elusive phenomenon of globalization (Ferrarese, 2012; Mazzola, 2010). This 
explains why the provisions of the 1929 Act do not always meet the needs 
of denominations whose presence in Italy is relatively recent (Allievi, 2000, 
2002), including Islamic organizations and their specif ic religious ministers, 
usually called ‘imams’ (Laurence, 2006a).
3 Religious ministers and State (secular) law
It is important to keep in mind that, in regard to the civil status of religious min-
isters, there is a substantial difference between the provisions of the legislation 
from bilateral (church-state) agreements and the provisions established by the 
1929 Act. The bilateral legislation implies an automatic recognition of religious 
ministers, to whom some important rights and civil benefits are granted simply 
because they exercise specific functions within a given denomination and in 
accordance with a corresponding religious law (Ferrari, 2008).
This is evident when considering the legislation ratifying the agreement 
between the state and the Catholic Church, i.e., the 1985 Act (no. 121), which 
ratif ied the 1984 Agreement of Villa Madama between the Holy See and the 
Italian Republic and almost entirely modif ied the 1929 Lateran Pacts. This 
agreement states: ‘appointments to ecclesiastical off ices are wholly made 
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by ecclesiastical authorities.’ This means that in the Italian legal system the 
Catholic authorities must only ‘inform the competent civil authorities of the 
appointments of archbishops and diocesan bishops, of coadjutors, of abbots 
and prelates with territorial jurisdiction, including parish and other off icial 
appointments to ecclesiastical off ices relevant to state administration’ for 
the appointed individuals to be recognized as religious ministers.
This substantial difference in law is also aff irmed through the bilateral 
legislation based on intese that has been signed and approved until now. This 
legislation aff irms very similar provisions to those stated in the 1984 Accord 
between the state and the Catholic Church for Lutheran pastors, Evangelical 
ministers, Orthodox priests, Jewish clergies, and Buddhist masters – those 
who in the language of the intese are called ministri di culto, which can be 
translated as‘ministers of religion’ or ‘religious ministers’.
This clearly demonstrates the fact that in both the 1984 Agreement 
(between the state and the Catholic Church) and the common legislation 
based on intese the principal reference for recognizing the civil status of a 
religious minister is the law of a denomination, rather than the state’s law: 
in this matter, the state’s law simply refers to the religious law. In practice, 
once a person has been defined and recognized as a minister by and within 
a religious community, he or she is considered a religious minister by the 
state as well. In brief, as far as the status of religious ministers is concerned, 
the rules that govern the internal activities of religious groups have almost 
automatic civil effects within the Italian legal system.
By contrast, under the 1929 Act a religious minister can have a civil status 
only after the public authority has formally recognized and appointed 
him or her. Moreover, the religious minister him- or herself must submit a 
specif ic request to the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs, who has to check 
whether the claimant meets the criteria established by Article 3 of the 1929 
Act and by the relative Royal Decree of 1930 (no. 289).3 To be recognized 
as a religious minister by the state, the request must contain:
1 The religious act through which the minister was appointed by the 
religious authorities.
2 The documents showing that the designation was made in accordance 
with the religious rules of the denomination concerned.
3 The documents affirming that the religious minister is an Italian citizen, 
especially if he or she is planning to celebrate religious marriages with 
civil effects.
3 Regio Decreto 28 febbraio 1930, n. 289, Norme per l’attuazione della legge 24 giugno 1929, n. 
1159, sui culti ammessi  nello Stato e per il coordinamento di essa con le altre leggi dello Stato.
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In addition, the claimant must demonstrate the ability to speak Italian, and 
to be prepared to give all further and necessary information for a correct 
and complete ‘legal enquiry’. Without government approbation, the state 
cannot recognize civil effects to acts, such as religious marriages, made by 
ministers of denominations governed by this law.
It is important to note that most of these criteria are especially formed 
on the basis of Catholic thinking: it is assumed that a hierarchical structure 
will be built around a ‘church’, in the Christian sense of the term. Because 
of the central role of a pastor or priest, it is assumed that those who per-
form religious rites will also represent the religion. Conceived as a general 
principle, this has become the principal reference for the def inition of a 
religious minister for all religions, including denominations other than 
Catholicism. This is also evident by the fact that in this f ield the above 
mentioned 1984 Agreement of Villa Madama was followed by similar intese 
between the state and some other religions.4 The Waldesian Church was 
the f irst non-Catholic religion to sign an intesa in 1984. Since then, all of 
the other intese have shared an identical content, which explains the term 
‘photocopy agreements’ (D’avack, 1989).
It was not without a reason that when the bilateral-common legislation 
procedure was extended in 2013 to some very ‘new’ religious organizations – 
which have comparatively more differences from the Catholic Church – the 
provision regulating the civil status of religious ministers generated some 
very complex judicial disputes. A telling example is the agreement between 
the state and the Italian Buddhist Union (Unione Buddhista Italiana, UBI), 
whose provisions have produced intricate legal paradoxes through the 
‘strange’ relationship between the common legislation based on intese and 
the 1929 Act on admitted religions.
On 9 June 2009, two dharma masters of the Temple of Shôbôzan Fudenji, a 
Buddhist organization that is member of the UBI, requested to be recognized 
by the state’s authority so that they could celebrate religious marriage 
with civil effects. In accordance with the provisions of the 1929 Act and 
after a long administrative dispute, the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs 
appointed these dharmas as religious ministers in January 2013. Twenty 
4 See in particular the six intese that were signed between 1984 and 1993 by: the Waldesian 
Protestant Church in 1984 (approved by Act 11 August 1984, no. 449); the Christian Churches of 
the Seventh-day Adventists in 1986 (approved by Act 22 November 1988, no. 516); the Assemblies 
of God, a Pentecostal Church, in 1986 (approved by Act 2 November 1988, no. 517); the Union of 
Jewish Communities in 1987 (approved by Act 8 March 1989, no. 101); the Christian Evangelical-
Baptist Union in 1993 (approved by Act 2 April 1995, no. 116); and the Lutheran Church in 1993 
(approved by Act 29 November 1995, no. 520).
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days later, however, an intesa between the State and the UBI association 
entered into force, completely replacing the jurisdiction of the 1929 Act 
with respect to all members of that association.5 This means that the 
dharma masters were no longer considered religious ministers under the 
1929 Act, but they could acquire the status of a religious ministry through 
the norms of the 2013 agreement. From the dharmas’ point of view, it did 
not seem to matter whether the 1929 Act was effective – which was not, in 
fact, the case. The 2013 intesa did not provide any rule regulating the civil 
effects of religious marriage, which, as said before, is the main, if not the 
only, reason the dharma masters wanted to be appointed by the state. Since 
the 2013 agreement entered into force, however, marriages celebrated by 
those masters no longer have a civil effect, unless the Temple of Shôbôzan 
Fudenji were to choose not to be part of the UBI association anymore and 
to re-submit itself and its members to the less favourable provisions of the 
1929 Act.
This example clearly shows that, concerning the civil status of religious 
ministers, Italian legislation regulating the church-state relationship does 
not always meet the needs of ‘new’ (i.e. very different) denominations 
(Alicino, 2013b). This seems even more manifest in relation to the civil 
status of Muslim imams, as discussed in the next section.
4 Are imams religious ministers?
Under Italian law, the expression ‘religious minister’ is a nomen iuris that 
the state uses to def ine the civil status of the carriers of religious off ice’ 
(Fiorita and Milani, 2010; Licastro, 2008; Parisi, 2014). At the same time, 
however, the law aff irms that the recognition of a religious minister is a 
result of a connection between the state’s legal system and the law of a 
religion (Grimm, 2013). In other words, the state attaches the civil status 
of a religious minister to those who, within a denomination, are already 
considered as such (Benigni, 2012; Cardia, 2010). Thus, as far as the civil 
notion of religious ministers is concerned, the connection between the 
state’s law and the law of a given religion is based on two main features:6
5 See Act 31 December 2012, no. 245, which approved the intesa between the State and UBI 
signed on 4 April 2007.
6 See Comitato per l’Islam Italiano, Parere su Imam e formazione, 31 May 2011, at http://www1.
interno.gov.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/notizie/Comitato_Is-
lam_italiano/0054_2011_05_31_comitatoislam.html_746804720.html.
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1 The autonomy of a denomination in deciding who is able to play the 
specif ic role of a religious minister.
2 The right of the state to formally recognize the status of a religious 
minister, i.e., verifying whether a person appointed by the religious 
community effectively exercises activities that, within the community, 
distinguishes him or her from other ‘normal’ believers (Bettetini, 2000; 
Licastro, 2005; Mirabelli, 1975; Onida, 1990).
Taking these elements into account, in this section I consider the f igure 
of the imam, analysing him in light of the state’s law regulating the civil 
status of religious ministers.
Historically speaking, the figure of the imam dates back to the first period 
of Islam. He is in this context considered to be the guide of community 
prayers – not only the Friday prayer, but also other ones. He is, so to say, 
a person who, standing in front of other believers, recites some religious 
formulas and performs typical religious gestures such as bowing and prostra-
tions (Madelung, 1986). The fact remains that imams are neither priests nor 
clergymen who, in Christian milieus, are purposely ‘consecrated’ for the role 
of religious ministers (Ciotola, 2007). Instead, Imams are generally selected 
at a local level (Saint-Blancat, 2008): members of a Muslim community 
choose someone who is considered knowledgeable and wise at that level, 
someone who understands the Quran and is able to recite it correctly and 
nicely (Branca, 2008).
We can therefore argue that generally an imam is a respected member 
of a given Muslim community or organization. In some communities, a 
Muslim believer may be recruited and hired to be an imam after undergoing 
special training.7 In other cases, imams are chosen from among the existing 
members of an Islamic group without any specif ic training programme. 
There is no universal governing body to supervise imams; everything is 
done at the community level.
The absence of such a body explains why in Italy, as well as in other Eu-
ropean countries, imams are almost all self-educated as religious ministers. 
During the week they usually take care of duties other than religion. To see 
them working as imams, one must often go down into some underground 
parking or into apartments that have been converted into mosques, where 
minarets and other Islamic symbols are only present in pictures or paintings 
hanging on the wall (Casale, 2014; Rhazzali and Equizi, 2013).
7 See, for example, CO.RE.IS, Statuto degli Imam della Federazione dell’Islam Italiano, at http://
www.coreis.it/Testi/STATUTO%20DEGLI%20IMAM.PDF.
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In any case, imams fulf il a crucial role in Muslim communities, which 
all together make up more than one and a half million believers in Italy, the 
majority of whom are immigrants. We must further keep in mind that many 
mosques and their imams provide a range of welfare services that strongly 
affect the integration process of immigrants. Imams thus play an important 
social role (Bombardieri, 2010). All things considered, however, there is no doubt 
that imams’ most important function is a religious one (Vincenzo, 2010). From 
the root meaning of the word ‘imam’, which is ‘in front of’, the imam comes 
to be the leader in prayer, and hence, by extension, the religious and political 
head of the whole Muslim community, whose task is to lead it in fulfilment of 
God’s commandments. Their other functions, including the social and political 
ones, come from and are based on their religious authority (Pace, 2004). In fact, 
imams are recognized through their everyday leadership, whose legitimation 
derives directly from their religious role (Arnold, 1999; Sordel, 1986).
As far as Islamic organizations are concerned, the theological absence 
of a sacred ordination does not necessary imply the absence of persons 
who are capable of managing the sacred rules of Islam – persons who have 
the essential duty within Islam to ensure the correct observation of the 
transcendental law (Frégosi, 2003). This is more than enough for taking 
into consideration the status and role of imams, even from the state’s point 
of view (Colaianni, 2003).
The real obstacle, then, is not the peculiar f igure of the imam in compari-
son with the traditional – mostly Christian – notion of religious ministers. 
Quite the contrary, these obstacles are created by the fact that in Italy 
Muslim communities are usually not recognized as a religious creed: there 
is, then, no way to establish an effective connection between the state’s legal 
system and the law of an Islamic community. This has two interconnected 
consequences: f irst, Muslim communities cannot fully affirm their autonomy 
as a religion; and second, the state cannot formally recognize the status of 
any imam simply because it cannot verify whether individuals appointed 
to this role by the religious community are effectively different from the 
other (normal) lay believers.
5 The relationship between the state and Islamic 
organizations
Any community with religious aims is able to operate within the Italian legal 
system without authorization or prior registration. The only limit is based on 
the protection of public order and common decency. Islamic organizations 
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or their legal entities may choose among various types of legal organization. 
They, for example, may constitute themselves as a ‘non-recognized associa-
tion’ in accordance with Article 36-38 of the Italian Civil Code: this model 
implies independence in property matters and the possibility of receiving 
donations and the like. It is also used by political parties and trade union 
organizations, and it is the simplest model of association that does not provide 
for particular control from the state’s authorities. According to Articles 14-35 
of the Civil Code and the 2000 decree of the President of the Italian Republic 
(no. 361), entities can also choose the form of a ‘recognized association’, which 
provides legal personality through registration at a local prefecture. The civil 
capacity of Islamic organizations may also be obtained through Article 16 of 
the Disposizioni sulla legge in generale (‘Provisions on law in general’), which, 
based on the principle of reciprocity, may grant foreign Muslim entities the 
same rights guaranteed to Italian legal bodies (Ferrari, 2011).
However, under all of these provisions there is almost no legal difference 
between an association with no religious purpose and an organization that 
is specif ically based on religious aims. This is why attention is normally 
focused on the above-mentioned 1929 Act, which provides entities with the 
possibility of obtaining a legal capacity on the basis of their religious aims. 
Yet, even considering these provisions, there are still obstacles to the religious 
autonomy and legal recognition of Islamic organizations. For example, the 
1929 Act may subject these groups to the control of the state, which is given 
a large amount of discretion; under this act, the state’s authorities can annul 
the decisions made by the representatives of a religious entity, and may even 
replace them with state commissioners.
In addition, because of the lack of unitary representation at the national 
level and the strict interpretation of the Italian public order, Muslim groups 
are normally regulated by the general legislation concerning associations, 
in its double version of recognized and non-recognized associations.8 This 
means that Muslim groups are not only excluded from some important 
privileges – like those established through the intese and (albeit with 
problems) the 1929 Act –, but also from the possibility of being legally 
recognized because of their religious aims. In other words, Muslim organiza-
tions can only enjoy the legal benefits guaranteed to other, non-religious, 
private associations.
8 The only Islamic organization that is not an association and that, in accordance with the 
1929 Act (no. 1159), has been recognized as a religious legal entity is the Italian Centre of Islamic 
Culture (Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia). See the decree of the President of the Italian Republic, 
21 December 1974.
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6 Islamic organizations
As in other European countries, there is no single national Muslim organiza-
tion in Italy that represents all Muslims and Islamic institutions in the 
country (Donini, 2002; Guolo, 2000; Mancuso, 2012; Pacini, 2008). There are 
many local Islamic groups; others refer to either a transnational Islamist 
movement or an entity of a foreign state. There are a large number of im-
migrants in Italian Muslim organizations that, when wishing to operate in 
Italy, must respect the principles of the Italian Constitution. These principles 
must be taken into serious consideration to establish a proper connection 
between the state and the Islamic organizations that will solve questions, 
like those concerning imams. In this sense, the f irst step is to clarify whether 
these Islamic organizations can be def ined as religious denominations 
in the legal sense. The problem of def ining what a ‘denomination’ is has 
become signif icant in Italy with the spread of ‘new’ religious organizations, 
including Islamic ones, whose presence in the country is relatively recent. 
As there is a complete absence of statutory def initions, some say that the 
state is neither able nor competent to provide such a definition, so the state 
should rely on the self-assessment of the adherents of a group that wishes 
to be recognized as a religious denomination.
In other words, if the members of a community share the belief that 
they form a religious denomination, in general the state must accept their 
assessment. Still, some decisions of the Constitutional Court state that the 
term ‘denomination’ must have an objective and not a subjective basis.9 
This is why some scholars have identif ied selected characteristics that a 
community must necessarily have to be considered a denomination. One of 
them is the ‘belief’ in a transcendental entity – not necessarily God – that is 
capable of answering fundamental questions about man’s origin and destiny, 
providing a moral code, and creating an existential interdependence between 
the members and that transcendental reference. Most importantly, these 
groups must have a basic organizational structure (Ferrari, 1995).
Now, whichever of these paradigms are used it can be inferred that in 
Italy many – if not most – Islamic organizations can be defined as religious. 
This being the case, these organizations can (at least potentially) sign an 
agreement with the state in accordance with both the general principles 
of Italian Law and Article 8 of the 1948 Constitution.
9 See in particular the Italian Constitutional Court, Decisions no. 467 of 1992 and no. 195 
of 1993.
370 Francesco alicino 
7 Bilateral (church-state) legislation
But what actually is the original aim of the bilateral legislation based on 
intese? To answer this question, it is important to keep in mind some of the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions, which state that the bilateral instrument 
of intese is mainly conceived for two interrelated purposes.10
First, it is intended to facilitate and promote collaboration between the 
state and religious denominations, which is the precondition for granting 
the denominations public prominence within the state’s legal system, as 
explicitly stated in the 1948 Constitution. This is a peculiar aspect of the 
constitutional order that, in fact, marks the difference between the limited 
Italian secularism model and the French principle of laïcité (‘secularism’) – a 
principle that is based on strict separation between the state and religions, 
and that therefore tends not only to relegate ‘religious factors’ to the private 
sphere (Laurence and Vaisse, 2007), but also to assimilate religious diversity 
into the founding principles of the French Republic (Robert, 2006; see also 
Jouanneau, Part I).11
The second purpose is that bilateral legislation based on Section 3 of 
Article 8 highlights the specif ic characteristics of a single denomination. 
This is because those characteristics risk being sidelined by the Parliament’s 
unilateral legislation that, given its general-generic nature, is less capable 
of responding to the particular needs and peculiar identity of different 
religious groups. For these reasons, bilateral legislation may be a suitable 
instrument for solving the questions related to the presence of Islamic 
organizations in Italy. In particular, it could be an appropriate mechanism 
for regulating imams – perhaps also including their training, which, as some 
have claimed, seems to be one of the most important steps in the process 
of Muslims’ integration (Ferarri, 2013).
It should be noted that the training of imams was neglected in Italy 
until a few years ago: while there had been some initiatives to educate 
imams from the Muslim side, public institutions preferred to avoid direct 
involvement. This situation came to an end in 2012, when a number of North 
Italian universities (namely, the Universities of Come, Alessandria, Milan, 
Padua, and the Catholic University of Milan) signed an agreement with the 
Minister of Internal Affairs in support of a course for the training of ‘Muslim 
religious leader(s)’ (see also Pallavicini, Part II). The Minister aff irmed that 
10 The Italian Constitutional Court, Decision no. 346 of 2002.
11 Robert (2006, p. 7). For a more general analysis, see: Balibar (2012, p. 66); Custos (2006, p. 398); 
Jeantet (2006, p. 29); Leveau and Kepel (1988); Rabah (1998); and Sayah (2006, pp. 922-927).
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the state would actively participate in this training programme, thereby 
facilitating the possibility that imams and other Muslim leaders would 
obtain legal recognition and be appointed in accordance with the 1929 Act, 
which would also be particularly important for acknowledging the civil 
effects of Muslim marriages.
This training project was mainly based on the experience of other 
European countries. It does not provide a religious curriculum. Instead, 
it is intended to impart knowledge of the state’s cultural and legal system, 
including family law, gender relations, and interreligious dialogue: themes 
that may help imams and other Muslim leaders better understand the 
specif ic connotation of Italy’s principle of secularism, which, as mentioned 
earlier, is far from strict (Alicino, 2009). Training imams in Italy does not, 
then, imply religious teaching. Rather, it provides citizenship education, 
through which imams can learn about the place where they live and work 
and become more familiar with the culture, history, tradition, language, 
and values (including the constitutional principles) of the Italian State. At 
present, most imams in Italy come from Muslim-majority countries and 
know little about the country in which they conduct their activities as 
religious leaders. Given the role they play within the religious communities, 
training imams in Italy is also (if not mainly) considered a way of promoting 
the integration of Muslims into Italian society.
8 The Italian State and Islamic organizations: A possible 
collaboration?
The position of imams in Italy leads to the observation that the usual in-
tegration approach between Islamic groups and state’s authorities should 
be revised and re-evaluated (Colaianni, 2009; Consorti, 2008; Macrí, 2007; 
Rivetti, 2007; Varnier, 2007). This is particularly true with regard to the 
question of training imams, which should not be solved by unilateral legisla-
tion that may generate forced assimilation and, perhaps, discrimination 
against Islamic organizations. Instead, these questions should be solved 
through active collaboration between the state and Muslim communities. 
The only available instrument for implementing this collaboration is stated 
in Section 3 of Article 8 of the Italian Constitution. According to this article, 
agreements may lead religious organizations to be active parts of the Italian 
legal system – which includes and presupposes the respect of constitutional 
principles. On the state’s side, though, this bilateral system necessarily 
implies the responsibility of the public authorities to treat Islamic groups 
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the same as other religious organizations, providing the same range of rights 
and benefits (Aluff i Beck-Peccoz, 2004).
Within the provisions of intese, the state and Islamic organizations 
can provide essential criteria, such as training programmes for imams as 
religious ministers recognized not only by their own organization, but also 
within the state’s legal system. This would also give a new impulse to the 
constitutional instrument of intese, which can be f inally used to support 
the peculiar characteristics of religious groups, rather than extending the 
phenomenon of photocopy agreements – a phenomenon that is not really 
consistent with the original scope of the bilateral system provided by Section 
3 of Article 8 of the Italian Charter.
Some Muslim organizations have negotiated with the government to 
sign an intesa. This is the case for the Unione delle Comunità Islamiche 
d’Italia (Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy, U.CO.II), 
which, only two years after its establishment in 1990, publicly manifested 
that intention, prepared a draft agreement, and sent it to the government. 
Other Islamic organizations followed that same path, like the Associazione 
Musulmani Italiani (Association of Italian Muslims, AMI) from 1994 and 
the Comunità Religiosa Islamica Italiana (Italian Islamic Religious Com-
munity, CO.RE.IS, 1996; see Pallavicini, Part II; Acciai, 1995; Musselli, 
1997; Tedeschi, 1996). It is noteworthy that from these drafts have come 
important efforts to adapt the status and position of imams and other 
Muslim authorities to the notion of the religious minister as established 
in all of the agreements between state and religions signed in Italy as of 
now (Cilardo, 2009).
All these efforts, however, have not been taken into consideration by the 
Italian public authorities, who have chosen instruments other than section 
3 of Article 8 to regulate the state’s relationship with Islamic communities. 
For example, in 2005 a Consulta per l’Islam italiano (Consultative Council 
of Italian Islam) was established by the Italian Minister of Internal Affairs 
(Ferarri, 2007). Since then, the council has been preparing documents 
to reaff irm the values of a secular state and religious freedom as well as 
encourage the creation of a federation of Islamic organizations.
In 2010 a Comitato per l’Islam Italiano (Committee for an Italian Islam) 
made up of nineteen members – representatives of Islamic organizations, 
scholars, professors, and journalists who are experts in Islam – was es-
tablished by the Minister of Internal Affairs. This committee has been 
acting as a consultant, and the ministry has been listening to its views on 
some current questions. This approach has also been followed at the local 
level, where consultative forums with representatives of the local Muslim 
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community and experts in law and religion have been established, for 
example in Milan (Alicino, 2011).
After a new government was established in November 2011, the Minister 
for Cooperation and Integration created a permanent conference on ‘Reli-
gions, Culture, and Integration’ in March 2012 with representatives of Muslim 
organizations and experts in Islam and in other religions. This conference 
was essentially conceived of as a space for meetings and seminars rather 
than as a consultative or decision-making body.
There was also a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2015 between 
the Department of Penitentiary Administration (DAP) and the Union of 
Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy (Unione delle Comunità e 
delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia), which may be seen as an important 
effort towards a more reasonable approach towards the growing presence of 
Muslim inmates in the Italian prison system (Ministero della Giustizia 2015).
9 Conclusion
The Italian approach toward imams seems to be based on the fact that 
Islamic organizations are ‘more other’ (Allievi, 2009) than organizations 
that are allegedly more compatible with the traditional system of rela-
tions between church and state in Italy – a system established through 
the implementation of Articles 7-8 of the Constitution and the 1929 Act. 
This approach was originally conceived in reference to a specif ic religious 
geography that has now changed completely (Tozzi, 2009). It was tailored 
for a substantially mono-cultural society, and is therefore unfit to deal with 
today’s religious reality in Italy. That is why this approach that seems attrac-
tive to some denominations can also be seen as a systematic disadvantage, 
if not a form of discrimination, by other creeds and their members (Fiorita, 
2003). This is evident from the fact that, since the 1948 Constitution entered 
into force, there has been a sort of ‘cold peace’ between the state and ‘new’ 
denominations (in primis Islamic denominations) (La Croce, 2003).
The recognition of Islam in Italy still has a long way to go. In the meantime, 
Muslims will continue organizing themselves and numerous initiatives have 
been taken up to establish Islamic organizations, undertaking all kinds of 
activities (see Rhazzali and Pallavicini, Part II). Hopefully the church and 
state, i.e., the Muslim communities and the state, will f ind a satisfactory 
way to cooperate that will in the end lead to the formal recognition of Islam 
in the country, and, consequently, to its further institutionalization and 
reasonable forms of interaction and integration.
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Abstract
This chapter presents an assessment of the main trends directing the 
evolution of an understanding of imams in Europe, with a particular 
focus on the sociocultural prof ile of those who assume this role in Italy. 
The number of prof iles of imams studied in this research project was 
one hundred from all over the country. The chapter also offers some 
updated f igures based on the results of another research project, origi-
nally conducted between 2011 and 2013, on places of Muslim worship in 
the country.1
Keywords: European imams, Italian imamate, Imams and mosques in 
Italy, institutionalization of Islam
1 This contribution originates from the outcomes of two different research projects. The 
f irst is a qualitative and quantitative study entitled ‘Socio-religious leadership of the imam in 
Italy: a European perspective’ (La leadership socio-religiosa dell’Imam in Italia in prospettiva 
europea). The f irst of its kind in Italy and f inanced with internal funds by the University of 
Padua, the project aimed at analysing the transformations of Islamic religious authorities and 
community leadership f igures in Italy, with particular attention given to imams. The research 
was conducted on a sample of 100 imams who were active throughout the Italian territory. The 
second project was carried out between 2011 and 2013 in the context of a PRIN-MIUR (National 
Interest Program of the Italian Ministry for Education, University and Scientif ic Research), which 
connected f ive Italian Universities (Padua, Bologna, Rome, Turin, and Palermo) to conduct a 
national study entitled ‘Religious pluralism in Italy: mapping and interpreting the different 
socio-religious entities in Italian society’ (Il pluralismo religioso in Italia: Per una mappatura e 
un’ interpretazione delle diverse presenze socio-religiose nella societa’ Italiana). The author was 
the coordinator of the interdisciplinary research unit (sociologists, psychologists, lawyers) for 
this second project that analysed the Muslim presence in Italy, and in particular the role of 
mosques and Islamic centres.
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1 The European imam: Current status
Social science researchers have been using different approaches to elaborate 
a typological framework of Muslim leadership in Europe. Within this broader 
picture, they also have sought to identify the core features of an imam. 
Brigitte Maréchal (2003) has written a pivotal review of the research on 
Muslim leadership in Europe in which she identif ies some fundamental 
issues: the autonomy, even within constraints, of the majority of mosques 
and their leaders; the recruitment and education levels of imams; the con-
sequences of some countries’ initiatives to organize worship opportunities 
for their compatriots; and f inally the relationship between imams and 
European countries, which are sometimes keen to formalize their religious 
and community role, but are also afraid of the possibility of links between 
mosques and radical groups.
The studies by Wasif Shadid and Sjoerd van Koningsveld (1999, 2002) and 
Nico Landman (1992) describe imams’ religious authority and role in the 
Dutch context, which Welmoet Boender and Meryem Kanmaz (2002) com-
pare with that of Belgium. Some link the imams in each European country 
to a specif ic religious doctrine and ethnic background. Thus Philip Lewis 
(2004) considers imams in Great Britain in relation to the Deobandi tradition, 
while Sabine Kroissenbrunner (2002) analyses the role of Turkish imams in 
Vienna. Ural Manço (1997) touches upon Turkey’s political outlook towards 
Europe, and Landman (1997) on the politics of the Turkish Directorate of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Turkish imams have been an important part 
of the subject of many studies, such as the work of Kadir Canatan (2001) in 
the Netherlands and that of Gerdien Jonker (2002) in Germany. Then there 
are studies that focus on specif ic urban areas, like the one by Jordi Moreras 
(1999) describing imams in Barcelona, and by Felice Dassetto (2011), which 
touches on imams in the context of a comprehensive analysis of Muslim 
presence in Brussels. In 1998, Franck Frégosi edited a volum dedicated to 
the juridical profile of Islamic authorities from a historical and sociological 
perspective. Michel Reeber (2000, 2004) has focused on khuṭbas (‘sermons’) 
in France.
There is also research on the sociocultural profile of the imam as a social 
agent. The same Frégosi (2004) has sought to characterize the imam as a 
f igure bridging the role of worship ministers and sociocultural mediators: 
on the one hand, the imam shows Muslims’ participation in the public 
sphere, where citizenship is performed; on the other, he maintains the role 
of an cālim, the lawyer-theologian, custodian, and recognized interpreter 
of the sharia. Jocelyne Cesari (2004) sketches a fourfold classif ication of 
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imams: leaders that have been put in place by institutions of so-called 
Muslim countries; parish leaders, who manage activities within the mosque 
or within an Islamic centre or association in a def ined area or neighbour-
hood; transnational preachers, who are nearly always connected to major 
Islamist currents or organizations such as the Tablighi Jamaat Movement, 
Wahhabites, or Sufi confraternities; and lastly, well-respected intellectuals 
that share their views on Islam, are legitimized by their cultural prominence, 
and are supported by a large audience of followers. In Cesari’s perspective, an 
imam can assume more than one of these roles, even if his most prominent 
identif ication seems to be as a parish leader. Solenne Jouanneau is the 
author of the insightful monograph Les Imams en France (2013; also see her 
contribution in Part I), which proposes a variety of imam typologies from 
a historical perspective, from the invisible imam of the colonial period to 
the imamate as a real profession from the 1990s onwards.
A framework for interpreting the Italian reality has been proposed 
by Chantal Saint-Blancat (2008), highlighting the plurality of strategies 
practiced by imams and community representatives, and drawing attention 
to the creative religious bricolage with which they try to mediate the need 
for inclusion and the intent to keep their ethical and religious viewpoint 
alive. I have studied contexts outside of the mosque that involve imams 
(Rhazzali, 2014, 2015b), and have noted an interesting interweaving, still 
in the making, between the theme of religious assistance (to patients of 
terminal illnesses in hospitals and to detainees in jail) and the practices of 
intercultural mediation that are supported by the public administration.
While it also highlights signif icant differences, this comparison between 
different countries indicates the need to identify, at least in its essential 
traits, a sociological profile of imams that would refer to the entire European 
Union context. One attempt at this is outlined in a study commissioned by 
the Policy Department of Structural and Cohesion Policies of the European 
Parliament in 2007 (Dassetto, Ferrari, and Maréchal, 2007).
2 Imams in Italy: Figures with changeable contours
Compared to other European countries, the phenomenon of migration 
in Italy has occurred over a relatively short period of time and has been 
marked by considerable internal differentiation due to the diverse cultural 
and national origins of the migrants. However, the history and current 
reality of imams in the Italian context are closely linked to the features 
that characterize the Islamic presence in Europe.
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Muslim communities, especially in the initial and middle phases of recent 
Italian history, have experienced an uneasiness in their interactions with 
Italian society, which approaches them with a mix of attitudes that oscillate 
from ideologically or religiously inspired solidarity, to the most aggressive 
mistrust, in the context of an extreme caution of public policies, which 
sometimes borders apathy. Islam is newly experiencing the phenomenon 
of being a minority, in which it must build a ‘credibility structure’ (Berger 
1969) that will make its presence tolerable for both Muslims and those who 
interact with them, in a context characterized by marked sociocultural 
differentiation and rapid changes.
Thus, if an imam comes to fulf il the role of a guardian of the religious 
tradition, he de facto accepts the role of leader of an organization as well as 
the organization’s link to the authorities. Above all, he takes on himself, often 
precariously and without juridical basis, at least some of the functions that 
were traditionally associated with an organized system of different roles 
such as cālim,‘adūl, qadi, and mufti (scholar, notary, judge, and fatwa-giver) 
(Hallaq, 2004), as well as some new functions deriving from the need to 
create relationships with the local context – similar to the roles assumed 
by Christian religious authority f igures in the context of the relationship 
between church and state (Allievi, 2010; Rhazzali, 2014, 2015a; Roy, 2008).
The history of the Italian imam mirrors the path that Italian Muslims 
have taken and are still treading to furnish themselves with the necessary 
cultural resources for interacting effectively with the sociocultural and 
political fabric of which they now claim to be a part, notwithstanding 
diff iculties relating to the legal recognition of the Islamic ‘cult’. Conducting 
a study on the f igure of Italian imams requires their specif ic prof iles to be 
differentiated from the more general background of the overall evolution 
of Islamic leadership forms. For this reason, the aim of this investigation 
was to reconstruct the interplay of factors that have most signif icantly 
contributed to imams’ current, unique features.
3 The first steps of the institutionalization of Islam in Italy
In the 1970s and 1980s, the first wave of Muslim immigration into Italy – mainly 
constituting students of Middle Eastern origin – gave birth to the Unione degli 
Studenti Musulmani in Italia (Union of Muslim Students in Italy, USMI), an 
association that f irst proposed giving a stable structure to Islamic religious 
presence in the country. The political and cultural aspects of this group 
coexisted with a more strictly religious ethos that would manifest more fully 
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in the following years with the birth of the Unione delle Comunità Islamiche 
d’Italia (Union of the Islamic Communities and Organisations in Italy, U.CO.I.I). 
This is the background of the formation of the first wave of religious agents.
At the very beginning of Italian Islam, the individuals steering the organi-
zation of mosques and working as religious guides were university students, 
professionals, doctors, and engineers originating mostly from Syria, Egypt, 
and Somalia, often with Italian citizenship. This group has continued to play 
a central role in the running of associations at the national level. In the wake 
of the rapid growth of immigration after 1990 – mostly from the Maghreb, 
and widely distributed throughout Italy –, the protagonists of the life of the 
mosques, especially at the national level, were often factory workers from in-
dustrial estates and businessmen connected to the so-called ‘ethnic’ economy. 
In those same years, Italy was experiencing a growth of local autonomy and 
a crisis of traditional ideologies and political parties. This might have limited 
the attractiveness of secular political and trade unionist associations, and in 
turn stimulated the initiative of religious players – particularly grassroots 
initiatives in which religion played a key cohesive role.
Amongst the promoters of religious bodies, among whom roles tend 
to continuously overlap and further diversify, some actors were ‘elected’ 
as religious guides of the community and assumed, somewhere between 
acclamation and self-proclamation, the title of imam. The decisive factor 
is often what can be termed ‘religious entrepreneurial charisma’, which is 
particularly evident in cases where a single or restricted group autonomously 
produced their own organization. In the Italian context, this element was 
no less important than the position of the imam as the guardian-preserver 
of ‘Islamic social actions’ (Dassetto, 2011). These imams, who sometimes 
stand out from and sometimes blend in with other community leaders, 
bring together different functions that are necessary to ensure an organized 
religious framework for their community and often also to respond to 
needs that are connected with religious themes in different ways, due to 
the not-so-simple relation between Islam and the problems of everyday 
life in Italian society.
4 Imam profiles
In the complex and changing scene of Islam in Italy, the individuation of 
the socio-cultural prof ile of the imam makes a def inition indispensable. 
In this section, I present an obviously idealized typology based on the case 
studies analysed in the two research projects I have taken part in.
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First, there is the ‘imam of the mosque’. As a place of worship, mosques 
require a f igure that will, to some extent, identify with it and with the 
important activities that take place there, a guide for religious events, who 
therefore represents the continuity between the religious tradition and the 
organization that the community gives itself in a precise historical moment 
at a specif ic place. This essential element can mix with the most diverse 
roles. The imam can act as a teacher of Islamic doctrine and as an Arabic 
language tutor, but as soon as the mosque becomes a conspicuous size, as has 
happened in some metropolitan areas, these additional roles are allocated 
to others and the imam tends to be def ined by his more ‘pastoral’ role. As 
a guide to prayer and as the khāṭib (‘person in charge of giving the Friday 
sermon’), the imam becomes the ‘spokesman’ of the mosque, so to speak 
– and through this he becomes the de facto representative of the human 
community that surrounds the mosque. This is an activity that the imam 
mostly carries out in a voluntary capacity: 85 per cent of the interviewed 
imams declared that they fulf il their role without receiving any payment, 
although in some cases they receive monthly reimbursements, sometimes 
as a proper wage and sometimes on an occasional basis – but most of the 
time unoff icially. For the vast majority of cases, therefore, the position of 
the imam as a worker is precarious. Even in cases where the imam is paid, 
he does not benef it from a def ined juridical framework that would give 
him a professional status.
The essential requirements for recruitment as an imam are the willingness 
to carry out voluntary work and the possession of theological knowledge, 
preferably acquired in the context of an academic course, together with the 
ability to communicate effectively and, in particular, to give public talks. 
Knowledge of Arabic is also a decisive factor, as the most important part 
of Islamic worship is conducted in that language. Knowledge of Italian is 
also considered important, but is not obligatory; a translator is frequently 
required for rendering at least the Friday sermon into Italian for those 
members who do not speak Arabic. Given the current demographic composi-
tion of Italian Muslims most sermons are in Arabic, though recently there 
have been cases of ethnically specialized mosques where the language used 
is Urdu, Bengali, or Albanian. A more complex aspect is represented by the 
(in)compatibility of the imam’s ‘theological-political’ and sharia-legalistic 
views with those prevailing in the mosque and especially amongst its steer-
ing group. The imam does not always cover all the most relevant religious 
roles, either; sometimes he specializes in Friday sermons, relying on the 
presence of an imam-custodian that provides the other services during the 
week. Sometimes a ‘travelling imam’ can also substitute for the mosque’s.
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This second type of imam (the ‘travelling imam’) is not permanently 
linked to a mosque and makes himself available to mosques only for Friday 
sermons or other specif ic occasions, thereby displaying some traits of be-
ing self-employed. He operates in a freelance fashion, sometimes with a 
background at a bigger or more famous mosque, and displays a level of 
competence that is deemed of such quality to justify a payment (at least to 
cover expenses). For ‘travelling imams’ references relating to a theological 
education are required, together with a reputation for social skills, elocution, 
and communicative abilities. As happens amongst self-employed individu-
als, there is competition between ‘travelling imams’. For this reason, an 
important role is played by the imams’ ‘marketing’ activities – especially 
a familiarity with computers and social media – and publication output, 
which is often characterized by a certain f lexibility in dealing with the 
various doctrinal orientations of the contexts where he performs his services.
If his knowledge of Italian allows it, a ‘travelling imam’ can access a par-
ticularly rich ‘market’ by acting as an essential reference point for information 
agencies and making himself available as an experienced spokesperson for 
local and national institutions, which also provides him with access to media 
platforms such as television programmes. This media aspect is equally, if not 
more, important in transnational Islam, where the f igure of the preacher 
(clearly analogous to that of the travelling imam) is taking on an ever-more-
prominent role. To keep up with the competition, it becomes indispensable 
for the imams to possess rhetoric abilities and communication know-how, for 
example regarding to the formalities that regulate interreligious dialogue. 
These qualities become as important as doctrinal competence, and enable 
the imam to assume the cloak of a Muslim representative in competition 
with other leaders and imams who are more directly linked to mosques.
Third is ‘the seasonal imam’, who is particularly important for liturgi-
cal occasions such as Ramadan. In recent times, this type of imam is not 
infrequently seen entering the life of Italian mosques from abroad for short 
periods of time. In some cases they are sent by Muslim majority countries 
and in others they come through their own initiative or with the support 
of foundations or associations. Endowed with a high level of theological 
education acquired by following the models recommended by the country 
of origin, this kind of imam acts mostly in the context of ethno-national 
communities. This type of imam deserves independent study because of 
its many implications for the evolution of Italian Islam.
The fourth and last kind is the ‘imam as religious assistant’. The need 
for a f igure that represents religious symbolic power arises at certain mo-
ments, such as life stage transitions like births, weddings, and deaths. 
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These are circumstances in which the imam is called to intervene. Imams 
may also be called upon in situations of heightened diff iculty or great 
emotional involvement, such as in the case of losing a job or a house, or 
experiencing discomfort in family relations. In this case, part of the activity 
of the imam is def ined through the interweaving of religious assistance 
and social and psychological help – similar to the role of priests in the life 
of Catholic parishes.
5 Interactions between Islamic and state institutions
The imam and those in charge of the mosque struggle to fulf il their com-
mitments if places of worship are geographically spread out, if they require 
numerous visits, and if they include institutions such as jails and hospitals 
that require a specif ic knowledge of their ‘logic’ and their languages for 
appropriate intervention to take place. This type of interaction puts the 
representatives of Islamic religious authority in touch with secular state 
institutions. Often the institutions themselves ask for the intervention of 
an imam for tasks that are equivalent to those performed by a parson or 
chaplain. After receiving such a request, and if they have the capacity to 
fulf ill it, mosques send an imam or a delegate of his – who is automatically 
considered an imam in the context of the interaction. Alternatively, the 
mosque could give way to independent professional ‘travelling imams’ or to 
intercultural mediators with sensitivity and some religious understanding. 
A space therefore opens for the imam to develop new expertise in provid-
ing religious/spiritual assistance within secular contexts, which has been 
experimented with for a long time in the European context, but is relatively 
new to the Muslim world, where it has only recently started to take shape 
through the murshid and mushida (‘male and female guide’; see Borillo, 
Part I). In Italy, these religious assistants are voluntary (as far as we know); 
if they are paid, it is as intercultural mediators.2
It is especially through the f igure of the intercultural mediator that 
female religious f igures emerge for the f irst time. Women often end up 
carrying out the majority of the functions that are associated with the 
imam-religious assistant, often starting from a signif icant theological 
knowledge interwoven with university studies in the humanities, law, or 
2 Systematic studies of this type of imam are hardly available. The author has conducted a 
study dedicated to Italian prisons (Rhazzali, 2014), but so far assistance in hospitals has produced 
only a qualitative research study limited to the theme of end-of-life care (Rhazzali, 2014).
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social sciences. In fact, women are predominant in the f ield of intercultural 
mediation, including Muslim women (Luatti, 2006, 2011; Rhazzali, 2015b). 
During our research, I had the opportunity to observe women carrying 
out – even though informally – a religious and welfare responsibility in 
jails that is extremely signif icant, covering tasks that otherwise would not 
be fulf illed through the resources of the mosques or the aid of voluntary 
services. These women performed the role of an imam, offering spiritual 
guidance to inmates, training the prison staff about specif ic issues that 
are sensitive to the Muslim community, and donating books on Islam to 
the prison library.
The four types of imam presented in Section 4 have one major point in 
common: the quality of the theological education of the imam and therefore 
his (or her) religious legitimacy. This is connected with an even more impor-
tant issue that is by now an established theme within the debate surrounding 
European Islam: the elaboration of a doctrine that is able to interact with 
current reality in a genuine way. The tangible nature of this issue becomes 
more evident when one considers the challenges that imams and Islamic 
organizations f ind themselves dealing with, such as the political and ethical 
confusion of young Muslims and the new and in many ways revolutionary 
sphere of the Internet, which accelerates the processes of transformation 
by overturning traditional styles of religious communication.
Depending on the position from which one considers the current sce-
nario, Italian Islam appears both precarious and rooted: integrated into 
the public space but to this day not recognized; simultaneously reconciled 
with Italy and an object of resentment. If the imams are bearing the 
weight of these contradictions, their ‘mosques’ carry all the signs of this 
as-yet-unsettled transition.
6 Prayer places: Physical spaces and organizational aspects
Offering an overall representation of the territorial distribution of Muslim 
places of worship in Italy together with an overview of the activities that 
are undertaken there and of the organizational forms they take is not an 
easy task because of the limited pool of data and bibliographical resources 
available for a sociological analysis.
When we f irst undertook our research, only two studies had been car-
ried out, the f irst conducted by Stefano Allievi and Felice Dassetto in 1992 
(1993), the second by Maria Bombardieri between 2008 and 2011 (2011). 
There was also the data on information policy for security published by the 
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Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la Sicurezza (Department of Information 
Security, DIS, 2007),3 operating as part of the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers, and the data published on the site of the Centro Studi sulle Nuove 
Religioni (Centre for Studies on new Religions, CESNUR), which relates to 
the monitoring of new religions in Italy.4
The notion of ‘places of worship’ in the Italian context entails the adoption 
of classif ication criteria that are diff icult to def ine in the case of Islam. In 
Italy, both in media and everyday communication, the word ‘mosque’ is used 
to indicate a place where the social religious life of Muslims takes place. 
However, there are only a handful that can be strictly def ined as mosques: 
one can mention with certainty the grand mosque in Rome, together with 
those of Milan (Segrate), Catania (currently inactive), Ravenna, and Colle 
Val d’Elsa. To this very limited catalogue can be added the many building 
attempts that were interrupted for various reasons before completion.
Indeed, the term ‘mosque’ is, in a strict sense, reserved for buildings that 
reproduce the architectural structure of a mosque, which, even though it 
displays forms that are very different depending on the time and place of 
construction, does maintain some common features, such as a courtyard 
for ablutions and a great prayer room that is able to host the faithful for 
the Friday prayer and the most important festivals in the Muslim calendar. 
A third element that has been the subject of heated controversy in some 
European countries, such as Switzerland, is the minaret, which Italian 
Muslims have never really claimed to be indispensable (Rhazzali, 2013). 
The mosque undoubtedly has a symbolic signif icance, evoking the public 
centrality of religious practices for Muslims and therefore of the cultural 
horizon to which the practices are connected. This in part explains the 
hostility of political parties, movements, and widespread forms of populism 
– which are generally diff ident regarding the Islamic presence – towards 
the birth of full-fledged mosques.
Worship places in Italy can be more appropriately defined as muṣallayāt 
(sing., muṣallā): simple prayer rooms that in general re-use and adapt pre-
existing spaces for to the most essential needs of religious service.5 They 
constitute the nearly always temporary attempt of Muslims to f ind spaces 
and times for group prayer in the immigration context, a diff icult and 
3 https://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/chi-siamo/organizzazione/dis.html.
4 Cf. http://www.cesnur.org.
5 In Muslim majority countries, this term currently indicates spaces in public structures such as 
airports, motorway service stations, universities, and hospitals that are set up as prayer facilities 
for religious people in transit and are based upon self-organization in the absence of an imam.
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sometimes painful quest that continuously faces political or bureaucratic 
resistance – which are strengthened by the generally lukewarm attitude 
towards the principle of religious liberty in Italy. This translates into a 
scenario of worship in garages, industrial warehouses, and better if situ-
ated on the edges of motorways, basements, or spaces that were originally 
designed for commercial activities. These spaces are constantly under threat 
of eviction, suspended leases, and disputed terms of use, even if they are 
sometimes made accessible through the local solidarity of individual secular 
or religious organizations as a result of the sensitivity towards interreligious 
dialogue that is fairly present in civil society. It must be remembered that, 
in the absence of an agreement with the state or any other legal recognition, 
Islam does not enjoy the legal status of an ‘accepted form of worship’. This 
entails that the so-called ‘mosques’ cannot be formally recognized as worship 
places or gain access to the relevant benefits that are granted to religious 
premises by law (see also Alicino, Part II).
Therefore, except for the case of the mosque of Rome (which is based on an 
agreement that dates to a time before the unfolding of immigration in Italy 
and was signed between the Italian State and the diplomatic representatives 
of Muslim countries), all the other Islamic places for prayer or religious 
assembly legally present themselves as the headquarters of individual 
associations that are established with various social and cultural aims. The 
religious nature of the practices carried out there remains the private choice 
of the members; the local administration and State authorities can view this 
with respect and a willingness to collaborate, or, as has often happened, can 
favour the restrictive interpretation of laws and regulations to make the life 
of the mosque diff icult if not impossible, with the ensuing swarm of legal 
controversies and the most diverse use of political rhetoric. Considering 
their size, their location in urban contexts, the national origin and linguistic 
features of those who frequent them, and the worship practices associated 
with them, aside from the few ‘real’ mosques previously mentioned, Italian 
mosques can be understood through the following typology:
Islamic cultural centres. In many cases, the group that leads the mosque 
describes itself as an ‘Islamic cultural centre’. However, this def inition 
technically only pertains to the limited number of cases where, aside from 
the space designated for prayer, there are also other rooms where other 
educational and cultural activities for a specif ic target audience can take 
place. These activities may include: a Quranic school; Arabic courses for the 
children of the congregation members or for Italians who want to know more 
about Islam; initiatives conceived for women or youths; and conferences and 
public meetings. The organizational level of the main ‘mosques’, which are 
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mostly located in urban centres, allows more consistency and continuity in 
the elaboration and implementation of activities such as providing assistance 
in jails and hospitals or supporting families in returning the bodies of the 
deceased to their homeland for burial, although these services are also 
available in smaller mosques with less resources to a certain extent.
Nationality-based mosques. Until the recent past, people who attended 
mosques in Italy could hardly be traced back to a single ethno-national 
origin. The leading groups themselves were of mixed backgrounds. More 
recently, however, there is a tendency to organize along ethnic lines. Mainly 
located on the urban periphery and in small provincial towns, these mosques 
are progressively becoming the most common models. The diff iculties 
of running so-called ecumenical mosques, together with the enduring 
legislative silence of the Italian State, has certainly not encouraged the 
institutionalization of an ‘Italian Islam’.
Mosques of modest size. This is currently the most common type of mosque 
in Italy. They are sometimes unable to guarantee the traditional division 
of space between male and female worshippers, or to adequately host the 
Friday gatherings for the faithful to hear the khuṭba. Located in buildings 
that are adapted with great zeal to the most essential needs of prayer, they 
represent a point of reference for local Muslims and often become the loca-
tion of organized events ranging from economic activities aimed at the 
self-f inancing of the mosque through, for example, halal trade, to the setup 
of forms of micro-welfare aimed at benefitting the community.
Sufi fraternities. Another case is the places that are run by Sufi fraternities. 
Sometimes characterized by ethnically homogeneous participation, these 
groups are often preferred by Italian converts, who arrive at Islam through 
intellectual and existential interest in Sufism. The relationship of the group 
with their physical setting is often tied to the most diverse circumstances 
and therefore tends not to stabilize, resulting in limited visibility of the 
Sufi ‘mosques’.
7 Mapping Italian mosques
To produce an accurate mapping of Italian mosques, we have combined 
several data-gathering strategies, taking into consideration the extremely 
volatile nature and changeability of the situation under study. First, we 
reconstructed the relationship between the mosques and regional and 
national Islamic organizations, and asked for the direct involvement of 
the latter in the research project. Signif icant help was provided by the 
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Unione delle Comunità Islamiche d’Italia (Union of Islamic Communities 
and Organizations in Italy, U.CO.II), the Confederazione Islamica Italiana 
(Islamic Confederation of Italy, CII) and the Comunità Religiosa Islamica 
Italiana (Italian Islamic Religious Community, CO.RE.IS), in combination 
with access to a catalogue of imams and community leaders created in 
during the action-research project ‘New religious presences in Italy’ (see 
also Pallavicini, Part II).6
The data thus gathered needed to be integrated with the outcomes of other 
investigations, such as verifying whether previously identified mosques were 
still active; searching local and national news and the Internet in order to 
identify mosques that had not previously been recorded; and contacting local 
administration offices and non-Muslim religious associations operating in areas 
where the information about the existence of places of worship was imprecise.
As of February 2013, the number of mosques in Italy was 655. This number 
is smaller than that provided by the Dipartimento delle Informazioni per la 
Sicurezza (Department of Information Security, DIS, 2007), which stated that 
there were 774 mosques, and that given in Bombardieri’s research (2011), which 
counted 746 mosques. The differences can be ascribed to a partial discrepancy 
in the criteria adopted by individual researchers. In the case of the DIS report, 
the research aims were presumably guided by the needs of the intelligence 
services; the report does not contain a methodological note and does not 
indicate the criteria used in the investigation. In other words, it seems to have 
tried to capture the presence in Italy of any form of Muslim association in the 
most comprehensive way possible. Bombardieri’s research (2011) a few years 
later seemed to confirm the final number provided by the DIS, from which it 
deviates only slightly. Bombardieri counted all Islamic entities mentioned in 
the media, thus including halls used for only brief periods, private apartments 
sporadically used as worship places, Sufi brotherhood spaces open only to 
members, and ethno-national associations for which religious activities were 
secondary. In this study, we deemed it necessary to conduct our research 
on the basis of a definition of ‘mosques’ that, even comprising the extreme 
variety of actual cases, would pinpoint some features of both a sociocultural 
and legal nature. We therefore chose to include only those places that were 
established with some formality, with some at least basic level of advertising, 
and which constituted their own legal entity.
6 The project was promoted by the Forum Internazionale Democrazia & Religioni (FIDR)—
cofounded by the University of Padua—between 2010 and 2013, under the sponsorship of 
the Ministero degli Interni and the Ministero della Cooperazione. Cf. http://www.f idr.it/
progetto1_eng.asp.
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The geographic distribution of mosques in Italy mostly follows that of 
Muslim immigration, which in turn has been dictated by the territorial 
development of productive activities over the last few decades. For this reason, 
mosques are most numerous in Northern Italy.
We then conducted an analysis of mosque distribution by province, 
which demonstrates how the area mosques are more common in the big 
cities and their peripheries, such as Milan, Turin, and Bologna and their 
extended peripheries, as well as provinces such as Bergamo, Brescia, and 
Vicenza where the presence of manufacturing and commercial activities 
is particularly sizeable and widespread.
In the northern regions of the country, there have been manifestations 
of solidarity between the civil society and the Muslim communities. Still, 
the institutions and political world of these regions have not been very 
welcoming to a wider dialogue concerning the needs of Muslim communities. 
Attitudes inspired by mistrust – sometimes covert, sometimes explicit 
– have signif icantly inhibited attempts to advance mosque projects in 
Milan, Brescia, and Parma. Furthermore, there has been a opposition in 
the Veneto region against any attempt by Muslim communities to gain 
access to suitable places of worship. The Lombardy region even formulated 
a law in 2015 in which religions that are not qualif ied as ‘accepted forms of 
worship’ are given less ability to acquire their own space. Going down the 
peninsula the relative number of mosques diminishes, with the at least 
partial exception of Tuscany – where the mosque of Colle Val d’Elsa project, 
conceived in agreement with the local administration as both a mosque 
and an intercultural centre, has been completed – and of Rome, where in 
addition to the atypical grand mosque, there is also a varied landscape of 
Muslim religious organizations. Sicily is different than the rest of Southern 
Italy because the Islamic presence on the island derives from historically 
stratified relations with its neighbours on the other side of the Mediterranean 
(Branca and Scidà, 1990, pp. 43-44).
This description of the territorial distribution of mosques in Italy be 
decidedly incomplete without highlighting the importance of the relation-
ship between most of local institutions, however small they may be, and 
the nationwide Islamic organizations. In the course of the last few decades 
these relations have started to assume an ever-more-important role in 
the elaboration of doctrinal orientations that guide the life of mosque 
communities, in the creation of a public forum discussing the meanings of 
Islam in the evolution of Italian sociocultural and political reality, and in 
maintaining a dialogue with State institutions.
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8 Conclusions
There appears to be two fundamental tendencies in the complex internal 
dynamic that characterizes the emergence of both imams and mosques 
in the Italian public space. On the one hand, there is an evident attempt 
to give life to an Italian Islam. Some groups of Muslims are making a 
concerted effort to integrate the prevailing part of their social and cultural 
experience that is now Italian, aiming to redef ine their religious identity 
based on the specif ic location they now live and interact. The contribu-
tion of Italian converts to this effort cannot be neglected, especially 
due to their cultural activism (Allievi, 2009; Rhazzali, 2013). On the 
other hand, there has also been a growth in a new form of valorization 
of ethno-national themes in recent years with the birth and growth of 
organizations of Muslims who share the same national origin, which are 
often economically and politically assisted by their respective ‘home’ 
countries.
Within these communities it has to be made clear that an intent to 
guarantee the continuity of relations with the country of origin does not 
necessarily contrast with the promotion of full participation in the life of 
the host country. Quite the opposite, in fact: amongst the most interesting 
aspects of this type of experience is the positive acceptance of what can be 
called a multiple identity. At the same time, one should not forget that the 
relationship with the country of origin is, in part, a substitute for the delays 
and reticence of the Italian State in regard to reaching a legal agreement 
with Muslim communities on the issue of religious practice.
The future will show whether Italy’s political system and society are able 
to interpret the will of a rooted and complex Islamic reality to interact with 
the overall dynamics in which the country is evolving – a reality in which 
the Islam of the immigrants, of the so-called second and third generations, 
of the Italian converts, and of the imams all weave together to f ind both 
chances of participation and fundamental challenges within the shared 
Italian public sphere.
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Abstract
There are over one and a half million Muslims residing in Italy. This diverse 
Muslim community faces many challenges, including a lack of off icial 
recognition by the Italian government. The Islamic association Comunità 
Religiosa Islamica Italiana (Italian Islamic Religious Community, CO.RE.
IS) has undertaken the task of establishing institutions addressing the 
importance of religious tolerance. Through building mosques, developing 
curricula, and providing training for imams in Italy, CO.RE.IS seeks to 
promote a united and moderate representation of Italian Islam. This 
chapter centres on the role of the CO.RE.IS in offering both imam-training 
courses and general courses on Islam since 1995.
Keywords: Italian Islam, institution-building, Islam and democracy, 
mosques building
1 Islam and the State in Italy
Muslims in Italy are still waiting to receive the off icial government recogni-
tion that would give them the same status as the numerous other religions 
that have already signed agreements with the state. In the absence of an 
official body dedicated to these matters, the places of worship and ministers 
of the Islamic faith depend on initiatives undertaken by individuals or 
associations seeking to meet the religious needs of the about one and a half 
million Muslims in Italy. Flats, off ices, cellars, and garages are often used as 
locations for the Friday prayers of Muslim communities, while volunteers 
– mainly immigrants from non-EU countries – and foreign imams sent by 
international Islamic organizations or the embassies of Muslim countries 
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try to carry out the function of preacher and provide moral support to the 
community. The majority of Muslims in Italy are first-generation immigrants, 
mainly from Turkey, Albania, Morocco, and other parts of North Africa, but 
there are also growing numbers of Bangladeshi, Pakistani, and Senegalese 
Muslims who have had limited education or professional training, and who 
are often unfamiliar with the Italian legal system, culture, or language. For 
most of these immigrants, Islam is an expression of a natural sensibility 
and cultural heritage intertwined with memories of their youth in their 
home countries.
Given the growing presence of Muslims in the country, Italian state 
institutions have promoted some important initiatives in pursuit of a 
united and moderate representation of Italian Islam. In September 2004, 
for the f irst time in Italian history, the Italian President received a delega-
tion of Italian Muslims at the Quirinale, his off icial residence in Rome. A 
year later, the then-Minister of Internal Affairs Giuseppe Pisanu, formed 
a group of sixteen Muslims to act as advisors for understanding Italian 
Islam. The President welcomed this delegation and permanently appointed 
them as the Advisory Board for Italian Islam (Consulta per l’Islam Italiano). 
Headed by the Minister of Internal Affairs and further empowered by 
Pisanu’s successor Giuliano Amato, the Consulta is composed of the 
signatories of the ‘Manifesto against terrorism and for life’ (Manifesto 
contro il terrorismo e per la vita), which was published on 2 September 
2004 in the newspaper Il Corriere della Sera. Representatives of Italian 
Islamic civil society and those responsible for the Muslim community 
used this manifesto to condemn the manipulation of religious identity 
and to express their full adherence to the principles of the Constitution 
and the values of Italian culture.
The Consulta per l’Islam Italiano unites Muslims who are Italian by birth 
with those who come from Albania, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, 
Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, and Tunisia and who have either already ob-
tained Italian nationality or are, to a large extent, integrated into the Italian 
society while still maintaining their original citizenship. These Muslim 
advisors connected to the Minister of Internal Affairs have successfully 
highlighted the differing perspectives on and interpretations of Islam within 
the context of the Italian public and political debate. However, this would 
not have been the case without the recent involvement of the members of 
the Consulta per l’Islam Italiano in various parliamentary commissions, for 
instance on the Constitutional Affairs Law on Religious Freedom and on 
Social Affairs and Family Conditions, and in the anticipatory discussions 
for the presentation of certain proposed laws concerning immigration, 
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integration, citizenship, and equal opportunities. The importance and the 
social implications of religious pluralism and cultural diversity in Italy led 
Minister of Internal Affairs Giuliano Amato to establish La Carta dei valori 
della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione (The Charter of the Values of Citizenship 
and Integration)1 with the active involvement of both the Consulta per l’Islam 
Italiano and stakeholders from other religious denominations and major 
ethnic associations present in Italy.
2 CO.RE.IS
Since 1995, CO.RE.IS2 has been promoting and organizing a programme 
of Islamic theological training for religious leaders, both men and women, 
and ministers of faith or imams. This programme is meant to enable these 
individuals to deepen their knowledge of traditional Quranic doctrines. 
Comparisons with the sacred scriptures of other traditions and study of the 
Italian legal system and the history of western thought are also regarded as 
essential elements for the training of Muslim religious leaders in contem-
porary civil society, and as a way to eliminate segregation and extremism.
In 1995, CO.RE.IS felt that the time had come to stop attending congre-
gational prayers organized by the Islamic centres in a number of Italian 
cities. This dissociation had nothing to do with the Italian citizenship of 
the members of CO.RE.IS, for most are converts to Islam; this differs from 
other communities, which primarily consist of immigrants. It also did not 
concern a distinction between Westerners and those originating from 
outside Europe, between natives and immigrants, or between converts 
and those born into the religion. Rather, it was the distinction between 
everyday believers and political militants, between those sensitive to the 
nature of how they conceived the spirit of Islam and those who, in their 
sermons and conversations, used proselytising language and ideological 
propaganda. All too often, the sermons in the Islamic centres promoted 
Islamic extremism, theorized about alleged Christian imperialist plots, 
and emphasized the struggle against Zionism. Many Muslims, both those 
born into the religion and converts, felt very uncomfortable in these settings 
1 Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione, http://www1.interno.gov.it/mininterno/
export/sites/default/it/sezioni/sala_stampa/speciali/altri_speciali/carta_dei_valori; for the full 
text see: http://www.milano.istruzione.lombardia.it/edsalute/normativa/f iles/carta_valori_cit-
tadinanza_integrazione.pdf.
2 http://www.coreis.it/13/.
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– places that were supposed to be prayer halls for the Friday community 
assembly, but that, in fact, had evidently been taken over by a number 
of extremists who were intending to build an international network. A 
number of Muslim immigrants were expelled from these Islamic social 
centres and, consequently, forced to restrict their religious practices to the 
private sphere to avoid being associated with the undesirable formation of 
a parallel society that they considered neither Islamic nor Arab, but simply 
set up as an alternative to the established democratic cultural and political 
system. This also resulted in Italian Muslims taking on the responsibility 
of training others, as they could not tolerate the unjustif iable exploitation 
of Islam and its values by extremist groups.
3 CO.RE.IS’s activities
This section describes the activities that CO.RE.IS has developed.
3.1 Building mosques
When CO.RE.IS presented the details of the project for the Al-Wahid mosque 
in Milan to the municipal off icials and politicians and those from the 
Lombardy region, it decided to concentrate on the essentials, avoiding issues 
such as minarets and simply requesting a place of worship in a building that 
CO.RE.IS already owned and that was in need of renovation. The aim was 
to promote urban, technical, judicial, cultural, and architectural coherence 
through a transparent agreement between the public administration and 
an accredited and trustworthy organization of Islam in Italy. The debate 
with some local off icials and politicians led CO.RE.IS to look at the details 
in depth and to accept certain conditions that would have gone against this 
laudable collaboration, had both sides applied them in a bureaucratic or a 
close-minded manner. The Board for the Integration of the Municipality 
of Milan (Commissione per l’Integrazione del Comune di Milano) approved 
the project in December 2000, allowing CO.RE.IS to convert an industrial 
warehouse into a place of worship. Since then CO.RE.IS has undertaken 
similar efforts to raise the necessary funds to pursue new buildings and to 
start constructing the Al-Wahid and other mosques. The construction of a 
mosque in the heart of Milan as part of the urban environment and in full 
contact with the life of the city is of fundamental importance, not only as 
a confirmation of the call to a divine reality, but also as a symbol of Islam’s 
interaction with the contemporary world.
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3.2 Development of courses
CO.RE.IS originally started to develop training courses with the intention of 
meeting the needs of Italian Muslims who wished to learn more about the 
doctrine and the practice of their faith. It was only later that these courses 
developed into their present forms – a course for imams, and a series of 
lessons for the training of Muslim religious experts and theologians. These 
two courses are different in character: while the training of imams focuses 
on basic knowledge of the Islamic religious sciences and the Italian legal 
system, the course for theologians combines programmes of comparative 
religious studies, the history of Islamic civilization, the history of Western 
philosophical thought, and intercultural education. There are also optional 
courses in Classical Arabic and Italian for foreigners.
The imam-training course provides the students with an expanded 
knowledge of the Quran, Classical Arabic, Italian, and the contemporary 
social context, to improve their ability to lead the prayers and prepare 
sermons. CO.RE.IS believes that imams who have successfully completed 
its courses will be recognized by Muslims in Italy as reliable and insightful, 
combining the wealth and depth of the Islamic doctrine with the harmonious 
testimony of the religion while seeking to respect Italian society in every way. 
The imams are taught to deliver sermons in Italian, in addition to the Arabic-
language ritual prayers and Quranic and traditional formulae prescribed 
for the Friday prayers. The duties of an imam revolve in particular around 
the pillars of religion and the juridical rules that allow it to be practiced 
– in this case – in the contemporary Western world. This is a world where 
Muslim communities live as religious minorities in secularized societies. 
As religious minorities, Italian Muslims have particular identity heritages 
that they seek to protect from widespread prejudices and stereotypes. The 
imam must be able to guide the faithful to both spiritual devotion and a 
sense of responsibility towards the society in which they live, protect the 
community from the interference of foreign political forces and extremist 
influences, and ensure that the place of worship has the greatest possible 
transparency, reflecting the dignity that should characterize an Islamic 
religious space.
3.3 The role of imams
CO.RE.IS often advises imams to avoid connections with centres that have 
an ideological, extremist, or sectarian background in order to preserve what 
it considers the true and authentic character of the Italian mosques where 
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Muslim worshippers wish to meet. It is the intention of CO.RE.IS to present 
these places as models of widespread integration in the urban areas and as 
meeting places for Muslims that are free from internal political exploitation 
or the logic of marginalization. For this reason, imams must also be able 
to function as linguistic mediators – translating the tenets of the Islamic 
religion for the f irst generation of Muslim immigrants from various non-EU 
countries, while also being able to address these future European citizens 
in the language of the nation in which they live. It is important for young 
people to look up to the imam as not only a religious leader, but also a 
precious guide who can help them live their faith in a worthy and natural 
manner amidst fellow students or workers, and to learn to express this 
dignity in the context of their families.
While this does not necessarily mean that the imam must act as a social 
mediator, his spiritual and moral assistance can be decisive in bringing 
harmony to the relationship between faith, reason, culture, and human 
rights. The courses offered by CO.RE.IS are intended to eliminate the risk 
that the religion would be seen as incongruent with the contemporary Italian 
context. The imam cannot, by nature, represent a language, a culture, or a 
foreign nation, but he can be particularly effective as a faithful interpreter 
of not only the religious doctrine but also the way the doctrine is experi-
enced by the believers he addresses in his religious role in the context of 
the language and culture of the country in which he lives.
In the eyes of CO.RE.IS, imported imams, or those appointed by inter-
national Islamic organizations from abroad or religious institutions of 
foreign governments, represent an obstacle to the active participation of 
the faithful and ministers in the country’s activities. They are, in CO.RE.IS’s 
view, conditioned by a vision that is not fully compatible with how Italian 
Islam should look. Therefore, it is CO.RE.IS’s expectation that the new 
generation of Muslims born in Italy will not recognize these foreign imams 
as credible or useful guides for their lives in this country. To guarantee the 
effectiveness of this relationship, the CO.RE.IS courses do not follow a classic 
programme of study for either the language or doctrine as offered in many 
Muslim countries. Instead, the programmes start from the knowledge and 
experiences of each individual imam to allow him to expand his knowledge 
and assist the faithful in their spiritual orientation in their youth.
Themes such as life and death, study, work, love, and the family are 
particularly signif icant because they allow the imam to contextualize his 
doctrinal competence in a practical application. The CO.RE.IS courses for 
imams therefore focus on the following aspects: birth; the sacred value of 
human existence; the creation of the world and the responsibility of the 
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representatives of God in this world; the equal dignity of men and women; 
the pillars of the religion; education and the search for knowledge; the 
transmission of knowledge; the principles of the Islamic faith; the stories of 
the prophet in the Quran; inter-religious dialogue; earning one’s livelihood; 
family unity; civil and religious marriage; parents’ duties towards their 
children; Islamic identity and active participation in the prosperity of society; 
political responsibility; and universal ethical values.
Additionally, the imam attends courses on health regulations in hospitals 
regarding childbirth, and the treatment of patients and the deceased, gains 
basic knowledge on the procedures for the registration of births, marriages, 
divorces, and deaths, and learns about the current legislation regarding 
training or work contracts in Italy. He is also trained in matters related 
to education in both state and private schools, and the rules concerning 
the specif ic needs of Muslim children regarding both teaching and the 
preparation of food.
When answering questions of the faithful, imams must not only aim to 
keep in line with the principles of the religion, but also think of a way to 
avoid conflict between the religious needs of the believers and full respect 
of the Italian legal system and cultural heritage. This is the only possible 
way for ministers of the Muslim faith to contribute in a signif icant manner 
to the constructive and active participation of Muslims in society: through 
facilitating their civil, intercultural, and professional roles and by maintain-
ing and reviving the spiritual heritage of their religious identity. The imams 
are expected to be able to cooperate with state institutions of all levels and 
with Muslims in the process of integrating the Muslim community into the 
contemporary, religiously plural and culturally diverse Italian society. Thanks 
to the work of these imams, CO.RE.IS is confident that the new generations 
of Muslims in Italy will be able to both experience their religion in a serene 
manner and discover the meaning of citizenship in a democratic country.
The two-year course requires students to attend lessons for at least twenty 
hours a month, mainly on Fridays, to allow the future imams to continue 
other studies or work activities. There is also an additional pedagogical 
benefit to this way of working: the students can practice what they learn in 
the course while performing their everyday commitments. Another issue 
is the imam’s uncertainty after completing the training course. The lack 
of an off icial organization with the task of managing or coordinating the 
Islamic places of worship in Italy means that there is no guarantee that 
the graduates will be appointed as an imam by any of the local Muslim 
communities. More importantly, very few communities are in a position to 
employ a full-time imam to provide for the needs of the faithful.
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In the past few years, the f irst group of Italian Muslims have successfully 
completed the imam-training course. They have since made themselves 
available to carry out their functions on a voluntary basis on various occa-
sions in different parts of the country.
3.4 Further initiatives
The main obstacles to the continuity of the courses are a lack of f inancial 
and institutional support. CO.RE.IS is fully aware of this situation, and 
since 2005 has started collaborating with national universities and a 
network of national and international partners to empower these spe-
cialization courses. CO.RE.IS is not limiting itself to Muslims who wish 
to deepen their knowledge of the doctrine so as to carry out their func-
tions of religious leadership in a capable and dignif ied manner; instead, 
the courses are available for every man or woman who is interested, 
for whatever reason, in a theological grounding and questions of social 
responsibility regarding the diverse aspects of contemporary Italian Islam. 
In addition to imams, there is a need for people with Islamic training 
inside the community, and who are also able to use their expertise outside 
the community to deal with governmental institutions, professional 
associations, social solidarity organizations, school administrations, 
cultural mediation, hospitals, social work, ethnic communities, and 
other religions.
The outcome of the f irst two-year training course held at the Al-Wahid 
Mosque in Milan has been gathered in the book Inside the Mosque (Pal-
lavicini, 2007). Besides continuing the course at the Al-Wahid Mosque 
– which was later developed as the Mizan center project –, in the follow-
ing years a Master’s programme in Islamic and interreligious training 
was jointly proposed by CO.RE.IS, the Philosophy Department of the 
University of Genoa, and the Interreligious Studies Academy (ISA) in 
Milan. This programme requested f inancial support from the National 
Funds for the Integration of Immigrants. Later, the Institut des Hautes 
Etudes Islamiques (IHEI) based in Lyon successfully adopted the same 
training course in France.
To stimulate the further integration of Muslims in Italy, CO.RE.IS has 
introduced another two-year programme on interreligious theology and 
intercultural education. Besides maintaining the programme reserved for 
imams, lessons and seminars focusing on social sciences, politics, teaching 
methods, and liberal arts studies have been added. The following themes 
are dealt with in this programme:
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‒ The history of Islamic civilization; East and West; tradition and moder-
nity; orthodoxy and extremism.
‒ The Quran and the prophetic traditions: the sources of Islamic doctrine 
and the interpretations of the law schools.
‒ North-South exchanges and Euro-Mediterranean cooperation; conflict 
prevention and the peace process in the Middle East; Islam and jihad, 
the Islamic caliphate and Arab nationalism.
‒ Sacred science and Western culture; state and private schools in 
Italy; religious education and the history of religions; globalization 
and ghettoization.
‒ Avicenna and Averroes, Al-Ghazali and Ibn Arabi: metaphysics, 
theology, intellectuality, philosophy, and reason; comparisons with 
the philosophy of Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche; comparison with 
the Christian thought of Saints Bernard, Thomas Aquinas, and Au-
gustine; comparison with the works of Plato, Meister Eckhart, and 
Dante Alighieri.
‒ Dialogue between believers and non-believers; the oneness of God 
and the Abrahamic brotherhood; the encounter with Judaism 
and Christianity.
‒ Freedom of expression and the language of religious symbols; osten-
tation and religious freedom in European societies; human rights 
and islamophobia.
‒ The Italian constitution; immigration law and the European Union’s 
policy on integration; democracy, secularism, and pluralism; the Italian 
state and religious pluralism; the Concordat with the Catholic Church 
and the system of agreements; the Council for Italian Islam.
The aim of this programme, which is not restricted to Muslims, is to present 
a balanced synthesis between the Western cultural perspective and the 
Islamic one. The programme culminates in a master’s degree and is aimed 
at future managers of Islamic cultural centres in Europe, social workers 
and intercultural mediators, headmasters/-mistresses and school teachers 
at all levels, religious teachers, those involved in interreligious dialogue, 
trade union groups and representatives of the private sector, professionals 
and entrepreneurs working abroad, employees of the public administration 
engaged in international missions, journalists, and people interested in 
learning more about Italian Islam and its development as interpreted by 
European Muslim intellectuals.
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4 Conclusion
A series of agreements for cooperation with state universities and Christian 
theological institutes are currently being examined with the aim of develop-
ing academic synergies. It is hoped that this will produce research projects 
and experiences of interest from scientif ic, intercultural, interreligious, and 
international points of view. The new European citizenship cannot disregard 
the contribution of the sacred dimension and, in particular, that of the three 
Abrahamic monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. A 
thorough knowledge of religious values and the composition of the various 
revelations can enrich the common cultural heritage, become a vital element 
for f ighting phenomena such as antisemitism and islamophobia, and help in 
conflict prevention and resolution.3 Because Muslims are a religious minority 
in Italy, CO.RE.IS f inds it important to react, in a constructive manner, to 
the tendency towards adopting a sense of victimization, vindication, or 
provocation that characterizes some Muslims. CO.RE.IS believes that every 
spiritual, intellectual, and social form of expression of all qualif ied believers 
and honest citizens is an added value and a specif ic responsibility, and that 
it is not dependent on the number of representatives or on the number of 
days one has actually lived in Europe.4
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Abstract
This chapter describes the process of creating an imam-training pro-
gramme in Finland. Finnish Muslims and Finnish Muslim NGOs took 
the initiative to establish imam-training programmes after conducting a 
survey of imams’ religious and societal training needs. It turned out that 
the majority of imams in Finland have some Islamic training, but it is 
still very basic. The imams indicated that they would welcome a Finnish 
training programme that would enhance their ability to work in local 
mosque organizations. After the survey, a limited training programme 
has already started, aiming mainly at enhancing imams’ leadership and 
societal skills.
Keywords: Islam in Finland, imam training programmes, Tatars, Church 
State relations, NGO’s
1 Introduction
Finland is unique among the Nordic countries in being the home of a small 
Tatar Muslim community since the 1870s; Muslims have only settled in 
numbers in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden since the late 1960s. The situation 
in Finland has, however, changed since the beginning of the 1990s, when 
immigration began to grow rapidly, new Muslim communities began to 
emerge, and pan-European debates and policy developments concerning 
Islam also came onto the scene. Whereas the historical Tatar Muslim com-
munity had generally not relied on external help but had organized its affairs 
internally, there is now an increasing number of external influences being 
exerted on the new Muslim communities (Martikainen, 2013b).
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Muslims in Finland are at a crossroads, with different agendas being put 
forward by a variety of actors. Besides the issue of transnational Islamic 
movements, particularly in Europe, there are other key developments such 
as state interventions into Muslim affairs and interreligious activities with 
other religious traditions. As has been argued elsewhere (Martikainen, 2013b, 
2014), two significant features of many of the processes concerning Islam and 
Muslims in Finland are the new set of actors that have only recently become 
interested in Islam-related topics and the changing organizational environ-
ment in which this is taking place. There is little in this new environment 
that can be understood through the historical relations between church 
and state; instead, a new constellation of religious, civil society, and state 
organizations and networks has emerged. In the current academic literature 
similar developments have been noted in other Western countries with 
Muslim communities (e.g., Laurence, 2012).
The aim of this chapter is to present an outline of the ongoing efforts to 
establish imam-training programmes in Finland. The chapter starts with 
a brief history and overview of Muslims in Finland. Then it presents the 
background, methodology, and results of a study conducted on imams in 
Finland in 2012-2013. This is followed by a description of developments until 
the spring of 2017. The chapter ends with a discussion of the possibilities of 
an eventual imam-training programme in the Finnish context.
2 Muslims in Finland
The history of Finland shares much with its neighbouring countries of 
Sweden and Russia. Finland was an eastern province of Sweden from the 
thirteenth century to 1809, when it was annexed into the Russian Empire 
as a Grand Duchy. Finland remained part of Russia until 1917, when it 
declared independence in the aftermath of the October Revolution. Whereas 
there are only individual mentions of encounters with Muslims during 
the Swedish period, this changed during the Russian era. The Russian 
Empire was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, and its subjects were 
often dispersed across different regions through military, administrative, 
and commercial activities. The f irst Muslims to arrive in Finland in any 
great numbers came as part of the military. While historical records are 
incomplete, it is known that there were military imams serving soldiers 
from at least the 1830s onwards. It is also likely that they occasionally 
permitted Muslim civilians to participate in their religious activities (Halén 
and Martikainen, 2016).
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The f irst records of more permanently settled Muslim civilians date 
from the 1870s, when Tatar Muslims from the Nizhni Novgorod region 
southeast of Moscow started to seek commercial opportunities in the Grand 
Duchy. The community gradually grew and, though numbering only in the 
hundreds, spread to several Finnish localities during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century with the help of an evolving railway network. Initially 
military imams also served the Tatar community, but in time they started 
to take care of their own religious activities. The October Revolution and 
Finland’s subsequent independence from Russia in 1917, combined with 
the increasingly closed borders between Finland and Russia’s successor 
Soviet Union from the 1920s onwards, led to the end of Tatar immigration 
to the country. After Finland liberalized its religious policies in its new 
constitution (1919) and passed the Act of Religious Freedom (1922) that made 
it possible for any religion to apply for state recognition, the Tatar Muslim 
community applied for recognition and received it in 1925. Over the f irst 
half of the twentieth century the Tatars created an effective infrastructure 
for the support of their own identity and the transmission of their culture, 
the Islamic faith, and the Tatar language. Their imams came from either 
within their own ranks or abroad, particularly from Turkey and Tatarstan. 
Since the 1970s, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991, the Finnish Tatars have sought to revive their relationship with their 
ancestral roots (Halén and Martikainen, 2016). The main characteristics 
and developments of the Tatars have been well documented and there is 
a rich body of literature on them in both the Tatar and Finnish languages 
(Bedretdin, 2011).
Until the 1980s, the Tatars were the only Muslim group in Finland that had 
mosques and mosque associations. Arabs living in Finland as professionals, 
students, and the spouses of Finnish women founded the f irst non-Tatar 
Islamic society in 1986. The situation started to change quickly after the 
beginning of the 1990s, with the increase of immigration to Finland. The 
reasons for this increased immigration were mainly external to Finland, 
and were related to changes on the world political scene and post-Cold War 
migration flows. The main migration flow has been that of UNHCR-quota 
refugees and asylum seekers, and associated family reunif ications. To a 
lesser degree, international students, marriage migrants, and professionals 
have also played a role in the growth of Muslims in Finland, as have conver-
sions. Tatars, who were the dominant Muslim group until the 1980s, are 
today a small minority of some 600 individuals compared to the estimated 
60,000-65,000 Muslims living in the country in the early 2010s (Pauha and 
Martikainen, 2014).
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Thus the majority of Muslims in Finland are f irst-generation migrants, 
often with a refugee background, who arrived during the 1990s and 2000s, 
and increasingly their Finland-born children, the second generation. The 
first non-Tatar mosque community – the Islamic Society of Finland (Suomen 
Islamilainen Yhdyskunta) – was founded in 1986; today there is a nationwide 
network of some sixty mosque associations, and many other Islamic associa-
tions that cater for the religious needs of the Finnish Muslim population. 
The most notable representative association, the Islamic Council of Finland 
(Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto), was founded in 2006 as an umbrella organi-
zation to represent a collective Muslim voice (Pauha and Martikainen, 2014).
The Finnish Muslim population is diverse in its ethnic composition. The 
largest group is Somalis, who numbered 16,000 in 2013; Arabs (mainly from 
Iraq), Kurds, Turks, Kosovo Albanians, Iranians, and Bosnians all have con-
stituencies in the thousands. As with immigrants in general, the majority of 
Finland’s Muslim population lives in the Helsinki metropolitan area and in a 
few larger cities. The population has a youthful demographic structure and 
higher than average fertility, which in combination with continuing immigra-
tion implies that their share of the total Finnish population will gradually 
grow. People of Muslim background constituted a little more than 1 per cent of 
the Finnish population of 5.5 million in 2013 (Pauha and Martikainen, 2014).
Issues related to the growing presence of Muslims in Finland have emerged 
in the national political arena in the 2010s to a greater degree, as there has 
been new political mobilization against the rise in immigration and the related 
increase in cultural and religious diversity. In the parliamentary elections of 
2011, several candidates known for having anti-Islamic views, particularly 
candidates from the ranks of the Perussuomalaiset (the Finns Party, also 
known as the ‘True Finns’), were elected to the Finnish parliament. After the 
parliamentary elections of 2015, the Finns Party is also included in the coalition 
government. In the Nordic context, Islam is still a relatively minor political 
issue, but due to some Finnish Muslims having joined the ranks of Islamic State 
in the conflict in Syria it is becoming increasingly controversial (Pauha, 2015).
3 The imam-training survey
The Finnish civil society organization Kulttuuri- ja uskontofoorumi FOKUS 
(Forum for Culture and Religion, FOKUS),1 conducted a study of imams 
1 FOKUS is an ecumenical civil society organization that supports and promotes peaceful 
dialogue between religions and cultures by providing information and creating open forums for 
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in Finland from June 2012 to March 2013 in cooperation with two Muslim 
umbrella organizations, Visioforum and the Finnish Muslim Union. The 
results of the study were published as a report Imaamit Suomessa: Imaa-
mikoulutusselvitys 2013 (Imams in Finland: Imam Training Report 2013) in 
June 2013 (Latvio, Mustonen, and Rantakari, 2013). The aim of the report 
was to assess the educational background of imams working in Finland and 
their needs for further training. The study was based on a questionnaire and 
personal interviews conducted with the chairpersons of mosque associations 
and imams in these associations. To provide a background to the public 
debate, the report also included information about the role of imams and 
their education in some Muslim and European countries. The report was 
the f irst stage of a project aiming to improve imams’ vocational skills and 
functioning in Finnish society. As the report has been published only in 
Finnish and is therefore not accessible to international readers, the key 
content of the report is summarized in this chapter.
3.1 Background
The immigration of Muslims is a signif icant aspect of the growing religious 
diversity in Finland over the past three decades. Together with the increasing 
politicization of certain religious questions that are often, but not only, 
related to Islam, has made the Finnish government, public authorities, and 
other signif icant actors more attentive to religious questions (Martikainen, 
2013b). The challenges posed by migrant religious groups have been seen 
in Finland in the light of both pan-European debates on religion and im-
migration and national experiences. This has led to the gradually increasing 
recognition of the particular needs of migrant religious communities. One 
particular initiative worthy of mention is the Dialogue for Integration: the 
Engaging Religious Communities (DIRECT) project, which was run by the 
Helsinki Regional Off ice of the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM), an intergovernmental body, in 2010-2011. The DIRECT project mapped 
out research on the role of religion in migrant integration; it also conducted 
brief seminars for religious leaders, and legitimated a religion-specif ic focus 
on immigrant integration. It was one of the several networks that brought 
ecumenical and interfaith encounters via discussions, exhibitions, art, and publications. It has 
pursued contacts and cooperation with international organizations such as Religions for Peace, 
the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), and the Anna Lindh Foundation. FOKUS 
coordinates a network of actors that jointly organize the celebrations of UN World Interfaith 
Harmony Week in Finland. For more information on FOKUS, see http://www.kulttuurifoorumi.f i.
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together different actors in the f ield, such as academics, civil servants, and 
the representatives of religious organizations in Finland (Martikainen, 
2013a). According to the DIRECT project report, religion may play a positive 
role in the integration of immigrants. Religious communities and societies 
guide and help immigrants in matters such as employment, education, 
civil rights, language training, the schooling of children, and family life. 
Counselling and guidance that is available immediately on arrival in the 
new home country may promote a sense of belonging and the assumption 
of an active role as a citizen. The recommendations of the report include 
recognizing migrant religious communities as integration facilitators by 
providing them with political and institutional visibility and offering them 
better resources for information-sharing, referral, and capacity-building 
services (IOM, 2011).
In addition to such external pressures, in the interviews conducted for the 
report many Finnish Muslims also expressed their concern about securing 
well-trained imams and other religious personnel who are also familiar with 
the Finnish societal circumstances and legislation. Most of the imams are 
self-taught and work in challenging multilingual and multicultural com-
munities. They are often recent immigrants themselves with only limited 
knowledge of Finnish society and culture. Finnish Muslims, just like the 
members of other religious communities, aspire to a wide variety of high-
quality religious services that would enable them to deal with challenges 
arising in their social context. There have also been appeals in the media for 
imam-training programmes from political and religious leaders, who argue 
that a good command of the Finnish language and a working knowledge of 
the regulations of the surrounding society – in addition to those of one’s own 
religious tradition – are also necessary from the point of view of integration 
and good ethnic relations. Moreover, as the state-sponsored training of 
elementary and secondary schoolteachers of Islam was already initiated 
by the University of Helsinki in 2007 (see Sakaranaho and Martikainen, 
2015), having a publicly recognized imam-training programme in Finland 
also seemed plausible and possible.
The survey itself was the result of two seminars held in Helsinki in 2011 
and 2012 during the United Nations World Interfaith Harmony Week.2 
These seminars discussed the situation of Muslim communities in Finland 
and the role and education of imams in both the European and Finnish 
contexts. The need for a comprehensive survey among Finnish mosque as-
sociations was acknowledged during the second seminar, since there was no 
2 http://www.worldinterfaithharmonyweek.com.
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systematic information available on the educational background of Finnish 
imams or on their needs for supplementary training. After consultations 
with different organizations it was decided that FOKUS would undertake 
the study in cooperation with the Finnish Muslim Union and Visioforum. 
The project received f inancial support from the Anna Lindh Foundation3 
and was supervised by a steering group.4 Riitta Latvio from FOKUS was 
commissioned to conduct the empirical study and draft the report.
The starting point of the project was to look into the need for an imam-
training programme in Finland as well as its various aspects and possible 
implementation. The emphasis was on charting the present situation and 
the needs and wants of mosque associations, and on how these requirements 
might be fulf illed even in the short term. In this task the f irst step was to 
gather information about the role of the imam in these associations, their 
responsibilities with regard to co-believers and society in general, and the 
educational background of the people who act as imams in present-day 
Finland. Another aim was to raise public awareness of what being an imam 
means in general and in Finland in particular. Finally, the project strove 
to initiate a discussion about training Muslim faith workers in Finland to 
not only improve their competence in answering the needs of their faith 
community, but also develop their communication resources and skills for 
engaging in dialogue with the surrounding society.
3.2 The survey
The main research questions in the imam survey were: How are imams 
trained elsewhere in Europe and in Muslim-majority countries? What kind 
of training do the imams who are active in Finland have, and where did 
they obtain it? Do they require more training, for example more in-depth 
3 This was the Common Project Action ‘Do We Need Imam Training in Finland?’ (2012-2013) 
of the Finnish Anna Lindh Network.
4 The steering group was chaired by Ambassador Ilari Rantakari (Chairman of FOKUS and 
Finland’s UNAOC Focal Point), with representatives from the Finnish Muslim associations 
Abdessalam Jardi (the Finnish Muslim Union) and Pia Jardi (Visioforum and the Islamic Council 
in Finland); two imams (Tariq al Hidaya Imam Walid Hammoud and Imam Ramil Belyaev from 
the Finnish Islamic Congregation); two experts on education, Professor Tuula Sakaranaho 
(University of Helsinki) and Pekka Iivonen (the Finnish National Board of Education); and 
the executive director of FOKUS, Mrs. Satu Mustonen. This steering group was responsible for 
informing the Muslim community about the survey and providing contact information for the 
associations. It also commented on the research plan, questionnaire, and interview questions, 
the seminar preparations, and the draft of the report as well as the list of consulted authorities, 
organizations, and scholars.
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theological study of Islam or more knowledge about Finnish culture, lan-
guage, and society? If so, how could imam training be feasibly arranged in 
Finland? The study was carried out among the associations that have either 
registered as religious Muslim associations in Finland or have a mosque or 
prayer house at their disposal, around 60 in all in 2012.
The f irst stage of the project involved the development of a question-
naire that was sent to both the chairs of the mosque associations and their 
imams. The chairs were asked to provide background information about 
the association, such as its year of foundation, the size of its membership, 
and how many imams it had; what kind of training the imams had had 
in the past; and whether the association wanted to become involved in 
developing imam training in Finland. In subsequent interviews with the 
chairs of the Muslim organizations, the current practices of recruiting and 
educating imams were further surveyed, including the chairs’ views about 
the kind of education that would best cater to the needs of their communi-
ties. The purpose was to gather views on the present situation and future 
needs, particularly about arranging basic or supplementary imam-training 
programmes in Finland. The questionnaire for imams comprised questions 
about the responsibilities and role of imams in Finnish Muslim societies, 
the current levels of education – both religious and secular – of the imams, 
their experience as imams both in Finland and elsewhere, their language 
skills in Finnish, their labour market status, the needs of the associations, 
and the views of the imams themselves about what kind of training would 
best serve them and their associations. Thirteen chairpersons answered 
the questionnaire and f ifteen chairs were interviewed, representing in 
all nineteen different mosque associations as some chairs participated 
both in the questionnaire and interview. Twenty-two imams answered the 
questionnaire, representing nineteen different mosque associations. Some 
questionnaires were not answered in full. Information was obtained from 
twenty (i.e., one-third) of the Finnish mosque associations.
3.3 Results of the survey
Of the mosque associations that participated in the survey, four had an 
educated and experienced imam from the time of the association’s foun-
dation, but most (at least ten out of nineteen) mosque associations have 
a history of using self-taught imams. Additionally, mosque associations 
indicated a practice of calling trained visiting imams from Muslim countries 
for teaching, consultation, and to conduct ceremonies, especially during 
Ramadan. Five of the mosque associations reported that it had not been 
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as much a question of choosing an imam as of persuading those with the 
greatest proficiency in the Arabic language and thorough knowledge of Islam 
to f ill the role. Later on, two of these f ive mosque associations had been 
able to choose an imam with some education from among the youngsters 
who had gone to study abroad in Islamic countries.
Seven of the interviewed chairpersons made clear that education and 
knowledge of the Islamic sciences alone are not suff icient criteria for being 
elected as an imam in their community: the individual’s personality, views, 
and conduct also matter. They preferred imams with strong morals and 
devotion to Islam and with moderate values, rather than either extremely 
conservative or liberal ones.
With regard to the required level of knowledge of Islam, the chairs 
prioritized a good knowledge of the Quran and Islamic law. The chairs 
commonly held that where Islamic and Finnish law were in conflict, imams 
should teach the members of the faith to live according to the regulations 
of the Finnish legal system.
Of the imams that participated in the survey, f ive had worked as an imam 
elsewhere before coming to Finland. Some had attended courses given by 
visiting imams and scholars in the Finnish mosques (six out of nineteen), but 
did not have a coherent religious training. Twelve imams claimed that they 
had the requisite educational training to work as an imam, but of those two 
stated that they had acquired that training by participating in lectures in 
their own mosque. Three answered that they did not have proper training, 
but had attended some courses offered by their mosque and seminars in 
Finland or abroad, or had taken correspondence courses. Hence most of 
the imams (ten out of nineteen) either did not have a coherent theological 
training or were self-taught. One third had an academic education in one 
f ield or another, and some had acquired this education in Finland.
Ten of the imams had lived and worked as an imam in Finland for over 
ten years. The majority (fourteen) had another occupation to live on; four 
were full-time students. All but one imam worked unpaid and irregular 
hours for the mosque – some for only a couple of hours, but most (thirteen) 
for over twenty hours per week. Twenty of the imams thought they would 
be able to f ind some free time to attend a training programme, but because 
of other commitments would not be able to engage in full-time study.
Only two imams expressed doubts about a possible Finnish imam-training 
programme, of whom one suspected that qualif ied teachers could not be 
found; the rest liked the idea. The most popular topics for possible sup-
plementary training programmes were academic Islamic studies and Finnish 
law (74 per cent), followed by courses in Finnish history and society, family 
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consultation, and leadership training (68 per cent). They also prioritized 
studies in Finnish and communication skills (63 per cent), for instance to 
be able to deliver a khuṭba (Friday sermon) in Finnish or to better represent 
their community in public. Nearly all (nineteen) asked for the courses to be 
organized by a tertiary education provider. It was suggested that concerns 
about the legitimacy of the training in the eyes of future generations could 
be resolved by using imported scholars, especially if Muslims themselves 
chose them. Three imams felt that the tasks performed by an imam towards 
his brethren should not be remunerated, because being an imam is not 
seen as a job, but as an act of devotion, religious duty, and service to God. 
However, two others emphasized that it should be a position in which it 
was possible to earn a living for oneself and one’s family, and which would 
thus be a full-time appointment.
Of the interviewed chairpersons, all but two expressed a moderate 
measure of acceptance of the idea of organizing imam-training programmes 
in Finland. All of the chairs thought that they could participate in the 
development of a Finnish supplementary training programmes. At the same 
time, the majority held that the so-called Islamic sciences should also be 
studied, or even entirely acquired, abroad.
In conclusion, the results of the study show that the surveyed mosque as-
sociations would prefer fully trained and qualif ied imams, and they welcome 
the idea of educational programmes for imams in Finland. A functioning 
religious community needs good spiritual leaders, teachers, and counsellors. 
If the Muslim community is to preserve and continue its practices, there 
needs to be a suff icient number of people trained in Islamic doctrine, law, 
and tradition who are able to transmit these to the Muslim community 
and the generations to come. The surveyed mosque associations attached 
particular importance to this last aspect of the education. Further, the 
survey displayed nearly as much demand for training in Finnish language, 
society, culture, and law as training in Islamic subjects.
3.4 Models for imam-training programmes
The study also looked into existing imam-training programmes in Europe 
and some Muslim-majority countries and gathered experiences by network-
ing with European experts.5 Examples from Egypt, Iran, Morocco, and Turkey 
5 Networking with European experts included participation in an international evaluation 
seminar of the Dutch imam-training programme at the Inholland University of Applied Sciences 
in Amsterdam, as well as direct contacts with universities that provide imam training and with 
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were briefly described, noting for instance that there are few educational 
programmes in Muslim countries dedicated to educating imams only; 
instead, the most commonly recommended forms of education for imams are 
Islamic schools and universities, which offer a wide range of Islamic studies. 
Of the students who graduate with a degree in Islamic studies, only a few 
end up serving as imams; others take up positions teaching Islam in private 
or public schools, work within government departments of religious affairs, 
or advance to become scholars or muftis. A deep knowledge of Islam and 
classical Arabic is a requirement for Islamic studies at the university level in 
Muslim countries. In several Muslim countries there are both state-owned 
and independent mosques, and the functions and requirements for imams 
at each kind of mosque can vary greatly. The state may specify the selection 
criteria for imams in the state mosques, while independent mosques can 
define their own criteria when recruiting an imam. In Turkey and Morocco, 
the state has developed specif ic programmes for educating imams (see 
Borrillo and Hashas, Part I).
Five European countries were chosen as examples of different approaches 
to providing imam training: state-organized multi-faith training for religious 
leaders in Norway; state-organized non-theological supplementary train-
ing for imams in Sweden and Germany; state-organized vocational and 
theological imam training in the Netherlands; and private imam training in 
Islamic seminars with accreditation in universities in the United Kingdom.
Norway. Instead of religion-specif ic programmes, Norway has opted for a 
multi-faith training programme for immigrant religious leaders with the aim 
of offering a more thorough knowledge of Norwegian society and improving 
their ability to function within it. The training programme is called Being a 
Religious Leader in Norwegian Society,6 and it was designed and launched in 
2007 by the Faculty of Theology of the University of Oslo. Representatives of 
various faith communities, the Islamic Council, the Buddhist Association, 
the Baptist Association, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Council for 
scholars who have worked on the topic. We wish to thank Mark Chalîl Bodenstein, Ron Geaves, 
Karin Klausing, Göran Larsson, Oddbjørn Leirvik, Johan Meulemann, Rimke van der Veer, and 
Kari Vitikainen for helpful comments and for providing research and other material on European 
imam training. Requests for cooperation with education providers were sent to those countries 
who are represented by embassies in Finland, i.e., Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and 
Tunisia, to gather information about imam training in Islamic or Muslim-majority countries. 
The countries included in the report are those that responded to this request. In addition, the 
imam training systems of Turkey and Iran were reported through the help of a colleague, Mr. 
Kari Vitikainen.
6 http://www.tf.uio.no/studier/evu/kurs/relleder/english.
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Religious and Life Stance Communities were directly involved in the planning 
process, at the end of which each faith community was granted a quota and 
asked to nominate candidates for the f irst round of the programme.
The training programme takes one-and-a-half years to complete and con-
sists of three modules: (1) Religion, Norwegian legislation, and international 
human rights; (2) Moral and religious counselling; and (3) Values, religious 
plurality, and interreligious dialogue. Among the participants, the largest 
groups were Muslim leaders, most of them imams, and Christian clergy from 
different denominations. The Norwegian Islamic Council recruits the Muslim 
participants. The feedback from students has been positive. The Norwegian 
model is appealing because it treats all of the minority religions equally and 
as such does not involve the stigmatization of any single religious group 
through assignment of the training. It also includes many of the subjects 
that were requested by the Finnish imams in the survey, although it does 
not provide the required training in the Islamic sciences.
Sweden. In 2008-2009, the Swedish government commissioned an enquiry 
on the question of a government-supported training programme for imams 
(Larsson, 2009). The enquiry concluded that the Swedish state should not 
support a specif ic training programme for imams. The chief impediment 
was that the Swedish state should be confessionally neutral, and therefore a 
specif ic training programme should not be required for any single religious 
group. Furthermore, it was argued that a training programme targeted 
at imams only might signal that Muslims present a problem for Swedish 
society and need training more than other religious groups. Other reasons 
for turning down imam-training programmes arose from the results of 
the survey: imams were not asking for a specif ic programme for religious 
training, but instead mainly for education about tackling social issues and 
to acquire language skills. There were also misgivings about imams being 
able to agree on any one imam training programme that would be capable 
of uniting all branches of Islam (Larsson, 2014).
Consequently the Swedish government has not provided any theological 
training programme for imams,7 although they may avail themselves of 
already-existing government language training for immigrants. Addition-
ally, folk high schools (colleges) in Sjövik and Kista have provided some 
supplementary training for imams.8 The Ibn Rushd Educational Association9 
7 This, however, is no longer the case, since Sweden launched a state-funded one-year 
programme in Islamic theology and leadership in Kista Folk High School in the autumn of 2016.
8 http://www.sjovik.eu/ and http://kistafolkhogskola.se.
9 http://www.ibnrushd.se.
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also offers courses on Islam in its curriculum. Recently, the Swedish Com-
mission for Government Support for Faith Communities has started short 
multi-faith leadership courses focusing on social studies, the history of 
religious communities in Sweden, family law, and youth studies.10 According 
to Göran Larsson, most of the Muslim leaders were content with the decision 
and considered a Swedish imam training programme undesirable (Larsson, 
2014). In a personal communication with the author of this chapter, Larsson 
recommended that, should Swedish (and Finnish) Muslims like to set up a 
private institution for the training of their leaders, the training of priests 
in the Swedish free churches might present a viable organizational model. 
Implementation of that option is still quite a distant prospect, considering 
the size and economic resources of the Finnish Muslim community (see 
Larsson, Part I).
Germany. In Germany, Islam – unlike Christianity and Judaism – has not 
yet achieved the status of ‘a public law corporation’, which would allow for 
numerous benefits including the teaching of its theology in state-funded 
universities. The confessional teaching of religion is, however, a legally 
guaranteed right in Germany and training programmes for teachers of Islam 
have been instituted in many universities since 2000 onwards. In 2010, the 
University of Osnabrück started a supplementary training programme for 
imams and spiritual advisers that included studies in German language, 
society, history, politics, and law, as well as community pedagogy, im-
migration sociology, and vocational skills for faith workers.11 In 2010 and 
2011, the German Ministry of Education chose four new universities to 
host a department or institute for Islamic theology: Münster/Osnabrück, 
Tübingen, Frankfurt/Giessen, and Nürnberg/Erlangen. It is hoped that these 
new forms of training will fulf il the training needs of German Muslims. The 
new theological programmes have been very successful, but imam training 
has still not been professionalized.
The Netherlands. In the Netherlands, where there is quite a large (5 
per cent) Muslim minority, the government initiated an imam-training 
programme with the aim to train imams who can speak both Arabic and 
Dutch and can take part in interreligious dialogue, working as a bridge 
between the Muslim community and Dutch society as a whole (Boender, 
2013). The Inholland Imam/Islamic Spiritual Worker Training Programme 
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Inholland University of Applied Sciences, several mosque umbrella organiza-
tions (the Milli Görus ‘National Vision’ Turkish diaspora organization, the 
Netherlands Islamic Federation (NIF), The Islamic Centre Foundation in 
The Netherlands (SICN), the Union of Moroccan Muslim Organizations in 
the Netherlands (UMMON), and the World Islamic Mission (WIM)), and, in 
the background, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. The study 
programme contained the Islamic religious sciences such as the study of 
the Quran, hadith, and f iqh, units relating to contemporary Western and, 
in particular, Dutch society, religion and modern society, monotheistic 
religions and interreligious dialogue, multicultural society and diversity, 
and training in various professional skills such as communication skills 
and pastoral counselling. Students could choose between three graduation 
specializations: imam, Islamic spiritual worker, or Islamic pedagogical 
worker (Meuleman, 2012).
This programme faced challenges related to questions of legitimacy, 
imam training in a secular context, and the diversity of Dutch society. 
The most serious question concerned how to combine traditional Islamic 
sciences with a Western academic educational concept. The programme’s 
adopted background model of Christian theological training was eventually 
questioned by both students and teachers. Some of the students were also 
not accustomed to reading and producing academic texts; in consequence, 
students who had expected confessional studies became demotivated and 
dropped out of the programme. It was also felt that a period of 3-4 years 
was not suff icient for learning traditional Islamic sciences as well as other 
subjects. The graduates had diff iculties f inding work: having been taught 
allegedly by the ‘orientalists’, mosque associations would not readily accept 
them, while Dutch social praxis demanded multi-religious workers or general 
spiritual workers only (Boender, 2013).
The international evaluators of the programme felt that partnership with 
Muslim organizations was not suff icient, and that Inholland University of 
Applied Sciences should prioritize certain subjects, outsource Islamic studies 
to Muslim organizations, and introduce branded lectures by respected 
Muslim scholars as visiting lecturers. For the better employability of the 
students, major and minor degrees (e.g., major in law and minor in Islamic 
studies) were also suggested. The programme stopped taking in new students 
after 2013. The experiences of the Dutch programme make it clear that the 
training of imams in a European context should not be based on pre-existing 
Christian models.
United Kingdom. Muslim faith leadership training in the United Kingdom 
is provided by more than thirty private Darul Uloom (a form of traditional 
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Islamic school in India; see Ali, Part II) seminars and institutes, which 
follow a curriculum of manqūlāt (‘traditional Islamic religious sciences’) 
and macqūlāt (‘rational sciences’). The degree usually also includes study 
abroad. These seminars have been criticized for being conservative and 
hindered by strategies of isolation, not being able to cope with the require-
ments of modern secular British society, and being split along ethnic and 
theological divisions. The study of theological and spiritual issues should 
be combined with courses on Islamic pastoral care and counselling and 
courses for contextualizing Islam in contemporary society (Geaves, 2008). 
However, many of the seminars are now engaging in partnerships with 
the British higher education system, leading to the accreditation of their 
qualif ications.12 An interesting development has been the creation of British 
Muslim chaplaincy roles in public sector institutions such as hospitals, 
prisons, universities, and the armed forces, and accordingly the creation of 
chaplaincy-training programmes (Gilliat-Ray and Ali, 2013; see Ali, Part II).
In comparison with the United Kingdom, the Finnish Muslim community 
is small and on its own does not have sufficient economic resources to set up 
private institutes for imam-training programmes. The Muslim population 
in the United Kingdom is large and long established, but it is split along 
several ethnic and theological divisions, such as the Deobandi and Berelvi 
Muslims (both of South Asian origin). This also relates to one of the concerns 
voiced by Finnish Muslim leaders: they would like to avoid the splitting of 
the Finnish Muslim community along ethnic lines as a result of the creation 
of separate training institutes for different ethnic groups sponsored by their 
countries of origin.
To conclude: European imam training programmes, whether organized 
by the private or public sector, by the Muslim community itself, or as part 
of the national system of education, all face challenges of credibility and 
legitimacy from either within the Muslim community or the authorities – or 
both –, as well as a lack of career opportunities for the students; all of these 
factors indicate a lack of sustainability. Countries with old or well-established 
Muslim minorities, such as the United Kingdom, usually have in-community 
training, but this training often reflects the views of a particular ethnic or 
political group or religious sect, and is not accepted by the wider Muslim 
community. Many Muslim scholars still choose to educate themselves in 
12 Examples: The Markf ield Institute of Higher Education, Leicestershire, http://www.mihe.
org.uk/mihe/index.php; The Muslim College, London, http://www.muslimcollege.ac.uk/; The 
Islamic College, London, http://www.islamic-college.ac.uk/ (Larsson, 2009).
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Muslim-majority countries, and many Muslim organizations continue to 
recruit their imams from those countries.
4 Ongoing preparations for imam-training programmes in 
Finland
After completion of the survey, a follow-up project involving the same 
partners looked into the different options available for developing an imam-
training programme in Finland. A comprehensive training programme 
leading to a degree was discussed with the representatives of universities 
in Finland, but that would be a long-term project requiring years of study 
and planning. A viable short-term option is the planning of supplementary 
training for imams and other Islamic faith workers. The approach of this 
follow-up project has been to plan and prepare for two separate supplemen-
tary training programmes: f irst, a non-denominational training programme 
concerning the Finnish and European legislative, cultural, and social context 
in relation to Muslim faith and culture; and second, religious training in 
the Islamic sciences and spiritual guidance.
The non-denominational component of the supplementary training would 
comprise a basic knowledge of Finnish history, its social service systems, 
the role and functioning of the civil society sector, and the Finnish way of 
life. Study modules would also include tuition in the Finnish language and 
communication skills, as well as mediation skills, religious counseling, and 
leadership training. Finnish legislation and international agreements and 
instruments would constitute a module of its own.
In planning the religious element of the supplementary training there is a 
need for a dialogue within the Muslim community to learn the common wishes 
and needs of its members. It is also important to take into account the diversity 
of the Muslim community. With the help of international experts in the 
Islamic sciences, this module’s contents could be customized according to the 
varying needs of the participants. Some modules could also be implemented 
outside of Finland. Special attention would be given to women, both as part 
of the Muslim community and as spiritual workers in Muslim societies (i.e., 
as murshidāt, see Borrillo, Part I). The aim of the training would be to enable 
them to work as guides and educators in their respective communities.
Between 2013 and 2015, work was also done to identify possible education 
providers and other cooperating partners, including partnerships with 
universities in Muslim and European countries. These negotiations led to 
a collaboration with the Helsinki Diaconia College and the moulding of 
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the non-denominational part of the supplementary imam training into 
a pilot leadership-training programme for Muslim faith workers that is 
open to both men and women. Resourcing has been a critical issue and 
has to some extent delayed the planning and preparations for this training 
programme, but its implementation got underway when some funding for 
the non-denominational part of the training was secured from the Finnish 
Ministry of Education in autumn 2015.
The pilot programme was carried out in the Helsinki Diaconia College 
during 2016. The goals for the training were to learn about the basic values 
on which Finnish society, culture, and legislation rest, to strengthen students’ 
knowledge of Finnish cultural practices, and to acquire skills in social, religious, 
and cultural dialogue and civil society involvement and thus support religious 
leadership in the Finnish milieu. The nine-month course comprised short 
periods of tuition (altogether fifteen days) with independent work through web 
modules, facilitated by tutoring. The contents of the training corresponded 
with the plan described above, except for the Finnish language classes. Study-
ing through the Finnish language was a challenge to some of the students, 
but their participation was facilitated by enhanced tutoring and allowing the 
occasional use of English and Arabic in course assignments. Of the twenty 
participants enrolled in the course – imams, chairpersons, and active members 
of mosque societies – ten finished the course, including three women.13
The feedback from the students that f inished the course was positive; they 
felt that they could utilize the information and skills gained from the course 
in their work in the Muslim associations. Of the course contents, information 
about the structure and service systems of the Finnish society, project 
planning and other organizational activities, management, and conflict 
resolution were particularly appreciated. The course also strengthened 
the networks of future Muslim leaders and their involvement in Finnish 
society – new skills were appropriated, for example through the development 
of meeting techniques; and two project ideas formed during the course were 
turned into concrete partnerships and project applications. State funding 
from the Ministry of Education and Culture allowed the implementation 
of the pilot leadership-training programme, but the continuation of the 
course is an open question. In the project report, Helsinki Diaconia College 
13 The course participants were quite heterogeneous in terms of their academic, IT, and language 
skills. Some participants also faced problems in getting time off from their work or family to 
attend the training. In the feedback, the participants requested more precise information during 
the course recruitment process on the nature, contents, and requirements for the course. Testing 
of the applicants was also suggested, as some would have benef ited from a pre-course to update 
their skills.
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recommends turning the course into a multi-faith leadership-training 
programme in the future. Negotiations carried out with Morocco between 
2013 and 2015 regarding the religious part of the proposed supplementary 
training have not born fruit.
5 Discussion
The study and planning process concerning initiating a programme of 
imam training in Finland clearly illustrates how a number of religious and 
civil society organizations have jointly created a platform for empower-
ing Finnish Muslims through leadership education. Whereas the already 
well-established religious traditions and their various denominations, 
including the Tatar Muslims, have had effective structures of their own 
for the education and training of their religious leaders for a long time, the 
new Muslim communities in Finland do not have any such infrastructure 
to rely on. As the Finnish State, which otherwise f inances and regulates 
many educational facilities in Finland, has not so far taken an active stance 
towards providing educational opportunities for Islamic education, there 
is a demand for other actors to f ill the void.
The initiative has instead been taken up by an active civil society or-
ganization, FOKUS, which has fostered cooperation with selected Muslim 
organizations and individuals. A key problem has been finding the resources 
and a suitable format for the training. While the process is evolving rather 
slowly, FOKUS has nevertheless been able to conduct the preparatory work 
that is necessary for the eventual establishment of such a programme. 
FOKUS possesses a good understanding of how to effectively progress ideas 
in the context of an administrative environment that requires funding 
applications, networking, and long-term planning. It also has good societal 
networks, and its key individuals have valuable connections with the public 
administration that make the gradual development of their plan possible.
Without the support of FOKUS, or another organization with similar 
willingness to help, it would be diff icult to f ind the right channels along 
which to proceed. Whereas the interests of the two different parties – Muslim 
associations and FOKUS – diverge to some extent, they share the common 
conviction that an imam-training programme would be beneficial for the 
Muslim community and for Finnish society at large. It remains to be seen 
how this initiative will continue to unfold, as it has to some extent been 
eclipsed by the plans for a grand mosque in Helsinki, but it is certain that in 
efforTs To esTabLish an imam-Training programme in finLand 429
the process new networks and alliances will be created that may eventually 
be used in other, as yet unforeseen contexts.
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